PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2626, 23 November 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Lord Kitchener has left Athens. This presumably means that the Entente has said its last word, and the sequel, _which should-not be long delayed, will be an announcement as to what Greece intends to do. The Grfick decision, upon which so much depends, .may be already known to Lord Kitchener, but in any case he is not the kind of man to sit on King Constantine's doorstep waiting for an answer to the demands he has voiced in the name of the Entente. Speculations as t-o the line of .action Greeceintends to follow figure 'prominently in the news to-day, but may for the most part be left to speak for themselves- 'As a whole their value is reduced by a report fchatvthc ruling state of mind in diplomatic circles in London is one of anxiety, and therefore of uncertainty. While definite news is awaited, there is ground for solid satisfaction in the fuut thftt the liutanle _bas. chosen as its envoy, to Greece &

strong man of action. Bitter experience has shown_ that the easy-going methods of ordinary diplomacy are futile' where the Balkan States arc concerned. These States have standards of their own, and to ignore the fact is to invite humiliation and disappointment.

Hope of a satisfactory response by Greece to the Entente proposals as presented by Lord Kitchener rests upon the possibility that Greece has been convinced of the danger of responding in any other fashion. To approach the matter from any other standpoint would simply be to invite a repetition of the humiliation suffered at the hands of Bulgaria. Greccc, like Bulgaria, owes much to the members of the Entente, but the position existing in Grocce to-day is a sufficient proof that gratitude ,pn the part of the Government is not to be reckoned upon as a steadying influence. The remark of a German newspaper, that it fears that Lord Kitchener's visit may produce a sudden change in Greek policy, may bo interpreted with some confidence as a recognition of the fact that the Allies have at length, rather late in the day, adopted the right policy in the Balkans.

According to one message tKo British Foreign Office has not received any information regarding the reported blockade of Greece. The denial is not very explicit, and it is worthy of note that there has been no denial of the recent report that the loading of Greek merchantmen in British ports had' been prohibited. Another report to-day declares that an embargo upon Greek trade has been imposed in Egypt. In spite of the inconclusive denial of the Foreign Office there is no reason to doubt that some preliminary steps have already been taken in the direction of making Greece feel the weight and power of the Entente-. Such restrictions upon Greek trade as the Allies can impose readily and with little stir by bringing their sea power into plaj; would be justified equally as i precaution, ill view of the possibility of hostile action by Greece, ancl as helping to give edge and point to the representations which Lord. Kitchener has made to King Constantine and his Government. * * *

Perhaps tho most interesting item in hand relating to the Balkans is a Paris communique which reads:

"The disembarkation'' of AngloFrench' troops at Salonika, continues. Unless it is belated, in which case it would be either meaningless or deceptive, this may mca-n that the Allies are_ confident of the sccurity : of their lines of communication through Greece which would bo made most insecure if_ that country took up a hostile attitude. ' Even if the communique is up to date, however, it does not of necessity warrant such an optimistic conclusion. The Allies might conceivably land additional troops at Salonika to assist in safeguarding their communication' against Greek attack.

Later messages than those which have been touched upon leave it in little donbt that the Allies arc subjecting Greece'to a commercial blockade. Angry protests by tho antiVenizelist Press are reported, accompanied by assertions that there .will presently be a lack of bread for non-combatants. ' It is stated also that the . Allied Legations have intimated that the Powers are "obliged to take cognisance of certain allusions made to the possibility . of measures by Greek Government contrary to assurances received." In other words, _ they are obliged to take precautions against possible Greek treachery-

*#* * . Two things stand out from the later news about Greecc: that tho Allies have taken up a strong and determined attitude in their negotiations, and that hopes that they may gain their ends with Greece seem to be widely entertained. These ends resolve tnemslvs into open lines of communication into Serbia in all conditions. Whether Greece will be able to concedo so much without arriving at a rupture with the Bulgarians and Austro-Gcrmans is chiefly her own concern.

A Serbian communique, reporting a victory in the neighbourhood of Leskovatz, south oMSish, constitutes a pleasant departure from news which has lately told of little else than accumulating Serbian misfortunes. Being official,' the news of the battle near. Leskovatz is as likely to be reliable as any other information available about the campaign. Developments generally, nevertheless, make it somewhat extraordinary that it should have been possible to fight a battle in. this locality. According to the Serbian account, the battle lasted for days' and ended in the complete rout of the Bulgarians, with enormous losses. Leskovatz is on tho main raihvav down the Morave Valley, a little over 20 miles south of Nish as the crow flies. The Bulgarians ave established on the main railway' north and south of the locality assigned to the battle. ' At the same time the Germans give accounts of their progress which imply that they hold positions due west of Leskovatz, and even a little further Eolith. The broken character of the country makes it diffioult to estimate the true position of affairs thus disclosed, but taking the reports as a whole a Serbian army anywhere near Leskovatz would appear to be practically surrounded by enemiesThe account given of the battle, however, suggests that the Serbians at this point arc operating freely and with a success that is as unexpected •as, it is gratifying. News of the campaign in Southern Serbia in hand at time of writing amounts to little more than, the repetition of previous reports about the desperate straits of tho garrison of Monastir. It is only reasonable to suppose that events are in progress in this region of which news is being withheld.' As it has been described for several days past, the situation at Monastir is one that plainly cannot last. A report some days ago that Allied reinforcements had been sent to Monastir still lacks confirmation, and the position of the Serbians was theD desperate. ».» # *

M. Yenizelos has emerged from the background to which he has been relegated by King Constantine to appear as an advocate of a vigorous policy by'the Allies in Serbia— a policy which would aim ultimately at an invasion of tho Hungarian Piain north of tho Danube. Tnc lato Prime Minister of Greece is speaking about matters upon which he is exceedingly well informed,- and his utteranco is an interesting championship of tho view—not probably the most popular vic\v—that Serbia still represents a- field into which the Allies may profitably throw powerful forces with a view to countering the Aitstro-Gernian aggression in the Balkans. This view is supported also by Colonel Shumsky, a Eustiian military uvltic, wlia is gf opifl' ion that Sm Ciuaiss Mqnsq rewm-

mended a withdrawal from Gallipoli from the strategic standpoint and with a view to the concentration in Macedonia of the Allied forccs in the Near East now separated into three groups. . Victory in Macedonia, according to Colonel Shumsky, would open the road to Constantinople more speedily than slow siege operations in Gallipoli.

,** * * This opinion obviously has some force, but the question must arise whether the concentiration of force in' Macedonia favoured by M. Venizelos and Colonel Shumsky might not be effected more profitably elsewhere. As against a winter campaign in the Serbian mountains many advantages would seem to attach to a landing on the Aegean Coast of Bulgaria or Turkey, more particularly •if Russia co-operated by effecting a landing on the opposite Black Sea coast. This last, is a contingency which Colonel Shumsky does not mention, but it should be well within the bounds of possibility-'

From the manner in which it is being discussed by military experts a withdrawal from Gallipoli is apparently regarded as a perfectly practicable--operation. The Turks have a material advantage in holding all the higher ground, and so being much , better placed than the invading army in regard to the direction of artillery fire, but in the event of a withdrawal their attendant naval squadron will be a priceless asset to. the Allied forces. The monitors, which now form the backbone of the squadron, kre powerfully armed with howitzers as well as ordinary guns,, and are able to laugh at submarine attack. It should not be beyond the powers of a squadron so constituted to efficiently' cover a withdrawal from Gallipoli, but as yet there is no official warrant for assuming that a withdrawal is contemplated.