The Dominion. SATURDAY. SEPTEMBER 25, 1915. "SPECTRE OF THE RUSSIAN WINTER

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2576, 25 September 1915, Page 4

The Dominion. SATURDAY. SEPTEMBER 25, 1915. "SPECTRE OF THE RUSSIAN WINTER

The world is just now wondering whether history is going to repeat itself in connection. with the present invasion of Russia by the armies of the Kaiser. The Russian snows defeated Napoleon and Charles XII of Sweden. Will they also vanquish the great host by means of : which General von Hindenberg is now hoping and striving to scatter the armies of the Tsar 1 It is stated that the peasants, predict that the coming winter will be a long arid severe one, and there fare indications tha/t the Germans are growing uneasy regarding the prospects ahead.. It was asserted in a recent cablegram that statements by German prisoners and deserters show that, the invading army "dreads the spectre of the' Russian winter."- The military -correspondent of the London Times is of opinion that the ' Germans to-day are riiistinderstanding' 'tlie Russians 'in much the same way as Napoleon misunderstood thein with such disastrous consequences in 1812. .. The Corsican made a triumphant march to Moscow, but when lie got there he was soon compelled to choose between retrpat and starvation, and we all know the terrible havoc which Cossacks _and the Russian snows played witli the French arniy. A little more than a hundred . years before 'Napoleon's .invasion, Charles XII of Sweden .defeated the Russians at Cholovezin, and resolved to march on Moscow; but marsh and desert fought against him, and his irien perished from hunger and disease. In the midst of his difficulties, a great. Russian army swooped down upon his demoralised army at Pultava, and he was completely defeated and his army almost annihilated. , It would be amistake, however,. to jump . .to the conclusion that what took place in 1709 and 1812 must necessarily happen again in 1015. Allowance must be made for differences in. circumstances, and changes in methods of warfare. Historical parallels should be treated with ca.ution. In, discussing this matter the writer of a letter in the Times reminds us that there were no railways when Napoleon invaded Russia' in 1812; his cop.missariat depended for . its replenishment upon a hostile population ; and hisvbase was in' France —1500 miles. . To-day the. Germans are advancing with a railway system behind them, and their base follows their, army,. ~ Unless such facts as these are taken into consideration, comparisons between 1812 and 1915 are apt to bo..misleading... But, after making every allowance for altered circumstances,' flier®' remains many real similarities between tlie doings of Napoleon's amy and the German forces now at grips with the Russians. The details of Russian strategy in the present war are probably known to nobody but the Rusjiiatv militaryauthorities themselves. The Tsar's forces certainly appear to havo met with a serious set-back. They arc being/pushed back further and further, into tHoiv own- country, - -This is plain to all; but it is_ very easy to'PUt '.aii liiidlily pessimistic internretation on the situation. It is imncssible to say how much of the retiremcn t is due to' strategy "and' how much.to necessity. - This muchc however, is certain, that Russian strategy tc-dajv as' in 1709 ftiid 1812,' is largely governed ,by the. climate and the nature of the country. Tho 'overwhelming superiority of Gei 1 - mah gun power, has, .of course, been a, potent Jactor in determining.the march of_ events, but th-°. Russians are still iii the field. They havo heeri neither shattered nor' demoralise. The Tsar's soldiers have won the admiration of the world. They have fought nobly iindcr gi'tiat clisadvahtagtis, and the hearts of Britishers go out in sympathy to them, One of the finest passages in one of the finest speeches" delivered on war anniversary day (August 4) Was Mr. Balfour's 'reference to Russia, He said:

I foiou- i>fl spectacle more moving to a generous spirit than that presented by this contest between men and munitions now doing on iu the Hast of Europe. AVns. there over heroism greater tlmn that which has been sho\yn by the Russian soldier, power of resistance more splendid, power of attack.moro'brilliant? Shall we look forward with anything but absolute and supreme confidence tn the timo when the'artificial military inequalities l>etween Russia and hor Western neigh, bour ai'e smoothed, nway, when the Russian Soldier will mftet the Geriiiaii '66 epal tSffllS fijaMs nrrt'iaments? Do wo not kiio? th.it, wlisn the £oy of jakihutioij tliat Ewsin Juts

suffered and is suffering now will ho repaid by her fnml and overwhelming triumph P This belief'in Russia's filial'triumph is based on something more than a desperate ,hopc. Without shutting our eyes to unpleasant facts and the general uncertainty of the outlook, wo may reasonably draw encouragement from tho historical parallels to which attention has been directed. The information at present at our disposal is not sufficient to warrant us in pronouncing judgment as to the success or failure of Russian strategy. A Russian officer rcccntly declared that the retreat is merely a reverting to the original plan of a defensive war, and that the Germans will meet the same fat© as Charles XII met at Pultava and Napoleon at Moscow. This view may prove to be correct. Reason tells us that we should suspend judgment until we know more, and that we would do well to wait and see what happens when the Tsar's armies arc in possession of ample munitions,. and reinforced by the coming of the Russian. winter.