PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2667, 12 January 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

'Xlxceiitaikt y about the position readied in _ Mesopotamia is pleasant-, ly broken into by the news that the British troops have won a decided success in that region and arc pursuing a beaten enemy up the Tigris from Kut-cl-Amara. It will bo remembered that some weeks ago a British force under General" Townshbnd ttdvtuml {ram Kut-01-Amura U fU»sinhon\ about 20 miles Lsqux

Bagdad. There a battle was fought in which the Turks were heavily defeated and dislodged from an entrenched position. Prospects of an early occupation of Bagdad then looked bright, but the situation was transformed by the arrival of very .heavy Turkish reinforcements, and the British force had to cffect a rapid retreat from the scene of its victory. The retreat was halted at which is a strong defensive position commanding two important lines of river transport extending to the south, the main channel of the Tigris and another waterway which connects the Tigris and the Euphrates. A± ICut-el-Amara, where they have since remained, the British repelled powerful Turkish attacks, but until to-day there was no assurance that they would be able to hold the place. In their retreat from Ctesiphon they wore outnumbered four to one, and though it was announced that reinforcements were being sent up river there was evidently a considerable margin of strength to be redressed. The news now received showg that the British force is in effective command of the situation. The Turks have been attacked in front of Kufc-el-Amara and heavily defeated, losing 700 prisoners and two guns. The _ number of prisoners makes it likely that the enemy's total losses, including killed and wounded, amounted to some thousands. On Sunday the Turks were retreating up the Tigris towards Bagdad, with the British in pursuit. * « * • It cannot be taken for granted that the advance on Bagdad will bf> immediately resumed, but these late developments of the campaign nevertheless, afford ' full ground for satisfaction. Made though it was in considerable strength, the enemy's attempt to_ secure the safety Bagdad has distinctly come to grief, and he must now choose between throwing further strong reinforcements into Mesopotamia, which are likely to be badly needed elsewhere, or looking to an early renewal of the British offensive. Faced by the conflicting claims of Mesopotamia i and areas nearer Constantinople, not | to speak of the promised attack on the Suez Canal, the Turks are likely to find themselves in a quandary. A British occupation of Bagdad would be a serious disaster from the Ottoman point of view, and would entail a loss of prestige only second to that which would be suffered if Constantinople were entered by alien armies. On the other hand, the Turks are hardly likely to relish the idea of devoting a considerable part of their total available strength to rolling back the British invasion of Mesopotamia, and the Germans also might offer decided objections to the adoption of such a policy. Meantime the question as to what the enemy will decide to do is open, but if the British are again checked in Mesopotamia, as they may be, by further additions to the defending Turkish army, the Allies will profit by the consequent weakening of Turkish forces available for other theatres. If the Turks do not send additional forces into Mesopotamia, prospects of an early resumption of the advance upon Bagdad will\ be good. The weather during the next few months will favour offensive operations, and there is a good road all the way from Kut-el-Amara to Bagdad. These places are about 100 miles apart as the crow Hies, but the practicable military route is about twice as long. It follows the windings of the Tigris, and the British force 1? largely dependent upon river steamers for the carriage of its heavy artillery and for other transport services.

Apart from the interesting campaign news, it is announced that Sir John Nixon is relinguishing the chief command in Mesopotamia on account of ill-health, and has been succeeded By Lieut.-General Sir Percy Lake. 111-health, as the' explanation of a military commander's retirement, sometimes represents a • polite fiction, but no such thought need be entertained in the case of Sir John Nixon, who has been officially commended and universally congratulated upon the distinguished success with which ho has conducted a very difficult and trying campaign. ♦ * * * Late news gives some further details of the victory in Mesopotamia, and_ states that it is regarded as_ most important. Heavy rain is said to be hindering the British pursuit. _ Generally speaking winter conditions are much more favourable to active campaigning in Mesopotamia than the intensely hot and trying weather which sets in about April. The very interesting suggest tion emanates from Rome that the Turks have decided to press the Mesopotamia campaign instead of proceeding with the project-of attacking the Suez Canal. If they do, it may be some time yet before British troops enter Bagdad. * * * * ■ During the last 1 few days the Germans have been more active on the Western front than for a long time past. Yesterday it was reported that they had gained some ground in an attack on the French hill positions on the eastern fringe of the Vosges, in Southern Alsace. To-'day there is news of a more ambitious enterprise of the same character, in the Champagne district, but it appears to have been ah almost total failure. Since they attacked on a front of five miles and made determined efforts to penetrate the French positions, it must be supposed that the Germans suffered heavy loss, but their total gain of ground is said to consist of two small sections of advanced trenches. The area selected for attack lies a mile or two east of the /famous Tahure bluff, the point at which the French, in their great September offensive, most nearly approached an important lateral railway which closely backs the German front in the Champagne. There is no suggestion that the attack was organised on a scale promising more than a local success, even if the hopes of the enemy had been realised to the full, so that it presumably represented little more than an attempt to improve and strengthen his defensive organisation. It should suit the Allies very well to have the enemy expend his strength in minor enterprises of this character, more especially when, as in the present instance his gain of ground is quite insignificant when set against the losses he must have incurred in winning it.

It is \mfortwnate that the vitally important question of military strength, upon which the ultimate result of the war to a very largo extent depends, is frequently the subject of messages and reports which can only be regarded as misleading. Thus to-day it is stated, on tho authority _ of The Times correspondent at Paris, that France has mobilised seven million men. The statement must be- an exaggeration. Germany, we have been told, has enrolled.practically ovary imssiblo man, and, ao cording fco the best authorities, her

total mobilisation, with an estimated population of nearly 68,000,000, is in the vicinity of nine million men. I ranee has a population of about 40,000,000, and accepting the German figures as a standard, her total mobilisation cannot have much exceeded men. In both Prance and Germany the mobilisation total may ba increased by the enrolment of men over military ago and otherwise outside the category of efficients, but this does not affect the comparison. Germany's enrolment of nine millions must needs include many men, of a low standard of physical C ( le w 3y ' anc f ifc * s P re % certain' that France has not enrolled anything like seven million men. The message which has been quoted states also that Franoe is calling un for training the l&-year-old class, which means presumably youths who attained the_ age of 18* fn 1915 and in normal circumstances would not have become liable for militarv service until 1917. This particular statement is very possibly in accordance with fact, and it may mean that France is little better off as regaids the inroads she has made upon her man power than is her chief enemy ; The broad position, so far as it is known, is that Germany has the classes of 1916 and 1917 (men of 18 to 19) still" under training, and the same classes are no doubt under training in France. This question of remaining reserves is complex—all the more so since exact information regarding maay details is lacking— but unless Allied authorities have erred gravely in estimating the inroads that have been made upon c . power, Germany .is nghting the winter campaign at a terrible disadvantage. The aergregate strength of the German 1916 and 1917 classes is variously computed at from 800,000 to 1,000,000, but it is generally agreed that they con-, stitute almost tho sole remaining effective German reserves. Accepting this as correct, Germany must either tace the steadily rising power of the Allies during the remainder of the winter with forces that are progressively declining in efficiency, if not in numbers, or, draw prematurely upon.the remaining effective reserves she is attempting to hold back for the decisive conflict which will open in the spring. * . * * * To the Allies the winter thus represents a period of opportunity. It, apart from any greater achievement, they can compel Germany to prematurely employ the youthful recruits she_ is as yet holding in reserve, their prospects in the great campaign to open in a few months Thl T7 P ate »«% improved, iho complete absorption of these two classes in the field armies during the winter would mean simply that Germany would enter the decisive struggle with practically only old nam and weaklings to make good the wastage of war. s * . * * « The Russian southern offensive represents a very definite effort to impose an immediate drain upon Germany s remaining strength, and is probably far more important in*this character than as an attempt to sway events m the Balkans or gain l?cal success of any kind. The continued pressure imposed upon ' the Germans in the Western theatre tends equally to the same end. Unless ideas on tho subject of German | reserves are hopelessly astray, it I must be Germaijy's. policy during the winter to fight above all for time in the main campaigns, and the policy of the Allies, on the other hand, to make the fighting as intense and the strain of the war as heavy as winter conditions will permit. From this standpoint the outlook is decidedly hopeful, for there is already a stir of great events on the Eastern front, and in the West extreme tension reigns, which, may at any moment break into a great blaze of battle.