PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2606, 30 October 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Me. Ashmead Bartlett's lecture at the Queen's Hall, which was reported at length yesterday, was marked in a high degree by the qualities which have/ made his war dispatchea_ jauv ous. But the freedom with which he criticised and pronounced judgment upon tho Entente policy and strategy in the Near East is only to be justified, if it is to be justified at all, on the assumption that Mr. Bartlett is as familiar with the inner history and governing circumstances of the political and military events in Turkey and the Balkans, in reference to which he pronounces so definite a verdict as tlw rulers and military authorities of Great Britain and tho other countries concerned. A moment's consideration will show that Me. Bartlett cannot well have fulfilled this condition. His opportunities of observing the battles and campaign incidents he has. described so well have been exceptional, and in regard to much that relates _to tho ®P ,r East, and especially to _ tho Gallipoli campaign, ms opinion merits respect, It is not disputed that serious mistakes have been mado at tho. Dardanelles, and the results of some of these mistakes Mr. Bartlett has witnessed with his own eyes, but no personal observation of the Gallipoli campaign can possibly warrant his sweeping allegations that the war affairs of the Entente in tho Near East have been bungled from first to last, and that success in the central object of conquering Turkey, and so relieving the blockade of Russia is now practically unattainable.

Himself an unsparing, if not reckless critic, Mh. Bartlett is open to tlio criticism that he has pronouueed a confident and final judgment when, of necessity he is in possession of portion only of the evidence that alone would sustain or •warrant such a- judgment. A surface survey of visible events in the Near East 'obviously suggests that in some material respects things are going badly with the Entente. The true position is that finality has not been reached in the struggle for supremacy between the Entente and its enemies. The present complexion of affairs is neither final nor decisive, but it ; s apparently unfavourable, and on that account may easily impart a delusive air of finality to such opinions as Mr. Bartlett has expressed. In this wav a- great deal of mischief may be done .by awakening uneasiness and unsettling public confidence in the responsible leaders, who alone are really in a position to say whether matters arc going well or ill in the Near East, and in other theatres ot war. „ .

To argue from unknown premises to an optimistic conclusion in regard to Near Eastern developments and prospects would be to fall into the same errors as Mr. Bartlett and some other critics, though from an opposite approach. Visible facts no move wcirnmli belief that • the k'niriil.t is moving towardii BH9II- - tliß. Near East

than the opposite conclusion that its fortunes in that region are wrecked beyond redemption. The only fact really established is that the struggle is undecided. Meantime, no man is entitled to say cither that the prcI jeet of breaking the Ilussian blockade will ultimately be defeated or that the Entente Powers have blundered in the Near East in a fashion inviting defeat, and making it inevitable. It is an easy, method of explaining the position now reached, and at the moment it is apt to be a popular method, to sot down all its unploasins? features to the indecision and ineptitude of Entente statesmen, diplomatists, and strategists. Coldly examined, the explanation is not convincing. The alternatives of a brilliant subjugation of Turkey or an epic adventure, gallant, but hopci less, and serving no useful purpose, are, for instance, very far from exhausting possibilities where tho attack on the Dardanelles is concerned. Far as it is from being driven home the assault upon the Turkish stronghold has achieved secondary objects —notably in engaging the principal strength of the Turkish army— which are at least of very great importance. The unsupported naval attack made in the first instance was a blunder, but the merits of the decision to employ limited forces in a land campaign cannot yet be tested. It is necessary first of all to know whether greater forces were available, and assuming that they were not, what the real motives were that induced Britain and France to take up tho campaign. What influence, for instance, refusal to embark on this campaign might have had on Russia. A suspension of judgment is very necessary also in regard to,the practical abandonment of Serbia to her own devices, which has lately created a painful impression. Tlw feeling is general that something might have been risked for the sake of Serbia, and no satisfactory explanation is visible of the failure of the Entente to powerfully oppose the Austro-German advance into Bulgaria, which has now been effected, or is on the point of being effected, but it must be recognised that the fate of Serbia is not necessarily identified with the main issues at stake in the Near East. Tho prize of war in the Near East is the possession of Turkey, and the Turkish sea-ways, and it does not follow because tho Entente Powers have been able to render only limited aid t-o Serbia that fhey have sacrificed their prospects of gaining this prize.

Public anxiety about the situation in the''Near East has been accentuated by the knowledge that dissension on questions of policy exists in both the British and French Cabinets., The reconstruction of the French Cabinet is reported to-day, and it seems very probable that similar action may be taken shortly in Great, Britain. It is as well to remember, however, that responsibility for what Britain has done or left undone in the Near East, as in other theatres of war, rests rather upon Lord Kitchener than upon his civilian colleagues. It may bo taken for granted that if tho War Minister had. been dissatisfied with'the decisions of his colleagues in regard to action in the Near East ho would havo taken prompt steps to mako his position clear. His silence implies approval of the policy pursued, and most people will bo content to accept this as an assurance that the best possible use is being mado of available resources. '

Sir lan Hamilton's farewell order to his troops at the Dardanelles doserves particular attention at a time when all sorts of uneasy stories are afloat about the Gallipoli campaign. The departing- General thankecl the troops for the fashion in which they had seconded his efforts to lead them to the decisive victory which he had implicit confidence they would achieve under his successor. This is a fairly definite indication that there is no intention of abandoning the campaign or slackening in its prosecution and upon these matters Sir lan Hamilton is doubtless much better informed than any of the critics whoso pessimistic speculations have lately bulked so prominently in the war news.

There is not at time of writing any report from an Allied source regarding the position reached in NorthEastern Serbia, but the Germans report that they aro advancing in Northern Serbia, and the Bulgarians from the Timok Valley on a line which entails an immediate threat to the main railway at Nish and further north. It is stated that tho Bulgarians have captured Kniazhevatz, which is 25 miles north-east of Nish, and connected with it by a branch, line. A more favourable situation is reported in Southern .Macedonia, where_ the French are reported to be moving north, well in advance of the main railway, and with their right flank across tho Bulgarian frontier. Tho Serbians a little further north are advancing on Ishtip, and so threatening the flank of the Bulgarian forde which occupied the important junction of Uskub. Ii: these attacks can be pressed there will be a fair prospect of checking the southern invasion of Serbia., even if the enemy master tho main railway into Bulgaria through Nish, as well as the Danube route. It will be the natural policy 'of tlio Serbs to concentrate in defence of the southern part of their country, when they arc no longer able & resist the concentrated pressure of tho Austro-Germans and Bulgarians in the north, and there are possibilities of a stout and prolonged resistance in this southern area. The position is complicated, however, by continued uncertainty as to tho good faith of Greece-.

Tiieiie is a suggestion of exaggeration about a Rome message which states that Austrian casualties in the first three days of tiie new Italian advance are estimated at over 140,000, but earlier official reports suggested that the enemy losses were at all events very heavy. There is no late news at time of writing of the fighting on the Isonzo front, but the Italians aro reported to have captured additional mountain positions on the approaches to Trent, in the Southern Trentino. Roverto, which they aro said to be now bombarding, Is about 12 miles south of Trent, and stands like that fortress on the main road and railway running north through the Adige" Valley. * - * * * ■ Reports in hand tell of no sensational development in cither of the main theatres, but the Russians give satisfactory accounts of the fashion in which they dealt with enemy attacks towards the northern and southern ends of their front. lii the Dvinsk region they temporarily lost some trendies, but rccaptured thera again, and they lvport also rolling back powerful and sustained enemy assaults in Southern Russia, on tho line of the River Styr. Of the German Attacks in the Dvinsk area the JiusiAM deobus ofibkilx. that the.

attacking columns wcro driven forward under a threat of being fired upon by their own guns. Even when it is made in a communique such a statement must be accepted with a certain amount of reserve, but if it is true an interesting indication is supplied that weak spots are beginning to show in the much vaunted Gorman war machine. An army that has to be driven to attack uy a threat of bombardment from the rear is not exactly attuned to victory, and to give tho devil his duo. the Germans have not hitherto been accounted the kind of soldiers who need such stimulation.

An interesting section of to-day's Petrograd communique, relates to the bombardment of the Bulgarian port of Varna in the Black Sea. Besides stating that much damage was done ashore the report declares that tho bombarding fleet successfully repelled the attack of enemy submarines. In the event of a- Russian landing in Bulgaria or Turkey tho problem of providing against submarine attacks will assume very great importance, and it is encouraging to know that tho Russians are capable of defeating tho under-water craft under conditions rather more difficult than those of tho speedy cruiser raids which have hitherto represented their principal naval activities in tho Black Sea. !

Until there is a. definite statement on tho subject some doubt must bo entertained _as to the true nature of the misadventuro to H.M.S. Argyll, which is roported today. The official report merely states that the Argyll, a fino armoured cruiscr of 10,850 tons, ran aground on the East Coast of Scotland, that owing to bad weather it is feared she may become a. total wrcck, and that the officers and crew were saved. It is possible, of course, that the grounding was accidental, and mention of bad weather somewhat strengthens the possibility; but inthe Navy navigation and seamanship are at sucli a high point of efficiency that accidents of this character are rare, especially in the case of heavy ships of the Argyll's class, which commonly keep a good offing, and leave inshore work to smaller craft. It is by no means impossible that, the Argyll struck a mine or was struck by a torpedo, and was run ashore as an alternative to sinking at sea. _ The Argyll will be no light loss if it is found impossible to salvage her, though the class of ar-. moured cruisers to which she belongs has como little into prominence in this war, except in naval actions in the Baltic.