THE BALKAN TANGLE

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2657, 31 December 1915, Page 6

THE BALKAN TANGLE

(By G. E. A.)

To an average observer, the actions of tho Balkan (states, and the motives which prompted them, must have seemed as bewildering as a jig-saw puzzlo. Beyond doubt our Foreign Office was from the first woll aware of the difficulties and uncertainties of tho position; but was obviously unable to diseloso these to tho public. It should bo possible, however, by considering tho past history of those puzzling peoples and studying the writings of these who know most about them to unravel some of tho tangled skein. In .1912 Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria united to fight and beat Turkey, which they did very thoroughly. As soon as that war was over, Rumania, who had conserved her power by an attitude of neutrality, took advantage' of Bulgaria's exhaustion, and joined with Greece andlSerbia to wrest from her (Bulgaria) much of what she had won.by hard fighting and great sacrifices. At the same time, Turkey, taking advantage of Bulgaria's prostration, crept back, aud regained a large slice of valuable territory which she had lost during the ,late war. Thus Bulgaria, after all, found herself, by the faithlessness of her late allies, robbed of nearly all she had fought for and won. It was a dirty piece of work, and reflects discredit certainly on Serbia and Greece. The new- boundaries of Bulgaria and the other States were fixed, so. far as any Balkan pledge could li- ihein, by the Treaty of Bucharest; though it was evident that the code of eoliiis prevalent among these States made it impossible to rely on assurances or even on treaties. ' Can, then, Bulgaria's attitude be wondered at? Britain's Change of Policy. When the present war broice out in August, 1914, Austria threatened fcerlia witli destruction, and Russia sprang to tho rescue of her little dlav sister. Germany and France'prepared to hack their respective allies. England, though friendly to France and Kussia, would have remained neutral had not Germany torn up the treaty guaranteeing Belgian neutrality, of which she and England were joint guarantors. England had no option. Her honour demanded this. She stated her position clearly, saying that the Serbian affair was no business of hers, and that she, was not concerned to light in a Balkan quarrel. But when Germany compelled her to draw sword, she became a full ally of Russia and France; and had to bo loyal to the programme agreed upon by the Council of the Allies. One of the chief aims of Russia was that the Turk should be. driven out of Europe, and Constantinople handed over to her. For generations it had been her dearest wish thus to gain .a southern outlet to the open sea. England's ancient policy had been to thwart this, and to prop up Turkey in Constantinople. The Crimean war was fought for this object. It was only in later years- that the oratory of >, Gladstone converted his party to a pro-Rus-sian policy, and declared that the Turk must be driven "bag and baggage" out of Europe. Later oil even the Conservatives held that England .had been "backing the wrong horse," and latterly England, wisely or unwisely, has shown no antagonism to the policy of supplanting Turkey by Russia at Constantinople. Thus was brought home to all, what our 6tulfs had realised before, that the - key of the whole war was to enable Russia to equip her vast armies. The Archangel and Siberian routes were not enough.- It was decided to attempt to seize the Dardanelles by a coup de main and force the straits, so as to allow ingress of munitions and egress, of wheat to pay for tliem. This attempt for various reasons failed. Ono reason for this.was isaid to. have been the failure of . Greece to fulfil her profnfse to solid an expedition to lielp us. Whether, or not she broke this promise she certainly failed to carry out her treaty engagement to go to tho assistance of Serbia, when '.attacked by Germany, Austria, and Bulgaria., Her behaviour and that of Rumania, in their persistent attitude of neutrality, have been a disappointment and a puzzle. Soon after the w4r, began, Britain and France had with infinite stubbornness «nd heroism broken the on-rash of the German millions, escaped disaster by a hair's' breadth, and finally taken up an impregnable position against which the enemy dashed itself in vain. All through the first winter the line was held in tho West. Russia in the meanwhile had invaded Galicia, and from the passes of the Carpathians was threatening to sweep over, the plains of Hungary. Thus the Allies had won invaluable time for organising their men and munitions, preparatory to a big advance in the spring. .This was essential, since Germany's enemies had not expected the war, for which she and Austria were fully prepared. About this time a terrible calamity befell Russia. Her one and only factory for munitions, near. Potrograd, was destroyed by traitorous German workmen; and disaster stared her in the face. Germany launched huge forces at her disabled foe and drove her out of Galicia and Poland. Itwas in vain that the Allies poured streams of munitions through Archangel and along the Siberian railway. It was too late to stay the debacle, and Russia had to retreat far back towards Petrograd and Moscow. But she was not broken, and Germany was_ at last brought up' short against an impervious line of defence. The Key to the Situation. Possibly the key will bo found somewhere in the following directionßulgaria and Serbia were on racial grounds favourable to Russia, but Germany, by flattering the ambition of the Bulgarian court, detached that country from the Russian interest, and probably promised that it should have supremacy in the Balkans. Anyhow, her diplomacy succeeded, but she was greatly helped : by tho bitter hostility roused in Bulgaria by the treachery of her former allies, Greece and Serbia, after the last -war, and tho determination to get back the territorv filched from her. Probably all the Balkan States, including Bulgaria, would like to see Turkey ejected from Constantinople. So far there is agreement, hut there is a radical divergence of view over the question of who is to be' her successor. The Allies are, I presume, pledged to pliicc Russia there; and must, if they win, carry out that pledge unless Russia, shall see fit to waive her claim. Neither France, Britain, nor Italy cares much who owns Constantinople, provided the Straits aro internationalised and free. The only owner which Britain must bar is one who might uso it as a taking-o(f place for a hostile spring at our Eastern Empire. Thus neither Germany nor any'of her Allies could be tolerated by her on any account, She would not object to Russia, Greece, or Rouniania, nor would she object (but possibly prefer) to leave Turkey whore she is, provided she would be friondly and consent to internationalise the Straits. Thus, wo have Russia claiming Constantinople, and her Allies perforce backing her claim. On the other hand, Greece and Rumania, having no racial tie or sympathy with Russia, make a similar claim, and refuse to fire a shot or move a single soldier to help to establish Russia there. And yet it is vital and urgent for Russia to get her munitions through the Dardanelles and get her wheat out. The attempt to force tho passage has failed, and docs not seom likely to succeed. What next? It may be suspected that the German talk about getting to Constantinople has been largely a bluff to cover her real designs on Salonika. For the last fifty years Austria has desired to own that port us wall as tho Arlrintio co.ißt, sua .jpbablv it will be found that tho Allies,

knew what her real aim has been, ana so, with Greece's tacit consent, have seized and fortified it. The Allies have been blamed for not having saved Serbia, but the blamo must rest not on them, but on Greece, who was hound by a solemn treaty to do so. The Allies were ready io help Greece in this, but when slio dishonourably .repudiated her promise, and showed signs of doubtful friendship to us, it was manifestly impossible for our Army to advance from. ■Salonika to Serbia, with a hostile Bulgaria on our right flank and a doubtful Greece 011 our left. All we could do was to thwart Iho Austrian, aim by fortifying Salonika, make a diversion by attacking Bulgaria, and watch the shifty Greek. ' An Understanding with TurUoy. So far the Allies have failed to placo Russia ill Constantinople. What are their prospects of being able to do so m tho future?- Can Russia advance from the oast along tho coast of Asia Minor, or can she invade Bulgaria and Turkey through Varna? Can the Allies roacli Constantinople from Salonika? Neither Greece nor Rumania is likely to help so long as Prussia presses her claim. But if Russia could be induced to waive this claim and consent to Turkey being left at Constantinople, at least for: the present, on condition that she consents to tho freedom of passage through tho Straits, it would seem that the tangle would at once unravel, Russia would be able t-o export her wheat and import her munitions. Her vast armies would soon be ready, and the military balance would at once tip in favour •of the Allies. More than ; probably the proGerman "Young Turk" party would be forced to come to terms with the Allies, for ifr is evident that Enver's policy ot Germanising the Turks is not popular.As to the future, time will show; but I cannot but believe that an understanding with Turkey, our former ally, would be. a master-stroke. There is no real cause for hostility between us. The attitude of the Balkan States has freed us from any obligation to them to drive out Turkey. Ail that is necessary is to persuade-Russia to agree—and it is very evident that it is to her real interest to do so. Sentimental' and religious ideals may urge her not to relent, for the possession of Constantinople would give her a'commanding position in tne East, both politicaland commercial, but the Balkan States are hotly opposed to this. Moreover the Roman Catholics, who are very powerful, are afraid that if the Eastern Church 'were again to celebrate Mass in St. Sophia, after nearly five centuries of banishment, she would prove a serious rival to Rome. Thus ; Russia may realise that the opposition to her aim is overwhelming, and decide to waive her. sentimental claim in favour of present and more pressing military interests. The sooner tho better.