PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2576, 25 September 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

■ Athens reports relating to the Gall'ipoli campaign are. not always reliable, but they sometimes give an early hint df_ev<snts dealt with more exactly and in detail in subsequent official reports. It is to be hoped that this applies to tho Athens message which states' to-day that as a result of a violent-bombardment by tho Allied batteries the Aftafarta Heights (east of Suvla Bay) may.be occupied without the necessity of a general assault. A statement of this kind is of uncertain value, but, its. interest lies in the. suggestion that the .Allies have considerably augmented their artillery train, as the, developing production of war material in Great Britain, together with their acquisition of .a. better landipg-plac© at Suvla Bay, may very" conceivably, havo enabled them to do. This would bo splendid news. Reports of the various battles fought on the Gallipoli Peninsula 'have indicated that the invading army is fairly well provided witli artillery, but there has been no evidenco . that it is possessed of the. overwhelmingly powerful siege train which the operations demand. .

The Allies at Gallipoli ar<i saulting a fortress, strong naturally nnd raado stronger by every available device of military art. The experience of the war has been, broadly, that a fortress can be held against an attacking army provided with a powerful siege train only when it is defended by equally powerful or mow powerful guns, mounted rather in field works than, in permanent forts, and protected by an efficient system of crtti'erichMcitt-s. 'In th 6 caso of the Gallipoli canipaign tho Turks have all the advantages attaching to the .(tefeiiM of a field fojt-

ress as against one depending for its strength oil permanent works and the use of heavy artillery by the invading army is hindered to some extent by transport difficulties, due to the broken nature of the country, but generally speaking a pronounced superiority in artillery .would be 1 just as potent a factor making for victory at Gallipoli as fin any other campaign. It is fairly evident that hitherto the Allies have not had the advantage of any such pronounced superiority in artillery except in the' landing and in operations near tho coast in which tho land forces were assisted by tho co-operating firo of warships. In the progress of tho attack upon the strongholds defending tho Narrows, however, there are interior, areas to be mastered which tiro more or 'less dead ground so far as naval bombardment is concerned. There are limitations upon indirect firo from tho sea even when full account is taken of the assistance tendered by observing arid directing aeroplanes.' The suggestion of tho Athens message under notice is that tho Allies are now equipped with such a force of artillery—a powerful siego train in -fact—as should cnablo them to shell the Turks from ono position after another by sheer weight, not necessarily of direct, but of directed, bombardment, and so greatly lighten tho task of the assaulting troops, who must in all cases complete and develop the work of the artillery. If there is a!ny truth in this report more will soon be heard on tho subject, for anything like an overwhelming superiority cf artillery in the hands of the Allies would materially alter the character of the conflict on the Gallipoli Peninsula. n A circumstantial story is told by tho Paris Journal des Dehat's of a new expedition tho Turks are said to be preparing against Egypt. The details are comprehensive, but not convincing. Two thousand . German officers, it is said, are in Syria training an army armed with new rifles, and the Turks, in furtherance'. of their enterprise, are . constructing - a railway which lias- been carried already as far as Beersheba, near the eastern fringe of tho desert. which fills the Sinai Peninsula.' In spito of this array of details the whole story is wildly improbable. Nothing is more unlikely than that the Turks will employ forces against Egypt which might be much more usefully employed in Gallipoli or held in reserve against the danger of a Russian attack on Constantinople, but if they, do they will earn the gratitude of their enemies by ' presenting them with an unlooked-for opportunity.

No better proof coulcl be desired that the Russians have extricated their forces in the Vilna. region from the perils in which they were lately encompassed than the latest enemy communique in hand dealing with operations in that area. It makes some general claims and talks of breaking the Russian resistance, and of a. pursuit, but-such details as it contains are confirmation of the Petrograd messages which tell of a very .great improvement in the situation from tlie Russian point of view. Tlie Germans cast, a net and snared their quarry, but the quarry broke the net and escaped, .'and naturally the net has been seriously damaged in the process. That is the situation in the Vilua region in a nutshell. Fighting still continues, and the Russians are evidently being subjected to extremely heavy pressure, but they are meeting it .with a front intast a*nd with open lines of retreat. Vigorously as they are pressing the offensive, the Germans, 'a& far as can be gathered, are not making very rapid headway. The most dangerous enemy advance is proceeding east and south-east of Vilna, and on these lines the Germans, according to their own reports at present available, are fighting a 'ong way short of the railway towns and other vantage points which were recently captured but not retained by their cavalry. To-day they-report sUccdssful actions, resulting in the capture of prisoners, on a north and south line about 30 miles east of Vilna; This implies a much less serious, state of affairs than when the 6nemy cavalry not many days ago, was in possession of commanding positions on the Russian railways about forty miles further east. -The Russians would seem to havo not merely cxtricated ah enveloped army, but to be offering very determined opposition to the German advancs from Vilna towards Minsk, which threatens not cne army only, but the whole of the Russian forces between the Vilna region and the Pripet marshes, opposite Central Poland.

While the Germans , appear to be held in the Yilna region in a fashion which should enable the Russians in that area and on a long lino to tho south to retreat as far as may bo neccssary with unbroken- lines, there is another section of the northern operations which demands attention to-day. .This is the northward thrust of the enemy armies aiming at an advance', along the main railway towards Petrograd, and incidentally the capture of the port of Riga, which lifs about 120 miles west of the railway. As yet tho Russians are standing firm on the River Dwina, which affords ft defensive lino between Riga and the, Petrograd railway at Dvinsk. Tile enemy; is now reported to be redoubling his efforts to penetrate this line, and one message suggests that the attack 'on tho line must now be regarded as the principal enemy undertaking on the northern section of the, front, the eastward advance from Vilna having dropped into a position of secondary importance on account of the failure to envelop the Russian army whioh retired from that place. Whether this is true or . not there is evidently a revival of activity along tho Dwina. The Germans claim to have penetrated the Russian advanced positions'west of Dvinsk. On the other hand, an unofficial report from Paris declares that'tho Germans in tho Friedrichstadt region (Friedrichstadt is on the Dwina 50 miles Southeast of Riga) have energetically' attacked tho Germans, breaking a great gap in'their lines and compelling them to retreat with a loss 1 of 1500 prisoners and many machine-guns. In reference to the operations in this region, the Germans make the somewhat cryptic report: "Geneeal von Hindenbukg's fighting south-west of Lennewarden' has not concluded." This looks like an attempt to obscure tho fact that they have suffered a reverse.

The retention of Riga andDvinsk by tho Russia as is admittedly problematical if the' enemy concentrate in force against the Dwina line, and the capture of these places would mean another step by tho Germans towards Pctrograd. The opinion appears to b6 gcnci'ai, however, thatan enemy advance against the Russian capital it* no.v out of.the question,so far. as the. season is coaosyn-

cd. The Germans are at no greater' distance from Petrograd than is covered in a night's railway journey, but their present rate of progress : s extremely slow. For weeks they havo made hardly any progress at all on the direct' approach to Petrograd,' and beyond the Dwina, where they aro now held up, there is a wide areahoneycombed by lakes and marshes to be traversed. Whether or not they succeed in entering Riga and Dvinsk it is practically certain that they will have to defer the completion of their enterprise until the return of better weather, and by that time the Russians should be in much better condition to roll back the tide of invasion. * . *. * » A message from Athens , to-day would put a ne>v complexion on the Balkan situation if it could be aeospted with faith. It states that there are indications that. Bulgaria's mobilisation is due to fears that Germany may violate her territory. This report, however, rests on no particular authority,, and as it stands it is open to obvious objections. If Bulgaria were really afraid of a German violation of her territory the best way to guard against the danger would be to join with her neighbours in : reconstituting tho Balkan League. That confederation would coritrol armies numbering in the aggregate nearly a million and a half men, and in face of such an array of force any Austro-German effort to penetrate the Balkans would be futile. Unless the facts havo been 'absolutely misrepresented, Bulgaria, instead of being inclined to work for the reeonstitution of - the Balkan League, is playing a lone hand, and nursing the grudge against her neighbours which was awakened by tno rough handling they gave her in the second Balkan war and the subsequent settlement. Her attitude is thus full of mena-ce not to the Germanic Allies, butvto Serbia and the Entente. ,

Allowance must be made for the possibility that Balkan affairs may be nearer a satisfactory settlement than surface indications suggest, but these indications are anything but hopeful. It is almost enough that Bulgaria is holding aloof from her neighbours and the Entente while an Austro-German attack on Serbia is probably imminent, and that this is the position can hardly be doubted. Evidence on the point is furnished to-day in the shape of a statement by the Secretary to tho Bulgarian Legation in London. It-is in the main a remarkably fine example of studied evasion, but it contains one striking admission. "I am not prepared to prophesy,".the Secretary is reported as saying, "as things might be ■ changed by unexpected events." We must' wait and see." This, is practically equivalent to saying that Bulgaria may fight , either, on one side or the other, and if this is what is meant it is a profession-of principles strikingly akin to thbse'of the nation which has plunged the world into war. The same official's- contention that Bulgaria is merely following the lead of other neutral nations which have carried- out a partial mobilisation in protection of their. ,■ neutrality is not ( without weight., Rumania,.;. Greece, and Switzerland arc more or less under arms, and have been for, a long time past. So also has Bulgaria, But tho position at the moment (so far as reports show) is that Bulgaria,lying in thotrack . of a probable Austro-German invasion, which one neighbour at least would gladly cooperate with hcv in repelling, is placing : every available man under arms, and at the same time, so far as we know, maintaining ; close secrecy as to the line of .action she intends to follow. It is not a situation to warrant the tono of the Athens message mentioned above, •'