PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2610, 4 November 1915, Page 6

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Ix his speech reviewing the war, Mk. Asquitu said that Serbia.might be assured that her independence would be regarded as an essential object, but according to current news of the Serbian campaign the verv existence of the Serbian nation : 's imminently threatened. Considerably more, than half of Serbia is in enemy occupation, and succeeding reports toll of further heavy inroads by the Austro-Germans and T!ulffli'Uijii.tippn the limited #roi thak is left la Serbiaajwudt,. Sqias'of

the news available to-day is of nil: certain authority, and tlie messages which deal most definitely with the situation arc of enemy origin, but as a whole the news is consistent, and for this reason and because it is unchallenged there is no reason lo doubt that it is substantially accurate. Taking reports as they stand, the main Serbian army is shown to bo cut off. from communication with its allies, and a small Serbian force holding the southeastern corner of the country, and indeed from all outside communication whatsoever, except through Montenegro or Albania. Tho Austro-Gcrmans occupy the whole breadth of Northern Serbia, and their area of occupation extends on an average from 50 to 00 miles south ■from the northern frontier. The Serbs still hold nearly the whole breadth of their country in its middle area, including a section of the main railway north and south of Nish, but further south the Bulgarian invading armies have penetrated deeply, and if a report from Athens that Monastir. has Been captured is true, the Bulgars have now almost ; reaohed tho south-western extremity of Serbia and completed the envelopment of the main Serbian army, apart from the possibility which has been mentioned of communications being maintained through Montenegro and Albania with oases on the Adriatio. * * * *

Thf, mere extent of country occupied by the enemy is not tho worst feature of the Serbian situation. It is a matter of much greater moment that the Austro-Germans ancl Bulgarians between them have gained effective command of.tho whole of the Serbian railways. Unlike the Allied force in south-eastern Serbia, which still has open railway communications with the Greek port of Salonika, the main Serbian army is cut off from all through railway communication. This is true whether or not the Bulgars have captured Monastir, and it means obviously that the Serbs, besides being heavily outnumbered, are at a terrible disadvantage also as regards the factor of transport, wliich counts for so much in modern war. Unless there is an early and powerful diversion in their favour, the only hope remaining to the Serbs is that winter may arrest the enemy advance and enable them to resort with effect to guerilla warfare in their western mountains.

Though there is further talk of Kussian aid for Serbia, the only visible and prospect of such aid at the moment is connected with the Allied attack on the Bulgarians from the south. It must be admitted regretfully that the prospect at the moment is not brilliant. The Allied troops, occupy only a small portion of Soutli-Eastern Serbia, and SouthWestern Bulgaria. They are in sufficient strength to enable them to repel Bulgarian attacks, and one report to-day shows that they won pronounced success in a battle which was evidently of considerable magnitude since the French casualties numbered a thousand and those of the enemy arc stated to have been enormous. _ The point to be noted, however, is that the Allies arc not, so far as reports tell, pressing north to dislodge the Bulgarians from the main railway. In view of the deadly perils by which the Serbian main army in tho north is encompassed, tho postponement of such an attack on the Bulgars must be taken to imply that the Allies are not in sufficient strength to attempt it. Confirmation of the capture of Monastir, if it is supplied, will afford final proof on this point. It means, or would mean, that the Bulgars make so little of the Allied threat against their flank that they are able to extend their lines to the extreme west of Serbia. Such an extension would certainly_ not bo attempted by the Bulgars if they were under any apprehension of having their lines pierced by an Allied attack or of being dislodged from their positions on the main railway which interpose between the main Serbian army and the Allies in the south.

Apart from its immediate significance, the Bulgarian advance into South-Westem Serbia opens up new and disconcerting possibilities where Greece is concerned. Monastir is only a few miles ;>.brth of the Greek i'rontijer, and if the Bulgarians got into immediate touch with Greece tho policy of that country is likely to be influenced in a maimer exceedingly detrimental to Serbia and the Entente. Already Greece stands convicted of having dishonoured her treaty obligations to Serbia, and- in tlii troubled passages of her recent history there has been no reassuring indication that the schemes of her pro-German King and . tho party which shares his views are likely to bo checkmated. On the contrary, M. Venizelos, whose policy was consistent with tho undertakings into whioh his country had entered, seems to be helpless, though it may be that ho is waiting his opportunity to move with effect. Full proof of the perfidy of King Constantine is supplied m Mr. Asquith's speech. When Bulgaria mobilised, M. Venizelos, as Prime Minister of Grcece, asked the Entente to send 150,000 men to' the Balkans and" undertook to order a Greek mobilisation, an undertaking which he honourably discharged, Later M. Venizelos announced that Greece must abide by her treaty with Serbia, but King Constantine repudiated the declaration and compelled M. Venizelos, though he commanded a substantial majority iu Parliament, to retire from offico.

It ia chiefly, almost solely, because of this treachery that Serbia is in her present desperate plight. Now that the Bulgarians are establishing themselves on the Greek frontier double significance attaches to the question, raised of late, whether King Constantine may not be prepared to pile one infamy on another by attacking the ally whom he has already basely deserted. Giving every credit for rectitude of purpose to M. Venizkl&s and the party he leads and represents, it is clear that it would be unwise, to depend a second time upon their being able to control the policy and actions of their country. Reports are current of a sccrct agreement between Greece and Bulgaria, and it is by no means impossible that. Greece under King Constantine may, follow the lead Bulgaria has given. It is barely possible that an internal revolution might bring_ confusion upon tho King and his pro-German supporters at the eleventh hour, but tho position of the Entente in the matter is sound only if it is prepared to' counj/Ji 1 hostile action by Greecc by the use of armed force. Naval furce is certainly available which could work havoc upon the Greek sea-coast cities and ports, but whether the Entente has made adequate provision for the maintenance of the land campaign in Southern Serbia in Mw cvmii el Grcnk hostility Is, at besk Aft aasa jiu£stio».

Tiie niosfc encouraging thing said by Mr. Asquint about the Dardanelles campaign is that ho considers it still premature to form a judgment upon it. This in itself, based as it presumably is upon the advice of the highest military authorities, is an effectual reply to the confident judgments lately pronounced by Mr. Ashmead Bartlett and other correspondents, and may he set against the opinion expressed by Sir Edward Carson that it will be impossible to maintain the forces in Gallipoli once the Germans have been given access to the lines of communication. For the rest, Mr. Asquith blew into the wilderness the t-haory that the initial naval attack upon the Dardanelles was undertaken chiefly at the instance of Mit. Churchill or any single Minister. The Cabinet as a whole was responsible for the campaign, and Ul2 justification for its being undertaken put forward by Mr. Asquith is, briefly, that its risks were warranted in wiew of the great prizes in sight. In addition, though under the necessity of admitting that these prizes have not yet been gained, he was able to point to secondary but important results which have been, and are being, achieved by the forces in Gallipoh.

No one who looks honestly at the facts can possibly suggest that the British Prime Minister laid too much emphaais upon these secondary results of the Gallipoli campaign. Ho said that the forces in Gallipoli were holding up 200,000 Turks, who would otherwise bo doing incalculable mischief elsewhere. The weight of this observation is best realised by considering the aspect of surrounding war areas in which the Turks are, or have been, engaged. Such a survey makes the conclusion inevitable that the Gallipoli campaign, ever since it opened, ha-s absorbed the main strength of the Turkish army, with results of which the benefit has been felt in the Caucasus, in Egypt, and in Mesopotamia. The campaign in Mesopotamia is important; the safeguarding of Egypt is of supreme importance; and it is possible that the relief afforded to the Russians in the Caucasus should bo rated as hardly less important than the protection of the vital lines of international communication which pass through Egypt. Belief afforded to Russia at a critical stage had much more than an immediate military value, and doubtless exerted an important influence i in strengthening the bonds by which the Allies are united in the war. It would'be easy enough I to pick holes in some of Mr. , ks- j qijith's detail statements 'about the campaign, but in the main ho has put forward a powerful justification, and one that is much more convincing than the pessimistic croaking lately in vogue.

# it # • A bright page in the history of file Dardanelles campaign relates to the achievements of the British submarines. Tho particulars made available by Mr. Asquitii -of the hav?c they have wrought to date are impressive. Two Turkish battleships, six other war vessels, eight transports, and 197 supply ships have been sent to the bottom bv British submarines. It adds to the splendour of this wonderful lecord that it has been established in face of the greatest conceivable difficulties and dangers. In order to destroy as many ships as they have tho submarines must have passed dozens of times through tho narrow gut of thc_ Dardanelles. Had tho enemy _ anti-submarine tactics been as efficient as those of the British Navy in the narrow seas and elsewhere, no British submarine would ever have reached tho Sea of Marmora. Even when every allowance is made for Turkish inferiority in this respect, the skill and daring with which the submarines have conducted their campaign of destruction must still be accounted almost marvellous.

There is comparatively little news of events in_ the main theatres at time of writing. It is suggested in one message that although the Germans have lately had to transfer troops from Russia to the Western theatre, the present lull on the Eastorn front masks intense preparations on their part for another great effort against the Russians. The prospect is not one that need cause alarm, for there is little reason to fear that the Germans will henccforth be able to depend upon a state of comparative quiescence in one main theatre while they are pressing the attack in the _ other. On visible evidence, the Allies are in a position to apply simultaneous pressure in all theatres, with the possibk exception of the Balkans, as occasion demands. And oven as regards the Balkans and the Near East it would bo pessimistic to_ assume that the Allies are committed indefinitely to a policy of inaction olfaction on a scalc inferior to that of the enemy. It is now evident that the Allies have suffered some of the penalties of a surprise attack as a result of putting unwarranted faith in Greece, but there are some general references in the speeches of Ms. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey which suggest that self-reliance will bo the keynote o! future action by the Entente Powers in the Near East, as in .other theatres of war.