PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2568, 16 September 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

The essential features of the Eastern campaign arc more clearly defined in to-day's news than they have been for some time past, and though it is now established that the Germans have succeeded in cutting the Petrograd railway north of Vilna, the general outlook, from the standpoint of the Russians, is not unpromising. In itself the German victory in the Baltic Provinces is of some importance, but there is much reason to suppose that It has been won too late to serve as the prelude to further offensive operations of major'importance. In order to cripple Russia as a fighting nation tho enemy must oither accomplish the destructive defeat of the Russian armies, which was attempted, but not accomplished, in the enveloping attack upon the_ Polish salient, or make such deep inroads into the Russian railway system as would fatally hinder tho process of re-arming and equipment of new armies, which alone will enable Russia to resume the conflict with restored and augmented vigour in the spring.. On visible facts, _ even though the fullest weight be given to their victory in the Baltic Provinces, the Germans are no longer likely to approach such a decision before the winter sets in. _ At an immediate view the most important of these facts aro the nature of the resistance the Russians are now-offering to the Austro-German invasion, and tho near approach of the bad weather which imposes very definite limits upon major operations in the Eastern theatre. Some consideration must also be given, however, to the influence of events, present and prospective, in other theatres. It is suggested to-day by a Petrograd correspondent that the Germans are no longer seeking a decision in the Eastern campaign, but rather such positions as would enable them to turn their attention to the other main campaign. * * * #

This is not a new idea, but it has naturally dropped into the background to some extent during tho months in which Russia has been bearing tho principal strain of tho war, so far as land-operations arc concerned. It has. not on that account lost any force that it ever possessed. AH visible evidence justifies the conclusion that Germany elected to fight a delaying campaign in the Western theatro while seeking a decisive victory over Russia, in the hope that she would thus ultimately be enabled to bring the greatest possible force to bear against the Western Allies. Taking any other ground it would have been her natural policy to ( concentrate rather against the Western Allies than against Russia in the summer campaign now drawing to an end. That the cost o£ her Eastern offensive has in all likelihood vastly oxceeded her anticipations and that its results, up to the present, must be grievously disappointing, does not dispose of the necessity Germany is under of turning her attention to the other main theatre. The immediate reward to Germany of such a victorious campaign in Russia as would have enabled her to impose peace on that country would have been freedom to launch' all her available forces in attack upon the Western Allies. Though such a- victory no longer seems within reach of Germany and her ally, it is as vital to Germany as if such a victory had been won that she should endeavour to overwhelm her enemies in Prance and Flandets. As the correspondent quoted very truly remarks, "Time is of the utmost importance to tho Germans at the present moment."

The reason is plain, Germany entered the war better prepared and organised than bar enemies, and even to-da,v it is uncertain how the balance stands in regard to some vital features of war organisation. It would perhaps be unwise to regard the passionate appeal which Mn.Li.oyd George has lately addressed tn thb British nation, as in all its cktiiiU a }Ut«<F«nt <si mafcb«ma,tif-al j mm,, Ml» M 1?M s* M\

statement ho said: "Tho Centra' Powers have still an overwhelming superiority in all ana equipment." At all events it is certain that whatever advantage Germany holds now in the matter of war-organisation is greater than she can hope to hold in succeeding stages of the war, unless she can contrive to defeat one or more of her enemies in detail. Against Germany's won-dcrfully-developed resources, the Entente Powers are able to set not only such resources as they havo developed, but undeveloped and partly developed resources very much greater than Germany lias at command. The alternatives before Germany are simple. Sho has to fight her enemies in the West at the earliest possible moment or fight them later, when they are more powerful, not positively only, but relatively to her own power.

Tiie position is complicated by tho existence of tho Dardanelles campaign, which it is so vitally in Germany's interest to defeat. So many factors bearing upon this section of the war—notably the possibility of an offensive through the Balkansarc in tho air and undetermined, that it is difficult to estimafie their importance. But a now campaign in the Balkans would not help Germany to malte the most of the time remaining available for the. prosecution of her offensive in the main Eastern theatre, and it would not materially limit the imperative necessity of attempting to strike a decisive blow against the Western Allies. That necessity is, in fact, so imperative that it may be expected to_ dominate Gorman war policy in the immediate future. The expectation of a German offensive in the Western theatre as soon as events on the other main front make it possible is inevitable if it is assumed that Germany still cherishes hopes of winning tho war. Any departure on her part from a policy of the maximum possible aggression would imply that she was. fighting, not in tho liopo of victory, but in the hope of a drawn war and an inconclusive peace.

There is a late message from Paris which speaks for, itself, though it is not official and must await confirmation. It states 'that the French Department of Defence has announced that it has received information that the Germans are transporting great numbers of troops and heavy howitzers from Poland towards prance, and that tho movement is believed to presage a great attempt to 6inash the Franco-British lines.

It is not yet clear how far the Germans are likely to extend the northern area of their invasion as a result of their success in cutting the Petrograd railway north of Vilna, but Vilna, tho port of Riga, and the railway junction of Dvinsk (about midway between Vilna and Riga) are all gravely threatened. The only development definitely reported at time of writing, however, is that the Germans have succeeded in crossing the main railway at a place 50 miles north-east of Vilna. As regards other sections of the theatre no very important advance by the enemy is recorded. In Galicia the Russians appear still to hold the uppor hand. An Austrian message speaks of Rusattacks in tho area lying immediately . north of Galicia which would imply that the offensive, instead of having spent its force, is spreading.

As a whole the situation lends somo colour to the statement in a Russian communique that, generally speaking, the Austro-Germans 1 efforts are directed to maintaining the appearance of an offensive. An exception must, however, be made in the case of. the Baltic Provinces where the enemy has evidently made a big effort and secured tangible results. An interesting suggestion is put forward by a Petrograd correspondent which perhaps provides the-key to the Aus-tro-German plans. It is that the enemy is bent upon' gaining possession of the Dvinsk-Rovno railway, the shortest line traversing the Eastern theatre from north to south. Apart from the benefit of a shortened front this railway, assuming that it could be captured and maintained in serviceable condition, would enable the Austro-Germans to rapidly transfer troops to any threatened point, but a great part of its length is still a long way from being won. To mention only a single detail, it runs through the .heart of the Pripet marshes and a wide aiea of marshy country, still in the possession of the Russians, must be mastered by the enemy before they can capture tho central section of the railway.

A number of interesting reports deal to-day with American-German relations, but the most arresting of all is tho brief statement in a message from the High Commissioner, that, the strain of American-German relations is increasing. The inclusion of such a statement as an official message is presumably indicative of a belief in authoritative quarters that the protracted negotiations between America and Germany are likely to culminate in some definite development—possibly a rupture of diplomatic negotiations.