PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2673, 20 January 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

A notable disclosure has been mado in the House of Commons by Mr W. H. Long (President of the Local Government Board). Resisting an amendment providing for the automatic conscription of unmarried men as they reached the age of eighteeu years, Mr. Long said that Lord- Kitchener had examined ihi question of numbers with the utmost care, and hoped l-hc Bill would pass as it stood, as it would givs him the men required to do (ill that was w soeujft victory. It is possible thai Ma. Lqkg_.

was indiscreet and made public a statomcnt intended only for the Cabiner, room, or that he raav have quoted the War Minister inaccurately. Even if he has done neither of these things, it is difficult to regard the statement as it is presented with an altogether approving eye. If it comes from Loud Kitchener it represents a departure from his pas!; policy of abstaining from anything- in the nature of prophecy except in the most general terms. The abstention was wise, for prophecies are not always realised, and if they fail arc apt'to leave in their wake a volume of disappointment and dejection which w.ould have been avoided had they not been made. Probably many people who will entirely dissent "from the embittered criticism of the War Minister by Sir Iron Heubekt, reported to-day, would have been better content had Lord Kitchener j restricted himself to simple expressions of approval of, or dissent- from, measures taken for the prosecution of the war, without attempting to indicate any limit to the sacrifices by which the nation is faocd. It is possible to say with a great deal of confidence that tho British nation is intent upon winning victory in the war, not at any stated or limited sacrifice, but if it nan be won by any practicable sacrifice. This being so, it is as well that even the possibility of such a disappointment as would attend the non-ful-filment of a prediction like that attributed t-o Lord Kitchener should be avoided.

So much being said, it must be added that if Lord Kitchener made the rema-rks with which he is credited by Mr. Long, they cannot be regarded as unimportant. They amount in effect to a statement that the million recruits to be made available under the Derby scheme, and by the compulsory enlistment of unmarried men, will enable Britain to dn her part towards winning victory in the war;' Presumably Lord Kitchener would have made no such statement had he not felt thai it was warranted, not merely on grounds of probability, but by a liberal margin. The, filial consideration must be, however, that \even Lord Kitchener, high authority as he is, is not infallible. Whether or not the end of the war is in sight, victory has still to be fought for, and it is better that it should be heralded by events in the various theatres 'thau by any prediction,' even a prediction backed 'by tho weightiest authority.

A modern offensive is frequently a-n affair of pulsations, intense and furious assaults, alternating with periods of relative inactivity. News of the resumption of the Russian southern offensive therefore affords no occasion for surprise, but the details in hand can be only tentatively received, sinco thcy_ do not rest upon official authority. Along with accounts of heavy fighting in Southern Kussia and Galicia-, in which the Russians have pierced the enemy front at different points, it is stated' that tho Germans are abandoning Lutsk—it is not said that they have actually abandoned the place. Lutsk, besides being a fortress, is the> terminal point of a branch railway which reaches at Lutsk the eastern bank of the Eiver Styr, in Southern Russia, along which the contending armies are in contact except at Chartorysk, about 50 miles north of Lutsk, where the Russians have forced the passage of the river and hold a limited area on the western bank. Lutsk is about 30 miles north of tho Galician frontier.

The reported flight of .the enemy from Pinsk has no direct connection with tho operations furthor south. Pinsk is situated more than a hundred miles north of Lutsk. It stands upon a railway which runs east and west through the central area of the Pripet marshes. In this great expanse of water-logged country relatively lighter forces are engaged than' on the fighting fronts north and south, and if the Russiarts have compelled the evacuation of Pinsk, it is likely that they have chno so rather by turning the nature of the country to account in the handling of mobile troops than by any such powerful offensive as they lately opened, and are now reported to have resumed, on their southern front.

In so far as it relates to the Mesopotamia, campaign the public anxiety which is said to obtain in Great Britain at the complexity of the situation in the East is not unreasonable. ._ It is quite obvious that the position of the British forces on the Tigris contains elements of hazard. The immediate aspect of thfe campaign as it is disclosed_ in the latest reports affords no particular ground for uneasiness. General Aymier is shown to be within a comparatively short distance, perhaps not more than a dozen miles, of Kut-el-Amara, the British advanced position he is advancing to relieve. Short of unforeseen developments there should be a reasonably good prospect of General Aylmer's column and the Kut? el-Amara garrison joining . hands. But viewing tho campaign in more extended perspective, it cannot be overlooked that British forces, probably consisting all told of only a fow divisions, are operating on the Tigris at tho end of some hundreds of miles of difficult road and river communications' by no means easy to maintain intact. Tliei'e is also a possibility of comparatively small forces so placed being overwhelmed by superior numbers. The danger is limited by the length and nature of the Turkish communications with Mesopotamia and by the calls upon Turkish strength in other theatres, but it undoubtedly exists.

It is only natural that questions should bo raised from time to time as to the wisdom of detaching forces in a campaign attended by so many risks, but it does not lack substantial grounds of justification. Some commentators have contended that the operations in • Mesopotamia should have been conducted on less ambitious lines, and thst the British forces should have made no such lengthy advance from the head of the .Persian Gulf.. It is certain that they need not have advanced anywhere near Kut-el-Amara in order to secure the safety of the Anglo-Per-sian oil pipe-line, the safeguarding of which was. one of the initial ob-, jects of the campaign, but it is plain that this object is now overshadowed by others of greater importance. It is essential not only that all attempts by tho enc-my to reach tho head of the Persian Gulf should bo defeated, but that everything possible should be done to check and neutralise his machinations in Persia. As matters stand, Russian troops arc engaged in suppressing n. revolt in Persia which was set on foot by German bribes' and German-Turkish intrigues, and but for the pressure to which he. has baan subjected in the. Mesopotamia Pima aim sjid lot the.

Russians in the Caucasus and Armenia, the enemy might by this time have lighted such a flame in Persia and further afield as would defy all attempts to suppress- it. The defence of Gallipoli did not absorb the whole of Turkey's available strength, and it must bo recognised that the British in Mesopotamia and the Russians in the Caucasus and now in Persia represent immediate obstacles to a Turkish enterprise in the*' Moslem world whicn might otherwise have developed with devastating effect.

Yesterday a Constantinople report spoke of the defeat of a great Russian offensive in the Caucasus, but to-day the Turks sing a different tune. They report that their troops are offering a heroic resistance to sujtprior Russian forces, apparently on that section of the Caucasian front which faces Erzerum. The Russian operations _ in this region should tend to relievo pressure ra the British columns on the Tigris, just as the Russian offensive on the southern section of the main front, if it has reopened in anything like the volume reported, should exercise an important influence upon the developments wheh are said to be in prospect in the Balkans.

That the downfall of, Montenegro should awaken exultation in Berlin and Vienna was to be expected. Indeed the moral effect of this event, at a time when the strain of the war is being severely felt, may be of greater value_ to the enemy than any purely military advantage he has gainrsd" by the Montenegrin surrender. A new and unpleasant note concerning Montenegro is struck by a section of the French newspaper press, probably not the best informed section. It is suggested by the uewspapers in question that the surrender of Montenegro in the face of hopeless odds is a well-staged farce, and that the little country is really in secret league with tHe Central Empires. Very definite evidence would be needed 'to earn a hearing for the charge so made against Montenegro, and all available . evidence goes to show that it is utterly unfounded. She has offered a long and stubborn resistance to numerically superior and bettel - equipped enemy forccs, and it seems to be undisputed that her crowning disaster —the fall of Mt. Lovchen—is directly attributable to the failure of the Allies to furnish essential aid.

According to the Salonika correspondent of the Paris Temps, the enemy will begin his attack upon Salonika to-day, and it will take tho form of a converging advance by three distinct routes, on' lines recently examined at some length. If this is misleading information, at all events it cannot mislead for long. At present it lacks confirmation and support. There is no very definite' news about Greecej though various rumours are afloat. One of the most interesting states that Entente troops have landed in the vicinity of Athens, but it is discredited 'in a London message which indicates that it is either a pure invention by the enemy, or has arisen as a result of the systemati-c search of' the Greek coast for enemy submarine depots which is being conducted by the Allies.

An interesting account given by Mb. Ward Pkice of tho manner in which tho Gallipoli evacuation was carried out will intensify the admiration with which, this great enterprise is universally regarded. It would satisfactorily dispose also of Turkish fairy tales about tho capture of immense quantities of booty had these stories not already been met and answered by_ explicit statements in British official reports. »1* . * «

The actual tone and tenor of the spccch delivered by the King of Sweden in opening ihe Riksdag and urging the augmentation of defence to maintain l neutrality- are possibly misrepresented in the brief extracts cabled to-day. But as they stand these extracts contain more than a hint of unfriendliness to Great Britain. As ho is reported. King Gustav appears to have justified the proposed increase in the defence vote on the ground that the Swedish Government had more than once been obliged to intervene against attempts to put Swedish trade under the usurped control of_ another Power. This'can only be interpreted as a reference, and a somewhat significant reference, to Great Britain, since it is upon Great Britain that the main burden falls of maintaining the Allied blockade in the seas oi Western Europe._ The significance of the statement is, of course, intensified by the fact that Great Britain and her Allies are believed to be rapidly perfecting arrangements for greatly tightening the bbekade of Germany: The somewhat outspoken language put into the mouth of the King may reflect the desire of the Swedish Government to bear down popular opposition to an increase in defence expenditure, or it may represent a bluffing protest against the tightening of , the blockadc, but the international horizon would have been somewhat clearer if no sucli language had been used. That it tias baon used hardly squares with the current interpretation of Sweden's attitude in the war.'

* > K * * It has been said, on apparently sound and well-informed authority, that the Government of Sweden, backed by a great majority of the people of the country, desire ibove all things to maintain It is admitted that a considerable section of the Swedish public regards Eussia v ; ith distrust and suspicion, amounting almost to hostility, and that a small,; but active, minority, ■which makes its opinions freely and widely heard, definitely favours participation in the war on the side of Germany. Nevertheless it has been held by Allied writers who are in touch with events in Sweden that the prevailing sentiment is overwhelmingly in favour of neutrality. This impression tfill be to some extent disturbed by the words attributed to King Gustav, unless it appears that their import has been over-em-phasised. If a threat is intended it is one before which Britain cannot possibly recede. Neutral countries cannot be allowed to act as unrestricted channels for the passage of supplies i into Germany, and some figures published to-day (on the authority of the London Morning Post) demonstrate that Sweden and some other neutral countries have hitherto been acting in this capacity. Britain must amend these conditions or renounce one of the chief attributes of sea power—ability to annihilate, the enemy's sea-borne supplies. It may bo .hoped that the mass of public opinion in Sweden will recognisc tho difference between Swedish trade in the true sense of tho term, and trade in respect to which Sweden merely acts as a depot on the way to Germany. In spite of the tone 4 which neimeates King Guoiav's.

statement, such a hope should not be vain. Otljsr considerations apart, even pro-German Swedes may be expected to recognise that the war is not now likely to turn in favour of Germany, and would be hardly more likely to do so if Sweden made common cause with the Central Empires.