PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2646, 17 December 1915, Page 6

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

The possibility of a more serious . attack upon the Suez Canal than has yet been attempted has always been recognised, and reports roceived during the last day or two suggest _ that Gor-man-Turkish preparations for such an attack are now maturing. It i is not easy to appraise the real value • of these reports; there are argus ments which must-weigh in the mind - of the enemy both for and against .' an attack upon the Canal. Against b the likelihood of the enemy embarkl ing upon this enterprise there is the - fact that any forcc attacking the > Canal will have to cope with a de- ; fence prepared and perfected at lei- ; sure, a defence which has presuml ably been organised upon a scale r commensurate with the strategic - importance of the Canal as a vital 3 link in sea communications and a 1 defensive barrier covering Egypt - from invasion. This implies no . mere dependence upon the strength , of fortified and entrenched positions, - but the presence of an army on the l north-eastern frontier of '.Egypt I which should bo capable of dealing . effectively with any force directed ; against the Canal. It may be i taken for granted that the prospects l of success in an attack upon the - Canal are poor, but this does not of . necessity mean tEhat no attack will )- be attempted. * * * » > It is a point worth considering [ thai; the Germans may be able to make . no more effective use of a consid- > erable section of .the Turkish forces > than by employing them in this i risky and doubtful enterprise. So r employed, the Turks will at least . keep a powerful British army in i play for a time, _ and effect some > temporary dislocation of British and » Allied trado and sea transport. > Given absolute freedom of choice, 1 the Germans would no doubt prefer i to make use of the Turks in an effort > to gain complete command of the Balkan Peninsula. Resignation of the problematical advantages to be gained by attacking the Suez Canal would be more than compensated by a strengthened position in the Balkans, which represents a gateway into Central Europe as well as a gateway from Central Europe into tho Near East. Obviously, it is in Germany's interest to as far as possible make hcr position secure as she goes, and it is equally obvious thsit conditions will by no meaps answered if Germany,

while hor position in the Balkans is far from being assured, launches a Turco-Gei'man army against the Suez Canal—an enterprise involving operations at the end of long and vulnerable communications. The position in the Balkans is that while Germany, with Bulgarian aid, has conquered Serbia and opened communications with Turkey, there are still considerable Entente' forces afoot 'in the Peninsula, and a distinct possibility that they, may ere long be increased.

The Serbian army is still formidable in point of numbers, and is being re-armed by the Allies, and tllerc are persistent reports that Italy is sending troops to co-operate with the Serbs. The Allied army retiring on Salonika apparently consists of something like 150,000 men; it is being reinforced, : and it is in possession of an excellent base for future offensive operations. Adding to this that Germany is apparently making no headway in her efforts to win Greece and Rumania to her side, it may fairly be said that so far from occupying a secure position in the Balkans she lies very much open to attack in that region. It is undoubtedly true' that Germany is chiefly bent upon using the forces of her Near Eastern Allies to her own advantage, but the conditions, from her point of view unsatisfactory, which at present exist in the Balkans, will clearly be accentuated and extended if she employs German and Turkish troops in an attack upon the Suez Canal.

A possible explanation of Germany's accepting the obvious risks attending such an extension of her Near Eastern operations is that the Turks, though willing to continue the war, are not willing to fight the enemies of Germany in regions where they have no hopo of national gain. It is very possible that the Turkß aro/ ready to undertake an expedition against Egypt, but not willing to send any large force north into the Balkans. Even' if they believe that the Austro-Germans will win the war, the Turks have neither hope nor prospect of territorial aggrandisement in the Balkans, but in their ambitions for the recovery of Egypt they are not opposed by any competitor in the Germanic Alliance. It is therefore only reasonable to suppose that the Turks will more readily undertake an invasion of Egypt than any large share in a Balkan campaign. There has been some mention of Turkish forces being sent into Bulgaria, and figures of Turkish casualties were included in a message which recently purported to give the enemy losses in the campaign against Serbia, but there is no definite evidence that the Turks have hitherto taken part in tho Balkan campaign, and there is reason to suppose that they may object to taking a. future part of any importance.

All things considerd, it is much more likely that Germany may be able to induce the Turks to renew their attempt on Egypt than that she will be able, a-s has been suggested lately, to raise Turkish levies to reinforce her European armies in_ the Balkans or elsewhere. On this account there is some real significance,in the threat of another at. tack upon the Suez Canal, but it Is also (true that such an extension of operations can hardly strengthen Germany's position generally in the Near East, and some such explanation as that Germany is shaping her policy not on strictly military lines, but with an eye to Turkish susceptibilities seems to be called, for. It will be time enough to believe that Germany is able to dispose of the Turkish armies at wif? when proof is afforded of the fact. There are reports to-day of a- movement in Constantinople in favour of. a separate peace, which is said to be encouraged by some Turkish Ministers, and it is added that the prospect of the arrival of a German afmy is viewed with disfavour, particularly by the Turkish officers and soldiers, who are familiar with German methods; To suppose that stories 'of this kind are absolutely groundless is to suppose that the Turks are devoid of common sense. They must. needs be restive under the German yoke, and in these circumstances it is no't at all improbable .that Germany _ contemplates using her Turkish allies in a risky, but popular, attack upon Egypt, as> against attempting to : command their aid where it _ would be more useful, but is not likely to be willingly rendered. « * # #

The idea that the Turks are probably unwilling _to expend their strength except in the hope of recovering Host territory Stands fdr what it is worth in any "cage, but it must be recognised also that it is very much in Germany's interests to foster the idea that, an attack on the Suez Canal is contemplated. So long as 'an attack is within the bounds'of possibility a strong force must be retained to guard the allimportant waterway, and the fact that the German Press is booming an impending,invasion of Egypt is, therefore, not in itself conclusive. More significance attaches to the diversion of the' Dutch East Indies liners from the Canal to the Cape route, and there is now in addition the story of an English missionary from Syria who tells of somo rather wonderful railway _ construction by the Turks, but indicates that other-' wise they are somewhat ill-prepared for the predicted invasion. As regards the vulnerability of the Turkish communications, it is worth noting that Gaza, which is on the route of the railway the Turks are said to have constructed, is only about four miles inland from the Mediterranean coast.

So far as Allied operations in' the Balkans > arc concerned, no material change in the situation is disclosed at time of writing. There is a message frorn Athens which states that it is officially confirmed that the Bulgarians have entered Greece, though the Bulgarian Minister'had declared that there would be no such incursion, but this news is neutralised for the time being by an official message, dated at London yesterday, which says that the Bulgarians have not yet crossed tho Greek frontier. Whether it is to prove temporary or otherwise the halt that has evidently heon called in the Bulgarian pursuit of the Allied army affords another indication that Germany's hold and control over the armies of her Near .Eastern allies is not absolute. If perfect agreement had obtained between Germany and Bulgaria thore would presumably have been no lilackening in tho Bulgarian pursuit, but the position is admittedly complicated by tho consideration' that Germany may have cherished eleventh-hour hopes that Greece would aid her in action against tho Allies. Light is possibly cast upon the cpul'm of events by a series tif messages, relating to Monastlr, It

was first reported that Germany bad hoisted the Greek flag at that place and recognised the railway station and the railway running intoGrecce as purely Hellenic property, an.! later, that Germany bad thrown off the mask, and that the German Minister at Sofia had declared that Monaßtir was irrevocably Bulgarian.

The results of using Honastir as a bribe do not seem to have been altogether happy from the Gorman point of view. Statements that relatione between the Entente and Grccce are improving, and that an agreement between Greece and the Entente Powers is imminent, emphasise the failure to influence the pariiy to whom the bribe was first offered, and so far it does not seem to have had any bettor effect upon the Bulgarians. The most authoritative news in hand is that tbey have not yet crossed the Greek frontier. and a report that they have offered Greece a neutral frontier zone stipulating only that the AustroGerinan troops shall be allowed to pursue the Allies; rather • suggests that they have neatly evaded AustroGerman pressure, and at the same time asserted their desire to. halt, and hold what they have won rather than venture further afield. The situation in some respects has yet to take definite shape, but its leading features meantime seem to be that the Allies are unmolested in Greece, that relations with that country are improving, and that the enemy has yet to organise an effective extension of his invasion south from the Greek frontier.

Nuws of the highest importance is contained in a late message jußt received. A Rome communique, states that the Italians, in strength,not stated, bavo landed safely in Albania. The transportation of' the troops was marred by two "accidents." A transport and a destroyer \vere mined, with a total loss of 47 lives. Though strong hopes have been entertained that Italy would land troops to aid the Serbs, and a recent message declared that a force' of 80,000_ men was landing,' to-day's communique is the first official intimation 06 the subject. It ia satisfactory, not only in its immediate import, but aa furnishing another indication that the Entente Powers are taking united and therefore powerful action in the Balkans.

The same cablegram contains a Renter report which confirms the idea that the Bulgarians d 6 hot want to enter Greece, and that the Germans are trying to force them on. At the same time there are. other reasons to account for the halt in the enemy's pursuit, of which the chief is that he is under the necessity of transporting heavy artillery to cope with that of the Allies, and is gieatly hindered in doing so by their destruction of tunnels and bridges. * * * * Even in the overshadowing tragedy of the war an occasional gleam of humour rewards the patient observer. A gem-'of its kind in this category is the gloomy, almost querulous, remark of the Vossiche Zcitwig that it is true that Germany wants peace, but she wants her enemies to declare that they are prepared to negotiate for peace on a necessity basis. As far a-s it goes, this is no doubt an unadorned statement of truth, but it is not all the truth. The trouble for Germany, and for the Vossiche Zeitung as a faithful expositor of German policy and ambitions, is that the Allies are not in the condition of necessity the Vossiche Zeitung so naively invites them to assume, and are not likely to speak or act as if they were. Between the desire of Germany to see her enemies suppliant and the actual conditions of the war, there is a, wide gap not to be bridged by any artifice of words. • The German Chancellor gdfc o\fer the difficulty the • other day by turning his back on the truth, ana declaring that the i Allies, are in a condition of necessity, and that the German armies are bound to prevail in the war. More honest, but <not more ingenious than the Chancellor, the. Vossiche Zeitung states the simple facts. Germany wants peace, and would hail with delight appeals for peace from her enemies. ~ But she has no means of forcing them to sue for peace, and in" contemplation of this unsatisfactory fact the Vossiche Zeitung is left waving hands of feeble protest in the air.