PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2618, 13 November 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Time alono will show whether Lord Kitchener correctly estimated the position wh<?n lia saUli pgnip jireeksj, ftgp 4 JW?

peared to have almost shot their bolt in Russia, but the events of the Eastern campaign since he spoke, and up to the present date, go uniformly to suggest that his judgment was sound. During these weeks the German invasion has at most points failed to make any progress at all, and it has nowhere made material progress, while on some sections of the front, in Galicia, Southern Russia, and to a less pronounced extent in the Baltic Provinces, tbc invaders definitely lost ground. These 'features of the campaign have now been normal for such a lengthy period that German prospects of extending thoir present hold on Russia have obviously very greatly diminished. If the enemv could reckon on a period of inaction, presently, in other theatres, the position in Russia would still have to be regarded as highly critical, but developments elsewhere than in the Eastern theatre seem to promise that the Austro-Germans will be granted no such opportunity to concentrate greater forces against the Russians. What information is available, suggests that the reverse position obtains, and that the enemy is under the necessity of transferring forces from the Eastern theatre to France and Flanders, and that it was from the Eastern theatre that the army now operating in the Balkans was . drawn.

It is no very- wild speculation to assume that tbese general conditions are likely to endure. Nothing very definite oan be said yet about the Balkans, but if the Austro-Germans mean to play a really strong hand in that region they will almost certainly have to largely supplement their present forces in Serbia.; Of the Western theatre it is possible to speak with much greater confidence. Some critics have lately revived the cry that a stalemate exists on the Western front, but such an allegation can only be made by those who wilfully ignore facts. It is true that the Allies have apparently not yet put forth efforts calculated to smash the German line and compel a general retreat; but they have demonstrated their ability to_ break into the most formidable sections of the enemy front, and the conditions supervening on the great assaults of September seem to amount rather to an intense fury of general- conflict than to anything resembling stalemate. The truth seems to be that though the Western Allies are not as yet putting forth their full strength, they are creating such conditions as to absolutely compel the enemy to concentrate all possible strength in the Western theatre in an effort to counterbalance their developing power. It may perhaps sum up the strategy of the Western Allies to say that thoy aim rather at compelling the enemy _ to concentrate strength for a decisive conflict, which they will precipitate at their own time, than at manoeuvring him, partly beaten, out of _thc positions he now holds. The inadvisability of forcing the Germans back to a shorter line when the alternative exists of fighting them 'it advantage upon their, present lino • has often been, enlarged upon, and it need only be said here and now that this consideration has by no means lost its vital bearing upon the policy of the Western Allies.

The posit/ion' in Russia is, of course, materially affected by the drain upon German and Austrian strength in other theatres. It is reasonable to suppose that the AustroGermans are not likely to be_ablo to pour reinforcements into Russia because there is an increasing demand upon their resources in the Western theatre, and to a lesser extent in tlw Balkans and against Italy. It follows that short of some unforseen turn of events favourable to the enemy, the hold-up of the Austro-Gerraan invasion of Russia is likely to be permanent. ' Thanks in the main to increased supplies of munitions and manufactured internally and obtained from abroad, Russia is rapidly building up her military strength. The Aus-tro-Germans have been stopped short of a decision in the campaign, and they are apparently incapable of imparting that new momentum to their invasion which alone will renew their prospects of reaching a decision.

Appreciation of these broad features of the Eastern campaign will be intensified by a brief survey of tho position now reached. In what manner the Gerirans _ hoped to achieve victory over Russia is known only to themselves. It may have been their aim to advaace on Petrograd or Moscow, or by an eastward march further south to reach Kiev, and so obtain a commanding position on the railways running north from the Black Sea ports. Whatever their ultimate objective may have been, however, there is no doubt that the immediate object of the Germans is, and has been for many weeks past, to obtain possession of the continuous chain of railways which oonnect the port of Riga, on the Baltic,- with I.emberg, in Galicia. As a moment's consideration will show, complete mastery by the enemy of this ohain of railways would enormously facilitate their further advance eastward. Generally speaking, the lines of communication extending eastward from the German frontier into Russia are bad and inconvenient. Railways are few and hard roads fit to bear heavy transport are also few, and in many extensive tracts of country non-ex-istent.

Command of tho railways which unbrokenly connect* Riga on the north with the Galician system in the south would mean for tho Austro-Germans elimination of- the most serious transport problems which oppose their further progress into Russia. Tho railways constituting this long north and south chain oi communications aro not all of tho same type. On sections of the route there is a double track, capable of bearing a maximum volume of traffic. Other long sections have - only a single track. The essential point is, however, that these lines in tho aggregate constitute an unbroken chain oi railway communication, running almost directly north and south. With their armies based on this railway chain the enemy would bo in a most favourable position to rapidly concentrate troops and guns to attack the Russians in any selected area. It is still more important that the enemy would be able, so established, to transport a full volume of supplies to his advauced front, with much greater facility than under existing conditions. On the south supplies could bo passed over the lines of tho Galician system, and then rapidly distributed along the front. On the north tho lateral line is fed by the main railway from Ecrliu to Potro< grid and mtaa.

The advantages which would have accrued to the Germans from possessing continuous railway communications parallel with their front, would have been very greatly increased if they had been able to capture the port of Riga, and establish naval command of the Baltic SeaThey would then have been in a posi tion to transport supplies to Riga by sea, and the fullest possible use could have been made of tho lateral railway. The natural sequel would have been a repetition of such assaults as swept back tho .Russians through Galicia in the opening days of tho German offensive, which is now at a halt or giving ground. The position at the moment is that the_ enemy is in possession of lengthy intermediate sections of the lateral railway he has fought so hard to attain, but that other vital sections remain in the hands of the Russians, and to all appearance are firmly held. By their valiant stand upon the Dwina.line, in the Baltic Provinces, the Russians have kept the port of Riga and the northern section of the all-important railway out of the hands of the enemy, and their_ forward movement in Southern Russia and Galicia has similarly safeguarded the southern portion of tho line, and prevented the Germans extending their railway communications north from Galicia. The Russian land operations in the north have been materially assisted by the enterprising work of the British .Bubmarines operating in the Baltic which have wrested command of that sea from tho enemy and defeated his hopes of using sea-transport to ease the problems of the Eastern campaign. » * * ».

, Even enemy reports to-day afford evidence that the position is improving from the Russian standpoint. A Berlin communique speaks of un-. successful Russian attacks, but admits a withdrawal by Marshal' von Hindenburg'« troops from positions west of Riga. Russian warships in the Gulf of Eiga co-operated with the attacking troops on land, and the German line has beea swung back for a distance from the south-western corner of the Gulf. The same communique reports a local success by General von Linsingen's troops in Southern Russia, involving the capture of a village, but the enemy in this region is considerably short of the lateral railway constituting his immediate objective, and judging by the late events of the campaign there should be no reason to anticipate untoward developments.

A symptom of the nervous tension, obtaining in Home political circles appears in a somewhat unpleasant incident in th 6 House of Commons 1 reported to-day. Mr.- Hogge, a Laoour member, gave Mr. Asquith the lie direct when he .denied that Lord Kitchener had resigned, and was subsequently "flayed' and reduced to silence by the Minister whom he had insulted. Mr. Asquith seems to have efficiently demonstrated his quality as an "old Parliamentary hand." and to have come out of the affair with 'dignity, but the main interest of the incidentals in the partial disclosure which it involved of the motives ; inspiring Lord Kitchener's visit to the Near East. Mr. Asquith said that Lord Kitchener set out on November s as r a result of serious news received on the preceding day, and Sir John, Simon stated later that the news so received was very grave, sudden, a>nd unexpected. This can only mean th%t some new danger has appeared in the Near East in> addition to those arising from, the visible features of an extremely 'complex and difficult, situation. It is useless to indulge in speculations about matters of this kind, but a vast majority of British pjsople will be well pleased that as strong ■ a man as Lord Kitchener has gone out to. cope with the new danger, whatever it may be, and with those already visible in the Near East.

Complex enough already, the situation in the Near East is made more so by Mr. Asquith's hint that tlja difficulties of the position have not yet been fully disclosed, but on the news in hana the Serbian campaign still seems to hold prospects of a limited recovery in the near future. The immediate question tol be determined is whether the twosections- of the Serbian forces can contrive to link up with secure communications, before the northern Serbian Army is crushed by the joint'* pressure of the AustroGermans a-nd Bulgarians, and to all appearance this question is still open. Tho Austro-Germans are forcing their way south, and the Bulgarians also are attacking enterprisingly, but the Serbo-Allied forces in the south are reported to bo pressing north, and they are apparently .still being reinforced. Prospects of a successful defensive campaign have not vanished, but much depends on factors which are as yet uncertain, notably the attitude of Greece and the strength of the Allied force based on Salonika. It has yet to be seen also whether Russia intends to take early action against Bulgaria, and the Austro-Germans intend to continue throwing tho main burden of the campaign on Bulgaria or propose to throw powerful reinforcements into' the scale. « « » »\ • Mr. Arthur Lynch, M.P., has taken it upon himself to assert that Lord Kitchener's record in the war is one of blundering, and to advocate tho romovaJ of Sir John French. There is the excellent authority of Mr. Balfour for the view that this kind of criticism is without value, and it should not be forgotten that in the present instance it emanates from a man who fought against his country in the Boer War.