HATS OFF TO COLONEL GIBBON.

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2666, 11 January 1916, Page 6

HATS OFF TO COLONEL GIBBON.

Sir,—Everything in connection with the "send off" of our soldiers thrills mo in some way. I have ono son in It.A.. serving in Flanders, a second discharged, served through the Boer War, lioval Horse Artillery. Nothing could bo better timed than the farewell addresses of Colonel Gibbon. All were good, but the last was splendid—it was apparently tho natural outflow of a mind well ordered. It was brotherly, it was i'athev'y, and 1 feel satisfied in this class of contribution towards tho general welfare of tho troops, intelligent; young New Zealandors will surely pj'olit by it. 1 consider the addresses of Colonel Gibbon should bo printed, miy coplw el von tp the itien mid (lm Uot seat to tiio spueral depots and hos«

pitals. Tho needs of the soldiers' physical nature are cheerfully provided but tho mental side also should be just as well cared for when it can bo done at a trifling cost.—l am, etc., A SOLDIM'S FATHEK. HELIGOLAND. Sir, —As Mr. Thomson has been unable to deny the correctness of the historical fact which led me to write my letter, 1 should, ordinarily, have been content to let tho matter rest. But he challenges my memory of tliQ attendant circumstances, and as to them 1 should like to make somo remarks. With the earlier portion of his letter I am not concerned. He there demolishes a number of charges, which no one, so far as 1 am aware, has evor made. Certainly I did not. The complaint of British Imperialists against the late Mr. Gladstone is not that he remembered the rights of other countries, but that lie always forgot the rights of his own country when lie had a chance of surrepderiiig them to the shadowy or non-existent rights of other countries. Hence the origin of that expression, "the policy of scuttle," which will always be associated with Mr. Gladstone'Sj foreign and colonial policy. ' Mr. Thomson's second paragraph is cryptic to a degree. His words could reasonably bear the interpretation tliat he docs not approve of our having redeemed our pledge to Belgium, which is next door to a pro-German sentiment. But Mr. Thomsen may have expressed his real meaning inaptly. In the sense 1 that sho was not allied with any of the four nations mentioned by Mr. Thomsen, it is true that England stood alone in ISSS. But it is also true tliat tho ■ colonial ambitions of two out of the four—Belgium and Italy—in no way conflicted, with English interests. And' under no imaginable circumstances could either Belgium or Italy be pictured as joining in war against Great Britain. Mr. Thomson's argument does not permit aim to be quito fair to Italy's powers of memory. Apart from this, Belgium had no navy and little of an army, and Italy had little of a navy and her army was sadly in need of reorganisation, as Abyssinia- taught tho "world. But I will meet Mr. Thomsen on his own ground. I will assume his combination of Powers to be a fact and not a fancy. They were powej'less. In 1885, the British Nary ivas, relatively, much ■stronger than in August, 1914. It had complete command of every sea. It could have defeated tho assembled navies of the world with ease. Consequently the combination would have been powerless, as Germany, Austria, France, and Russia still were in 1896 (Jameson raid), and in 1899-1902.. Our trade routes were safe, . and Mr. Gladstone liad nothing to iear. But more than this can be .said. The most powerful power in Mr. Thomson's combination, Germany, would never hate attempted to tight us on a question of colonies iu»1885. Bismarck then was at the zenith of his power. Me was never in favour of colonial expansion, and the German colonial party iu -Germany was small, and, comparatively, uiiintluential. When at the solicitation of Dr. Peters, Herr Luderitz and a few others, he sent his son to England to "bluff" the 4 Liberal Government out of Heligoland and some colonies, he did the utmost that he could be persuaded to do. "Walfisch Bay, tho one. little hit of British territory which Mr. Gladstono retained on the south-west coast, he left totally defenceless, thereby annulling its strategic value. Its main advantage to us so far has been that, the Germans could not fortify it. On the East Coast, Mr. Gladstone would also liavo surrendered St. Lucia Bay, which is just north of Natal. He was only prevented from, doing so, by some very plain speaking on the part of the colonists. St. Lucia Bay is tho best natural harbour on the East Coast, but its development has so far been hindered by tho South African coast towns. As Bismarck's "Memoirs" show, the German Colonial party wore very irate at Count Herbert's "failure to squeeze St. Lucia Bay out of Mr. Gladstone also. Zanzibar is a good harbour, but the place is not exactly a sanatorium. St. Lucia Bay is a far. | healthier place. Mr. Thomsen's simile' is neat, but hardly satisfying. Englaud may have kept the two door keys, but slie also kept tho front doors permanently unlocked, for Mr. Gladstono did not fortify cither "Walfisch Bay or St. Lucia Bay. . In liis last paragraph, Mr. Thomsen reverts to the methods of liis first paragraph. Neither I nor any other Imperialist have ever advocated or dreamt of advocating the policy contained in tho maxim he quotes. It is a maxim with an unpleasantly strong German flavour, and it does not appeal to an English I>alate. Those who think as I do, believe that true Imperial policy lies in assuring, a'mongst other things, that the British race of to-day shall hand down to its descendants unimpaired the glorious inheritance that it received from its forbears.—l am, etc., ENGLISHMAN. ' January 9, 1910.