PROGRESS OF THE WAR.

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2591, 13 October 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR.

A certain amount of encouragement' is to be drawn from the fact that the German newspapers are celebrating the capture of Belgrade as one of the greatest successes of the waiy because, such an excess of jubilation'is obviously not warranted. It is always a good sign when" the enemy is reduced to the gross; exaggeration 'of a minor success, because an inference is thus warranted'that more solid grounds for satisfaction are, for the_ time being at any rate, non-existent. What is to follow the fair of Belgrade is'for the future to show, but in itself it is a comparatively unimportant incident, less important by far than the heavy defeat of tho Germans in their efforts to- win back their lost positions at Loos, 01; than the Russian attack on the AustroGermans in Southern Russia and Galioia.. Belgrade was the capital of Serbia until the Government removed to Nish early in the war, but its geographical situation makes it an exposed outpost on a frontier whici the Serbians could at no time defend unless against a hopelessly inferior enemy. - The river frontiers of Serbia from Montenegro to Rumania are about 300 miles long. The Serbian army has an effective strengthy of about 250,000. If it attempted to permanently hold the rivers it would bo inviting disaster, and therefore , no such attempt is contemplated in the Serbian scheme of defence. ..The military, as distinct from the political frontiers of Serbia), are set in the mountains south of the Save and Danube, and east of the Drina. This being so, . the Serbian resistance on the river frontiers is in the nature of outpost fighting, and it is the simple truth that the capture of Belgrade, hailed by the German newspapers as on© of the greatest successes of the war, was the capture of an outpost.

On visible evidenoe there is less cause for uneasiness in the presence of an Austro-German army in Northern: Serbia than in uncertainty as to the turn events are likely to take further south. Tihe thing l is summed up in the statement of the Serbian Minister at Paris: "If the army we expect from the Allies allows us to devote ourselves to our assailants from the • north, we will fight without uneasiness, and oppose the invaders again victoriously." A more succinct statement of the position is attributed to a- Serbian officer: "If the Allies look after the Bulgarians, we will go into battle singing." It is a. matter of positive knowledge that these statements by Serbs are not idle boasting. Warweary and ill-equipped, the Serbian army inflicted disastrous defeat last year upon a well-appointed Austrian army, and now that it is in much improved case as regards both condition and equipment its prospects in the renewed conilict_ are good, always provided 'that while meeting the Austro-German northern' attack it is protected against attack in iiank and rear. The Serbian link in the Entente, chain of power in the Balkans has been subjected to a. crucial test anc! proved sound and reliable, but disaster will result unless of the chain is formed of links as good. On the facts as *lij3W> . tjio Ftsnoh pendent wb,q setuaates tl}at iba AK :

lies must send 300,000 men into Macedonia has advanced a moderate, estimate. It is an imperative necessity of the situation that Serbia should be relieved of the whole weight of Bulgarian aggression, and Bulgaria, according to the same correspondent (whose estimate in this particular is confirmed by others), will put 400,000 first-class soldiers into the field. To this must be added any co-operating forcc provided by the Turks. It is not enough that the Allies should protect the right flank and rear of the Serbian army, and keep its railway communications with the sea at Salonika intact. .These things arc in themselves of vital importance, but the circumstances demand in addition a powerful attack upon 1 Bulgaria as soon as she strikes a blow at Serbia or opens her railways to the passage of munitions for Turkey. To carry out such a policy very' powerful forces will be required, of which the army sent into Macedonia will form only a part, and the policy will bo crowned with full success only if Bulgaria is attacked quickly as well as in adequate force. It must be the ai'm of the Allies not merely to present an unbroken front to the Austro-German and Bulgarian combination in the area north from the Aegean to the Serbian • mountains, but to gain possession of the road from Hungary into Turkey winch otherwise will remain a valujiblp asset ill the hands of tlie enemy This is to be done only by invading Bulgaria in heavy force.

That fclia Entente Powers have the force available which this emergency demands can hardly be doubted. The only question is whether they will bring it to bear in time to defeat the Austro-German Balkan enterprise, as it should be defeated, at its inception. It will be time enough when this question is resolved to pass judgment upon the Balkan policy of Great Britain and her Allies. The extreme attitude taken by the London Times, in an article quoted at length, to-day, does not seem to be warranted by visible facts, and the article is evidently inspired rather by a desire to press the case for conscription than to pass a , deliberate judgment. No one would pretend that Entente diplomacy has been brilliantly successful in the Balkans, but though the position _ to-day is in some respects bad, it is not past mendincr bj; resolute military action. It is within the power of Britain, France, ■tiussia, and Italy, acting in conJ® rt > to Put forth such an effort in the Balkans as would not 1 only wipe out past, diplomatic;mistakes and shortcomings, but open up' a pros-, pecfc of decisive military advantage. At .ail immediate view there is a ®j*iovis danger that the war supplies of . the Ottoman Empire may bo heavily replenished, but' if the Entente Powers handle the Balkan situation as it should be handled they will not only be in. a better position to attack Turkey, but will be in a fair way to open a road of invasion into the Central Empires.

It is to be hoped that soma comments by Frenoh newspapers, which are published to-day, do not reflect the spirit in which the various Entente Powers are dealing with the Balkan problem. Little exception can be taken to the specific contention that it is undesirable that the Frenoh ,should";weaken ■ their in the Western theatre in order to send troops to the Balkans, and that the burden of dealing with the crisis must fall chiefly on Kussia, England, . and Italy. The most objectionabk feature .in these newspaper utterances is the suggestion that though all the Entente Powers are interested in Serbia, somo are more in-1 terested_ than others, and that their efforts in the Balkans should be measured accordingly. This way of looking at tilings betrays an amazing poverty of vision, and it will be a had day for the Entente Powers if they ever come to govern their activities by such pitifully narrow standards. There is no question in this war of limiting efforts and sacrifices in accordance with what is undertaken by allied Powers.. The nations linked in. the Entente are each and all fighting for their lives, and it is mere nonsense to suggest that one, nation or another, has a greater stake in the Balkans than its Allies. An Austro-Gcrman triumph in the Balkans would be as disastrous to Franco as to any of her Allies, for the obvious reason that its effect upon'the war would be general as well as local. The French newspapers are upon unassailable ground in advocating the closest possible co-ordination in the military plans of the Entente, but it should be the aim of co-ordina-' tion, not to provide for a laborious adjustment of individual responsibilities, but to make possible a maximum'collective effort.

Detail news concerning the Balkans in ihand at time of writing does not carry affairs much ahead of the point reached in yesterday's reports. Fighting along the Serbian river frontiers has been of a most sanguinary character, and the Serbians report enormous losses on both sides. The Germans claim that they,have completed the crossing of the Save and Danube on an extended front, with its extremities about 40 miles west and 50 miles east of Belgrade. They speak, also, of further battles, in the Driiia region (western frontier), but without going into details. It is therefore; not yet manifest whether they intend to concentrate upon effecting a junction with Bulgaria, across t)he north-eastern* corner of Serbia or to embark upon & comprehensive movement against ths Serbian army in the "mountain strongholds to which i't is retiring. «•* # » The interesting statement is mado in an unofficial message from Bucharest that it is reported that the Grand Duke Nicholas is going to Nish to take supreme command in the Balkans. A story of this kind carries no great weight in the absence of official confirmation, but it is at least a reminder of the fact that tho removal of the Grand Duke from the main Eastern ISeatre has never been explained otherwise than in the published statement of the Tsar that events demanded his presence in the south-eastern theatre. This last is a wide term, and it is plain that the Grand Duke is more likely to find scope for useful activity in the immediate future in the Balkan Peninsula than in tho Caucasus, his announced destination when lis took his departure from the main , theatre.

# , . * ■ * » News from the two main theatres is definite in character, and calls for little comment. On tho Dwina front which for some weeks has witnessed the enemy's most unsparing efforts, the Russians have materially improved their position. In the aiea south-west of Dvinsk they have pot only recaptured the village the loss oil JlAI0& rested yesfcsr,.

day, but have oxpelled tho enemy from his trenches, and penetrated his lines for a distance in the area beyond it. In "'tho Niemen region thijy have rolled back a German attack, and the nature of their continuing offensive_ in Southern llussia is indicated in n, reference to fighting at Kolki, about 90 miles north of the Galician border. Herotho Russians oii Sunday evening capturcd the third line of. the enemy's trenches, so that evidently their attack was pressed with power and determination.

Further information is supplied by Sir John French .about the rccent Gorman atacks south- of La Bassee Oanal. The outstanding tacts are that German ■ attacks made in powerful force and at very heavy coat, were repelled without any call being made upon the British reserves. Better still, tho British losses were even less than the first low estimate. Sir John French gives a direct contradiction to a Gorman report alleging an unsuccessful British attack east of Vermelles. The story was a pure invention, no such attack having been attempted. Good accounts are given also of the French operations in tho 'Champagne, wttere m'ore ground has' been won from the enemy.