PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2668, 13 January 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

The position in Mesopotamia is [ by no means so good as it was made .. to appear in messages commented on t yesterday. General statements re- ' gardiiig an important British victory . on the Tigris and -a pursuit of the - beaten Turks made the supposition , reasonable that General Town- . shend's force, which has lately been withstanding assaults at fiut-al- . Amara, hadoroken the enemy invest- . ment, and was again . moving up . river towards Bagdad. The supposition, however, was erroneous'. De- , t&il facts transmitted as late news : yesterday, and supplemented to-day, ' show that General Toivnshend is not only_ still invested at Kut-el-Amara but is surrounded at that place, and that the success recorded was achieved by two relieving columns which are fighting their way towards Kut-el-Amara in an effort to restore communications. Even now the situation is not fully cleared up, but it is evident that the reccnt battles were fought on the banks of the Tigris considerably below Kut-el-Amara. The starting-point of the relieving columns is given in the cablegrams as "Iman-Ali-Gherbi, 100 miles south-east of Kut-el-Amara." In point of fact, Iman-Ali-el-Gharbi, 'as l it is named on the best available map, lies fifty miles duo east of Kut-el-Amara, as the crow flies, or at a distance of nearly a hundred miles following the course of theriver. Tlio place actually in question may be Imam Sherki, which is 60 miles south-east of Itut-el-Amara in a direct line, and upwards of a hundred miles distant by river. At all events, the relieving columns set out from one of these places, and Colonel Aylmer's column, on the east bank, has now covered half the distance between the starting-point and Kut-el-Amara, and this after defeating and driving back a Turkish force consisting of three divisions. How far Colonel Kemball has proceeded on the west bank is not stated, but it was his column that dislodged the enemy from an entrenched position and captured 700 prisoners and . two guns, so that it appears to have won an even more pronounced success than the column commanded by Colonel Aylmer. Though the relieving columns are not yet shown to have reached their goal at KutelAmara, they obviously arc, or were, making good headway towards it, and the statement made in one London message to-day that there have been no definite British successes is not warranted, unless it is based on detail information not yet available ( here. • i

As a whole, the situation is critical, but there is no visible evidence for assuming that it is desperate. The most disquieting fact in sight is that -the Turks are in such strength as to be able not only to shut up General Townshend, with 10,000 men, at Kut-el-Amara, but to send several divisions down river beyond that place. Strong as they are, however, these advanced Turkish forces have apparently been soundly beaten on both banks of the river by British columns, and if General Townshend's little army is in condition to stand a siege at Kut-el-Amara there should be no present ground for uneasiness, even if the relieving columns arc unable for a time to restoro unbroken communications. Upon these points there is no definito information at the moment, but it is a hopeful, indication as far as it goes that General Townshend appears to have sent a portion of his force down river in order to stand a siege at Kut-el-Amara. It is said that the garrison consists of 10,000 men, whereas in his advance on Bagdad General Townshend had some tiling like ■ twice that number at disposal. The reduction would indicate tlmt ha foresaw that he would him to stand a siege at KuM-Am&i'a.

to and reduced his garrison to c.ompact dimensions in order to minimise the r- danger of running short of supplies. :i- Kut-el-Amara is worth holding, even i- at some risk, as a valuable advanced y base, and in addition his stand there no doubt enabled General d Towkshend to secure an unmolested d passage down river for his wounded i'- and prisoners. If the worst comes to u- the worst, the garrison should have a a fair prospect of cutting its way it out and joining hands with the rc- £- lieving columns which at latest re--10 ports arc shown to be only fifty miles 1- away. i- » * * ir ' The immediate outlook in Mesopo:t tami.a is admittedly troubled. Britie ish forces arc fighting with more than two hundred miles of difficult o- road and river communications between them and the head of the Perr: sian Gulf, and fco all appearance the , 0 enemy lias at present a considerable iv numerical superiority. On the other n hand if adequate foroes are made e- available it should be possible to 16 press the invasion in such a fashion J. e that the Turks will be able to check j g " it only at the cost of definitely reio stricting their efforts in other ■o theatres. Bad as are the communiw cations immediately behind the inj vading army, it is an easier matter for Britain to send reinforcements ,o ancl supplies into Mesopotamia from 1, India than for Turkey to do the s- same from Constantinople. Taking • distance to be actually covered into [j consideration, the present fighting e area is at a distance of nearly 1500 I miles from Constantinople, and over tl a great part of this distance the e facilities for transport are poor. l " There can be no question of rapidly " transferring Turkish troops from ' e other theatres to Mesopotamia and :r back again, and it is a distinct coms pensation for the difficulties and dangers at present confronting the n British forces on the Tigris, that a these results, as yet inconclusive, . have been achieved by the enemy at s the cost of materially reducing his f strength in other theatres. There C need be no attempt to minimise the problems by which the invading army ,- is faced, but it has triumphed over - many difficulties in, the past, and to 0 date the Mesopotamia campaign has . made heavy and ever-increasing de--1 mands upon Turkish resources. * * » * Some very confident predictions are i current of an early attack on the - Allies in Greece, but it will be no--3 ticed that Mb. Ward Pkice, who is 3 at Salonika, does not pretend to any f precise knowledge on the subjcct. 2. He leaves the question open, point- . ing out only that the Germans have . strong motives for attacking or for 1 inducing their allies to take that . course. The enemy the observes, has ( now had time to repair the bridges 5 and tunnels on the Vardar railway,' . which the Allies destroyed in their rc- [ treat, and the present is the most [ favourable time for an attack on the ; Allied lines. It is undoubtedly true r that tho enemy has nothing to gain > by delay. At the most immediate view early action is dictated by the , consideration that each day that , passes makes the Allies stronger, if . not by the introduction of additional reinforcements by the continual improvement of their defensive lines, which they have already made exceedingly formidable. It is still more -important, however, that the opportunity of attacking the Allies ' at Salonika as an isolated force is not likely to remain indefinitely open. As Mr. Ward' Price justly observes, the Allies at Salonika occupy not a defensive position merely but a, jumpihg-off jjlace for an offensive in the spring. Unless they contemplate such an offensive the continued retention of Salonika and . assemblage there of a powerful army i would be meaningless, and it may ' practically be taken for granted that j when the Allies strike forward from Salonika there will be concerted attacks by the Russians and by the Italians _ and Serbs established on j the Adriatic seaboard. Meantime the German have an opportunity of attacking separately the most powerful section of the Allied forces in the Balkans, but the opportunity, as has been said, will not remain open indefinitely. • * » *

The time required to restore his railway communications possibly accounts for the enemy's delay in attacking Salonika when he has so much to lose by delay, but to assume that this is a complete and satisfactory explanation would- be to take too much for granted. It is by no means impossible that the-enemy is seriously perplexed and at a loss to raise the force which would enable him to attack with a:ny prospect of success. The admirable description of the Allied line given by Mr. Ward Price shows that it is strong naturally and made immensely stronger by elaborate artificial defences. It runs for 15 miles up the Vardar, in itself a formidable obstacle, and continues largely through & region of marshes and lakes. Besides being protected by extensive wire entanglements, it is fronted by a stretch of plain over which attacking troops would have to pass, exposed to the fire of a powerful artillery, admirably placed, and firing at known ranges. An attack upon a position of this character demands greatly superior forces, both in men and artillery, and the problem for the Ger- ' mans is to find 'these forces. The Russian offensive appears to have enforced a considerable withdrawal of Austro-German troops from the Balkans, the Bulgarians acting alone or with negligible aid can hardly be equal to the task, and .it is at least doubtful whether a Turkish army is available for service in Greece.

2 Whatever , wonders she may be able 3 to accomplish in the way of mili--1 tary organisation, Germany cannot : extinguish the deep-rooted animosities which divide and antagonise the Balkan nations. Even a Bulgarian ' invasion would involve a certain risk ! of a collision with Greece, and this ; danger would be intensified if Turks 1 also were introduced. It is an addi- ■ tional complication that there is no love lost between the Turks and Bulgarians. It has lately been reported that they arc again at issue over the territory along the Dedeagatch railway which was transferred to Bulgaria some months ago, and it seems unlikely that Turks and Bulgars could bo induced to act together in harmony even if the Turks were willing to engage in a campaign outside their own frontiers, which offers them no prospect of profit. At the same time, Germany will undoubtedly organise an attack upon Salonika if she can contrive to overcome the incidental obstacles, for she has to choose between attacking or making the damaging admission that she is too weak to attack. * * » Things are going rather badly with the Montenegrins. The Austrians claim that they have capfcurcd Lovchen, the dominating mountain which overlooks the naval port of Calfcaro, and the Montenegrins admit the loss of an important section of this position, It is thus likely the Austaiaas will for acme fcijtaa...

bo guaranteed in secure possession of Catta-ro, an. excellent base from which to raid the Allied sea transport lines in the Adriatic. The Austnans claim also that tlicy have captured Berane, a town inside the Montenegrin north-eastern frontier, but the Montenegrins report of tho fighting in this area that they have driven back the enemy "with heavy loss. Some detail aspects of the campaign in Montcucgro are obscure, but it is plain enough that the Austrian plans tend generally towards a flank attack by land upon the perbian; and Italian forces in Albania, aided by submarine attaeks upon the water-borne transport, upon which these forces aro entirely dependent. *#» ' » A dispatch from Sir Charles Monro discloses the highly interesting fact that the Turks attempted a general assault upon the Allied line on the Gallipoli Peninsula immediately before the evacuation. This is evidently tho shred of fact underlying tho story concocted by the Turks about a great battle t in which the Allies fared so badly that they were compelled to evacuate their positions. As the facts are stated by Sir Charles Monro, the Turkish attack was a feeble effort. Bayonets were fixed by the enemy troops all along the line, but they actually assaulted only a limited section of the Allied front, and these were decisively repulsed. Afterwards tho evacuation proceeded quietly, and without molestation by the enemy. Clearly the Turks, were not aware that a withdrawal was in progress or they would have pressed their attack with redoubled vigour, instead of suffering it to flicker out tamely. A message from Mr. Malcolm Koss shows that 'New Zealand troops were among tho last to leave the peninsula, and that they left not a single gun to the enemy, even bringing away those which by reason of hard wear were cbnsidered worthless, except from the sentimental point of V J GW - It .is to be hoped that some of these time-worn guns which saw service years ago in South Africa, and have now oeen preserved from bemg_ exhibited as trophies in Constantinople, will find an ultimate resting-place in Now Zealand. * * * * There is satisfactory news from the Western theatre. The German attack in tho Champage appears to have proved a lamentable failure, and to have resulted in enormous loss to tho enemy without corresponding gain. It made little headway in the fhrst instance, and, as reports go to-day, French counterattacks have levied heavy toll from the enemy, and won back practically all the ground that he had occuit e defeat of the Germans is all the move important since they aie leported to liave employed crack troops in their ill-starred enterprise.