THE BALKAN PROBLEM
It cannot bo said that Sir Edward Grey's review of- the Balkan situation has thrown any more hopeful light on' what must be plainly recognised to bo a disquieting posiAll that the British Foreign Minister disclosed had been already made known by M. Viviani, the French_ Prime Minister a day or two earlier. On oertain points, indeed, notably the intentions of Russia, M. Viviani went rather further than Sir Edward Grey. The most satisfactory feature of a situation fraught with grave possibilities is the announcement from both statesmen that the Entente Powers in this matter, as in all others, are acting in complete accord, and that the policy and plans laid down were agreed on after consultations Between the military advisers of the Allied nations. The disquieting features at the moment are the continued uncertainty as to the intentions of Rumania and Greece, and_ the doubt which appears to exist as to Italy's views concerning the dispatch of forces to the Balkans. The contention put forward in several quarters both in England and France, that it would be a' dangerous policy to allow oin enemies to compel us to divert forccs from the main theatres of war and to fight where we should be less advantageously placed is, of course, guite sound if it wero merely a question of choosing the ground of battle. Unfortunately, however, the situation is complicated uy other considerations. Tlic first of these is the fate of Serbia, Inclination and duty both call to the Entente Powers to send assistance to the gallant little nation which has tough t so magnificently against such odds. But more important still from the point of view of its bearing on the ultimate issue of the war is the possible effect on Greece and Rumania of failure on the part of the Entente Poweis .to adequately assist Serbia. If the Central Powers are allowed to develop their campaign in the Near East practically unchecked, will it not almost certainly result in Rumania and Greece going over to the enemy 1 ! It is not an easy matter to balanco the pros ancl cons of so complicated a situation, more especially as the plans of the Entente Powers are necessarily shrouded in secrecy, but it does seem "impossible to avoid throwing a powerful force into the balance in the Balkans, despite the obvious drawbacks of such a step. It will occasion little surprise, if, in view of recent developments, the Allied forces on Gallipoli are withdrawn and transferred to another and not very distant field of activity. Sir Edward Grey's reticence, no doubt is largely influenced by the necessity for avoiding any premature disclosure of .the plans of the Entente Powers in regard to the Balkans. Probably the first real indication of the intentions of Britain and her Allies we shall have will be when those plans aro actually put into execution.
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Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2594, 16 October 1915, Page 4
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483THE BALKAN PROBLEM Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2594, 16 October 1915, Page 4
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