PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2641, 11 December 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

There is more definite news from the Balkans to-day than , for some time past, and the position revealed is far from satisfactory from the standpoint of the Allies. Though it includes a dispatch from a Reuter correspondent at British headquarters, tho most important details of the ne.ws rest upon official authority. Put briefly, the.position disclosed is that tho Bulgarians, assisted according to one report by 50,000 Germans, are concentrating in strong force against the Allied army in Macedonia, and have compelled it to oontract its lines and relinquish portion of the territory it has lately been holding. Attacks upon the British section of the line, oast of the Vardar railway and near the Bulgarian' frontier, opened on Monday last, and at first were beaten off. Renewing their attacks on the following day, the Bulgars drove the British troops out of tneir positions and compelled them to retreat to a new line. On Wednesday the British repulsed all attacks, but in the evening withdrew to a new position conforming to tho general alignment., This last retirement was apparently made necessary by a contraction of .the French lines further north. According to the Reuter correspondent, tho - French on Wednesday made a gallant but abortive effort to extend their lines westward and join hands with a Seibian force. There is possibly somo mistake as regards the date of this attempt. At all events the final result of the operations lasting from Monday until Wednesday was a material retirement of the Allied line. « * # • Some emphasis is laid in the news upon the fact that the Allies, though driven back for a distance, are now in occupation -of strong defensive positions. It is remarked b;; the Router correspondent mentioned that the French, in readjusting their lines, shortened their front and are now established in easiersupplied winter quarters. This may relieve immediate anxiety as to the prospects of the Allied army, but it cannot be pretended that the position reached is or the outlook on visible evidence promising. The conclusion seems irresistible that the climacteric of the Balkan crisis has been reached, or all but rcached, and that the Allies are now called upon to determine whether they will speedily augment their present forces or abandon all present hopes of gaining. that commanding position in the Balkans upon wnich so much depends. The main issues at stake are not yet decided. There is still time for additional Entente forces to enter and turn the scale, and a bright spot in the day's news is a report that the Russians are actively developing their concentration on the Rumanian frontier. The prospects of the Entente in the Balkans in the immediate -future depend absolutely upon such an introduction of additional force as is here foreshadowed. Until an ■ answer is given to the all-important question whether the Entente is capable of introducing the force required before it is too late, the detail developments of the campaign count for little, and in themselves hold out little promise. At the present time the Entente is not even attempting to strike for. victory in the Balkans. The Serbs in Albania and Montenegro and the Allies in Macedonia are equally thrown back on the defensive. It is mentioned to-day that the British and French War Offices have energetically commenced fco .revictual and reequip the Serbs via Albanian ports, and they may presently be in a position to offer nearly as stubborn a resistance as they offered in their own territory.

Both as regards tho Serbs and the Allied army in Macedonia, however, prospects of advantage in a merely defensive campaign seem, at the best, doubtful. It puts a strain on optimism to suppose that either the weakened Serbian army or the Allies in Macedonia are capable unaided of arresting the' enemy's further advance. The Allies at" all events are being attacked in greatly superior force, and the enemy may be expeoted to strain every nerve in endeavouring to drive them back into Greece. To bass hopes upon such a state of affairs would be to ignore its gravity. * » * •

Dauk as th& outlook is at the moment, it is too soon to take it for granted that the Allies have decided meantime to let the prize of war in the Balkans go by default. One potent reason for assuming the contrary is that the.v already stand deeply committed. The Allied army sent into Macedonia and the aid which is being rendered to the Serbs represent a considerable outlay in men and material which will for all practical purposes have ' been thrown away unless the Entente effort in the Balkans -is augmented. In the present predicament of the Serbs, and the predicament of the Anglo-Frenoh army • in Macedonia there is no question of a surprise successfully sprung by the enemy. Tho developments now visiblo were recognised many weeks ago to be inevitable in the event of no effectual check being offered to the Germanic combination in the Balkans. In its essence it is simply a matter of a weak" force going down before a much stronger force. That the Allies, under the guidance of such men aB Loud Kitchener and General Jofpee have placed themselves in this position without any immediate prospect of bettering it is not to be believed. It must be considered more likely that tho Allies, though in a position to continue the strugglo in the Balkans, are under the necessity of spinning out a holding campaign until such forces as will enable them to strike for victory can bo provided. It is an oxcelleufc reason for assuming .iJxat suck juitioii is contemplated

tha.t the Allied army in Macedonia was not withdrawn weeks ago.

Two French officers are quoted today, one as advocating a withdrs.wal from Macedonia and the other as stating that the abandonment of Salonika would give Germany the Aegean and that the Allies muiit decide immediately be two" a reinforcements _ and re-embarkation. This latter opinion is probably unassailable, but while a full unfolding of the Allies' plans is awaitai it may be worth while to consiihr whs.t consequences would attend a withdrawal from the Balkans. vJe\'erai:, Pereot, who advocates this course, assigns as a reason that France will soon need all her Eastern troops, presumably in the main theatre. Evidently he rests his ewe upon the familiar argument \n favour of concentration- of force, against which there is nothing to be said on general, grounds. Even the suprenw necessity _ of concentrating a superior force in the main liio. atros, however, will hardly jut a policy of leaving the ensinv unmolested in the Balkans, in free contact. with Turkey and with neut»al nations over whom the Entente. woi.ld then exorcisc no effective control. Apart from the fact that the abandonment of the struggle in the Baliians would mean relinquishing all present hope of conquering 1 urkey and opening free communieationis with Russia, it would almost certainly., be followed by the defection of Greece to the enemy, aud it is impossible to say with confidence that Rumania would decline to follow suit. So far as Greece is concerned, hardly any doubt ex'st* It is reported to-day tl>nt the Bulgarians, though they could easily have "occupied Monastir, abstained from doing so, and left it to tne Germans to take possession of t*i3 city. The obvious explanation is thai Monastir.is being dangled as a bait before Greece, while the issue of the Balkan campaign is an open question, Greece may be afraid to swallow the bait, but thero is little doubt that she would swallow it eagerly enough if the Allies withdrew their forces. If it gave them notiing else, an established footing in Grecco would give the Germans such a base as they have never yet possessed for their submarines.

There is great foroe in Colonel Roussa's remark that the-abandon-ment of Salonika would give Germany the Aegean. It would be an immensely more difficult matter to cope with enemy submarines in the Aegean and Eastem 'Mediterranean if they had free access to the Greek coast and islands, and since the Allies, with the possible exception of Russia, are wholly _ dependent on sea transport in their operations in the Near East, the importance of maintaining a firm hold on Grecce can scaroily be over-estimated. Even now the enemy submarines are reported to be making some use oi depots on' the Greek, coast, but if they were free to come and go .atwill their destructive capabilities would be very 'greatly increased. Their sea power would, of course, enable the Allies to attack the Greek' coast, but it would be no easy matter to locate and destroy submarine depois on such a coast. With their submarines operating from Greece, the _ Germans would, at all events, be ill a vastly better position than at present to raid the sea transport routes which are vital both to the defer.co of the Suez Canal and to the continued of the Gallipoli campaign. General Pereot, who advoca>Js withdrawal from Salonika, is at least consistent in declaring that the Britisß have mistakenly decided not to abandon Gal--lipoli. Very possibly the fa.te of the Gallipoli campaign hinges upon that of the campaign in the Balkans. It is truo that the Gallipoli campaign was in full swing before the Allies landed at Salonika, but when it opened the Germans had not openeda roac! through the Balkans and the danger of a submarine campaign based on Greece therefore did not exist.

Further details of the fighting in the Champagne show that the Allies have ,von back practically all f ' ground lately captured by the enemy, A pretty definite indication that stationary warfare is expected in Northern Flanders for some time to come is supplied in a report that the Belgians have resorted to inundation to protect their Yser 'Iront, as they did last winter, and that the •.Germans have been compelled as a result to evacuate numerous advanced positions. At time of writing there is no news from the Russian main front, and there .has been little during the last day oir two—possibly an indication that the Russians are maturing such measures as are peeded to restore lihe Allied fortunes in the Balkans.