PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2632, 30 November 1915, Page 6

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

• There would be more cause for uneasiness in the .news that difficul-

ties h/ive again arisen between the Allies and Greece if it were not plain that in safeguarding their occupation of Greek territory as a base the Allies depend in the last resort upon their own power, and not upon the goodwill o! King Constantine and the present governing party. According to' one correspondent, at Athens, the present situation as between Greece and the Allies is regarded as grave, but there is no suggestion that any new question has been raised. The whole trouble seems to be that Greece, as represented by its Government, has once again manifested its disinclination to carry into .practical effect an agreement to which it Btands honourably committed. There is more than a suggestion of treachery in the attitude Kino Constantine and his Government are now said to have taken up. They found no means of evading the Allied demands for guarantees regarding the security of communications through Greece and reasonable freedom of action in Greek territory, but now apparently hope to gain time and help their Austro-German friends by haggling over details incidental to the concessions they have made in principle. This is bad enough, but the situation would only be really grave if the Allies lacked power to enforce their just demands upon Greece. It is roasonablo to suppose meantime that the, temporising policy of the Greek Government is to be defeated and overcome by the same strong measures as were recontly found effectual in extracting generally satisfactory assurances of benevolent neutrality. Sea power should provido tho key to the existing problem, as it did to that of tho immediate past, and the fact that its Government is apparently determined to make Greece out a sorry and discreditable figure in the eyes of the world need not be,taken to imply that the Allies have lost effective command of the Hitufttlmi, As yob ift i, mtly patuli* luted fcJiafc the Greek Government; is,

inclined to recede from honourable obligations, and not that it has powe r to do so.

Some of the Greek Government journals, it is stated, indicate certain points in the Allied demands which it will be difficult for Greece to accept, but in such_ details of the demands as arc supplied no ground for dispute appears. Considering that tho Allies wero committed to the Macedonian campaign in the first instance by an invitation from the responsible Greek Government to land troops at Salonika no possible exception can be taken to the demands tor adequate railway facilities and tho withdrawal of Greek troops from the vicinity of Salonika. These are the elementary conditions of reasonable freedom of action and in tho circumstances the temporary occupation of Greek territory and railways involved cannot bo regarded us' high-handed. Greeoe has obligations both, to Serbia and the Allies, and in view_ of her shameful betrayal of Serbia, cannot complain if all reasonable precautions are taken against a second act of treachery on her part. The third demand made by the Allies is that Greece should police her territorial waters against Austro-German submarines. This is not a demand born of special circumstanoes. It is simply asking Greece to perform an _ ordinary • duty of neutrality which she' is bound under the law of nations to perform in any oase. Stories of enemy submarine depots being discovered in the Greek Arohipelago, an area rich in possible havens for the under-water craft, indicate at least a possibility that Greece has hitherto been lax in carrying out her duty in.this respect, and obviously no apology is needed for the Allied demand that the duty should be carried out with vigour and efficiency.

Accepting the present attitude of the Greek Government as' inspired by a desire to "hamper the Allies and hinder the effective development of their Macedonian campaign, it may be expected that-the Allies will not tolerate any further delay on the part ;of tho Greek Government in carrying out the undertaking insisted on._ Reports suggest that the SerboAllied forces in Southern Sorbia are rather holding their ground, in expectation of attack, than attempting any forward movement, but there are other reasons to account for this than doubts about Greece. A number of messages point to the probability of a powerful enemy attack on the Anglo-French troops in their positions covering tho remaining section of themain railway in South-Eastern .Macedonia. It is stated that the Bulgarians have desisted meantime from their efforts to reach Monastir, in order to concentrate upon' such an attack, and according to another report they are expecting Austro-German reinforcements. The movement of the campaign further north makes it possible that this aid may be received. Having thrust the Serbian northern army_ back towards the Albanian -frontier, the Austro-Germans may now relax their efforts in this region, and send portion of their forces, south to co-operate with the Bulgarians. The local circumstances, of the Serbian campaign may be materialy affected presently by a Russian advance through Rumania into Bulgaria, but this as yot is in prospect • only. The enemy meantime has a strong incentive to attempt to break through the barrier opposed to his progress in Southern Serbia, and expel the Allies from their base of operations in Greece. • Repeated assurances of effective action by Russia should exclude the possibility of the enemy' being allowed to concentrate • undivicledly in this fashion against the Entente foroes based on Salonika, but for the time being there is ample reason _ for ithe Allies in Southern Serbia adopting a purely defensive policy, such as is implied in the withdrawal from tho north to the south bank of the River Oherna, on the western side of the Vardar River and railway. » * * J!

It is far from oertain in any oase that an carl;y advance north through Serbia is contemplated by the Allies. The arrival of an early and severe winter has introduced conditions in the last degree unfavourable to any such enterprise, and assuming early and powerful intervene tion by Russia, an advance eastward' along tho Salonika-Constantinople railway should offer a much more attractive alternative. It is obviously upon the Russians and the action tney are expected to take that tho course of the- campaign in the immediate future must largely depend.

.* . ■ In formally announcing that they have succeeded in opening communi--cations with Turkey the Germans make no mention of the railway destruction effected by the Serbs, but this is a very- important factor. According to the Serbian Minister at Paris, the numerous tunnels on the section of railway between Nish and the Bulgarian frontier were all destroyed by' the Serbs before they, retreated, with the result that the lino cannot be rapidly repaired. This means that 'the only' heavy transport route into Turkey as yet available to the Germans involves the passage of the Danube between the Serbian and Rumanian frontiers, and the Danube route is commanded by Rumania. It. is admittedly not the most promising feature of the existing situation that Rumania has up to the present offered no hindrance to the passage of enemy supplies along the Danube.

Threats of an Austro-German invasion of Montenegro are renewed to-day. It is not by any means certain that the little country will be suoh an easy prey as is implied in the reported statement by German newspapers that it is expected Montenegro will soon bo without ammunition. In their own interests, as well as for the sake of Montenegro, the Allies aro likely to see to it that this_ expectation is not realised. There is no great difficulty about passing supplies into Montenegro. The port of Antivari constitutes a sea gateway, and there are communications of a kind with the interior, including a pack-track whioh runs right across the country into Serbia. Even if it receives no other reinforcements, Montenegro has probably absorbed some of tho retreating- Serbian forces, and its mountains are likely to be stoutly defended if the Austro-Gcrmans attempt a drive to the sea. \

Proof, if it were needed, that tho Turks are now using German supplies in their Gallipoli campaign is supplied in a French communique which states that the Turks for tho first time used_ asphyxiating gas in attacking a British position. It is addod that the attack failed. The use of poison gas opens a now and miptensiifif, olmpfeev to fh« HSstery <?£ ttb/? Dardanelles e&cyifupt but there

is more than one reason for believing that the enemy will derivo little advantago from its use. It has long been anticipated that the Turks would resort to this infamous weapon, and no doubt all possible measures have boen taken to defeat gas attacks. Moreover, Gallipoli is a knot of hills, wind-swept in the winter season, and in such an area gas-attacks are much less likely to Bo effective than on the plains of Flanders and Poland. Asphyxiating shells and bombs can be used in Gallipoli, as elsewhere, but their effects also, can be minimised, and at worst the Turks are not likely to on joy any monopoly in their use.

The French report mentioned speaks marked artillery activity at the Dardanelles, but makes, no mention of the minor successes claimed by the Turks in the Anzac zone and at Suvla Bay. *. * «

Theke is a ccrtain amount of .promise_ about an Austrian communique dealing with the Italian attack, on Gorizia. It speaks of desperate fighting and the incessant, bombardment of. the place by heavy guns, and includes the significant statement: "We have maintained new positions." ; In its admission that other positions have been lost, this goes_ to confirm recent reports of Italian origin that material headway is being made in the attack upon the fortress. * * * *

There is no_ doubt an element of ixaggeration in the statement that lussia hopes to put in the field in he spritg seven million men. In natters or this kind there is~apt to >e some confusion between Russia's lltimate resouroes in man-power ind the numbers of men she can rain and equip within a limited jeriod. Without accepting any loubtful speculations, however, there ire ample grounds for belioving ; hat Russia will put forth a magniicont effort with the return of beter weather, and add enormously to ler strength in the field. Revicwng the position in August last, Jeneral Folivanoff (the Russian iVar Minister) stated that a force if over two million men then ascmbled or about 'to be summoned vould be trained far behind the ighting lines, and would be ready -o ta&e the field next spring. This mmenso reserve consists chiefly l of 'oung men—conscripts of the 1917 :lass and men of the second ban— tut includes two contingents of men >f 37 and 38 years of age, and it nay be expected to tell with decisive fleet against an enemy who has jrobably passed the zenith of his trength so far as man-power is conlerned, even if numbers only and not (uantity, are taken into account, jome pessimistic comparisons have ieen drawn • betwen the promise of i grand offensive by the Allies in 915 and the prospects now held out or the spring of 1916, but obviously ■here is no _ parallel. Though the Western Allies have for some time ieen in superior strength' to the memy it is only now that the pre- ) a rat ions of the Allies as a whole ire beginning to tell. , When the* vinter is over they should be posessed of a muoh greater superiority n strength than tho enemy posessed when he opened the war, and neantime they can afford vastly beter than the enemy to; continue the var of attrition through another Pinter. It cannot be assumed, of ;ourse, that deadlock and stalemate ivill be as much in evidenoe this winter as last. Aerial activity arid other signs and tokens on the Western front seem to point decidedly to an opposite probability.