LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
THE STRATEGY OF THE WAR. Sir, —Tho following extract from a letter of 0110 who is an intelligent student of military history may he of interest. It is dated September 23.—1 am, otc., G.E.A. "I have not in the least changed my optimism. Tho Russians aro now 011 the line from Vilna to llorno, with an excellent railway behind them. It is true that Vilna has fallen, which will binder the communications with Petrograd, but J. fancy tho Russians intend to stop on this lino, and as tho Pripet marshes are impassable, and as they aro gaining ground in the south, they will probably bo ablo to sparo munitions for an adequate defence of tho Vilna-Dvinsk railway, which is now the | vital spot. If there were any fear of thoir falling behind tho Yilna-Rovno railway, I should bo—not anxious—but disappointed, as there appear to be no adequate 'lateral railway communications in tho direction of the Beresina. 111 their present position the Russians appear to be admirably situated. They have got tho shortest possible line from Riga to the Rumanian frontier. Their Tine is probably unassailable in tho Pripet marshes ; and as they have now formed up straight with tho Rumanian frontier ,they aro able to give Rumania the protection she desired before committing herself to any hostility against Germany. If these really have stopped the transit of German munitions into Turkey, and still more if they have stopped tho sale, of grain to Germany, it shows that the retreat of Russia has had the expected effect of protecting ' the Rumanian wing. "Of course, all critics agree that the key to the whole war is the Dardanelles. Success there will alter t'he whole course of the war. Failure there will lengthen the war; and the present delay there has probably caused us already to postpoue the expected advance in France and Flanders. It is obvious that if we cannot feed : munitions into Russia via the ! Dardanelles, it must have been necessary to pile in munitions through Archangel before the closing of the Whito Sea. I conclude we have lfeon doing so, and that this is the reason why we have had to hold back equipment and munitions for our new armies. Russia's needs were more urgent. I have never believed a word about the so-called stale-mate in tho West. It has seemed to me perfectly clear that France was ready to move 111 April or May, but did not dare turn the * Germans out of their present line until the Russians " were out of danger. It is obvious that if tho Germans had been holding t'he Rhino instead of their present distant and dangerous line, they would lave been able, by means of their wonderful railways, to have spared largo numbers of troops from the West to pile into the Russian offensive. We must hold them as far apart from tho Russian lino as possible, until either tho German reserves aro exhausted or until Russia has recovered her power of offensive. It is just possible that Russia has now reached the end of her retreat on the Vilna-Rovno line, and that the three weeks' bombardment of the German lines in the West is ill preparation for an advance through Alsace and Lorraine across the Upper Rhine, or for converging wedges driven in respectively at Perthes and Arras. If we have any hopes of an early defeat of the Germans we might do the latter. The double wedge converging towards Namur would probably drive the enemy back to tho Meuse, if not to the Rhine at once. If, however, we expect- a war of exhaustion, and. do. not expect an early victory, we should probably concentrate our offensive in Alsaco and Lorraine, cross the Upper Rhine, and advance along the Swiss frontier to hold out a hand to the Italians. It is noticeable that in all the French offensive during the last six months they have had success up to the point where they seemed able to break through at any time, and that rhen they havo suddenly dropped operations, and begun .again elsewhere. It has seemed-clear to mo that though they wished to take points of tactical value, the last tiling they wished for was a premature advance. One's strategical instincts also. teach that it would havo been absolutely disastrous to move the enemv out of tho Flanders pocket, until ALL the Allies, and also all possiblo neutral friends, were ready to form the complete ring round Germany from Riga to tho Dannbe, and from the Danube down tho Rhine to the" Dutch frontier, or further. It is true that we English had to wait for high explosives, without which an advance would have been most costly, but there was no necessity for us to do more thftn hold our litis. The advance would havo boon lower down, and tho French were more or loss ready. It was the .unreadiness of Russia that put the clock back.
"Germany's trump ca_rcl_ is to create an atmosphere of pessimism in the world, and to foster the belief that the war is interminable. Unfortunately onr second-class Press have fatuously fallen into tlio German trap. Some papers have, I fear, published pessimistio rubbish of malice -prepense, and have been rigbtly dubbed traitorous. All first-class papers —at least all I have seen —are sensibly optimistic. 'As long as Russia was in advanced positions, which could not he defended adequately, she tto6 in danger, and_ Germany was able by moans of her railways to work her wicked will. Now that Russia lias been extricated—by the maenificent generalshin of the Grand Duke Nicholas and the finest military operation that nrobnbly the world has over seen —she Has the advantage of a short line, good railway system, nearness to her bases, and flanks protected by the sea on one side and by Rumania on the other; wltilo Germany has, temporarily at all events, lost most of her railway advantages, and will lose more and more as she pushes Russia further'east. The German threat to raid through Serbia to Turkey is, I think, mostly bluff, to distract onr forces from the main theatre. Sho has not the meu to spare. "I am not ranch in fear about tho trade -unions. As soon as they -understand the war they will fall in and do their best. It is the 'traitor' Press that sometimes alarms me. Luckily they have now been shown up."
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Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2603, 27 October 1915, Page 6
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1,075LETTERS TO THE EDITOR Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2603, 27 October 1915, Page 6
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