PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2671, 18 January 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

A peomise of early and vigorous action by the enemy against Salonika was held out in some of yestorday's messages, but it now seems likely that the promise either anticipated events or represented an erroneous reading of the situation. There is at. time of writing no further mention of the attack the Bulgarians were said to have opened on a sectiozi of the Greek northern frontier. More than this the authors of some of the reports now in hand doubt whether the enemy contemplates any .serious attack upon Salonika, or is in a position to attempt it. Tlio most important news in hand is contained in a highly interesting statement by M. Pasitch, the Prime Minister of Serbia. He says definitely that the bulk of the Serbian troops are being transferred to Salonika, and expresses an opinion that the fate,of Serbia will be determined by the fate of the offensive from Salonika. The announcement that the Serbs are being transferred is welcome. It means such an accession of strength to th.o Salonika army that some faith may now be reposed in reports that its strength will shortly be raised to a total of 350,000 men. Taking this news as reliable, and it rests to all appearance on sound authority, the Allies arc massing the great bulk' of their offensive strength where it_ can bp most effectively used, while leaving Albania garrisoned, adequately in the opinion of M. Pasitch, by the Italian expedition and the smaller force under the command of Essad Pasha. , • ' * * • Additional light is dow thrown tipsoi the action aMbr. Allies in destroy ins. railway hxiioa in the nor-

tliern part of Greece. It had already been inferred that this action followed upon a decision by the Greeks not to hold their northern frontier, east of the Vardar, and the inference is confirmed by a statement attributed to General Sarp.ail. It is to be noted, howevei' that instead of blowing up two bridges only, as the first brief reports stated, the Allies are now said to have blown up all the bridges and .viaducts along a stretch of 40 miles of Greek railway, which runs parallel and adjacent to the Bulgarian frontier, and is approached by an arterial road from Bulgaria and by the railway from Serbia. The decision of the Greeks not to hold the eastern Section of their northern frontier is a rather pointed indication that they are still of a mind to let their policy be decided by events, but, on the other hand, not unfavourable auguries are to bo drawn from the fact that they have acquiesced, apparently with good grace, in the action of the Allies, involving though it does the creation of a gap in their internal communications which is likely to result in isolating a considerable section of their own army from its bases of supply. These are the present elements of a situation which may easily witness dramatic developments and changes, but visible evidence §oes in the main to bear' out an opinion that the Allies have emerged from a period of doubt and uncertainty in regard to the Balkans, and are working out a definite policy with a single eye to launching a powerful offensive. At a surface view the ■ fate of Montenegro, an undoubted example of local weakness, _ may seem to discredit this opinion, but it quite possibly affords ihe strongest evidence that the Allies are making all things else secondary to the development of their main strategic plan. A Montenegrin Minister is quoted today as denying that Italy is chiefly responsible for the failure to adequately _ support Montenegro, and as attributing it instead to the failure of the Allies to settle on a common, far-seeing programme in the'Balkans. Even if he is right, it is not quite certain that a common plan, prepared m good time, would have made provision for the measure, of support to Montenegro .• which would have averted her present fate. The position being coldly examined from a purely military and strategic standpoint, the diversion of forco entailed might conceivably have been regarded as out of proportion to the advantages to be obtained. 'At all events it seems clear that the Allies are now bending all their efforts upon preparations for an offensive based on Salonika, and in these circumstances the downfall of Montenegro, though it is an event to stir the pity of the world, has but an indirect bearing upon the main developments of the-Balkan campaign.

While the Serbian Array was still defending its own territory, conditions were totally different. Quick and resolute action at that time, had. it been possible,_ would have placed the Allies much nearer -victory in the Balkans than they stand to-day, and the mournful words in which King Peter of Seebia speaks of the hard fate of his soldiers—fighting bravely but doomed to .defeat .because the help for which they waited did not come—emphasises 1 not only the misfortunes of Serbia, but a failure on the part of the Entente Powers which has cost them dear. But though weakness and delay on the part of the Entente explain the fate of Serbia, the same causes can hardly bo held to explain the fate of Montenegro. Consideration for Serbia no longer ties the Allies to any particular line of action, and the apparent explanation of more recent events is that they have refused to modify their campaign plans out of_ consideration for Montenegro. It is a decision which bears hard for tho time being upon the smallest of the Slav States, butt the general outlook in the outlook for Montenegro and Serbia, as well as for their Allies—is undoubtedly .very greatly brightened by the fact' that the action of the Entente is no.w governed by purely military considerations. The work of the Allied Army is not to immediately succour any single State, but to defeat the strongest combination of force which the enemy can bring against it. Some recent reports take it for granted that the Allies, when they set out from Salonika, will strike north through Serbia, but any such assumption can only be tentative. The immediate aim of the Allies cannot be to win back this or that section of Balkan territory, but must be, not only "to.defeat the enemy, but to defeat him under, the conditions best calculated to favourably influence the main developments of the war. It is quite possible that these ends may be better served, in the first instance, by. an eastward advance against Turkey, particularly if Russia sends an army into the Balkans, than by an attempt to drive northward through Serbia. The encouraging features of the existing' situation are that the Allies are not only concentrating powerfully at Salonika, but, in virtue of being estabished at that ba-se, are possessed of/ an open freedom of choice as to the line their offensive shall take.

At last reports the British columns in _Mesopotamia, which are fighting their way up the Tigris with the object of relieving the force under General Townshend invested at Kut-el-Amara, were shown to bo something like 50 mileß short of their goal. A considerable advance is therefore implied in the news that on Thursday last the Turks were attacked and defeated,, in a battle which lasted all day, at a distance of 25 miles from Kut-el-Amara. It is stated that the Turks ultimately retreated east and north, closely pressed., Running generally from west to east below Kut-el-Amara, the Tigris follows a very winding course, but the stated direction of their retreat can hardly mean anything else than that the Turks have been driven right away from the-river, and' therefore presumably out of immediate'touch with their compatriots investing General Townshend. Importance is attached to the victory won by the relieving column, but the enemy is evidently operating in strong force.

A satisfactory position appears to obtain in Western Egypt, where one of the New Zealand IliUe Brigade battalions recently took part in au engagement with Arab tribesmen. It is reported to-day that a force of 400 Arabs was dispersed by a British column, the latter suffering no casualties, * * ft * * r * * • No very sensational event is reported at time of writing in the main theatres, but further interest? ing accounts arc given of the nature and effect of the rccenfc Russian offeaalve in tlw sou thorn Keutiaa of the jiUffar-n front. CL&ft correspondent.

attributes the suspension of the offensive not to strategic considerations, but to a thaw which made heavy transport impossible, and infantry movements difficult. The weight of opinion appears to be, however, that the offensive has served its present lAirpose in compelling the concentration of large enemy forces which are now pinned down inactive.

No final opinion can be pronounced upon the merits of the Baralcmg case until the whole of the evidence has been published, and an explicit British reply has been made to the accusations levelled by Germany. But only one judgment is possible upon the German reply to the British Note concerning the Baralong As an argumentative statement it is contemptible, and it is saved from paltry insignificance only by a descent to depths of savagery which even Germany might have been expected to avoid. Faced by the accusation that the orcw of one of her cruisers had shot in cold blood German submarine sailors who had sunk a passenger ship and caused loss of life to noncombatants, Great Britain offered to submit this charge, with bthers selected from a long,list outstanding against Germany,' to an impartial tribunal. The .German reply is a compound of falsehoods and vituperation. It rejects the British offer, and is rounded off with a threat of "punishment" and . reprisals. That Germany should defend the cowardly and infamous crimes committed against the liner Arabic, the submarine El 3, and the steamer Ruel, was only, to be expected, and the shameless reference to the submarine campaign as "legally recognised" will cause as little surprise. The only- section of the concoction which merits a moment's attention is its sinister concluding passage. This is in all probability a savage threat against defenceless British prisoners, and there seems one way, and only one, in which Britain can meet the threat. It is a method which has been suggested before: that personal responsibility for any outrage committed against prisoners should be, fastened upon the. Kaiser and his "principal accomplices. .