PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2666, 11 January 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

The evacuation, without loss of life, of the western zone of the Gallipoli Peninsula was hailed, and not without reason, as a marvellous military feat, but a greater marvel is now reported in tne withdrawal of the . remaining British forces— those which were holding a line across tho southern end of the Peninsula, confronting the Achx Baba' ridge. Instead of profiting by the plain warning afforded them in the earlier withdrawal, the Turks have again been hoodwinked in the selfsame fashion. _ The second withdrawal following so closely on the first is a striking proof that sheer audacity sometimes pays handsomely in war. All that has been said about the perfection of military and naval organisation evidenced in the brilliant success of the western withdrawal must be echocd and cmpha.sised in regard to the operation now reported. In the southern area, as in the western zone, any defect in the British organisation would have involved a terribly costly rearguard action. But tho second withdrawal is a more wonderful feat than the first, _ because the first served as a warning which might well have made the later enterprise impossible. In point of fact the naval and, military authorities concerned seem to have dealt with the perilous task of evacuating Gallipoli as calmly and methodically as if they had been dealing with a crush of holiday traffic, and the Turks, to whom they have left their empty trenches and some worn-out guns, effectively destroyed, must be a very astonished and disappointed lot of men. It is not only the Turks who will be astonished at the second evacuation, and indeed it has_ involved a, policy so bold and audacious that it would scarcely have been resorted to save under pressure of necessity. Tho reason that the Capo Holies area was not evacuated simultaneously with the western zone is presumably that the available transport licet and tho naval squadron were incapable of handling so lug a task in a single instalment. The consideration is bo

obvious that it might have been expected to occur to the Turks and make them vigilant in -a- degree which would have precluded the possibility of an unmolested withdrawal from Cape Holies. * * * As regards the ground occupied, the. Allies-were hardly more favourably placcd in the south than in the west. In the latter area they occupied at most points a narrow strip of coastal territory, overlooked by higher ground in possession of the onemy, and with the opposing lines in close contact. At some places the trendies were only fifty yards apart. In the south the Allies lield a short line across the Peninsula, backed by a few square miles of country, but here, also, the enemy holcl dominating heights and the trenches in places closely approached. The shortness of their front was an advantage to the Allies, but it was hardly an advantage that in the process of withdrawal portion of their forces had to 'traverse a considerable extent of broken ground in order to reach the embarkation beaches. **** . j • There is no doubt that the complete evacuation of Gallipoli is a matter for pure congratulation from the standpoint of the Allies. The offensive campaign was abandoned when the positions at Anzac and Suvla Bay were given up and the withdrawal as a whole means that a useful army, which was unprofitably locked up, has been released for service where it can be employed to the best advantage. While it was still thought that the southern positions would be retained, the point was made that the British guns commanded the entrance to the Dardanelles, and so contributed to an effective blockade of Turkey. This contention carried a certain amount of weight-, but the blockado can no doubt be effectively maintained by the Navy, and in any case it is the interior land communications of the Turks which must now command chief The British and Frcnch troops in the southern part of the Gallipoli Peninsula were posted on the verge of a fortress which it was no longer deemed practicable to assault. They are now free to P.dt against the enemy under vastly more favourable circumstances vmd the predominant sentiment awakened by the news of their happy release, as in the case of the earlier withdrawal, must be one of relief and gratification. Even if the extreme view were taken that ' the sacrifices incurred in Gallipoli have been incurred in vain, there would still 'be every reason for satisfaction in the safe withdrawal of the army —an operation which lately seemed \mpossible, save at a heavy cost in lives. * # * *

In one respect the Turks have been a little quicker to rise to the occasion than when Anzac and Suvla Bay were evacuated. Their reports of a great offensive in the western ■zone, and of the capture of much booty, were as belated as their recognition of the fact-that they had been outwitted and deceived. In the present instance their report that as the result of a great battle the British have been compelled to completely evacuate the southern area arrives on the heels of British messages reporting the evacuation. Prompt as itus, the Turkish story is a clumsy effort, The battle of which it tells was never fought, and it concludes with the naive confession that not a single Britisher remains behind. Had the evacuation been compelled by s'trokc of battle, it is likely that not a few Britishers would have remained behind.

The moral effect of the complete abandonment of the land campaign at the Dardanelles is not altogether to be ignored, but while they are giving up the direct attack upon the Narrows, the Allies are 'visibly strengthening their position elsewhere in the Near East and in the war as a whole. Even neutrals not without pro-German leanings may be expected to realise that Constantinople is now much more formidably menaced than when the Gallipoli campaign was in full swing, and that the actual effect of abandoning Gallipoli is to enlarge the offensive power and scope of the Allies —a fact of which positive demonstration may reasonably be expected before many months have passed. * * * '* Though the prospect of an enemy attack upon the Allies at Salonika is apparently being seriously canvassed in London and Paris, such details as body forth general predictions on the subject to-day do not maljg them very 'convincing. The enemy is said to be concentrating four German and seven Bulgarian divisions in preparation for his offensive. This would amount to a total force of about 200,000 men, and it is easy to agree with the Paris report which declares that such a force is quite inadequate to attack an Allied army of 210,000 men holding an immensely strong defensive line. The odds would, in fact, be so greatly against the enemy in these circumstances that it must be supposed either that he does not really contemplate an attack or that his strength has not been ' fully disclosed.

The positive statement that an attack on Salonika is expected cannot be altogether disregarded, but there are several factors which make against the concentration -of a powerful enemy army in the Balkans. Rising tension on the Western front, and the Russian offensive in Bukowina and further north must tend to discourage any considerable movement of German and' Austrian tropps iuto the Balkans, and may easily induce a movement in the opposite direction. At the same timo the Bulgarians already have their hands fairly full. They have wide areas of invaded territory to garrison and extensive frontiers to guard, and it would probably tax their resources to find in addition such a force as they are said to have massed on the Greek frontier. Germany has another source of military strength in 'Turkey, but it is probably impracticable to employ Turks against the Allies at Salonika. It is not by any means certain that the Turks would conscnt to be so employed, or that if they_ did the Bulgars would tolerate their aid and the Greeks 'their intrusion into Greek territory. All things considered"it is not easy to see where Germany can find such an army "as would enable her to attack the Salonika lines - with any hopes of success. The evacuation of Gallipoli must further tend to discourage the enterprise since it places an additional mobile forcc at the disposal of the Allies.

Uneasy stories are again afloat about Greece, but the worst suggested is that she may throw her frontiers open to the Bulgarians as well as to' the Germans, and even so Kino'Cosstastise is said to be apprehensive that the entry of the Bulgarians may inflame his own trooos

and precipitate a collision. As current reports go the Bulgarians are preparing to cross the "Greek frontier by way of the Monastir railway as well as along the yardar lino, and if such an entry is permitted it will indicate that pro-Germanism is not quite at its last gasp in Greece. Against rumours of this kind, however, there is to be set the fact that the Allies have been able to effect extensive" arrests of enemy subjects at Salonika without coming to any open breach with the Greek Government. Germany is furiously demanding redress from Greece over this matter. * * * No further event of importance is reported on the Ilussian southern front at time of writing, but there is a message from Bucharest which declares that the Bussians have massed 800,000 men and 3500 guns in Bukowina. This must be set down as gross exaggeration, but there is no reason to doubt that the offensive is serving its purpose in compelling the enemy to transfer large reserves from other theatres. _ Most of the news from the Western front to-day is of a normal trend, but an exception is the loss by the French of the much-disputed summit of Hartmannsweilerkopf (in Alsace) and of another summit immediately to the south. * * ;» « The loss of the battleship King Edward VII, sunk .by a mine, is no light matter, for she was one of the finest British ships of the pre-Dread-nought type. Though hardly fit to take.her place in the Grand Fleet as it is now constituted, such a ship was still capable of rendering useful service. _ The one redeeming feature of the disaster is that it was not ak tended by loss of life. tf * * Another naval item to-day relates to the Goeben, and is interesting as affording definite evidence that she is still afloat in fairly serviceable condition/ The news may be accepted as reliable, since it is contained in a Bussian communique. It is to the effect that the Goeben was engaged by Russian torpedoers, and at long range by a Bussian battleship, from which slie x ultimately sought safety in flight. The Goeben's performance doe's not seem to have been very inspiring, but her escajo at speed goes to suggest that she is less seriously damaged than some reports have averred.