PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2604, 28 October 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

When tho transport Royal Edward was sunk by an enemy submarine in the Aegean Sea it was said with force and truth that her fato suggested not the failure but the triumph of British In a year of war and with dozens of submarines at disposal, the enemy contrived to si lit one British transport. That they achieved nothing more against our transports during that year is, as was said at the time, conclusive testimony to the splendid guardianship, of the Navy in protecting hundreds of thousands of troops in all the seas of the globe. _ There is no occasion to revise this judgment now that a second transport has incurred the same fate as the Boyal Edward and in the same sea. There is still an overwhelming balance in favour of the Navy, and these infrequent exceptions to the common rule of immunity and ..security on the transport routes emphasise the splendid efficiency with which it has discharged its trust. In the sinking of the Marquette, fewer lives, happily, were lost than when the Royal Edward was sent to the bottom. According to tho official report at present in hand, it is understood that 09 of the personnel are unaccounted for. No clue is given as to whether the ship had troops aboard, but if she had it is evident that the greater part nf her complement was saved. A transport of 7000 tons might easily have been carrying a thousand men or more. Siiu'O she was torpntlqcd in tho Acgcaa ths Jlar.quette must have,

becil bound to or from cither Salonika or the Dardanelles, most probably Salonika, since it is to that port that all available transports may be supposed to be plying at tho moment.

The Germans have little reason for pride or satisfaction with their record and performance where submarine attacks on transports aro concerned. There is hardly any class of warfare in which their inferiority has b-Cii more conclusively demonstrated. Except in tho matter of Home defence Britain is wholly dependent upon sea-trans-port and sea-communications, and the target presented as a consequence to the German submarines is almost illimitable. To date they have sunk two British transports. German transports, on the other hand, are excluded from every sea except the Baltic, and yet in that one sea about five times as many German _ transports have been sunk by British submarines a»s the British have lost in all seas. Only a few days ago it was announced that six German transports had been sunk in the Baltic, and in four or five instances individual transports have been sunk. The Germans havo cscaped heavier losses only by kcephig their transports iu harbour, and on that account the comparison between the remarkable success of the British submarines and the almost total failure of Gcfman submarines operating against tb.2 multitudes of British transports continually plying the seas is all the more striking. In the Turkish seas British submarines have proved themselves as splendidly efficient as in the Baltic, and that they are still active is shown in the official report fo-day that another Turkish munitions transport has been sunk in the Sea of Marmora. _ Tho submarine campaign in this area will assume greater importance than ever if, as seems likely at the moment, the, Austro-Germans succeed iu opening a road through »thc Balkans and replenishing Turkish supplies. The Turks have land communication by road with the Gallipoli Peninsula-,' a ?", a ]l a^wa y to the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles at the Narrows, but their best and most convenient transport route is through the Sea of Marmora, and that route the submarines arc in a fair way to closc. They have at least _ succeeded in, making it so precarious as to very greatly reduce its value.

Even in view of t> the magnificent success with which the Navy has hitherto safeguarded sea-transport l'ffutcs the problem of maintaining intact the communications of the considerable additional force required to cope with the crisis in the ■Near East is admittedly a grave one, and_ the anxiety on the subject manifested by. Lord Loeeburjj in the House of Lords is understandable. The Germans are no doubt sending all available submarines into tho Mediterranean and the Aegean, but unless they vastly improve upon their past performance their prospects of seriously interrupting the flow of Allied troops and supplies into the Balkan Peninsula are not bright. Their submarines will be hampered to an ex--I}'i i k' lc sa '^ e anc ' stable bascj from which to operate Unless they select, a distant and, therefore, inconvenient headquarters in the Adriatic they must work either from coast depots more or less exposed to naval attack-or risk the passage of tho Dardanelles and the possibility of being entrapped at.the entrance of the strait. British submarines face an even greater risk in passing the Narrows en route to tho Sea of Marmora, but the expericncc of the war has been that the British underwater craft are very miich more efficient than those of the enemy. It is clear, however, that tho prospective extension of the campaign in the Near East must impose a heavy additional strain upon the resources which have hitherto enabled the Navy'to restrict British losses on tlie transport routes to two transports and an inconsiderable number of supply ships.

Little comfort is to 'be drawn from current news of tho Balkan campaign. It goes to show that hopes of preventing a junction between the Austro-Germans and tho Bulgarians across north-eastern Serbia _ have practically disappeared. Available details of the campaignarc meagre and some of them reported on doubtful authority, ' but their generally unfavoiu able import is confirmed in statement made by Lord Lansdowne, speaking in the House of' Lords as the mouthpiece of the Imperial Government. It was bluntly stated by Lord Lansdowne that it was highly improbable that the Serbians would be able to withstand the Austro-German and Bulgarian - attack in north-eastern Serbia for any length of time, and there is no promise in his speech that adcguate > Entente aid will be rendered Serbia in time to turn the scale in her favour. He stated, indeed, that the Government regarded the 13,000 British troops sent to Salonika as the precursor of larger forces, but his remarks on the subject admit the 'inference that! the original British force of 13,000 has not yet been strengthened. Unless the French expedition sent to tho Balkans is very much more numerous than the British force it is obvious that Serbia is still fighting under a desperate handicap.

It is on this account net difficult to believe, as German and Greek reports in hand declare, that tho Serbs, in spite of their heroic efforts, are being driven back both in Northern Serbia and before the Bulgarian advancc in portions of Macedonia. There is official news, however, that the French are fighting successfully on the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier near the southern extremity of Serbia and that the Serbs have recaptured Veles, which is ou the main railway more, than 50 miles north of tho Greek frontier. The fate of Uskub, the important railway junction further north, remains uncertain, but its occupation by the Bulgarians is taken for granted 'in an unofficial message from Athens.

It is in North-Eastern Serbia that the heaviest pressure against the Serbians exists, and of this area it is reported that the Bulgarians have occupied Negotin and that as a consequence a junction between the Bulgarians and Austro-Gcrmans is imminent, If tho Bulgarians have captured Negotin they arc well forward in an advancc across the _ narrow north-eastern corner of Serbia where at the outset they were separated from their Allies by little more, thin forty miles of country. A coincident forward movement by the Aus-tro-Germans in the north would place the Serbians in this are a in the position of being crushcd between the closing jaws of » vice, Tho unofficial news fcbfit such s. move*

incnt is' under way possibly runs ahead of events, but it has been recognised all along that the Serbians cannot indefinitely prevent their enemies joining hands unless they are powerfully reinforced, and Loud Lansdowne's speech in the House of Lords indicates that this essential condition has not been fulfilled. It follows that the first prize of tlio Balkan campaign—a road into Turkey—is probably within the grasp ol the Austro-Gcrmans. Many other aspects of the campaign are touched upon to-day, but it will only take definite shape when this initial issue is definitely settled.

A statement equally remarkable for its effrontery and apparent lack of truth is credited io the Premier of Bulgaria (M. Badoslavoff). He is reported to have said, in effect, that Bulgaria's solo aim in making war was to capture Macedonia, and that when she is in full possession of that province she will only continue fighting if the action of the Entente constrains her to that course. Apparently Bulgaria, having passed from bluff and bluster to treacherous war upon her neighbour, is anxious to retrace her steps by the same route, retaining the fruits of her treachery. The attempt is audacious even when measured by Bulgarian standards, and it is tolerably certain that M. Badosmvoff will find the comfortable retreat he has projected for his country doubly barred. It is not likely to meet with the approval of the Germanic Powers to whom Bulgaria is bound body and soul that she should prematurely withdraw from the fight, and Bulgaria has in prospect also a reckoning with Serbia and the Bn--1 ente, from which she will not bo absolved by any temporary success.

The unfavourable turn of the. ! Balkan campaign no doubt accounts for the bellicose tone taken by Kino Constantjne in a pronouncement .reported to-day, which is worthy of Tsar Ferdinand himself. More importance probably attaches, however, to ail incident in the Greek Chamber of Deputies, where M. Venizelos, taunted by his Ministerial opponents, reminded them that the life of their Government depended on his party. Reading this with Lord Lansdowne's definite statement that it was at the instance of the Venizelos Government that ithe Allies landed troops at Salonika "to enable Greece to fulfil her treaty obligations," it would seem very possible that Greece may yet adopt a policy consistent with her honourable obligations and national interests, in spite of all that King Constantine may do. It is probably vain, however, to look for military co-operation from Greece until the Allies have taken a firmer hold on the Balkan campaign than they are shown to have taken up to the present date.