HOLLAND AND THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2675, 22 January 1916, Page 2

HOLLAND AND THE WAR

ATTITUDE OF THE DUTCH FIRST HAND INFORMATION £% Frederick Stubbs, F.R.G.S.] Whilst sojourning in Holland a few years ago I was fortunate enough to make tne acquaintance of a number of JUiglish-speaking Dutchmen. Some I met '.vmlst officiating at the ancient lresbytenan Church in Amsterdam, wiiere there is an intelligent and influential congregation of mixed descent, not a few of whom claim as ancestors those devout Scotchmen, who Eought religious liberty in Holland during the time of the worthless Stuarts. Others I met at The Hague, at Rotterdam, at Leyden, Utrecht, etc. In common with most travelled Englishmen, 1 saw the present conflict coming, though one always hoped it would not come in one's own time, and therefore made it my business to ascertain as far as possible tho sentiments cf the Dutch people in regard to a possible conflict between Germany and England. In the present article the Autralasian reader is furnished with the result. Tho Dutch, as the reader -will know, are but a small people, some 6,300,000 .in number, inhabiting that portion of the Low Countries, 12,648 square miles in extent, now known as Holland or the Netherlands. . They are a peace-loving nation, industrious, orderly, unaggressive, democratic. But they also love liberty, and are extremely jealous of their independence. . It is this that makes one hopeful—l do not say confident—that before the close of tho present war they will come in on the side of the. Allies. . Feeling Towards England. But first let mo say plainly that if they do so it will not be out of any particular love for England. They respect England, and admire her enterprise gild achievements, especially in the way ()f colonisation. They respect her fighting qualities and her prowess on the sea, which cost tho Dutch so dearly during the 17t-h and 18th centuries. They recognise that for more than 100 years the British liavo been good neighbours and valuable customers. But they do not love her. Over and over again when in Holland have I pointed out England's good qualities—her kindred passion for liberty and order; her services to the Low Countries t and to the Protestant cause in the time of Queen Elizabeth and Louis XIV; her brave and successful stand against Napoleon when the liberties of Europe seemed lost; her respect for the interests of Holland in the East Indies. All these things are admitted, but there is'one thing that Hollanders seem incapable of either forgetting or forgivlnSj a "d that is tho defeats which they suffered at our hands in the 17th and 18th centuries. They declare with .some bitterness, and a good deal of truth that they owe their downfall 'as a great naval and colonising Power to Great Britain. It ivas, of course,' the fortune of war, and it was not always the Dutch fleets that "tvere uefeated. On one" memorable occasion a Dutch fleet sailed right up the Thames. The splendid Art Gallery at Amsterdam ia full of great canvases representing defeats of the English' by the Dutch, lfiey admit that if Holland had wiumphed England would have had few colonies to-day. Nevertheless, the fact remains that tho Dutoli as a people, have never been quite able to' forget or forgive the humiliation they suffered at England's, hands, which terminated ; their cffijeer 'a-s.. a naval. Power,' and. relegated them to' the. position of a minor State. One cannot altogether, jlame them, though it seems Unwise and futile to allow, the doings of past to dominate the present. But. there is the_ fact, and it needs to be always taken into account when considering Holland as a factor ia international relations. Feeling Towards Cermany. But the Dutch, though thoy have no particular affection for the English, certainly do not love the Germans, and during the last 40 years have lived in constant dread of them. They know perfeotly well that a victorious Germany would mean the end of Holland's independence and territorial integrity. For many years past, indeed, she has been openly claimed as a part of the great Pan-German scheme. Tho possibility of the German.. annexation of Belgium becoming permanent is at the present moment a nightmare' to every Hollander, for he knows that if Belgium is annexed Holland will soon follow. And they have good grounds for this conviction, not only in the geographical position of Holland, but also in th© official declaration of the German Government. "It is. obvious," declared the German Foreign Secretary on August 4, 1914, "that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without makingi at the same time territorial acquisitions at the expense of Holland." It is tme that at the same time the Gorman Govornment promised to respect the integrity of Holland, but so they did that/ of Belgium. Why Holland Hesitates. Why, then, has not Holland come in? First, because she does not want war. Sho has seen in the case of Belgium what a German invasion means, and realises that if she fights against Germany her territory also will be invaded, whilst if she fights with Germany against the Allies she will lose her valuable colonies. Secondly, because she is doing , very well as it is. 'She retains her freedom, which the success of the Allies will make yet more secure, whilst at the same tiuie sho escapes the horrors of war. The risk of Germany's attacking Holland diminishes each day. On tne' other hand, sho believes that if the Allies aro ultimately victorious she has nothing 'to fear. They will not rob her of territory, and Germany will not bo able. At tho same time the Dutch aro _ very anxious for the war to end. It is interfering seriously with their trado; it compels them to keep their army mobilised; and it burdens them with tho caro of a vast number of refugees. Tliev know, too, that so long as Germany remains unbeaten their own independence is in jeopardy, and that if Germany were victorious sho would not be likely to spare a little nation whoso sympathies had been openly on the other side. Henco Holland's perplexity. She sinceroly wishes tlio Allies to win; she is horrified at the brutal treatment of Belgium; she dreads Germany's success; and yet sho fears to take any decisive step.

If Holland Came In. If Holland came in 011 the side of the Allies tho result would probably bo decisive both for herself and for them. It would render a German victory in the West practically impossible. Not onlv would she be able to put 300,000 fresh troops in the field, but sho would also open tho door to a now theatre of war which would deprive Germany of tho advantage that her fortification of-Bel-gium lias given her. With the assisttinco of the Allies, Holland could strike at Germany through Westphalia and the Rhenish-'provinces, cut the main connections of the German armies, and force Germany to withdraw from Fraiieo and Belgium—which, of course, would mean the beginning of the end—tho end which Holland avowedly desires. It is not only that Holland could supply n useful addition of troops, but she would open a road by which Gewnnv could bo easily and decisively attacked. If Holland Remains Neutral. If Holland doe 3 not come in, and Germat-y. wins, her indeuendcnce. as I,

have shown, will bo lost. Tho Hagu« will take its orders from Berlin just as Vienna, Constantinople, and Sofia do now. And all tho countries in the Continent of Europe, with tho possible oxception of Russia, will be in mucli the same position. National liberty, the right for each nation to develop its lifo according to its own genius, will pass away. Only 0110 type of civilisation will be tolerated, the Prussian.But suppose it is the Allies, and not the Germans that are completely victorious. • In that case, no aoubt, Holland's independence will remain. But the Allies will owe her little gratitude, and can hardly be expected to consider the interests of a Power which refused to aid them when aid was badly needed, and tho cause was Holland's as well as theirs. Or tako the possible contingency of a drawn battle, a patchedup peace. In this case neither Germany nor tho Allies would be pleased with Holland's conduct, and if on some future occasion (as is likely) difficulties arose with Germany, why should the Allies prevent her seizing, say, -'he extensive and wealthy Dutch colonies, with their 40,000,000 of inhabitants, by y ,a . v of settlement? Might they not be tempted to allow Germany to satisfy her aspirations at the expense of a rower whose friendship had proved valueless? The geographical position of Holland forbids her standing isolated alone. She is bound to come into one political system or other. It is almost unthinkable that she should choose to commit national suicide by amalgamation with Germany. If, 0 n the other hand she joins the Allies, she will retain her Freedom, and will help them to retain theirs -and to deliver the world from the nightmare of Prussian militarism. ' Will Holland Come In? For theso reasons I regard it as probablo that Holland will come in. Her interests are clearly bound up with those of the Allies. She is deeply moved at the treatment of Belgium; she likes tho French and respects the English, whom she recognises are now her friends npd protectors; ,her most influential newspapers do not conceal their abhorrence of German methods and their desire for the Allies' success:'her citizens have succored the multitudes of distressed Belgians "with a generous sympathy who have taken refuge within her borders. Professor Treub, one of her loading men, and brother of the Minister of Finance, recently declared: "We are anti-German because we are good Hollanders and love our country." No, Holland cannot stand idly by and see Belgium annexed and the Allies defeated. _ She oaii easily find a- pretext for action—e.g., she may inform Germany that she regards the annexation of Belgium as threatening her own independence, and demand a withdrawal. Her troops are already mobilised; the Landsturm Bill adopted' the other day by the Dutch Chamber of Deputies is obviously designed to place tne army on. a war footing; and my opinion is that before many moiiths are over Holland will come in.