GALLIPOLI DISPATCHES

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2664, 8 January 1916, Page 5

GALLIPOLI DISPATCHES

A FULL SUMMARY WHY SIR lAN HAMILTON FAILED' WARM PRAISE FOR THE ANZAC BOYS

By Telegraph—Press Association—Copyright London, January 6. Sir lan Hamilton, dealing with Gallipoli, recalls the fact thai Lord Kitchener iu June promised him three regulal' and two Territorial divisions of infantry, and that their concentration would be complete by August 10. After rejecting the possibility of ail advance from Cape Helios, or a disembarkation on the Asiatic side followed by a inarch 011 Olianak, the possibilities were a landing at Enos, m order to seizo the neck of the isthmus of Bulair, or the reinforcement of the Australians and ,N T ew Zealandcrs to make a combined landing at Suvla. Bay. Admiral De Robeck's naval objections to the lauding at Enos were well nigh insurmountable. Owing to submarines all reinforcements liad to bo brought up from Mudros to Helles and Anzac by night by a fleet of mine-sweepers and trawlers. The landing at Bulair would have added fifty miles, which was too severo a strain on I the capacities of the flotilla. It was impossible to guard against submarine attacks. At Enos the enemy would have time to organise a formidable opposition by means of the troops in Thrace, therelore lie determined to storm the dominating height, Ilill 305, with the capture of Maidos and Gaba Tepe as a, sequel. From the very .first lie had hoped the landing force under Sari Bail- would enable ns to strangle the Turkish communications, but the hopes had not borne fruit; nevertheless, the Australians and New Zealrfnders rooted themselves very near enemy's vitals. Their tenacity and courage still held open the' doorway whence one strong thrust forward would have given us the command of- tile Narrows. Tasmania Post Attaok. "In order to carry out the |>lan for smuggling a large number of troop 3 to Anzac and landing a large force at Suvla, it was essential to ' eliminate moonlight. Unless the plunge was taken in the second week ot August the whole venture must bo postponed for a month. Having decided on the plan and the date,- it was necessary to. fill up the intervening period with as much lighting as possible. Working out the ammunition allowance, I found I could accumulate enough high explosives to deliver one serious attack every three weeks. One of these actions was tho .attack at the Tasmania Post, which was threatened by the extension of tho Turkish t-rcncli. The task of capturing this was entrusted to the 3rd Australian Brigade. On July 31 four assaulting parties of tho 11th Battalion dashed forward and crossed our barbed wire on planks. Directly a series of mines were fired, and they were iiito the craters before tho whole of tho debris had fallen. There were only eleveii killed and soventy-four wounded, compared with 100 Turkish killed. Hoodwinking the Turks. "August 6 was now approaching, and in order to divert the enemy from the main strategical "conception a certain amoiiut of ingenuity was essential. My scheme fur hoodwinking the Turks included, firstly, strategical diversions intended to draw away enemy reserves not yet landed on tliePeninsula; secondly, a tactical diversion meant to hold up reserves already oil the Peninsula. The strategical diversions included a surprise landing north of the Gulf of Saros, demonstrations of warships opposite Mitylene, a concentration, at Mitylene, and inspections at Mitylene by' Admiral De liobeck and myself. _ The tactical diversions included maintaining the attack at Helles, and an attack on the Lone Pine trenfihefi. As a result the Turks, despite their excellent spy system, were completely off their guard at dawn on the 7th. It was impossible to concentrate on Peninsula even one-third of the fresh ttoops required for the attack. The forces destined for the offensive were, the day before the battlo at Aiizac, Imliroß, Mudros, and Mitylene. The last three detachments were 14, 60, and 120 miles from the arena of tho attack. I belipvo. that tho clearness and completeness of the General Staff's orders for this concentration and landing will hereafter be studied as models in military academics.. An enormous quantity of water liad been secretly stowed in a' reservoir at Anzac, holding 30.000 gallons, and petroleum tins holding 80,000 gallons were collected. ' "Accidents interfered with both plans, hut Anzaff, ever resourceful in the facc of misadventures, did not meet the disaster with folded liands.

Operations at Anzac, "1 took up my headquarters at luibros, where I' was forty-five minutes from Holies, forty from Anzac, and fifty from Suvla. The attack at Helles on the 6th ijhowed that the Turks, who had been regarded as a moral : y lialfbeaten enemy, Were again offering _ as stout a resistance as to the original landing. This was duo to news of the Austro-German atlvanco in Russia and tho arrival of reinforcements at Holies. Although the attacks wore only a partial success, they drew certain Turkish reinforcemonts to the southern area." Passing to the operations at Anzac, Sir lan Hamilton says: "The entire, details of tho operations wore _tormu» lated by General Birdwood. subject to my final approval,. The local preparations reflect tha greatest credit not only 011 General Birdwood atid his staff, but on the troops/ who toiled like slaves to accumulate food, drink, munitions, and accommodation for the extra troops to be lauded. This necessitated immense work in preparing concealed bivouacs and making interior communications. Tho Australians and New Zealanders worked entirely by night, without complaint. Tile efforts of these much-tried troops are as much to their credit as their heroism in tho following battles. 'Hip reinfoi'cing troops wore shipped into Anzac very silently. They werb tucked nivay from tho enemy aeroplanes' observations in prepared hiding-places.

Assault on Lone Pine. "The scheme was carried out without a hitch. J much .doubt whether a more pregnant enterprise than the landing of so large a force under the very eyes of the enoiiiy lind keeping it concealed for tlireo days is recorded in the annals of war. General Birdwood's troops totalled 37,000 rifles and 72 gnns,- supported by two cruisers, four monitors, and two destroyers. The enemy's left and centre were subjected to a slow bombardment for three days, and the assault on tho Lono l'ine ontrenchmont was ordered on tho afternoon of August 6, with the object of drawing Turkish reserves from the grand attack. Major-General Walker, of tho Ist Division, workod out the schcnic with forethought. "Tho assault was entrusted to General Smythe, of tho ls.t Brigj.do, and was carried out by tho 2nd, 3rd, and •ltli Australian Battalions. Tho first rush across the open was a regular race aacinst death. Then there was a terrible moment, whon it seemed physically ijruxvssible to ponotuuo tho trendies.

The overhead cover of stout pino beams resisted all individual efforts, yot the loopholes continued to spit firo. Groups of men then bodily lifted up the beams, and individual soldiers leapt down into the semi-darkness of tlio galleries amongst the Turks Within Fovea minutes the 3rd and 4th Battalions wore well wifliiu tho enemy's vitals. Tho reserve 2nd Battalion advanced over their parapets and niado good tho wliolo of the trenches. Tho Turks organised a violent counter-attack, wlion wave upon wave of the onemy swept forward with tho bayonet. The battle continued Until August 12. The Turks were in great force, and very full of fight, yet o weak Australian brigade, numbering 2000, supported battalions, carried Lone Pine under tho eves of a whole enemy division, and maintained a grip like a vice for sis days. Plan of the Real Push. "Successive counter-attacks and other frontal attacks at Anzac were less fortunate, but they kopt tho Turkish reserve on Battleship Hill from becoming available,to meet the real push, which was a night attack on the summits of Sari Bail- Ridge, Our object was to effect a lodgment alotig tho crest of the main ridge with two columns of troops. We planned that two assaulting columns should work up the three ravines aiid two should storm tho high ridge. Those were preceded by two covering columns, of which the first was to capture the onemy's positions commanding tho foot hills. The other was to strike out northwards until from Damajclik Bair it could guard the left flank of the Column assaulting Sari Bair from the enemy in the Anafarta Valley, The whole of this big attack was uiidef General Godley. "The Anzacs, assisted by the warship Colne (destroyo') had been educating the Turks. '.Pin's is how they lost % redoubt near Tabletop. Every night at 9 o'clock the Colne threw its search-' light and bombarded the .redoubt for ten minutes. Then there was ten minutes' interval,' a second illuminatiotL and bombardment, concluding precisely" at 9.30 i The idea was for the enemy to get tho habit of taking the searchlight as a hint to cloar out until tlie shelling ended. On the night of the 6th the searchlight switched off at 9.30. Instantly our men- poured out of the jungle of scrub into tho enemy redoubt. Tho whole series of entrenchments were carried by 11 o'clock."

Attack on Chalak Dere. Sir lan Hamilton, referring to the at. tack on-Chalak Dere, remarks:—'"This was less cleanly carried out than the, attack-on Lone Pino; indeed, it made an ugly start. A littlo column of stormers was hold up by biirbed wi ro of unexampled' height and depth, the solidity of which completely closed tlie, ravine. 'Here a splendid body of men, the Otago Mounted Rifles, lost some of their bravest and' Lest moil. "The desperate passage, was forced with most conspicuous cool couragc by Captain Shera and a party of New Zealand Engineers, supported by Maoris, who are descendants of tho warriors or tho Gate Pah. Simultaneously the attack on "Tabletop was launched cover of tho Colne's heavy, boinbard-. Wont. The banks were so steep" J thab Tabletop ' gives the impression of a mushroom, tho summit bulging over tho stem, biit as faith "moves mountains, so valoui' carries them. , Praise for New Zealanders, "The Turks fought bravely. The iingio of tlie Tablet-op's ascent was recognised in the regulations as impracticable for infantry, but neither the Turks nor the angles of ascent were destined to stop Brigadier-General Sir A. H. Russell and his New Zealandcrs that higlit. .There are moments of battle when men become supermen. This was one of those moments. The scarped heights were scaled and tho plateau carried at midnight. With this brilliant feat the task of the right covering force ended in attacks made with bayonet and bomb only, the magazines of the rifles being empty by order. No words can do justice to the achievement- of Briga-(iief-Geiieral Rtissell and the New Zealand Mounted Rifles, the Otago Rifles; the Maoris, and the New Zealand Field Troops.

Crand Attack in Full Swing. "Meanwhile on the right tho assaulting column, under Brigadier-General 11.I 1 . E. Johnston, with the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, an Indian mounted battery. and a company of New Zealand Engineers, entered the southerly ravines at midnight, and commenced ' a-hotly-contested light on tho trenches on tho lower part- o'f Rhododendron Spur, whilst tho Chalak Dero column pressed Up the valley. "The grand attack was now in full swing, but tho country gavq new sensations in cliff-climbing, evon to those officers and men wlio had graduated over the goat-tracks of Anzac. Tho darkness of the night, tho density of the scrub, tho slow progress on hands and knees up the spurs, sheer physical fatigue, and the exhaustion of spirit, cjuo to repeated hair-breadtli escapesall these combined to take the edge off tbe energies of the troops._ . ' "The 4th Australian Brigade, with tho left assaulting column, under Bri-gadier-General Cox, struggled on, fighting hard as it went, making for Hi'l 305. Tho crest line was not captured at dawn, although, considering all things, Cox's column had .made a marvellous advance ; the enemy being flung from ridge fc> ndge. "An excellent line for tin? renewal of tho attack was scoured, and the auspices were propitious except for the exhaustion of tho troops. "Brigadier-General Johnston's column, led by tho Otago Battalion, had to pick its way amongst pitfalls, and forced a passage through the scrub, in Chalak Derc. It was Gin the morning before the bulk of the column joifr' ed up.

A Feat without Parallel. "The Canterbury Battalion, on tin lower slopes of Rhododendron Spur, eventually entrenched on tlio top of the spur, within a quarter of a mile of Cliunuk Bair, which would have been victory. Soon after, the 4th Australian Brigade, assisted by the 14th Siklia,; Was ordered to assault Hill 305. "The enemy's reserves were now moving up from Battleship Hill to the' attack, and the right assaulting column on Cliunuk Bair was checked. : The only possibility was to hold fast on the Asmak Dero watershed, whilst fresh assault was launched. _ "Our aims at Cliunuk Bair were not •fully attained in the afternoon. The hoped-for help from Suvla was not ■forthcoming. But' I fully endorso Genoral Birdwood's words, that the troops had performed a feat without a parallel. Great- kudos is duo to Major-Generals Goilley and. Shaw. Generals llusselL

Johnston, Cox, and Travers, but most . W all to the rank and file. i Reconnaissances at Sari Bair. , "During the afternoon of the 7th, reconnaissances were carried out at Sari , Bair, and the troops prepared for fresh advances by three columns early in tho inorning. By the first faint glimmer of dawn an observer saw figures moving , on the skyline of Chunuk Bair. Were they our men or Turks? Telescopes were anxiously adjusted, and as the , light grey stronger the ir.eu wero seen to ho climbing up from our side of the : ridgo. They were our own fellows—thi/ topmost summit was ours. General .. -Johnston's column on tho right, headed by i the Wellington Battalion, supported byvthe'Auokland- Mounted Rifles, the 'Maoris, and the 7th Gloucesters,, led ' most gallantly by : Lieut.-Colonel - Malone, raced each other up tho steep. ■'Nothing could check them. They went . toamtilr'tho last' determined' rush, and ■ fixed.: .themselves firmly on the crest of. Jthe'knoll. :Colonel Malono was mortal-ly-wounded as ho was marking out the Imoito be held. i . -."The 7th Gloucesters.suffered terrible Josses V.-.. Tho <fire' was: so hot,, ' their : trenches being only 6ix inches deep, that;every officer, sergeant-major, and . quartermaster-sergeant was killed" ; or •wounded. ! Yet this battalion of tho i New.'Army fought from midday till su'n.set without any officers. Tho -Ith Aus-.-itralian' Brigade, advancing from Asmak iDore, on the left,, was meanwhile held •up by cunnmgly-placed machine guns. '•AVhdii .'heavyi columns ,of Turkish' rein- ■ forcoments approached, tho Australians, .who wero- virtually surrounded, were ■ withdrawn to their original position, •' after, losing over a thousand men. Here they stood, though half dead with thirst and fatigue, 'and bloodily repulsed attack after attack. Another Grand Attack. "So matters stood at noon on tho 1 8th. Tho expected support from Suvla still hung fire, . but .the . capture of Chunuk Bair was a presage of victory. The troops were full of fight, so I decided upon essaying another grand attack, with JolinstoiPs; Cox's, and Baldwin's columns. The Chunuk Bair ridge . and -Hill' Q. were heavily shelled at dawn on the 9th, until tho whole ridge was a mass of flames'and smoke, from which huge clouds of dust drifted slowly, ill strange patterns towards the sky. General Baldwin was in command of tho 38tli.' Brigade of the. New Army, and these ti;oops were massed behind the trenches of the New Zealand Brigade. - General Baldwin lost his way, through no fault of his own. ' When tho Crhurlks attacked Sari Bail', Genoral Baldwin's column was a long way . off, and, instead of having his, support, there ivas a Turkish counter-charge., ! 'The G-hurkas and Lancashires saw the promised laud, but. were forced to fall ! back.oyer.the crest....-■ '■;■', .

: ."Other battalions of- tho iiew army I attacked with fine audacity, but the Turks were now lining the whole crest in overwhelming numbers. The enemy much encouraged,' turned his attention to the New Zealand troops :• and other battalions,holding south-west Chunuk bair. Constant attacks, urged with fanatical .persistence, met with sterner, .resolution Although our troops were greatly exhausted by the end of the day, still they kept a'footing."on. th© summit which covered the. Narrows: , They saw' .the roads leading to Bulair and Constantinople. Eight hundred iheh. held i the crest of Chunuk - Bail- in slight ■trenches hastily dug, but the .fatigue of tho. New Zealanders. and the fire of .tho enemy prevented solid work' in the trenches, which .wero. not -protected fipm-fire:, The Ist Australian Brigade was now reduced from - 2000 .to -1000. ■Jhei total.oasaialties on the evening of the. 9th/were 8500. Tho troops were still m. extraordinary good heart, and nothing could damp their --keenness.. Turks Deliver an Assault. - "Tho New Zealanders and the new army at Chunuk Bair were relieved at night ha If-dead from fatigue.' Chunuk Bair, which they had so magnificently'' held, was handed over to tho 6th North Lancashire:. and .the oth'Wiltsliires. ' v vTurks delivered a'grand 'assault at daybreak on -the 10th. .The North Lancashires. 'were: simply overwhelmed ■uj-tho shallow trenches by sheer weight of numbers, whilst, the Wilts, who were caught in:the'"open, -were literally almost . annihilated. The. assaulting column consisted, of a full division plus t-hrce battalions. .It swept, over the ci est, and swarmed upon. .Baldwin's column, which was only, extricated after Buttering the 'heaviest losses. :

"Now It Was Out; Turn." . "Now it was our turn. ' The'-War- ;.. fillips and tlie New- Zealand and Austraif y lian artillery got. the chance of a- life- . _timo. An iron rain fell>on the succes- • sivo solid lines of Turks. . Ten mii chine-guns of the New Zealand infantry i played oil the serried, ranks . at close range until the barrels were red-hot , Only a handful straggled back to,their ?, o\yn side,of Ohunuk Bair. - iv"? y H lO eve,lin g of the 10th General uirdwood s casualties were 12,000; in-' ;■■ : eluding, the largest, proportion of the i : . officers. The Grand Coup Had Failed. .."Tim grand coup had failed' to come in. The Narrows were beyond field- [ , gun_range. It was not General Bird--■Wood s fault or that of any officers aud' « i mon of, Ms command. General Bird-- ; wood ; had done all that mortal ,nan • ' could do. . "General Birdwood handled two divisions with conspicuous ability/ ". The troops faced death with joyous alac-. •rity, as if engaging in some form of exciting recreation—a tiling that astonished even an old campaigner like'mv- : self. • "The operations at Suvla. Bay were i entrusted to Stopioid.; It was 'believed that the Turks' , defences were under 4000. The lltli Division was ferried from Imbros, dis- ; embarking an half an hour. After tho attack on the northern flank at Anzac I -hoped, that Chocolato Hills would bo captured by daybreak. 'l'he surprise of tho lurks was complete. The wea- - ■tli.nr was of the hottest, and-the . new troops sufiered much from lack of : water.

The Suvla Failure. "Partly owing to the enemy's fire and partly owing to want of" 'jious/ which is second,nature to an old campaigner, ,th'ey : hung. fire. Lieut.-General IStopford, recollecting tho vast • issues hanging on success in forestalling the enemy, urged.'the-divisional commanders to. push on. They believed themselves unable to move owing to tho men /being exhausted by the fighting on the 7th at Suvla. The conmanders overlooked the fact that the half-defeated Turks were equally exhausted. An advance was the simplest and swiftest method of solving tue water trouble and other difficulties. The divisional tommanders' objections overbore Lieut.General. Stopford's resolution. He told them ho did not wish them to make frontal attacks on entrenched positions, "but desired them to turn any trenches possifile. _ This instruction was the root of our failure to make use of the priceless daylight hours on August 8. "Driving power was required, even a' certain ruthlessness, to brush aside the pleas for respite for the.tired troops. "Tho one fatal error ,was that inertia prevailed. I went to Suvla when I found , tho battle going wrong, and ordered my general reserve to Suvla, hoping to enable Stopford to securo commanding ground at tho bay. Finally I appointed Major-Gencral De Lislo in Stopford's place. "When tho fighting ended General Birdhvood was commanding twenty-five thousand rides; General Davies, at Helles, twenty-threo thousand, in addition to seventeen thousand French. The. Turks had one hundred and tcn_

S thousand, with' all the advantages of the ground." Reinforcements wanted. ; Sir lan'a report concluded:—"l 1 therefore sent your Lordship a- long 1 cable asking for fifty thousand fresh ! rifles of British division», and also fortyfivo thousand under the establishment. ■ If: the_ reinforcements had been sent 1 immediately, it 6cemed a'certaintj', Im--1 manly speaking, that wo could still 1 clear a passage for the fleot to Constantinople. It may bo judged how deep' was my disappointment when 1 ' learned that essential reinforcements and munitions could not be sent, the reason given preventiug any further insistence. "Your Lordship cabled on October 11 asking for an estimate of the losses involved in evacuation of the Peninsula. I replied on the ISt.'i that such steps seemed to me unthinkable. I received a cable on the 16th recalling me to London, as tho Government desired a fresh ■unbiased! opinion on the question of early evacuation. So I farewelled, with special God speed, the campaigners who had served mo right through from those terrible yet most glorious early days—tho incomparable 29th Division, young veterans, the Naval Division, the over-victorious Australians find Now Zenlanders, the stout East Lancashires, end my brave fellow countrymen from the Lowlands of land."(Signed) lAN HAMILTON. THE FINAL QUESTION. COMMENT BY THE "TIMES."-: (Rec. Jauuary 7, 11.43 p.m.) London, January 7. The "Times" comments on Sir lan Hamilton's dispatch and says: "Paralysis overtook the Government after their refusal of Sir Tan Hamilton's request for more men, and tho actual abandonment was delayed for four months, giving point to Sir Edward Carson's declaration that the Government could not make up their minds. Tho -Suvla. landing was in many respects deplorable, ebut when everybody olse was amply aild desorvedly blamed, the final question to be answered is why Sir lan Hamilton, ivlio was on the spot and knew the right course to follow, meekly effaccd himself at the critical moment." THE BUVLA FAILURE. ' NO FORMAL INQUIRY HELD. (Rec. January 7. 8.40 p.m.) London, January 6. Mr. H. J. Tennant. (Under-Secretary for War) stated in the Houso of Commons that the circumstances leading to the Suvla failure had been carefully considered, but there had not been, a formal inquiry.