PROGRESS OP THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2593, 15 October 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OP THE WAR

: f , _ Tiik most sal/is factory feature of the Balkan campaign »h il, lias developed at time nf writing is that the Aitstro-Ormans 1 in Northern Serbia have not yet effected a jimclion with the Bulgarians. This is definitely shown in the report that a Serbian bombardment compelled the Av/.lro-Gcrmans to evacuate Orsova, a river town standing north of the Danube, near I he point, at , wtikh the . ttiniKtU'V, Serbia, aud Eiwanw, 'loin. At Or-

sova the Austro-Gcrmans arc _ only 40 miles distant from Bulgaria—oiv about half-as far again around the windings of the Danube through and bcloiv the Iron dates and since tho Serbians have had to bc<U the whole brunt of Austro-Gcrman attacks, for a- week, and latterly those of the Bulgarians as well, it must be regarded as one of the surprises of the campaign that the two sections of the enemy forces have not ere now mastered tho narrow projection of- Serbian territory by which they are separated. 'It has been poin'ted out before that though this territory is mountainous in oharac- j tor, and is not traversed by a railway, the Danube, running roundthe north-eastern corner of berbia into the region penetrated by a Bulgarian railway, affords the enemy ample facilities for ieavy_ transport. In former years navigation of the river where it runs between Rumania Land Serbia was impeded by rapids and rocks, but such improvements have been effected that it is now navigable up as far as Oi'sova by steamers and barges having a draught c-f six feet. Above Orsova, as far as Vienna, the Danube is navigable by vessels drawing five feet. On present indications nothing short of Rumanian intervention will prevent the Austro-Ger-mans utilising the section of the Danube south from Orsova in their progress southtowards Bulgaria and Turkey, That" the Serbs still effectively command this stretch of navigable waterway is better news than might have been expected. So long as they maintain their defenoe in the neighbourhood • of Orsova, the enemy is short of his initial objective in the campaign—an open road into Bulgaria and so into Turkey— in the area in ■which he might expcct to attain it most easily. « * * *

The check to the enemy at Orsova 1 is almost the only satisfactory de- J tail in the campaign reported at the moment, and in observing its general trend it is just as well to remembar > that the Anglo-French Army landed i at Salonika has still to make its : weight felt in positive fashion, and. that a diversion, presumably power- i ful,- may be expected to result from the promised Russian' landing on the < Bulgarian Black Sea coast. If there were not a prospect of the Anglo-French and Russian armies taking off, between them, much of the pressure now bearing on Serbia, the position of that country would be desperate. "The broad effect of available infprmation about the northern operations is that the enemy, despite his recent local defeats and losses, has gained a firm footing on the Serbian side of the Danube,, and is advancing south from the vicinity of Belgrade. This, however, is not the most disquieting foature of the situation. The northern Serbian armies aro not .yet thrown back upon the mountain ridges where they may be expccted to put ' forth their supreme effort against the Austro-German invaders, unless Bulgarian attacks on the Serbian right flank make a firm stand in the north impossible. , *#• * » The overshadowing fact at present and one that cannot bo regarded without concern is that Bulgarian attacks across the Serbian eastern frontier are still being developed and pressed, and that while they have been repelled, apparently only Serbians havo as yet been available to repel them. If the balance 'of force is allowed to endure on this basis much longer, the quidnuncs who profess to regard a wave of Austro-German invasion through the' Balkans as an affair of minor importance will soon sea their theories put to a. practical test. The reported Bulgarian attack .which had Krushevatz for its objective j deserves special attention, lvrusnevatz stands about 35 miles north- - west of Nish. It is ten miles west of the main north and south railway, with which it is'connected by a short branch line, and close upon 60 miles west of the Bulgarian frontier. It is to be assumed that the Bulgarian attack, was brought, to a halt a long way short of it's objective, since if the attacking forces had got to within' ten miles of Krushevatz they would have. been astride the main. Serbian railway, and i the communications of the northern armies would have been cut. Why the Serbian reports should speak of the Bulgarian attack as being aimed at Krushevatz, without mentioning the main railway, is not, clear They arc definite in stating that' the Bulgarian Macedonian forces engaged in the attack were heavily defeated and thrown back in confusion, but the mention of a locality so far west of the Bulgarian frontier carries a disagreeable suggestion that the Serbians have found it necessary to establish their defensive line not far east of railway, the security of which is vital to their whole campaign. The railway is not the only material asset the Serbians have to guard in this northern section of their territory. Thirty-five miles north-west of Krushevatz, and standing like that place on a branch line west of the main railway,, is Kragujevatz, tho principal Serbian arsenal. * # *

It will be seen that the Austr'oGerman attack on the north and the Bulgarian attack from the east are the elements in an enveloping movement which threatens the bulk of the Serbian forces in the .field, and also the most important depot of supplies. Assuming that the Bulgarians arc anywhere near the main railway, in the area between Nish and the northern. frontier, so dangerous a threat might se6m to be involved to the communications of the Serbian northern armies as would make a rapid retreat inevitable. It has to be remembered, however] that the campaign is developing in an area of exceedingly broken and mountainous country, and that conditions whioh dominate fighting in more open areas have little bearing upon the campaign in the Serbian. | mountains.

One hundred thousand men is tho highest total yet named as the strength of the Entente army landed at Salonika; and it is obvious that unless Russia lands a very great army in Bulgaria a much more powerful Anglo-French force will be required to relievo Serbia and redress the balance of power in the Balkans. If only 100,000 Anglo-French troops are available on the Serbian eastern frontier an ample explanation is (forded of tho fact that the Serbs are being left unaided to defend its northern section. Such an Allied force would no more than sufiicc to guard the southern section of the eastern frontier, and the railway north from Greece, against attacks bv the Bulgarians and by the army the Turks aro said to bo massing on their northern border. The need of providing a really powerful Jyileiitc army to act against Bulgaria is all the greater since Greece is as far as ever from show MS. any !««lin«M«l!Jo taJca -to field on behalf of Jier alii:,

She is reported, instead, to be resorting to tho quibble that Serbia's present predicament is not "Balkanic in character, and that she is therefore not bound to intervene. The latest report regarding Rumania is that she is selling her grain-harvest to Germany. This cannot be called good news, though probably it is a case of -two countries meeting in a transaction which is to their common interest, without reference to their general relations. ■ * * * »

Vigorous military action is so obviously the only remedy for the state of affairs at present existing in the Balkans, that discussion of details is move or loss vain until events have shown whether the Enlnite Powers are prepared to make the- free call upon their rcsouroes which alone will suffice to turn the tide of war in their favour. While tho question l'Cr mains in suspense it is depressing to be told that a controversy is raging in Great Britain on tho advisability of sending a forco of four hundred thousand men to Balkans. Ihe occasion calls for action rather than controversy, but possibly in this case the controversy follows on action ot which the effects hove not yet appeared. It is not encouraging to read in the same message that experts are divided between the claims of the West front and Serbia. There is, of course, reason in the view that if the Germans withdraw forces from one or both of the two main theatres to press their Balkan enterprise, it will be so much easier to defeat them in these areas, but it is not possible on that aecount to discriminate, between the campaign in tho Balkans and the campaign in France Russia, The only point really worthconsidering is that if the Balkan enterprise of the Germans is not decisively defeated they will have put their forces employed to highly profitable use, by infusing new We into Turkey, maintaining tho blockade of- Russia, and overawing armies aggregating over three-quarters oi a million bayonets, which otherwise might be in the field -against them. It is certainly not' wise counsel to suggest that advantages of this mag nitude should be left open to the enemy unless it is humanly impos* siblc to avert it, for if the enemy is allowed to grasp these advantages the day of Entente victory m the war will inevitably be postponed. * * * »

There is w ' weight of. testimony to-day to the fact that the tide has very definitely turned in favour oi the Russians in the Eastern theatre. Whether it has turned permanently or not only the future will .show, but present indications are decidedly hopeful. In the Baltic Provinces the Russians have followed up a successful resistance to German frontal attacks pressed in strong force during the last month by driving the enemy back in the are.a south-west of Dvinsk for a distance of four miles. At the southern end of their front the Russians are following up a still more successful assault upon the enemy. Brilliant cavalry work is spoken of to-day, so that evidently the armies of the Tsar-arc opening up the fighting in an area where they lately dislodged the enemy from fortified entrenchments. Visible details all go to support the statement in. one message that the Germans have failed in the attempt to reach a line on which they could havo taken up an advantageous position to fight a delaying winter campaign. The Russians, it is true, havo done little more as yet than arrest the forward, movement of the enemy, but that in itself is a positive achievement full of promise for the future.

In connection with the considerable increase in Russian supplies, it is' reported tfiat the Trans-Siberian railway is wholly given over to the transportation of munitions, and that twenty car-loads of guns and munitions produced in Japan are passing over the railway every day. The last detail is not impressive, and is probably a mistake. Twenty car-loads of munitions per day would not go far in such _ a campaign as the Russians have in hand, and it may be taken for granted that the actual volume of Japanese supplies is very much greater. The best indication of the rate at whioh supplies are pouring in is that'the railway is beingworked at full capacity in transporting them. Japan is, of course, not the only source _of supply. Russia is also importing large quantities of equipment and material from America, and probably from other countries as well.

• It will be noticed that claims laid by the Germans to local successes on the Western front are definitely contradicted by Allied reports dealing with fighting in the self-same areas. The actual position seems to be that heavy German attacks on various parts of the Allied line were nearly everywhere decisively repulsed, and that where the enemy did gain some ground it was of 'very limited extent: A German correspondent is quoted as predicting an early renewal of the Allied offensive.