PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2650, 22 December 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Withdrawal from a campaign in which great and costly efforts have been put forth is not' in some aspects a matter for congratulation, and yet it is likely that satisfaction and relief will outweight other sentiments awakened by tho news that the British invading • forces, including the Australians and New Zealandcrs, have been withdrawn from the Suvla Bav and Anzae zone of the Gallipofi Peninsula. For this there are a number of reasons which may be briefly touched upon. It is to be rioted in the first instance, however, that withdrawal from this, western zone—tho area in. which tho Allies have attempted to develop a flank and enveloping attack upon the defences of the Narrows—does not involve abandonment of the land campaign at the Dardanelles. On present indications no such abandonment is contemplated. An official message states that as a result of the withdrawal from the western zone, operations in other parts of the line—that is to say, in the southvrn area where the Allied front extends across the Peninsula—will be more effectively carried out v Thprc is also an unofficial message which states that British operations in other sectors at Gallipoli will be continued. It is, in fact, hardly in doubt that it is intended to maintain a footing in the southern section of the Peninsula. The step which has been taken nevertheless involves a very groat reduction in the importance of tho Dardanelles campaign, and so far as the Australians and New Zealanders arc concerned it sets a period to the epic adventure in which they have won immortal fame. Regret that no better fortune has attended their heroic efforts is inevitable, but though denied a crowning victory, they have established a name and fame which obtain generous recognition, as the cablegrams show today, throughout and beyond the Empire. If there have been blamcablc failures at the Dardanelles, _ no vestige of the responsibility involved rests upon the gallant colonial solclicrs who h&vc borne themselves so well during eight months of such viu'iavo as tbe world has seldom ceaa.

The supremely gratifying fact at . thi> moment is that the withdrawal was accomplished with such slight loss that the casualties are officially described as insignificant. _ The troops withdrew, removing their guns and stores, unmolested by the enemy with whom they were in close contnct. The achievement is no less wonderful in its way than the original landing, and necessarily implies a, perfection of naval and military organisation . bordering on the marvellous. Nothing more is definitely revealed as yet than that the feat has been accomplished, but a hint as to the methods followed is given in recent reports that the New Zealanders had been given a period of rest at orie of the island bases and had afterwards returned to Gallipoli. No doubt the Australians and sonic other sections of the forces were granted a similar privilege and the heavy movements of troops involved would assist to hoodwink the enemy. The constant passage of transports to and fro would facilitate the removal and reduction of material and sfcore3 besides affording the naval and military authorities an opportunity of perfecting their plans, and to some extent paving the way for the ultimate withdrawal. The temporary transfer of troops to island bases «nd back again obviously played a part in deceiving the enemy since, with the permanent evacuation, it is robbed of its ostensible object. All being said, however, the withdrawal implies extraordinary perfection of organisation, and when the full story comes to be _ written it should be no less enthralling than the story of the landing. * * * « Ultimate results of the transfer of troops from the Dardanelles must be looked for far afield, but the situation left existing in the_ Gallipoli Peninsula is not undeserving of attention. In the baldest terms what the Allies have done is to reduce the burden of continuing the campaign to a minimum, while at the same time retaining a position of very great strategic importance. Before the evacuation was effected, they were in the unfortunate case of holding an extended froiit, on which they had hoped to develop a successful offensive, though that offensive had been decisively checked. They have now relinquished four-fifths of their fighting front and correspondingly reduced the burdens of the campaign. The western zone, which has Been given up, was of value only as a base for offensive action intended to outflank the Narrows defences. When it was made evident that, as a result of the failure at >Suvia Bay there was little prospect of the offenisivb being driven home, the principal 'motive

for maintaining a footing in the western zone disappeared. It remained to be determined whether it

was wise ' to cling to this hard-won strip of coastal hill country—the sacrifice and risk involved being set against the possibility that a resumption of the offensive might ultimately become possible. The evacuation supplies the answer. It has been decided by the responsible authorities concerned, from Lokd Kitchener downward, that the sacrifice and risk involved are no longer warranted, and the decision means that hope of mastering the defences of the Dardanelles has for the time being been abandoned. . »•* * »

Widely different conditions relate to the .southern front. Hero the

Allies' are strongly .posted on a line li'ttle more than three miles long, extending a-cross the toe of the Peninsula. Though they are faced by an enemy established on higher ground, the nature of the country enables them to receive effective support from the fire of ships in the Gulf of- Saros, and at the entrance to the Dardanelles, and it is to be remembered that powerfully-armed monitors which are proof against submarine attack, now form the backbone of the Allies' bombarding fleet. All things considered, they are admirably placed to stand -a siege, though the prospect of developing an offensive from the contracted front now held is so remote that it need not be considered. So long as they maintain their present front, the Allies command the entrance to the Dardanelles, and this in itself affords an amply sufficient I motive for continuing the campaign within 'the contracted limits to which it has now been reduced. Located in this fashion at the seagate of the Turkish Empire, the Allies will at least maintain an effective blockade, which is of very great immediate importance, especially where' submarines are concerned. There are also political factors to be considered. A complete abandonment of the Dardanelles campaign would have afforded the enemy a useful peg upon which to hang.his propaganda, in neutral countries. He is unlikely to derive the same advantage from the conditions now established. Instead of retiring in disorder, and with incidental heavy loss, from a campaign in which their immediate prospects of decisive success are now meagre, the Allies have .adjusted their plans and measures to the. changcd in the Near East. There is certainly no triumph for tho enemy in the skilful withdrawal of forces which can now be more usefully employed elsewhero and the maintenance of the blockade which has from the first been an important element in the campaign.

There is some divergence of opinion as to the probable destination of the troops withdrawn from Gallipoli, but light on this point may be awaited with patience. It is quite certain that the transfer of force effected marks a material step forward in the development of tho Allied counter-stroke to the German aggression in the Near East. Whether or not i't has been carried direct to Salonika, the army taken from Galliiioli represents a direct and material gain to tho effective' strength of the Allies in thteir Near Eastorn operations, and it may bo taken for granted that the advantage thus arising will be turned to account with the same bold decision as has marked the withdrawal. The gain in strength may be to some extent by tho release of portion of the Turkish troops _ defending Gallipoli, but the essential point is that the Allies havo succeeded in a most remarkable fashion in withdrawing a body of strength from a theatre in which it was Tittle likely to achieve any useful result, and arc now free to use it where it can be cmploved to the best advantage. i * * B

Practically nothing is added at the time of writing to what was already known about the position in the Balkans. There is no word of the enemy having yet crossed the Greek frontier, nor arc there any further details of his lately-reported attack westward, towards the Adriatic coast. There is a German report, said to originate in Bucharest, that the Russians are moving large forces from Usui (on the Bessarabian frontier, adjoining Rumania) to the

Bukowina frontier, for a campaign against Bulgaria. In this form the message is meaningless, since the Russians could enter Bulgaria from Bukowina only by passing through Austrian as well as Rumanian territory. Probably the message has been garbled in _ transmission, and alleged in its original form that the Russians had been compelled to withdraw troops from Bessarabia in order to meet attacks in an allegation which may possibly be a mere invention.

* * # » . News from the Western front relates chiefly to bombardments and to aerial fighting. In both departments of activity the Allies appear t-o have achieved useful results. Tho pronounced success of their aircraft is particularly notable and gratifying at a time when, accurate information of enemy movements is supremely important to all tho armies engaged.