PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2619, 15 November 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

So far as surface events are concerned news in hand levcals no very material change in the Near Eastern situation, but there is much to suggest that this state of' affairs willnot last long. The events of the campaign in which tho Serbians, with material aid now from their AngloFrench Allies, are putting up a gallant fight for life, are of a nature to rivet attention, but the whole suggestion of recent news is that the events of the Serbian campaign are likely soon to be embodied as a detail in a struggle of much greater magnitude and wider range. Tho dominating factors of the struggle in the Near East, are of much greater scope than any of the issues immediately at stake in the Serbian campaign. 'On tho, one hand the Allies pf Russia have a powerful motive for seeking to win an early and decisive victory in the; Near East, because by doing so they would gain a freedom of trade and war communications with Russia which would do much to body forth and give effect to the better co-ordination of the high commands now being arranged; on the other hand the Austro-Germans have an equally impelling motive to strike for some decided and spectacular success in the Near East. Doing so, they would not onty maintain tho barrier between Russia and her Allies, but would recover* some of the prestige they have lost and are losing in the maid theatres.

If only a military effort by the Austro-Germans themselves were _ in question, the Near Eastern situation would probably be less gravely critical •'that it is. The idea is revived to-day (in a message from Switzerland) that the Germans are meditating a coup-de-main. which is likely to take the form of an attack on the' Suez Canal. It is added, somewhat naively, that if the Canal is immediately entrenched the coup-de-main will prove a disastrous failure. The implication conveyed in this message is that the Germans are likely to use German or Aust'ro-Gcrman troops in an attack upon the Canal, though there is no express statement to this effect. It may be quite safely taken for granted that tlie Near Eastern problems with which Lord Kitchener has gone out to deal are by no means so simple as this Swiss messago implies. In addition, it is very doubtful if the Germans -contemplate any such risky extension of their Balkan enterprise as would bo involved in an attack on the Suez Canal with German troops. One of their main objects undoubtedly is to ensure the continued defence of the Turkish waterways and beyond that they are more likoly # to be looking for further additions to their strength, such as they have gained by the adhesion of Bulgaria than for now ontarprifKM which would inwlve a additional drain uaoa

their resources. Should they gain this additional strength, then the Suez Canal would be a probable objective for_ further effort. To judge by events in the main theatres, and in the Italian campaign, AustroGcrman resources are already being seriously taxed, and it seeras hardly likely that they are capable of supporting a serious attack on the Suez Canal at the present time. Another Turkish attack upon the Canal is by no means improbable, but it will probably bs of a minor character if it does.take place anywhere in the near future.

A hint of the actual danger-centre in the Balkans is possibly conveyed in the report that Lord Kitchener has been 'received by King Oonstantine as the bearer of new Entente proposals. The report originates with an Athens newspaper, and there is no particular reason to doubt its truth. Assuming so much it would follow almost of necessity that the immediate danger threatening in the Near _ East concerns Greece, and possibly Rumania, rather than Egypt and the Suez Canal. . When Lord Kitchener's mission was.announced a days ago, the possibility was mentioned, amongst others, that he might be going to Egypt to deal with any internal troubles arising in that country, and to supervise its defence. No special evidence was available in support of this theory, though on visible facts it seems to be_ one of a number of possibilities arising out of an extremely complcx_ situation. Tho immediate occasion of Lord Kitchener's mission was the receipt of news from the Near East which was described by Sir John Simon as "very grave, sudden, and unexpected." It seems unlikely that this' news immediately concerned Egypt. The vital importance of the Suez Canal has all along been recognised, and elaborate provision has been made for its defence, and while internal disaffection in Egypt would gravely complicate the problem of defending tho Canal, such a development could only be sprung as a surprise upon the British Government in the event of amazing laxity on the part of the offioials charged with the control of Egyptian affairs. That the possibility of internal disaffection in Egypt has been recognised makes it all the more likely that a tight hold has been kept upon the situation. At worst there should be no "very grave, sudden, a-nd unexpected" developments in EgyptGranted ordinary efficiency in the governing and military authorities, any troubles arising will be foreseen in good time, and provided against.

It is reasonable, in any case, to suppose that Lord Kitchener has gone to the place where his presence is most required, and by the information at present available that place is Greece. All sorts of possibilities exist in the Near East but Greece is a positive factor,.and her action or inaction is certain to count for much as the struggle in the Near East •between the two great forces opposed in the war develops. Without going to the extremo of joining the Germanic' alliance and making war on the Entente, Greece could materially increase the difficulties b.y which the Entente Powers ar* already faced in the Balkans, and the total effect of available news about Greece, despite friendly assur-' ailces tendered by the Government, is to leave the policy and intentions of 'King Constantine open to suspicion. It is reported 'to-day, for instance, that an Austro-G'erman mission has arrived at Athens empowered to definitely settle Greece's relations with the Central Empires. Considering its origin, the report from Sofia that the, Greek-Minister at the Bulgarian Court told a group of. German pressmen that his country's relations with the Central Empires would be very friendly, and hinted 1 at the possibility of a Graeco-Bulgarian alliance, may be a mere fabrication', but what is known about Greece and its masterful ruler makes it not at all unlikely that Lord Kitchener is attending at Athens to not the least important detail in the mission which • has taken him to the Near East.

The Serbian campaign presents in the main tJ\e same general features as during the last day or two, which is to say that the Serbian! have lost some further ground in the north, while in the south the ScrboAllied forces are _ improving', their position and making some progress towards dislodging, the Bulgarians from a section of railway, south from the junction of Uskub, where their presence meantime deprives the Serbs of continuous railway communications in the limited area of their country which now remains in their possession. ■ The French are reported to bo clearing the ground towards Veles, which is on the railway about 28 miles southoast of Uskub., Veles and the 28 miles of railway to Uskub must be recovered in order to the Serbian communications. At Uskub a line leaves the main railway and runs about 60 miles north-west to Mitrovitza, opposite the Montenegrin frontier. Except in the immediate neighbourhood of Uskub the whole of this branch line . apparently remains in the hands of the Serbians. The Bulgarians, having advanced westward from the main railway, recently attacked the Us-kub-Mitrovitza line at' a point 20 miles north of Uskub. They were defeated, and it is stated to-day that the Serbians ar<j developing the advantage thus gained. An enemy report declares, howevor, that Bulgarian cavalry have entered Prishtina, which is a few miles east of the Mitrovitza railway towards its northern end. If they continue to repel attacks on the northern section of the line and dislodge the Bulgarians from the southern section between Uskub and Veles; the SerboAllied forces will be in possession of a continuous railway, running through about half the length of Serbia from .south to north, and in touch with Salonika. Meantime the Austro : Ucrmans, moving south, have reached positions some forty miles north of Mitrovitza.

As matters now stand the Sorbs arc holding a third, or less, of the total area of their country,'but the situation is slightly improving in the south, and -there is still time for additional forces to transform the aspect of the campaign.- The only official information on this point is Sir Edward Grey's statement about Britain's decision to contiuue sending troops to Salonika. An unofficial message states that General Monro has reached Salonika, and that numerous troops are arriving. German reports that General Kuropatkin has been appointed to command an army of 250,000 Russian troops destined to act against Bulgaria are somewhat open to doubt, in the first because they arc German. -A'number of similar reports regarding Russian action in tlv> Balkans have no far failed to materialise, and it ia .doubtful in

any case whether General Kukopatkik will bo appointed to such an important command as is suggested. The record of disaster which stands against his name in connection with the Russo-Japanese War is not likely to be overlooked, although it is recognised that he has since exercised a potent influence upon the reorganisation and improvement of the Russian Army. Particular interest attaches to the statement of an Italian newspaper that Italy has agreed to actively co-operate in the Balkans. Italian aid would serve an immediate purpose in' assisting the Sorbs to overcome the hostility of a section of the Albanian population which has lately been mentioned as likely to add to their perplexities.

Fuller details concerning the loss, of ground by the Germans in the area west of Riga, in the Baltic Provinces, show that instead of making a voluntary retirement (as they alleged) they were defeated and driven back after eleven days of intense and continuous fighting. Without attaching- any credence to the interesting record given to-day of alleged angry passages between the Raiser and von Hindenburg over the letter's failure to capture Riga arid the Dwina line, it may easily be believed that their failure in this region is one the Germans would have done much to avoid. It has been said that the Germans are capable at any time of breaking limited sections of thb Russian line at 'selected points, but the success with which the Russians have defended the Dwina front indicates that this statement of the position no longer holds good. It is suggested in one message that the Germans hope to do better on the Dwina front when the ice of winter has closed" the Gulf of Riga to Russian warships, and when pontoons ■will not be required in the crossing of streams. Russian ships, however, have played but a small part in defending the land approaches to Riga, since only the extreme flank of the enemy line is exposed to their fire and the weight of opinion is_ that winter conditions generally will tell much more heavily against the enemy_ than against the RussiansThe freezing-in of the gulf will also make an end for some months of German hopes of transporting troops and stores to Riga by sea, hopes which have been defeated hitherto by a most effective, submarine blockade.