PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2605, 29 October 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

The story of a correspondent of the Echo tie Paris that the British Capture of Loos and neighbouring sections of ..the German line was only a partial victory, _ the full fruits of which were limited by imperfect organisation, seeks to discount what was regarded at the time as a'very fine achievement. It is to be said at once that something more than the word of a single correspondent is needed to establish facts reflecting so seriously upon those with responsible commands in the British Expeditionary Force. The -story of the Echo cle Paris correspondent may appear to gain standing from having been allowed to pass by the British censorship, but past experience tells us . that this is by no means a safe guide. Why such a story should have been allowed to circulate without refutation if refutation is available, it is difficult to imagine, but it does not follow that it is incapable of refutation. Similar erroneous and misleading versions of important events have been allowed to pass the censor. Evidence is not available to us here which would make it possible to 'apply a conclusive test to the assertion that the battle south of La Bassee, in which Loos and Hill 70 were gathered into the British line, was a second Neuve Cliapelle —a victory which should have been a greater victory—but what is known of the circumstances goes on tho whole to suggest that it was nothing of the kind, but, on the contrary, a highly successful attack upon the enemy made and intended to ho made within definite limits.

By the standards of former wars a limited assault might hiive been dismissed as a paradox, "a contradiction in terms, but this war has set new standards, and the conccption of a limited assault can be set asido only by rejecting much that has been_ said, apparently on sound authority, about the strategy of the Western Allies. Apart, however, from the broad contention that the attack on the Germans south of La Bassee, like the simultaneous attack in the Champagne, represented a normal development of the strategy which aims at gradually weakening tho enormously extended German lino in France and Flanders there are particular circumstances tending to discredit the view that the British assault south of La Bassee stopped far short of its real objective. It is stated by the correspondent mentioned- that if fresh troops had been available to press the attack beyond Loos and Hill 70, not these [positions only but the whole Douai Plain would have been captured. Breaking into the enemy's front to this extent the attackers would not only have turned La Bassee and Lille in the 6outh, but would have cut across vital to the, German armies further south towards the Aisne. A victory so sweeping and achieving such decisive results would almost certainly have been the prelude to a general German retreat.

It will hardly be disputed that iE the Allies had contemplated such an effort to force and break the enemy's line at a single blow they would have concentrated all available force south of La Bassee and made coincident attacks upon other sections of the enemy front subsidiary to this major enterprise. In point of fact practically everything that has been said on the subject, officially or otherwise, to prove that the French attack in the Champagne was organised upon a much greater scale than the British attack south of La Bassee, and that much greater forces were employed in the Champagne offensive than in British and French attacks combined on the front between Arras and La Bassce. Sri far as we know no one has suggested that the Champagne offensive was only a larger edition of Ncuve Chapelle. It is the accepted view_ that it achieved ;v succcss so brilliant as to merit comparison with the victory of the Mame. Tho result of the victorious French advance was to drive the enemy back upon important communications and so materially weaken his battle-line. The sarni is true of the less extensive British operations south of La Basecp with the addition that- a further step was

maclo towards outflanking that formidable stronghold. No "positive refutation is available of the state-ment-that the attack south of La Ba'ssce constituted an abortive attempt to blast a passage right through the German front, but it is practically impossible to believr: that the Allies embarked on such an attempt in Northern France while simultaneously _ employing much stronger forces in an attack upon the Germans in the Champagne. That they attempted to breach the German line, simultaneously in two widely separated areas is inconceivable. Such a policy would have involved a wasteful distribution of force which would have been much more effective if concentrated. The only feasible explanation of developments in the Western theatre—and It is a perfectly satisfactory explanation—is that General Joffre is adhering to the policy of racking and straining the German line, with steadily increasing violence, looking to the time when it will no longer bo able to stand against assaults. It is an essential feature of this policy that the enemy should be compelled to expend his strength _ in counter-attacks as he has been doing, with an almost invariable abscncc of sucoess, during the last few weeks.

The Austro-Germans report oE their northern invasion of Serbia that they arc advancing_ all along the line and have established communications with the Bulgarians across North-eastern Serbia. Against this there is, at time of writing, no news from Allied sources of military operations in the Balkans, except a bald statement- by the British Under-Secretary for War, in the House of Commons, that the. British forces in Greece are already co-operating with the French on the Graeco-Scrbian frontier. As indicating that the Anglo-French forces are operating only at the southern extremity of Serbia, while the Serbian armies are fighting for dear life against overwhelmingly superior Austro-German and Bulgarian forces, this would imply that the Anglo-French force is comparatively small. It is practically established in any case that the Austro-Germans have achieved the first great object of their campaign by winning a road into Turkey, and this in itself demands resolute counter-measures by the Entente Powers such as they have not yet shown themselves capable of taking in the Balkans.

With their northern defences driven in and the Bulgarians apparently firmly established on their railways in the south, ths.'Serbs are. in a condition to awaken the pity of the world. They are imminently threatened with annihilation or overwhelming defeat. It seems impossible to escape the conclusion that the Entente. Powers, in practically leaving Serbia to her fate, have, at tbi same time permitted the enemy to gain a position of advantage which cannot by any stretch of imagination be reckoned unimportant even at a time when he seems to be definitely at fault in the main theatres. There is still a possibility that reinforcements may reach the Serbs in time to enable them to hold a portion 'of their country against the invaders; but in view of late events'the prospect cannot be considered over-bright.

Whatever may happen to Serbia it is as necessary as ever that powerful opposition should be offered to the Austro-Germans in the Balkans unless the Entente is prepared to see Greece and perhaps Rumania as well gathered into the German fold.

[ Lloyd's underwriters will underwrite an insurance policy against almost any contingency. The submarine menace, which most people would be inclined to think would have resulted in enormous losses to the underwriters, proved (as some of the English papers have indicated) a source of profit, and yet the premium rates have been moderate. The underwriters are • very shrewd men, as they need to be to carry on their special business, and their sources of information are marvellous. T;his being so, it may be accepted as a good augury that Lloyd's underwriters have accepted a premium of ;85 ss. per cent, against Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria being on the throne ifter June 30, 1916. If Tsar Ferdinand is still in possession of his throne on July 1, 1916, the underwriters will pay the insurers £100 for every five guineas of premium money risked. The odds are big, and indicate optimism on the part of the underwriters, but they know or have the means of knowing a good deal more than the average citizen. One risk to which Tsar Ferdinand is exposed is that of assassination, but the terms of the speculation imply a belief on the part of the underwriters that, apart from the 'risk of assassination, the Bulgarian monarch is likely to be dethroned before many months have passed, by internal revolution or otherwise, and such an event could scarcely occur save in circumstances much more favourable to the Entente than those at present existing in the Balkans.