PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2612, 6 November 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

The downfall of the Zaimis Government does not of necessity mean that Uho pro-German party in Greece has been finally overcome, but it opens up a reasonably good prospect that it may be overcome in the near future. M. Venizelos came to an open breach with the Government, denounced its policy, and defeated it on a no-confidence vote by a majority of 33—less than half tho majority with which he was credited after tho appeal to the country which followed upon the resignation of the Gounabis Cabinet a few months ago. This is the . point to which events are carried in the news in hand at time of writingnews which touches only the surface details of a very complex situation If matters take a constitutional course in Greece the natural outcome. of the Venizelist victory in the Chamber of Deputies will be that Greece will enter the war on the sido of Serbia and tho EntenteWhen M. Venizelos was forced by King Constantine a few weeks ago to resign, he was developing a policy -which involved war against Bulgaria in the circumstances the latter country has created by her attack on Serbia. . It was in order to reverse this policy that the King forced M. Venizelos to resign, and installed M. Zaimis in. 9ffice, and tho noconfidence division now reported in the Chamber of Deputies was a trial of strength on the main issue. That M. Venizelos has not changed his ground is shown equally in his condemnation of the policy of the Zaimis Government -us, fatal to the interests of the country, and in his statements to interviewers that if he returns to power ho will make war on Bulgaria-. The vote of the Chamber of Deputies is a decision in favour of war and against the policy of neutrality or any policy in the Austro-Germ&n interests.

Suoh a decision does not in itself produce finality. The question now to be determined is whether King Constantine or M. Venizelos has the better hold upon the Greek population, and what is perhaps of more importance,, upon tho Greek Army. If the King is consistent in his pro-German sympathies ho will not acknowledge . defeat merely because one makeshift minority Government has been thrown out of office. He may play for time by substituting another Government of the same type, and his prospects of gaining time will he good unless the influence of M. Venizelos predominates in tho. country and in the army as it does in Parliament. The question at stake is essentially one of personal influence, and while it is universally acknowledged that the influence exercised by M. Venizelos over his countrymen is powerful and far-reaching, it cannot be ignored that the King, as a successful commander of the army in the Balkan struggle, is a formidable antagonist. No one, however, is better qualified than M. Venizelos to estimate the difficulties and possible danders of Iho course upon which he has embarked, and this in its<ilf implien that he hap not ar.lod i with aa», limited object ifl, yiow.

His action is a direct challenge to the Royal authority, and an assertion of the popular will, and it may Ijo taken for granted that he has not entered upon a contest with the King without looking well ahead and assuring himself that there is a reasonable prospect of reaching his goal.

Athens newspapers, it is stated, Uniformly predict the reappointment of the Cabinet which has just possibly with a new War Minister, and a dissolution. The unanimity of tho prediction possibly 'implies that King Constantine, through his agents, is "flying kites" with a view to ascertaining whether the Greek population is likely to tolerate his riding roughshod over the constitution. Fuller particulars now available of the debate in the Chamber of Deputies, which culminated in the fall of the Zaimis Government suggest that King ConSTANTINE may have some difficulty in bringing about a dissolution. Deploring the abandonment of Serbia to Bulgaria, M. Venizelos declared that the Government could not shelter behind the King, since the Government alone was responsible under , the constitution. He added significantly that the King had a right to disagree with the Government, but that after last election there should have been no further disagreement. Taking this position, it seems possible that M. Venizelos will not consent to a dissolution in the present emergency unless he is. compelled to how to force.

Whether or not it is destined to play an activc part in this war it must ho rceognised that tho Greek Army is a formidable fighting machine. Its recent history, in the years preceding and following the .Balkan War, has been one of rapid development and improvement. Both M. Venizelos and King Uonstantine have taken a prominent part in promoting this development. The King is a commander of proved ability in the field, and his connection with the army has been far from nominal, while M. Venizelos was associated as Minister of War with the work of raising the army from comparative insignificance/ to greatly increased strength and high efficiency. Before tlio Balkan War of 1912 the Greek Army was composed of four regular divisions and a brigade of cavalry. Its total strength, including artillery and a regiment of _ cavalry distributed among the divisions, amounted to somo 65,000 officers and men. Under the arrangements made by M. Venizelos, who was War Minister for two years before the outbreak of the Balkan War, a second-lino aimy, which was practically a replica ''of the first-line formations, was rapidly mobilised, and within a month of taking up arms Greece Bad an army of 130,000 men in the field. As reservists came in_ from abroad the strength was raised to 180,000, and at this figure it was maintained until the close of the second Balkan War.

It is remarked by the military correspondent of the London Daily News, who supplies the foregoing particulars, that tho Greek Army, since the Balkan wars, has made enormous strides both in strength and organisation. Prior to ,the mobilisation now in fores provision was made for a war establishment of 300,000 men, organised in 20 divisions—a_ considerable advance in the eight divisions mobilised in 1912. An army of 300,000 men by no means represents the wihole armed strength of Grcecc. There are in addition some 200,000 men of military age available as reserves. Many of these men are abroad, in England, America, and Egypt, but when the call was made on reservists in 1912 the proportion of absentees was less than 5 per cent. It has been reported recently that the mobilised Greek forces number considerably more than 300,000 men, and there is no reason to doubt that this is true. Men are certainly available in greater numbers, and Greece has had ample time to obtain and prepare equipment. The raw material of which the Greek Army is composed, according to the correspondent quoted, is of the best. Physically, the Greek conscript is etjufl to either Serb or Bulgar, while mentally he is superior to both, being quick-witted, and adaptable. The Greek regimental officer of today is considered as good as any in Europe. As to commanders, General Danglis, who was Minister of War in the last Venizelos Cabinet, is regarded as standing next in rank and reputation to King Constantine, and until the enforced resignation of the Venizelos Government came as a bolt from the blue, it was assumed that General Danglis would probably take the field as commander-in-ohief.

Though one report to-clay states that the landing of Frenoh troops at Salonika continues without incident, and there is mention also of important British reinforcements passing north, the Entente force, in south-eastern Serbia is apparently still. standing on the defensive and making no immediate effort to repel the Bulgarian invasion of the country to the north. At time of writing there is no further mention of the reported passage of a Russian expedition through Rumania or of an . Allied landing at Itavala, On visible evidence the only aid at present being rendered to the. Serbs Is that of the tiicuto force in southeastern Serbia, which, as has been said, % apparently stationary though, constantly engaged with the Bulgarians. So long as these conditions obtain it must be expected that tho enemy will continue to methodically increase their area of occupation. Serbian reports speak of a hope that Allied reinforcements may arrive in. time to improve tho situation, but it is already manifest that the task facing what is left of the Serbian Army and its Allies, when they are able to take the offensive, will be that of reconquering the greater part of Serbia. On the north the Serbs are falling back fighting stubborn rearguard actions! On the east the enemy is reported to bo within half a dozen miles of Nish, and gaining that place he will gam also a continuousM'ailway from Hungary into Bulgaria, In the south the Serbs are gallantly holdln£ UP the Bulgarian advance to- | wards Monastir. Reinforcements may yet reverse the fortunes of the campaign m this southern area, but as regards tho fighting further north it will not be surprising to hear at any time now that Nish has passed into the hands of the enemy

Reports in hand tell of no very notable e\cnt in cither of the main theatres,, but the Italians have inaugurated another series of assaults' upon the Austrians, and report the capture of important positions west of Gowia and on other sections of the Isonao tront further south.