PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2572, 21 September 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

The capture oi Vilna by the German northern armies is not an unexpected event. If has been a standing possibility for weeks that the Russians mignt be unable to retain possession of this important railway junction, and its'loss has been pretty definitely foretold during the last few days. Reports of the . fighting which led up to the German success are obviously very incomplete, but while some heavy engagements are mentioned which were fought at no great distance from Vilna, it is shown that cavalry, and mobile troops depending on speedy motor transport, played an important part in the sweeping and encircling movements which have compelled the Russians to fall back from the Petrograd railway at Vilna and further north. That open fighting of the character implied in the.employment of such troops has been possible in itself suggests that the Russians are Jiolding the northern section of their line with • tho minimum possible strength, and is consistent with the idea that they consider it most important meantime to check the Aus-tro-German invasion in Galiciaand Southern Russia, as they have been doing very successfully for weeks. One message from Pefcrograd states that a great, battle is expected in the Lida region, south of Vilna and east and north of Grodno, but the capture of Vilna must bo regarded as a forward step in tho German offensive which looks north rather than south to its ultimate objective. It is not at all unlikely that Dvinsk, midway between Vilna and Riga, and- Riga itself may soon be in German hands. The way would then be cleared to some extent for a northern advance on' Petrograd, but whether the Germans are prepared to embark on such an enterprise at this timo of the year and in view of the demands upon their resources in other war areas, must be regarded as extremely doubtful. Considered as what it presumably is, the opening phase of an invasion intended to reach the Russian capital, the Germans' enterprise in the Baltic Provinces received a scvero setback in the defeats inflicted upon their fleet when it attempted to gain possession of the Gulf of_ Riga- Positive indications of reviving energy are supplied in the renewed aggression which has so far resulted in the capture of Vilna, 'but there is some reason to suppose that tho. Germans have missed their tide where this northern invasion is concerned.

Some compensation for tho Russian defeat in the northern fighting area is afforded in their 'continued success in Galieia and the adjoining Russian territory to the north, the broad facts of the' position in this southern region are not in dispute. The Russians are attacking with vigour at different points along' a front of about ISO miles, and in a number of places have compelled the enomv to withdraw for a. considerable distance westward. This is attested even in a Vienna communique, which declares that the Russian offensive at the S try pa has broken down. The River Strypa is in some places more than la miles west of the Sercth, from which the Russians launched . their attack, and the w.rao ene'm,y ; ihgssubo admits ibat ij» ilMsia'na arc fighting in

superior forcc in the Volhynia triangle of fortresses (in -Southern Russia), and also the withdrawal of portions of the Austrian front to positions further west. The circumstances generally lend, some colour to a prediction, said to originate in Lcmbsrg, of a great. Austrian defeat in Southern Russia., As to the situation in Galic-ia- it has been stated in one German message that the Austi'ians on tho right bank of tho Sfcrypa were compelled to'retire ten miles. This would imply a Russian advance of . more than twenty miles on a .section of tho Galician front.

The success of the Russians in driving back a section of the enemy forccs over a distanco of at any rata 15 miles in this southern region is in some respects one of the most remarkable developments in the Eastern, campaign to date. From recent reports it would appear that supplies of essential war material available to tiho Russian armies are being progressively and rapidly augmented, but there is no possible reason to resume that they arc yet upon anything like an equality with' the enemy forccs in this particular.. Definite evidence to the contrary is supplied in the fact that the Russian offensive west of Tarnapol was ultimately stopped by an artillery bombardment against which they were unable to make head. The hold-up west of Tarnapol apparently continues, but to the north and along the front further south, in areas almost as well served by railways and roads as the region west of Tarnapol, the facts as a whole suggest rather strongly that tho Austro-German forces on the southern section of the Eastern front have lately been drawn upon for purposes, of a/ concentra<tion elsewhere. Ono explanation of this state of affairs would be that troops hacl been,withdrawn to reinforce the armies operating in the Baltic Provinces, but in ppito of the late success of these armies such an explanation is improbable. Important in itself, the capture of Vilna does not promise any early triumph to the German arms.' It is at best, from the German point of view, .1 comparatively early step in a camaaign that promises to be long and arduous, and this will still be true even if the Germans develop their jjiese'nt northern success by capturing Riga-.. . •

A much more probable explanation of the presumptive weakening of the Austro-German southern front is to bo found in a message from the Higli Commissioner which states that a German offensive in the Balkans is thought to be probable. Assuming this to be the true explanation the motive directing Austro-German policy is apparent. Though they were slowly losing ground in Southern Russia and Galicia until they launched the offensive whioh is still in progress, the Russians were, offering such a resistance to the AustroGerman advance towards tho Blaok Sea railways as to minimise its prospects of success. The offensive in the Balkans which has been so often predicted and is now .again said,to be probable would constitute an attempt to attain the; of the Austro-German southern invasion by_an alternative procedure. These objects are, of course, to maintain tho relative isolation by which Russia is now handicapped and cut her off from the benefits which otherwise would accruc to her with the opening of tlie Dardanelles and the Bosphorus These ends would be gained equally well by an effective reinforcement of Turkey as by , an eastern advance cutting the railways which run north from Odessa and other Black Sea ports, and if the latter advance is no longer considered practicable the Austro-Germans have an obvious incentive to attempt to reach their goal by ma.rohing south through the Balkan Peninsula,

The Ausfcro-Germans have another incentive, and a potent one, to attempt such an enterprise. It is dealt with in a message which quotes an interview withENVER Pasha,- tho Turkish War Minister, published in thi>. Berliner Tageblatt. . Enter Pasha is reported'as declaring in a strain of bombast that the Turks aro ready for a Russian attack on Constantinople, that the ' Russians can move when they like, that tho Turks have over 2,000,000 men apart from unarmed Armenians and Greeks, and'so . forth. As directly conveying news a message of this kind has no value. Its interest and value rest upon the perfectly reasonable assumption that the of the Turkish War Minister, has been inspired by actual fear of a Russian attack on Constantinople, and that the possibility of such an attack is being canvassed iij Germany. Ample grounds for believing so much are to be found in what i? kn'own of tho position reached in the war. It would be difficult to overestimate .the magnitude of tho issues turning upon the fortunes of tho campaign against Turkey. As matters stand nothing is so'important to Russia and her Allies as that she should obtain an open .avenue of supplies and outlet for her exports. Nothing is so important to the Central Empires as that they should prevent Russia obtain-' ing such an avenue.. It is strictly reasonable in existing circumstances that tho Austro-Gernians should fear a diversion of Russian strong® from the main campaign. against Turkey and that they should be'prepared to incur heavy risks in attempting to checkmate such a move.

The Russians' immediate burdens have been materially reduced by the retreat which has carried their armies far back into their own territory, and it is not at all improbable that they are capable of detaching tho. forces requisite for the attack on Constantinople at which Enver Pasha scoffs so unc'onvincingly. Preparations for such an enterprise would furnish an explanation, of the still unsolved mystery of tho transfer of the Grand Duke Nicholas from the main theatre, ostensibly to the-Caucasus, when ho had earned tho gratitude of his country by extricating its armies fiom the perils which threatened them during the summer campaign. It is not to the point that -little has been heard of the possibility of a Russian attach on Constantinople 'or surprise, as far as it is possible, is an invaluable asset and aid to success in any military enterprise.

Tiie possibility that Russia may develop her opportunities by throw-' iug a. big additional force into the scale against Turkey is all the more to bo welcomed in view of tho broad hints given by Captain Bkax ;uu.l other correspondents at the Dardanelles that in normal course the troops established on tho Clallipoli Peninsula must be content to settle down to a winter campaign. This runs .'counter to hopes recently held out, in unofficial messages, of early victory in the campaign, and it is not yet to bo taken for gra-ijfcd, of -tat a sinter, o&mp.aign is

inevitable. Tho possibility, however, has to bo faced as matters stand, whereas a Russian attack on Constantinople added to the pressure of the Gallipoli campaign, would almost oort-ainly induce a Turkish collapse before "the winter, * * * »

Naturally enough the present critical developments in the war arc reflected in a state of extreme diplomatic tension in tho Balkans, and it would appear that Bulgaria, in particular, has at length readied a point when further vacillation is impossible and a definite choice between the parties in the war is inevitable. Neutrality, is no longer possible to Bulgaria if the AustroGermans are intent, as is highly probable, on fording a road to Turkey. Bulgaria Hes across the only road available arid ah© has to choose between opposing or assisting the Aus-tro-German passage. Present indications of Bulgarian inclinations arc hopeful rather than otherwise. Following on the announcement that Servia has agreed to make territoria' concessions to Bulgaria, it is reportid io-day that strong efforts are being made in the latter country, by | anti-German politicians, to Beoure the formation of a Coalition Cabinet.