PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2509, 12 October 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Though interesting additions are «>oing made to it from day to day, the story of the developing Balkan crisis is still incomplete in many vital details. On the information in ihand it is impossible to form anything _ like a confident opinion as to which side at the moment holds the best hand in the great game of war and diplomacy, which is still at a very early' stage. No definite information is available at time of writing as to. the strength of either the Austro-Gcrman Army which has invaded Northern Serbia or the Entente Army whioh is entering the Bailkan Peninsula by way of Salonika. The attitude of Greece is more or less in doubt, though she seems to be definitely committed at least to a policy of benevolent neutrality towards her ally and the Entente. Above all Bulgaria has not yet made the attack on Serbia which was presumably the object of her mobilisation. This is the move whioh will do more than anything else to body forth the Balkan crisis in its true dimensions, and until it is made the situation must be , regarded as more or less open, and a margin must be left for possibilities.

Not only is the balance of forces in tho impending struggle necessarily, for the time being, a matter of but it is quite impossibleas yefc to 'reach a definite opiniou as to the true nature and scopc of tho enterprise upon which tho AustroGermans have embarked. Military events so far reported afford no proof that it is the purpose of the Germanic Allies, as the Frankfurter Zeitmg _ avers, to gain free communication with Turkey across the north-eastern corner of Serbia and to crush Serbia. What has. been so far reported of the progress of the Austro-German offensive is consistent with the idea that only the first of these objects may bo really aimed at. In this connection it is possibly significant that little has been heard up to tho present of the attack on the Drina line-, on tho western frontier of Serbia. Definite progress, including the oapture of Belgrade, ha® been reported in the operations against the northern frontier, but as regards the Drina line nothing more definite has come through at time of writing than general statements that it has been forced at several places (which are not named). This point deserves _ attention, though it would be unwise to found any definite conclusion • upon the meagre information about tho opening ovents of the campaign as yet available. An eastward advance from the Drina will be an essential feature in the, operations of tho Austro-Ger-mans if they are intent upon mastering the main railway which runs south through Serbia and branches at Nish into lines whioh reach the Aegean at Salonika and the Bosphorus by way of Bulgaria. No such importance will attach to the operations on the Drina line if tie Austro-Germans aim only at effecting a junction with Bulgaria across the narrow north-eastern projection of Serbia and so pouring supplies into Turkey by the method which will entail the minimum expenditure ol military strength. Austro-German action on these lines is feasible, and would be checkmated only by an overwhelming attack on Bulgaria for which the requisite force may not be available in time. Unless they are assisted by Rumania—and that country shows no present inclination to enter the war—the Serbians are probably not in a position to seriously contest the occupation of the north-eastern oorner their 'country, and once located in this area the Austvo-Gevmans would be in posKsaicm of an wibroken transport

routo into Turkey, with the Danube as a link between their own railways and those o£ Bulgaria. If they once gain this route the_ only way to deprive them of it will bo to defeat their armies in Northern Serbia and drive them back into Hungary, or, by the invasion of Bulgaria, to cut across it further south.

Whether or not possession of this short and to all appearance easy route into Bulgaria is tho principal object of the now enterprise upon which the Austro-Gcrmans ha-vo embarked it is tolerably certain that they will attempt to master it in tho near future, and it is not at all unlikely that they may succccd in doing so. It may be part of the plan that Bulgaria should play in tho first instance a passive part and fight only_ in defence of her railways against an Entente attack. If matters develop on these lines tho pro-German party in Greece will be furnished with an argument in favour of continuing to stand aloof from tho war, and suoh an opportunity is likely to bo utilised to the full. Tho worst dangers of the Balkan crisis are thus not necessarily associated with, an immediate Aus-tro-German attempt to crush Serbia. At the same time too dark a view of tho situation is perhaps taken by Mr. Auery, a. member of the House of Commons, in a speech from which some extracts are eablcd to-day. Mr. Amery holds, in effect, that if Germany succeeds in establishing contact with Turkey through Bulgaria the Turks will be enabled to equip new armies and so to some extent to counteract the- disadvantage under which Germany labours owing to tho progressive depiction of her resources in men. It will mean, he says, that when the Gorman resources in men aro beginning to fail new Turkish armies will be ready to take tho field. This in its turn, Mr. Auery suggests, may pave the way for new Turkish attacks, which will fall most heavily upon the British, in Egypt, Macedonia, and even in India.

It is possible, at least, that Mr. Ameky is crediting the Austro-Gcr-mans with' more ample supplies of war material than they actually have at command and more ambitious military enterprises than they aro now capable of attempting outside the main theatres of war. German ambitions in regard to the Near and Further East are known, but it is probable that they are compelled by military exigencies to very' materially modify these ambitions so far as the war at its present stage is concerned. It is obviously in their interest to replenish Turkish supplies of war material with a view to stiffening resistance at the Dardanelles and to any attack the Russians may' launch in Asia Minor, or nearer Constantinople. It docs not by any means follow that the Germans are prepared to pour guns and war material into Turkey in tho "unlimited" fashion of which Mr. Ahery speaks. Splendidly as they are organised for war their material resources are no more unlimited than thoso of any other nation engaged. They have enormous supplies at command, but their position relatively to their enemies is less advantageous in this respect than it has ever been and the balance will turn against them still further as time" goes on. Whatever their present production of war material may be it is certain that the Austro-Germans could find profitable use for overy available guri and shell in the main theatres, and it is only reasonable to suppose that a definite limit will be set by necessity upon tho volume of supplies they may succeed in passing into Turkoy. To strengthen the Turks at the cost of weakening the German and Austrian armies in France and in Russia would bo a suicidal rather than an enterprising policy. It is doubtful in any case whether Turkey is capable of placing any large additional armies in the field. She mobilised for this war, it is believed, something like, 750,000 men, this number including somo men under the age of twenty. A total population of over twenty millions . may seem to afford scope for additional recruiting upon a large scale, but the population of the Ottoman Empire includes considerable national groups which for one reason or another are not available for military service, and its imperfect social organisation, heightened by the demoralisation born of tho war, is not favourable to a full assemblage of its whole availablo man power. Of the total mobilisation in the early stages of tho war .of 750,000 men, probably at least a third aro accounted for, and even if a liberal allowance is made for additional recruiting it is unlikely that Turkey can spare any very considerable force from her current campaigns at the Dardanelles, in the Caucasus, and in Mesopotamia. k * * »

Though there is reason to believe that German designs against Serbia and on behalf of Turkey are more limited in scope than some current comment of both enemy and friendly origin would imply, it is none the less true that the Entente is face to faoo with real; and pressing dangers in tho Near Eaat._ The passage even of limited supplies into Turkey is so undesirable and would do so ifuth to prolong the defence of the Dardanelles that the Entente Powers may be expected to use cv<y'y effort to prevent it. As has been pointed out circumstances to an extent favour the Austro-Germans, and it will be no easy matter to prevent them reaching Bulgaria by the shortest available route. It is just possible, however, that their' plans may be frustrated by a concerted Entente attack upon Bulgaria. The Entente troops landed at Salonika have advanced along the Vardar railway to protect it in the event of a Bulgarian attack, and it is reported that a considerable Serbian force has been detailed for the same duty. The Allied Army thus engaged is in position for an invasion of Bulgaria across tho western frontier. Bulgaria is open to attack also on her Aegean Coast, and, by the Russians, on the. Black Sea coast. So long as the Austro-Germans can bo held in check in Northern Serbia tho advantage they possess of an easy approach to Bulgaria will retain its valuo only if that country is able to repel tho invasion to which it lies open on three sides. The Entente and Serbia are sot the task, with or without Greek assistance, of folding or defeating the Austro-German invasion in the mountainous areas of Northern Serbia and conquering Bulgaria or at all events mastering the railway communications of that country. Unloss these ends arc accomplished with little loss of 4me the Turkish war supplies will shortly be replenished. This, of coursc, would not bo the end of the Balkan campaign—it would only be the fcc"inning—but it would mean that the 1 enemy had won the first move.

Official reports relating to the two main theatres continue the osuUefa.ctory story, told during toe laet

few days. Moro ground has been gained from the Germans in tho Champagne, and their counter-at-tacks at various points have been decisively repulsed. Special importance no doubt attaches to the reported attacks by a powerful Allied air squadron upon the German communication railways in the Champagne district. Battering their way into the enemy's front in this region the French have forced him back to within less than two miles of the only lateral railway availablo in an extensive area. Thoy arc thuß in a position to bring maximum pressure to bear upon his communications. As regards the Eastern campaign tho Russians report the loss of a. village west of Dvinsk after fierce fighting in which it changed hands several times, but they are apparently still meeting the full pressure' of the enemy's attack_ in this northern area with a practically unohanged front. In Southern Eussia and in Galicia south as far as Bukowina they are attacking briskly, and have gained ground. A notable event is a powerful bombardment of tho Austrian front in the near neighbourhood of the Rumanian frontier.