PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2601, 25 October 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Where actual happenings arc concerned a general offensive by the Italians stands first in importance amongst the major developments of tho war reported to-day, but even this, important as it is, does not transcend _in interest the intensely critical situation in the Balkans, where a test of strength is in prospect, the result of which is bound to materially affect the duration of the war. At the moment political prospects and developments overshadow military events in the Balkans, and in its aggregate effect tho news is more hopeful than it has_ been for some time past. Greece, it is true, with its pro-Gorman Court and minority Government, has rcjcctecl the Entente proposals anent intervention and declined meantime to carry out its treaty obligations to Serbia. Even Mie offer of Cyprus—an offer made as it now appears, without prejudice to any other claims Grceco may have as an active party in the war, to territorial expansion—has not sufficed to turn the scale in favour of the policy to which Greece is honourably pledged,-and from which sho has been diverted by a Court and political coteric who set more store by .German favour than by the national interests and obligations. Tho actual inclinations of Greece, however, are not necessarily reflected in tho rejection of tho Entente offer. Even those who for tho moment dominate Greek policy have mado their rejection of the Entente proposals temporary and inconclusive, and it is somewhat unlikely that they would be able to command popular and general support, if they sought to make it final. It is not' disputed that ■ King Constantine and the party of the Court are definitely pro-German and that the Zaiiiis Government is willing in all things to obey tho King. There is another party to be reckoned with,' however, which sots national ir.tercsts first— the powerful party led by M. Venievents seem to be rapidly approaching tho stage at which this party will be able to make its voico heard with effect. '

1 It is being suggested to Greece on behalf of the Entente that if sho is hot prepared to support her ally she cannot object to demobilise. This should force Greece to a decision and make an end of her balancing between tho parties, in the war. It will be rcmemberctl that M. Venizelos made it .a condition of his provisional support of the Zaijiis Government, which exists on suffcrance, that tho mobilisation ordered and effected before ho left office should be maintained. The Court, and minority Government in Greece would thus seem to be faced by the choice of accepting the Entente proposals or adopting a course which would precipitate an immediate conflict between the Zaimis Government and the party which favours intervention on reasonable conditions. The policy of declaring war on the Entente is probably not within the range of practical politics so far as Greeco.is concerned. That the Venizelist Party will oppose demobilisation with their whole power may almost be taken for granted; since it would entail renunciation of the national ambitions. It is not suggested, of course, that M. Vejtizelos and his party aro prepared to rush into war without receiving assurances of adequate co-operation and support. One message to-clay states that all the Greek parties are agreed that Greece cannot move unless the Allies have 300,000 men in Macedonia, and that when such an army has been landed the Greeks of their own 'accord will ask that they may join the Entente. This, no doubt, indicates the general position accurately enough.

A moke important factor in the Balkan situation than Greece is brought to the fore in the current news regarding Rumania. Messages from different sources report that an agreement has been concluded between Rumania and the Entente, under which Rumania will enter the war when the Entente has assembled an array of '100,000 men in the Balkan 'Peninsula. News so .important must await confirmation, but it receives some support meantime from surrounding circumstances— notably the vigour with which the Russians have lately taken the offensive in the southern section of their front. It is noteworthy also that _ a Rumanian mission is at present in Russia, One of the envoys, said_to be a near relative of the Rumanian Premier (M. Bratiano) has stated (according to the Petrograd Xovoe Vrami/a) that his country will shortly enter the war and lias already concentrated a considerable force in the Carpathians, that is to say on the borders of Transylvania, This great province is regarded by the Rumanians in much the sanw spirit as that in which the Italians regard the Trcntiuo and Istria, and for a similar reason. Transylvania is largely populated by Rumanians, and its inclusion within the frontiers of the Dual Monarchy is on that account regarded by the Rumanian nation as unnatural and uni"st - * * « * i

Taking the news about Rumania at its face value, the outlook in the Balkans is materially improved, but it dueu «ul- follow that there will be any immediate relief of the extreme

pressure bearing on Serbia. Rumania i is apparently stipulating for such' co-operation by the principal Entente Powers as would enable her to bond her whole energies upon the invasionof tho province which it is her ambition to gain. The stipulation's not unreasonable, for Rumania is under no particular obligation to the Entente Powers, least of all to Russia, and her military cooperation would still be of great value even she restricted her action to invading Transylvania and guarding her frontiers. Both because it is named as a condition of Rumnniiin intervention and b.c<iusc the prospect of that intervention will furnish the Austro-Germans and Bulgarians with an incentive to press the attack on Serbia with redoubled vigour, it is more than ever necessary that the Entente should throw a powerful army into the Balkans. It would be taking rather too much for granted to assume that the necessary force, will be made available in V mo t( > P rcven t a junction of. the Austro-Germans and Bulgarians. •n S issue of the campaign still hangs in doubt;, and nothing less than the presence of an Entente army adequate to repel the Bulgarian invasion will ensure the full defeat of the Austro-Gcrman project and prevent the re-arming of iurkcy. There can be little doubt, however, that Greek co-operation is only temporarily withheld, and if the latest reports about Rumania are true, Entente prospects in the -balkans would seem to be fairly bright. _■ Assuming so much, there is a that the Austro-Ger-man enterprise may be defeated betore it has achieved any material result, and failing that the Entente aii f les should be reasonably well placed to continue the struggle and recover lost ground. * * # »

As to the actual progress of tho oerbian campaign it is a peculiarity oi the news in hand that it throws no light upon the operations in what would m ordinary circumstances constitute tho most critical area of the whole campaign—north-eastern k.crbia. Tho news is fragmentary anci inconclusive in any case, but while reports from various sources deal with the Austro-German southern advance, and'with Bulgarian attacks across the eastern frontier of Serbia towards tho Salonika-Bel-grade railway, there is no further news of the attacks from north and south upon tho projecting northeastern corner of Serbia in which the Austro-Germans and Bulgarians are separated by a distance of little more than forty miles. Since success in this area would enable the two sections of the enemy forces to join hands and would also open a road for the passage of German munitions into Turkey, it is to be supposed that vigorous pressure is being brought to bear upon the Serbian defence, but the news docs not show this to be the. case. As reports go the Austro-Germans, ins-tead of attempting a rapid drive across the north-eastern extremity of Serbia, which would give them the Danube as a- transport link between Hungarian and Bulgarian railways, are developing their main attack further west, along tho main railway which runs fron Belgrade to Nish and there branches south-e?st into Bulgaria and south to Salonika. If the current reports that Rumania is likely soon to enter the war are credited by the Austro-Gerir ans their neglect of the apparent advantages of tho Danube route is understandable. With Rumania in the field tho passage of the Danube would in all likelihood bs blocked, even if tho Serbians were driven out of that northeastern comer of their country which is admittedly very difficult to defend.

By their own accounts the AustroGermans arc still pressing forward against the- resistance of the Serbian northern armies, and a Bucharest message tells the same story, with the addition that the invaders have been on several occasions seriously checked and aro suffering very heavy, loss. It is stated, apparently on good authority that Austro-Gcrman casualties in battles at three of the chief points of attack on the Save and Danube reached a total of 60,000. Reports generally go to show that tho enemy is paying a heavy price for his forward progress, and it is not suggested that the strength of the Serbian northern line has been put yet to any conclusive test. The Serbs are still fighting in advance of their main defensive positions and their position meantime would be seriously endangered only by tho success of the Bulgarian attack on the main railway further south. As regards this section oi tho campaign reports at the moment arc more or less in conflict. It is clear that battles are in progiess at several points on the eastern side ot the railway, but there is no definite information as to the strength of the forces engaged, or as to the number of Anglo-French troops so far sent into Macedonia. Until there is definite news to the contrary, n° wcve /> it is reasonable to assume that the

lino is intact. * * * * Though the Italian offensive has evidently given rise already to a struggle of the first magnitude, its detail features are not as yet very sharply indicated. The Italians speak of their attack as extending from the Tvrol and Trentino to the eea,' and claim some headway on tho southern approaches to Trent but it is obviously on the eastward facing the I-sonzo front, that the offensive has developed its maximum power. The nature of the fighting may bo appreciated from tho- fact that sections of this front were subjected to a preparatory bombardment of fifty hours. According to the Austrians the Italian main, attack was developed at various points on a front of about 40 miles _(30 miles as the crow flies) from Tolmino south to the Adriatic, and everywhere broke down. They admit that their lines penetrated at some points, but assert that '•he attackers were finally everywhere driven out and suffered enormous loss. The Italians are silent—perhaps signifificautlv so—regarding the southern section of the lsonzo front, immediately north of the Adriatic, but they report the capture of important positions both north and south of Tolmino, and also north of Gorizia, a fortress about twelve miles north of the Adriatic. Italian and Austrian reports aro thus hi direct conflict.

These reports in' any ease- leave .much untold about what is apparently the greatest battle, or series of battles, the campaign has yet witnessed. Whatever tile immediate success of their effort may have been, it is obvious that the Italians, besides advancing their own cause, are doing a signal ssvvico to their Allies at a time when their aid is likely to be of supreme value. According to one report it is estimated that 800,000 Austrians aro now en-

gaged on Uie Italian front, and whether this estimate is exaggerated or not it is clear that the Italian onslaught _ places the enemy under the necessity of concentrating all possible rainforccments to aid in repelling it. That the Italians have any idea or hope of pressing their offensive to an early sucooss is not necessarily implied in the vigour with which it has opened, bub the hold they have obtained on the mountain passes of the Tyrol and Trentino and those of the Carnic Alps loaves them free to concentrate the bulk of their strength against the Isonzo front, and it is a factor in the situation also that winter will do much less to impede operations in this region than in the northern mountains.