PROGRESS OF THE WAR
Renewed suggestions .are made today that the- Germans arc about to embark, upon a big offensive in the j. Western theatre, and though obviously there is much to make them pause on the brink of such an enterprise, the_ question at stake is one upon which it will be wise to leave a margin for possibilities. The Western Allies are stronger now, both absolutely and relatively to the strength of their enemy; than they have ever been, and it follows that a German winter offensive would have the poorest prospects of success.. There is another consideration, however, which may cxercisc a very potent influence upon German war policy. It'is the consideration that the Germans will never again have the opportunity of striking with such strength in tho Western theatre as they can now muster. At tho moment the Russian campaign is practically at a standstill; the conflict in the Near East has also died down for the time being, and even if it blazes up again presently, it is relatively insignificant as compared with the war in the main theatres. No advantage is in sight or prospect in the Near East which is likely to tempt Germany to i move any great body of strength into that region from either France or Russia. It will suit her 'necessities much better to leave her allies to bear the burdens of war in the Near East. Meantime she is faced in tho Western theatre by her must formidable enemies, and they are giving her no rest. They choose for the time to postpone the. day of decisive battle, but this is evidently a matter of deliberate policy, whatever the precise considerations dictating the policy may be. To Germany these circumstances represent in the aggregate a limited and rapidly vanishing opportunity of making a last desperate bid for victory, and if she 'is to seize the .opportunity then, she must throw her whole available power into an effort for victory in the Western theatre. Nothing of moment is to be gained by an attempt to enlarge her Russian conquests in a winter campaign, and the incidental wastage would disastrously impair her prospects in tho_ crucial struggle for supremacy- which cannot now be very long postponed. On the other hand, if Germany could contrivc to heavily defeat the Western Allies her position and prospects would be materially improved. Instead of looking forward to a battle for lifo oil two fronts in tho spring
and summer, she would have gained another breathing space. and perhaps an opportunity of concentrating once more against the Russians; and no doubt the Central Powers would also take advantage of such a success to attempt to drag in on their side wavering neutrals, or even use the occasion to endeavour to persuade one or other of the Allies of the desirableness of peace on terms favourable to Germany.
There is every possible reason to bclievo that any hopes entertained by Germany of intluencing tho Allies in this way are vain, but it cannot be assumed that official Germany is prepared to admit as much. _ Even from the peace talk that is rife, the opinion may be gleaned that the luiser and his war lords are prepared to consider peace only upon', their own terms, and _ that failing this impossible concession they prefer to continue the war. 'So deciding, they must choose between waiting to be attacked simultaneously on the two main fronts by prepared and formidable enemies or anticipating this crushing assault as far as 'they are able while they still, have an apparent opportunity—the appearance, it is true, may be delusive—of concentrating against one section of their foes. The dangers, to the Germans, of an offensive in the Western theatre are so great and the penaltics of failure would bo so heavy, that they may well falter before the enterprise, but it is an evident and unassailable _ fact that if Germany is to materially improve her position in the war she must strike, and strike with devastating effect, in the Western theatre before she /is herself attacked both in the West and in the East.
If the Germans do not attempt a forlorn-hope offensive in the Western theatre, the inference will be that they have finally accepted the conditions of a defensive war, except in their secondary.Near Eastern enterprise, in which it is their apparent aim rather to make full use of their allies than to expend their own strength. If thev do make such an attempt they will in all likelihood be playing into the hands of the Allies. Organised and prepared as they are for a grand offensive at no distant date, the French and British armies are not likely to be seriously shaken by the utmost efforts of an enemy whom they successfully withstood when he was in the prime of his strength, and they were relatively weak and ' ill-prepared. Abandoning {lie defensive for attack, the Germans would sacrifice the advantages of the great system of fieldfortifications which has enabled them thus far to cling to their area of invasion in France and Flanclers, and would be fa cod by the problem of breaking lines no less formidable than their own. From such an effort, in all human probability, the German columns would rccoil shattered and broken, and' their failure would involve ,a notable step towards their ultimate defeat in the war. Nevertheless, for the reasons touched upon, it is conceivable that the Germans may attempt the desperate enterprise. _ Placed as they are, they must strike soon against /he enemy by whom they are most hrectly menaced, or. admit that heir power to strike has departed.
«•( * n » Accohding to one report to-day, the_ Germans are expected to launch their predicted offensive against 'the British front in Southern Flanders ancl Northern France (in the Ypres region, ancl on the La Basse Canal). Reports of this kind count for little, and the report 'mentioned probably an inference from the fact that in these areas the German main communications are imminently menaced rather than any definite knowledge of the enemy plans. If there is anything in the report, it does not brighten the prospects of the Germans. _ They have suffered enormous loss in successive attacks on the Ypres salient without achieving any materia] gain of ground, and in a long period of intense fighting in the neighbourhood of L.a Bas&e the Allies have gained position after position, with the result that the German line is very much weaker than it was. There is probably no section of their front on which the Allies are better placed to withstand attack than the section which extends southward from Flanders into Northern France, and the German rank and file, as reports go, is' not insensible to & fact. More than one correspondent has told of the lceen distaste the Gel-nun soldiers have for scrvice on the Yser and other sections of the British front, and it is said that the fear of being sent there haunts them -like a ; nightmare. j
Other reports imply that the Germans are meditating a powerful aggression in Alsace, but" for reasons that have been traversed recently it seems more likely that they are intent in this region upon stiffening their defence against a possible French advance towards the Rhine. In. the early stages of the war the Germans hoped to find a gateway into France from Alsace, through the gap of Belfort, but the gateway has been so effectively closed that the problem of forcinsr it has become immensely more difficult. Following the same policy as they adopted in the case of Verdun, the French have protected the fortress of Belfort with an elaborate system of entrenchments and field-works extending far in advance of the original lines. In addition they have mastered tho breadth of the Vosges mountains north of the Belfort gap, and it is on a section of the inner fringe of the mountain chain that'heavy fighting has lately been in progress. Under the conditions that obtain, any.- effort by the Germans to burst through from Alsace into France is opposed by such enormous difficulties as practically ■ preclude the possibility of success. On the other hand, tho French arcs splendidly posted for an advance to the Rhino when the time is ripo for such a move. Besides holding in Belfort a strong base which is ! regarded as the ke;f to Alsace, they are established, further north, in positions overlooking ths Alsatian Plain. These being tiic ruling conditions, no other explanation seems to be needed of any offensive action the Germans may undertake in Alsace.than that it is inspired by a desire to anticipate attack. anil, if possible, to strengthen a defensive position which is essentially weak. * a » »
General von Mackensen is now said to be in command of the enemy forces in Alsace, a story best accepted with a grain of salt. For some time past the Germans hayo been using the name of this, comnnuidcr much as they used tliat of vox HiNDENDima months ago, when he had attained notoriety "in the Russian campaign. AC that tin 10 it was von Hindenbuko who was to carry all before him on the Western front, but he remained in fact in his own appointee* sphere in tho other main theatre. If tho story about von Macbbk/sbn being in
Alsace carries any meaning at all it is probably that ho now enjoys a higher reputation in Germany than von Hindenbukg, and that his name is therefore considered more useful when the ears of the multitude are to be tickled with .fairy tales.
Knowledge of the position reached in the Balkans is not materially advanced by news in hand at time of writing. Reports as they stand cover almost every conceivable line of _ development, but afford little guidance as to'which line is likely t; be followed. From some messages it is to be inferred that the Bulgarians are acting obediently under Gorman rule, while others point to a state of acute tension between the Bulgars and their taskmasters. One report in this latter category asserts that the Bulgarians arc demanding a guarantee that they will be eonfirmed in the possession of all occupied territory, and that if this is denied they will dig in on the Greek frontier, and make no attempt to cross it.
No purpose would be served by speculating about the bulk of the Balkan and Near Eastern news, as it is presented to-day, but from the mass of rumour and conjecture one or two facts stand out which deserve attention. General Castelnau, a very high authority, has expressed his satisfaction with the _defensive measures taken by the Allies at Salonika, after a personal inspection of the works. The position at Salonika is presumably, therefore, now reasonably secure. As to the enemy preparations there is a continued absence of evidence that the Germans have sent any strong force intd the Balkans, and there arc some positive indications that the burden of the campaign is still being thrown upon the Bulgarians. As a whole, news in hand is consistent with the view thit' the Germans intend to leave it mainly to the Bulgars and the Turks to carry on the war in the Near East. There is no sign meantime of any aggressive action by the Allies, but assuming that the Serbs in Albania- and Montenegro are reasonably secured against overwhelming attack, the Allies are very possibly now prepared,, to bide their time in the Near East, as in the main theatres. The opinion seems to hold that the next' big effort by the enemy in the Near East will take the form of a Turkish attack on the Suez Canal, and if the opinion is well-founded, a considerable proportion of the available British forces, including perhaps 'the troops withdrawn from Gallipoli,_ will necessarily, be concentrated in defence of the Canal. Postponement by the Allies of offensive action in the Balkans might in'some circumstances open' a danger of Greece and Rumania passing under German influence, but this danger will be less, acute if Germany, as now seems ..to be the caso, is leaving it mainly' to her minor allies to carry on the war 'in the Near East.
A remarkable* example of German enterprise is reported in an unofficial message from Cairo. German officers, it states, have been landed from a submarine in the Gulf of l Solium, at the western extremity of the Mediterranean coast of Egypt, and arc organising a'force of 5000 Bedouins for an attack on Egypt. The immediate military importance of an enterprise of this • character may be slight, but the Germans, if they have undertaken it, arc no doubt inspired by the hope of creating such disturbances amongst the tribes in north-western Egypt as might involve the withdrawal of portion of the troops engaged in defending the Suez Canal. The starting point said to-have been selected by tho Germans is on the edge of the Libyan deSvirt, a groat expanse of country pooi-ly provided with means of communication, and it is conceivable that a few determined men might work a great deal of mischicf by stirring up disaffection and unrestf amongst the desert tribes. It is stated,_ however, that the-Brit-ish authorities in Egypt arc taking energetic measures of repression, and they may be able to deal with the conspiracy before it has time to gather head.
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Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2654, 28 December 1915, Page 4
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2,229PROGRESS OF THE WAR Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2654, 28 December 1915, Page 4
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