THE DARDANELLES OPERATIONS.

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2546, 21 August 1915, Page 12

THE DARDANELLES OPERATIONS.

, GiLLIPOLI LANDING

GENERAL HAMILTON'S | REPORT . ,

SPLENDID FEAT; OF ARMS

following- report from General Sir lan Hamilton, General Commanding >ilie Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, to the Secretary,of State for War, dated -from General Headquarters, Mediterraneau.Expe.ditionary Force, May 20, ;was published on J.uly 6 as a supple::ment to the.London Gazette:— ■v.I have'the liosour to submit my raport on' the operations in the Gallipoli 'Peninsula, up to and including May's. '.filn accordance with' your Lordship's instructions I left Loiidon on, March, 13 my General Staff by special train lo Marseilles, and thence in' His. Majesty's ship .Phaeton to the scene of the naval operations in the Eastern Medi■terraneanj reaching Tenedos on March 17 shortly afternoon." .v. ' ; 'Immediately on. arrival '.I conferred witll Vice-Admiral do Robeck, Commanding tho Eastern Mediterranean ■Fleet; General d'Amade; Commanding 'the French Corps Expeditionnaire; and Centre -Amirr.l Guepratte, in command of , the' French Squadron. At'this conference past difficulties were explained to me, and, tho intention to make a fresh attack on the morrow was an., liouneed. Tho amphibious battle between warships and Jand fortresses, took placenext day, March ,18. I . witnessed these stupendous events, and thereupon cabled your Lordship my reluctant deduction that the co-operation of tho ~ whole of tho force under my command would be required to enablo ,tho. Fleet effectively to iorco the Dardanelles. By that timo I had already carried out a; preliminary reconnaissance of the liorth-western' shore of the Gallipoli Peniiisula, from its isthmus, where it is 6paimea by the Bulair fortified lines, to Cape Helles,. at its extremest point. From Bulair this singular feature runa in a v south-westerly direction for 52 miles,' attaining near its centre a breajltli of. 12 . miles. . The northern coast of the northern half'of the proiriontory slopes downwards steeply to the Gulf of Aeros, in a. chain of hills, which extend as far as Cape Sulva, Tho precipitous 'fall of these lulls'precludes landing, except at a few narrow! gullies, far'too restricted for'any serious military movements. The southern half of tho peninsula is shaped like a badlyworn boot. The anlcle dies between ■Kaba Tepe and Ifalkmaz Dagh; beneath the heel lie the cluster of forts at Kilid Balir, whilst the _ toe'is, that promontory, five miles in width, stretching from Tekke Burnu to Sedd-el-Bahr.

The Coastal Features. The three dominating"features in this Eouthorn section seemed to me to be: (1) Saribair-Mountain, running up in : a succession of almost perpendicular ■' escarpments to 970 ft. ■ The whole mounV tain seemed to be a network of ravines . and covered with thick' 1 jungle. | (2) Kilid Bahr plateau, 'which rises, 1 a ' natural fortification artificially fortified, to a height of 700 ft., to cover .the forts . of the Narrows from an attack from 1 the Aegean. > ..... ... • (3) Achi Baba, a hill 600 ft. in height, ■ dominating at long field-gun-rango what I .liavo described as being tho. toe of the peninsula. v A peculiarity to bo noted as regards this last southern sector is that from 'Achi Baba to Cape Helles the ground is hollowed out like a spoon, presenting only its outer edges to direct firo from :.tlie sea. The inside of the spoon appeaxs to be open and undulating, but actually it is full of spurs, nullahs, and '-confused tinder features.

' Generally speaking the coast is precipitous, and good landing-places are few.' Just south of Tekko Burau is_a small sandy bay (\V), and half a mile ,'j:orth of it is another small break in the cliffs (X). Two miles further up tho coast the mouth of a stream indents these same cliffs (Y 2),- and yet another ."mile and a half up a scrub-covered "gully looked as .if activo infantry might -bo able to scramble up it 011 to heights -not altogether dissimilar to those of Abraham, by Quebec (Y). liiside Seddelis a sandy bearih (V), about 300 yards across, facing i"a semi-cirelo of ■ steeply-rising ground, as the flat bottom 'of a half-saucer, faces, tho dm,, a rim flanked on oij'e side by an old castle,'on the other : by a modem fort. By Eski ■'Hissarlik, on the east of Mortro Bay (S) :.was another small beach; which was, however, dominated by tho big guns irom' : Asia/ Turning northwards again, there are two good landing places on ; either side of Kaba Tepe. Farther to . tlie north of that promontory the beach was supposed'to be dangerous and difficult.: 111 the most of these landing ' places the .trenches and .lines of wire entanglements were plainly'-visible from 011 -board ship. What seemed to be gun emplacements' " arid infantry " redoubts oould also be- niade out through- a telescope, but of the full extent of these defences and of the forces available to . man them there was 110 possibility of judging except by practical test. i No Piecemeal Programme; - 'Altogether the result of this and subsequent reconnaissances was to convince me-.that nothing but a thorough and ; systematic scheme for : flinging the wholo Df. tlio troops tuider my command veryRapidly ashore could be expected to meet ~frith success; whereas, 011' tho other iar.d, a 'tentative or piecomeal pror gramme was bound to lead to disaster. The landing of an army upon "the theatre of operations I have described — j'a' theatro strongly garrisoned througlii<mt and prepaved for any such attempt - —involved difficulties for which 110 precedent was forthcoming in military history except possibly in the sinister legends of Xerxes. The beaches were either so well defended by works and guns, or - else so restricted by nature ; that it did not seem possible, even by two or three simultaneous landings, to .pass the troops ashore quickly enough, to enable them to maintain themselves against the rapid concentration and uounter-attack which tho enemy was 1 bound in such case to attempt. It be--amo necessary, therefore, not only to land simultaneously at as many points as possible, but to threaten to land at other points as well. Tho first of theso neoossities involved anpther unavoidable if awkward contingency, the separation by considerable intervals of the

The weather' was also bound to play a vital' part in. ra.v landing. Had it lrf-im British weather tlioro would liavo bepn 110 'alternative) but- instantly to qive up tho adventure. lo land two o- tiiTco tliosuand men, and. then to Wik off ana leave them. exposed for a * the atacks of 34,000 War troops viffli li hundred guns at their boi<k."Vrtis 'l- ail eventuality to .is li'/htlv envisaged. Whatever, happened i'hV weathor must always remain an incalmiiabi© factor, but at least by aeliiv til) t&o end of 'April wo. had a

cliance cf several days of consecutive calm. Before doing anything else I had to redistribute the troops on the transports to suit the order of their disembarkation. . The bulk of the forces at my disposal had, perforce, been embarked without its having been possible to pay due attention to the operation upon which I now proposed that tiliey should be launched. Owing to lack of facilities at Mudros redistribution in. that harbour was out of the question. With your Lordship's approval,: therefore," I ordered all the. transports, except those, of the Australian Infantry Brigade and tlie details en : camped at Lemnos Island, to the Egyptian ports. On the 24th March I myself, togetherwith _ the General Staff, proceeded to Alexandria, where I remained until 7th April, working out the' allocation of. troops to transports in minutest detail, as a. preside to the forthcoming disembarkations. General d'Amade did likewise. On the Ist April the remainder of the General Headquarters, which had not been mobilised when I left England, arrived at Alexandria. Apart from the'rearrangements of the troops, my visit to Egypt was not without profit, since it afforded opportunities of conferring , with the G.O.C. Egypt and of making myself acquainted with tflie troops, drawn from all parts of the French Republic and of the British Empire; which it was to' be my privilege' to command.

Preparations for Landing. By the 7toi April my preparations were sufficiently advanced to enable me to return with my General Staff to Lemnos, so as to put the finishing toudyes to my plan in close co-ordination witih tihe Vice-Admiral Commanding the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet. , ' The . covering force of the 29tli Division left Mudros Harbour on the evenin gof 23rd April for the five beaches, S, V, ~\V, X, and Y. Of-these, V. W, ojid X wero to be main landings, the landings at S and Y'being made mainly to protect tho flanks, to disseminate tho forces of the enemy, and to interrupt .the arrival of his The landings at S and Y were to take place at dawn, whilst it was planned that the first troops for V, W, and X beaches should readli the shore simultaneously at 5.30 a.m., after half an hour's bombardment from the fleet. The transports conveying the covering force, arrived off . Tenedos on tlhe morning of the 24th, and during the afternoon tho troops were transferred to the warships- and' fleet-swoepers in ' which they wore to approaoh the shore: 'About midnight these ships, each towing a number of cutters and other small boats silently slipped their oables, and, escorted by the 3rd Squadron of the Fleet, steamed slowly towards - £heir final rendezvous at Cape Helles.The rendezvous was readied just before dawn on the 25th. ; The morning ' was absolutely. still; there was no sign of life on the shore, a' thin veil of mist hung motionless over tho promontory; the surfaco of the sea was as smooth as glass. The four battleships and four cruisers which formed tho 3rd Squadron at once took up tho positions that had. been allotted to them, and at 5 a.m., it being then light enough to fire, a violent bombardment of tho enemy's defences was begun. Meanwhile the tioops. wero being Tapidly transferred to tho small boats in which they word to bo towed ashore. Not a move on the part of the enemy; except. for shells thrown from the Asiatio side of the Straits tho guns of the Fleet remained unanswered. .

The detachment detailed for S beach (Eski Hissarlik Point) consisted of the 2nd South Wales Borderers (less one company) under Lieut.-Colonel Casson. Their landing was delayed by tlie current, but by 7.30 a.m. it had been successfully effected at the cost of some 50 casualties, and Lieut.-Colonel. Casson was ablo to -establish his small force on tlie high ground near De.Totts Battery. Hero he maintained himself until the general advance 011 the 27th brought him into touch with the main body. ■ The landing 011 Y beach was entrusted to the King's Own Scottish Borderers and tho Plymouth (Marine) Battalion, Royal Naval Division, specially attached to the' 29th • Division for this task, the. wholo under command of Lieut.-Colonel Koe. The beaoh at the point consisted merely of a narrow strip of sand at the foot of a crumbling scrub-covered cliff some 200 feet high immediately to tho west of Krithia.

A Deadly Trap Escaped, A number of small gullies running down the face of tho clilf facilitated the' climb to the summit, and so impracticable had these prccipices appeared to tlie Turks that no steps had been taken to defend them. Very difforent would it liavo been fiad wo, as was at one time intended, taken Y,2 for this landing. There was a large force of infantry, entrenched up to their necks, aud supported by machine and Hotchkiss guns, wero awaiting an attempt whiph could hardly liavo made good its footing. But at Y both battalions were able in the first instance to Establish themselves 011 tho heights, reserves of food, water, and ammunition wero hauled up to tho top of the cliff, and, in accordance with tho plan of operations, an endeavour was immediately made to gain touch with tho troops landing at X beach. Unfortunately, tho enemy's strong detachment froni' Y 2 interposed 1 , our troops landing at X woro fully occupied -in attacking tho Tul'ks immediately to their front, ahd 'thb attempt to join hands was not persevered with. ' Later in the- day a large force of Turks wero-seen to bo advancing upon tho cliffs above Y beach from the direction of Krithia, and Colonel Koo was obliged- to entrench. From this time onward'his small force was subjected to strong and repeated attacks, supported by field artillery, and owing to the configuration of tho ground, ivhich here drops inland from the edgo of tho cliff, tho guns of tho supporting ships could render him little assistance.. Throughout the afternoon and all through the night tho Turks made assault after assault upon the British line. They threw liorabs into the trenches, and favoured by darkness, actually led a pony with a lnachiuo gun oil, its hack over the defences, and were proceeding to come into action in tho middlo of cur position when they wero bayoneted. Tlie. British repeatedly counter-charged with' the bayonet, and always drovo off the onomy for the moment, but the Turks wero in a vast superiority, and fresh troops took tho place of those who-temporarily fell back. Colonel Koo (siiice died of wounds) had! become a casualty early in tho day, and tho number of officers and men killed and wounded during tho incessant fighting was very heavy. By 7 ji.jn. on tba 26th, oals. about half of the

King's Own Scottish Borderers remained to man tho eiitren:hu.ent made for four times their number. These brave follows were absolutely worn out with continuous fighting; it was doubtful if reinforcements could reach them an time, and orders were issued for them to bo re-embarked.

Thanks to the Fleet. Thanks to His Majesty's ships Goliath, Dublin, Amethyst, and Sapphire, thanks also to the devotion of a small rearguard of tho King's Own Scottish Borderers, which kept off the enemy from lining the clift, the re-embarka-tion of the whole of the troops, together with the wounded, stores, and ammunition, was safely accomplished, and ■both battalions were brought round the southern end of tho peninsula. Deplorable as the, heavy losses had been, and unfortunate as was the tactical failure to mako godd so much ground at tho outset, yet, taking tho operation as it stood,, there can be no doubt it has contributed greatly to the success of tho main.!attack, seeing that tho plucky stand made «t Y beach had detained heavy columns of the enemy from arriving at the southern end of 'tho peninsula during what it will be, seen was a very touch-and-go struggle. } The landing-place known as X beach consists of a. strip of sand sbrne 200 yards long by eight yards wide at the i'ait of a low cliff. Tho troops to be landed hero 'were tho 1 st> Royal Fusiliers, who wero to be towed ashore from His Majesty's ship Implacable in two parties, half a. battalion at a. time, together with a beacli working party found by the Anson Battalion, Royal Naval Division. About 6 a.m. His Majastj/'s ship Implacable, with a boldness much admired by the Army, stood quite close in to tho beach, firing very rapidly with every gun she could briiif' to bear. Thus seconded, tlie > Royal 1' usiliors made good their landing with but little loss. The battalion thbn advanced to attack the Turkish' trenches on tho Hill ll'l, situated between V and W beaches, but wero heavily counterattacked and forced to give ground. Two more battalions of i;ho 87th Brigade soon followed t'licni, and by evening the troops had established themselves in an entrenched position extending.from half a mile round the .landingplace and as far south as Hill 114. Hero they wero 'in touch with the Lancashire Fusiliers,, wjio had landed on W beach. Brigadier-General Marshall, commanding the 87th Brigade, had been wounded during tho day's fighting, but continued ill command of tho bngado.

The Landing Plan. The landing on V bench was planned to take place on the following lines:— As,soon as the enemy's defences had been .heavily bombarded by the fleet three companies of tho Dublin Fusiliers were to be towed ashore. They were to be- closely followed by the collier River Clyde (Commander "Unwin, R.N.),' carrying between decks the balance ot' tho Dublin Fusiliers, tho Muiistor Fusiliors, half a battalion of the Hampshire Regiment, the West Riding Field Company, and other details. - ' The. River Clyde had been specially prepared for the rapid disembarkation of her complement, and large openings for the exit of the troops had been cut ill her sides, giving on to a wido gangplank by which the men could pass rapidly into lighters which she had in tew. As soon as tho first tows had reached land the River Clydo was to run straight ashore. Hor lighters were to be placed in position to form a gangway between the snip and tho bcacli, and by this- means it was hoped that 2000 men could be thrown ashoro with the utmost rapidity. Further, to assist in covering- the laliding, a, battery of maoliins guns, protected by sandbags, had been mounted in her bows. Tho remainder of the covering force detailed for this beach was then to follow in tows from the attendant battleships. V beaoli is situated immediately to the west of Sedd-el-Bahr. 'Between the bluff on which stands Sedd-el-Bahr village and that whidi. is crowned by No. 1 Fort the ground forms a very regular amphitheatre of three or four hundred yards radius. The slopes down to the' beach are slightly concave,_ so that tho whole area- Contained within the limits of this natural amphitheatre, whosd grassy terraces rise gently to a height of a hundred feet above the shore, can be swept by tho fire of a defender. Tho .beach itself is a, sandy strip some 10

yards wido and 350 yards long, backed along almost tho whole of its extent by a low sandy escarpment about four foot high, where the ground falls nearly s'Jiecr down to, the beach. The slight shelter afforded by this escarpment played 110 small part in the operations of t'ho succeeding thirty-tare hours.

The Defenders' Advantages. t At the south-eastern extremity ol the beach, between tlio slioro and the village, stands tho old fort of Scdd-el-Balir, a battered ruin, with wide breaches in its walls and mounds of fallen masonry within and around it. On the ridge to tho north, overlooking the amphitheatre, stands a. ruined barrack. Botih of theso buildings, as well as No. 1 Fort, had been long bombarded by tho Fleet, and the guns of the forts had been put out of action; but their crumbled walls and the ruined outskirts of tho village afforded cover .for riflemen, whilo from the terraced slopes already described the defenders were able to command tlie open beach, as a; stage is overlooked from the balconies of a theatre. On .the very margin of tlio beach a strong barbed-wiro entanglement, made of heavier metal and longer barbs than I have ever seen elsewhere, .ran right across from the old fort of Sedd-el-Bahr to tli'o foot of the northwestern headland. Two-tihirds of the way up the ridge a second and even stronger entanglement crosscd tho amphitheatre, passing in front of the old barrack and ending in the otuskirts of the village. A third transverse entanglement, joining these two, ran up tho hill near the eastern end of . tlie beach, and almost at right angles to it. Above the upper entanglement the ground was scored with tho enemy's trenches, in one of which, four pom-poms wore emplaced; in others were dummy pom-poms to draw fire, while the debris of the shattered buildings on either flank afforded cover and concealment for a . number of • machine-guns,. which brought a cross-fire to bear on the ground already swept by rifle fire from tho ridge. Needless to say, tlie difficulties in tho way of previous reconnaissance had rendered it impossible to obtain detailed information with Tegard either to the locality or to tlio enemy's preparations.

A Tornado of Fire. As'often happens in war, the actual course of events did not quite correspond with the intentions of tho Commander. The River Clyde catn& into position off oecld-01-Bahr in advance of the tows and, just as the latter reached tho shore, Commander Unwin beached his ship also. Whilst tho boats and the collier were approaching the landing placo tho .Turks made no sign. Up to the very last moment it appeared as if tho landing was to be unopposed. But tho moment tho first boat touched bottom the storm broke. A tornado of fire swept over the beach, the incoming boats, and tho collier. The Dublin Fusiliers and tho naval boats' crows suffered exceedingly heavy losses while still in tlie boats, Those who succeeded in landing and in crossing the 6trip of sand managed to gain some cover when they reached the low escarpment on tho furthor side. None of the boats, however, were ablo to get off again, and they and their crews were destroyed upon the beach. Now came tho moment for the River Clydo to pour forth her living freight; but grievous delay was caused here by tho_ difficulty of placing the lighters in position between the ship and the shore. A strong current hiiiderad-the work, and tho onemy's fire was so intense that almost every man engaged upon it was immediately shot down. Owing, however,to the splendid gallantry of tho naval working party,'the lighters were eventually' placed! in position, and- then the disembarkation began.

A company of the Hamster Fusiliers led the way; but, short as was the distance, few of the men ever reached tho farther side of the beaei through tho hail of bullets which poured down upon -thorn from both flanks and the front. As tho second company followed, the extemporised piers of lighters gave way in tho current. The end nearest to t/10 shore drifted.into d'eep water, and many men who had oescaped being shot were drowned by the weight of their equipment in trying to swim from tho lighter to tho beach. Undaunted workers wero still forthcoming, the lighters wero again brought into position, and tho third company of the Minister Fusiliers rush-

Ed ashore, suffering heaviest loss this time from shrapnel as well as from rifle, pom-pom, and machine-gun' lire.

Where General Napier Fell. , For a space the attempt to land 1 was discontinued. Wlion it was resumed tho lighters again drifted into deep water, with Brigadier-General Napier, Captain Costeker, his Brigado Major, and a number of men of the Hampshire Regiment outboard. Tlicro was nothing for them all but to lie down on tho lighters, and it was hero that General Napier and Captain Costeker wero killed. At this time, between 10 and 11 a.m about 1000 men had left the collior, and of these nearly half had been kil'ed or wounded before they could Teach t'lie little cover afforded by tlio steep, sandy hank at tho top oi' the hoacli. Further attempts to disembark were now given up. Had tho troops all been in open boats but few of tlieni would have lived to tell the tale. But, most fortunately, tho collier was so constructed as to afford fairly efficient protection to the men -who wero still on board, and, so long as they made no attempt to land, they suffered comparatively little .loss. Throughout tlie remainder of tiie day there was practically no change in tho position of affairs. The situation was probably saved by the machine-guns on the River Clyde, which did valuable service in keeping down tho enemy s fire, and in preventing any attempt on their part to launch a counter-attack. _ Ono half-company of the Dublin Fusiliers, which had been landed at a camber just cast of Sedd-el-Balir village, ivas unable to work its way across to V beach, and by mid-day had only twenty-five men left. It was proposed to divert to Y beach that part of the main body which had been intended to land oil V beach; but this Would have involved considerable delav owing to the distance, and the main body was, diverted to W beach, where tho Lancashire Fusiliers had already effected a lauding.

Fighting by Moonlight. Late in the ' afternoon part of the Worcestershire Regiment and the Lancashire Fusiliers worked across the high ground from AY beach, and seemed likely to relieve the situation .by talcing the defenders of V beach in flank. Tlie pressure 011 their own front, however, and the numerous barbed-wire entanglements which intervened, checked this advance, and at nightfall the Turkish garrison still held their ground. Just before dark some small parties .of our men made their way along tho shore to the outer walls of the Old Fort, and when night had fallen tho remainder of the infantry from the-collier were landed. A good force was now available for attack, but our troops were at such a cruel disadvantage as to position, and tho fire of the enemy was still so accurate in tho bright moonlight that all attempts to clear the fort and the outskirts of the village during the night failed one after the other. The wounded who were ablo to do so without support returned to the collier under coyer of darkness; but otlienviso the situation at daybreak on the 26tli was the same as it had been on the previous day, except that tho troops first landed were becoming very exhausted. Twenty-four hours after the disembarkation began there wore ashoro oh V beach the survivors of the Dublin and Munster Fusiliers, and of two companies of the Hampshire Regiment. The brigadier and his brigade-major had been killed; Lieutenant-Colonel CarringtonSmith, commanding the Hampshire Regiment, had been killed, ana tho adjutant had been wounded. The adjutant of the Minister Fusiliers was wounded, and tho great majority of the senior officers were either wounded or killed. The remnant of tho landing party still orouehed on the beach beneath tho' shelter of the sandy oscarpment which had saved so many lives. With them were two officers of my General Staff—Lieu-tenant-Colonel DouchtyrWio and Lieu-tenant-Colonel Williams. These two officers, who had ianded from the River Clyde, had been striving with conspicuous contempt for' danger to keep all their comrades in good heart during this day and night of ceaseless 'imminent peril.

Scattered Units Re-formed. Now that it was daylight once more, Lieutenant-Colonels Doughty-Wylie and Williams set to work to organise an attack on the hill a.bovc tJie beach. Any ■soldier who has endeavoured to pull

scattered units together after, they have been dominated for many consecutivo hours by close and continuous fire will bo able to tako tho measure of their difficulties. Fortunately, General Hunter Weston had arranged with Rear-Ad-miral. AVemyss about this same time for a heavy bombardmont to be opened by tho ships upon the Old Fort, Sedd-cl-jiahr Village, tho Old Castlo north of tho village, and on the ground leading up from the beach. Under cover ot this bombardment, and led by Lieuten-ant-Colonel Doughty-Wylio and Captain Walford, brigade-major R.A., tho troops gained a footing in tho village by 10 a.m. They encountered a most stubborn opposition, and suffered heavy losses from the firo of well-coiicealed riflomen and machino guns. Undeterred by tho resistance, and supported by tho naval gunfire, they pushed forward, and soon after midday they penetrated to tho northern edge of the village, wheuce they were in a position to attack tho Old Castle and Hill 141. During this advance Captain Walford was killed. Lieutenant-Colonel DoughtyWylie had most gallantly led the attack all tlio way up from the beach through tho west, side of the village -under agalling fire. , And no;v when, owing so largely to his own inspiring example and intrepid courage, the position had almost been gained he was killed wliilo leading the last assault. .But the attack was pushed forward without wavering, and. fighting their way across tho open with great dash, the troops gained , tlio summit arid occupied the Old Castlo and Hill 141 before 2 p.m. .

Land Mines and S6a Mines. W beach consists of a strip of deep, powdefy sand some 350 yards long and from 15 to 40 yards wide, situated immediately south of Tekke Burnu, whero a small gully running down to the sea opens out a break in the cliffs. On either flank of the beach the ground rises precipitously, but, in the centre, a number of sand dunes afford a moro gradual access to the ridge overlooking tho sea. Much time and ingenuity had been employed by the Turks in turning this lauding-placo into a death trap. Close to the water's edge a broad wire entanglement extended tlie whole length of tho shore, and a supplementary barbed "network lay concealed under the surface of the' sea in the shallows. Land mines and sea mines had been laid. The high ground overlooking the beach was strongly fortified with trenches, to which tho gully afford&d a natural covered approach. A number of ipachinc guns, also, wero cunningly tucked away into holes in the cliff so as to be immune from a. naval bombardment whilst they were converging their fire on the wiro entanglements; The crest of the hill overlooking the beach was in its turn commanded'by high ground to the north-west and 60uth-east, and especially by two strong infantry redoubts near point 138. Both these Tedoubts wero protected by wire entanglements about 20ft. broad, and could be approached only by a bare glacis-like slope leading up from the high ground above W beach or from the Cape Helles lighthouse. In addition, another separate c-ntanglement ran down from these two redoubts to the edge of the cliff near tho lighthouse, making intercommunication botween V and W beaches impossible until theso redoubts had been captured. So strong, in fact, wore tho of W beach that the Turks may well have considered them impregnable, and it is my firm conviction that no finer feat of arms has ever been achieved by the British soldier—or any other soldier—than the storming of these trenches from open boats on the morning of April 25.

Astonishing Success. The landing at W.liad been entrusted to the Ist Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers (Major Bishop), and it was to tho complete lack of the senses of danger or of fear of this daring battalion that wo owed our astonishing success. As in the case of the landing at X, the disembarkation had been delayed for half an hour, but at 6 a.m. the whole bat-' talion approached tlie shore together, towed by eight picket boats in lino abreast, each picket boat pulling four ship's cutters. As soon as. shallow water was Touched, tiie tows wcro cast off and the boats were at once rowed to the shore. Three, companies' headed for the beach, and a company on tho left of tho line made for a small'ledge

of rock immediately under the cliff at 'l'ekke Burnu. Brigadier-General flare, commanding the''Bßth, Brigade, accompanied this latter party, iWiioh escaped the cross lire brought to bear upon tho beach, and was also in a bettor position than t'ho rest of the battalion to turn the wiro entanglements. Wiiilo tho troops woro approaching the shore no 6hot had been fired from tho enemy's trenches, but as soon as tho first boat touched tho ground a hurricano of lead swept over tho battalion. Gallantly led' by their officers, the Fusiliers literally burled themselves ashoro and, lired at from right, left, and centre, oommenccd hacking their way through the wiro. A long lino of men was at once mown down as by "a 6cytho, but the remainder were ,not to bo denied. Covered by the firo of the warships, which had now closed right in to the shore, and helped by the flanking Are of tho company on tho extromo left, they broke through the entanglements and collected under the cliifs ou cither side of tho beae'h. Here the companies wero rapidly reformed, and set forth to stonn the enemy's entrenchments wherever they could find them. In making these attacks the bulk of the battalion moved up towards Hill 1 114, whilst a small party worked down towards tho trenches on the Cape Helles side of tho landing-place. Several land mines were exploded by tho Turks during the advance, but the determination of tho troops was in no way affected. By 10 a.m. three lines of hostile trenches were in. our kinds, and our hold on the beaoh was assured.

Barbed Wire Entanglements. About 9.30 a.m. more infantry had begun to disembark, and two hours later a junction was effected on' Hill 114 with the troops who had landed on X beach. On the right, owing . to tho strength of the redoubt on Hill 138, little progress could ha made. The small party ■ of Lancashire ihisiliers which had advanced in this direction succeeded in reaching the.edgo of the wire entanglements, but were not strong enough to do more, and it was here that Major Frankland, brigademajor of the 86th Infantry Brigade, who had gone forward to mako a personal reconnaissance, was unfortunately killed. Brigadier-Goneral Hare had been wounded earlier in the day, and Colonel Woolly-Dod, General Staff 29th Division, was now sent ashoro to take, command at W beach and organise a further advance.

At 2 p.m., after the ground, near Hill 138 had been subjected to a heavy bombardment, tbe Worcester Regiment advanced to the assault. Several men of this battalion rushed forward with great spirit to cut passages through the entanglement; somo were killed, others persevered, and by 4 p.m. the hill and redoubt were captured. An attempt ]vas now made to join hands with the troops on V beach, wlio could make ho headway at all against the dominating defences of the enemy. To help them out tho 86th Brigado pushed foi'ward in an easterly direction along the cliff. There is a Emit, however. to the storming of barbed-wire entanglements. More of these barred the way. Again tbe heroic wire-cutters came out. ' Though glasses they could, be seen quietly snipping away under a hellish fire as if they wore pruning a vineyard. Again somo of them fell. The fire pouring out of No. 1 Fort'grew hotter and hotter until the troops, now thoroughly . exhausted by a sleepless nighii and bj tho long day's fighting under a hot sun, .had to rest on their laurels for a while.

When night fell the British position in front of W beach extended from just oast of Capo Holies lighthouse, through Hill 138, to Hill 114: Practically every man had to be thrown into the trenches to hold this line, and the only available reserves on this part of'our front wero. tho 2nd London Field Company R.E. and a platoon of the Anson Battalion, which had been landed as a beach working party. During the night several strong ana determined counter-attacks were made, all successfully repulsed without loss of ground. Meanwhile the disembarkation of the remainder of the division was preceding on W and X beaches. Australians and New Zealanders. The Australian and Now Zealand Army Corps sailed out of Mudros Bay on tiio afternoon of April 24, escorted by tho 2nd Squadron of the Fleet, under Rear-Admiral Thursby. The rendez-. yous was reached just after half-past one ill the morning of the Sitli, and there the 1500 men who had been placed on board H.M. ships before leaving Mudros were transferred to their boats. This operation was carried out with remarkable expedition, and in absolute silence. Simultaneously the remaining 2500 men of tho covering fores were transferred from their transports to six destroyers. At 2.30 a.m. H.Mt ships, together with th© tows and tho destroyers, proceeded to within come four miles of the coast, H.M.S. Queen (Dying Rear-Admiral 'l'hursby's flag) directing on a point about a mile north of Kaba. Tepe. At 3.30 a.m. orders to go ahead and land were given to tho tows, and at 4.10 a.m. t-ho destroyers were ordered to follow. All theso arrangements worked without a hitch, and were carried out in complete 'orderliness and silence.', r*o breath of wind ruffled the surface of tho sea, and every condition was favourable save for the mcon, which, sinking behind tho ships, may have silhouetted them aaginst its orb, betraying them thus to watchers on the shore. A rugged and difficult part of coast had been selected for tho landing, so difficult and rugged that I considered tho Turks were not at all likely to anticipate such a descent. Indeed, owing to the tows having failed to maintain their exact direction - tho actual point of disembarkation was rather more than a mile north of that which ■I had selected, and was more o'osely overhung by steeper cliffs. Although this accident increased tlio initial difficulty of driving tho enemy off tho heights inland, it has 6ince proved itself to have been a blessing in disguise, inasmuch, as tho actual baso of tho force of occupation has been much bettor defiladed from sliol' fire. Tlie beach on which the landing was actually effected is a very narrow strip of sand, about 1000 yards in length,' bounded on the north and the south by two small promontories. _ At its southern extremity a deep ravine, with exceedingly steepj scrub-clad sides, runs inland in a north-easterly direction. Near the northern end of the beach a small but steep gully runs up into- the hills at right angles to the sliore. Between the ravine _ and tho gully the whole of the beach is backed by the seaward face of tho.spur which forms the north-western side of tho ravine. From tho top of the spur the ground falls almost sheer, except near the southern limit of tho beach, where gentler slopes givo access to the month of the ravino behind. Further inland lie in a' tangled knot tho nnder-featurep of Sariliair, separated by deep ravines, which take a most confusing diversity of direction. Sharp spurs, covered with denso scrub, and falling away in many places in precipitous sandy cliffs, radiate trom the -principal mass of tho mountain, from wliicli they run nortti-west, west, south-west, and south lo the

A Vigorous Onslaught. The boats approached the land in tho silence and tlio darknosa, and they were closo to'tho shore before tho enemy stirred. Then about one battalion of Turks was seen miming along tho bcaoli to intercept tho lines of boat 1 !. At this so critical a moment tho conduct of all ranks was praiseworthy. Not a word was spoken—everyone remained porfeotly orderly and quiet awaiting the enemy's fire, which' sure enough opened, causing many casualties. Tlio moiuont tho boats touelicd land tlio Australians' turn had come. Lilto lightning tlioy leapt ashore, and oach man as lie did so vent straight as. liis bayonot at tliQ

enemy. So vigorous was the onslaught that tho Turks made no attempt to withstand it, Mid fled from ridge to ridge pursued by the Australian infantry. This attack ' was carried out by tho Third Australian Brigade, under Major (temporary colonel) Sinclair Maelagan, D.S.O" The Ist and 2nd Brigades followed promptly, and were all disembarked by 2 p.m., by which time 12,000 men and two'batteries of Indian Mountain Artillery had been landed. Hie disembarkation of .further artillery was delayed owing to "tho fact that the onemy's heavy guns opened on the anchorage and forced the transports, which had been subjected te sontinuous shelling from his field guns, to stand further out to sea. Tho broken ground, tho thick scrub, the necessity for sending any formed detainments post haste as they landed to the critical point of the moment, the headlong valour of scattered groups'of tho men who 'had pressed far further Into tho peninsula than had been intended—all these led to confusion, and mixing up of units. Eventually the mixed crowd of. fighting men, some advancing from the beach, others falling back before tho oncoming Turkish: supports, solidified into a semi-circular position with its right about a mils north of Kaba Tepo and its left on the high ground over Fisherman's -Hut. During this period parties of the' 9th and lOtir Battalions charged and put out of action three of the enemy's Krtipp guns. During this period also tho disembarkation of the Australian Division was being followed by that of the New Zealand and Australian Division. (two brigades only).

Attack by 20,000 Turks. From 11 a.in. to 3 p.m. the enemjo now reinforced to a strength of 20,000 men, attacked the whole line, making a. specially strong effort against the 3rd Brigade and the left of the 2nd Brigade. This counter-attack was, however, handsomely repulsed with the help of the guns of His Majesty's ships. Between. 5 and 6.30 p.m. a third most determined counter-attack was made against the 3rd Brigade, who held their ground with more than equivalent stubbornness. During the night again the Turks made coustajit attacks, and the Bth Battalion repelled • a bayonet chargo; but in spite of all the line held firm. The troops had had practically no rest on the night of the 24th-25th; they had been fighting bard all day over most difficult country, and they had been subjected to heavy shrapnel firo in tho open. Their casualties 'had been deplorably heavy. But, despite their losses, and in spite of their fatigue, the morning of tho 26t3i found them still in good heart and as full of fight as ever. It is a consolation to know that the Turks suffered still more seriously. Several times our machine-guns got on to them in close formation, and the wliolo surrounding . country is still strewn with their dead of this date.

The reorganisation of units and formations was impossible during the 26th and 27th. owing to persistent attacks. As advance was impossible until a reorganisation could be effected, and ( it only remained to entrench the position gained and to perfect the arrangements for bringing up ammunition, water, supplies to tho ridges—in itself a most' difficult .undertaking. Four battalions of the v Royal Naval" Division were sent Up to reinforce tho Army Corps on the 28th and 29tlh April.' On the night of May 2 a bold effort was made to seize a commanding knoll in front- of the centre of the line. The enemy's enfilading machine-guns were too scientifically posted, and 800 men were lost without advantage beyond the infliction of a corresponding loss to the enemy. On May 4 an attempt to seize ICaba Tepe was also unsuccessful, the barbed-wire here being Eomething beyond belief. But a number of minor operations have been carried out, such' as the' taking of a'Turkish observing station; the strengthening.of entrenchments ; tho reorganisation of'units; and tho perfecting of communication with the landing-place. Also a constant strain has been placed upon some of. the best troops of the enemy, who, to tha number of 24,000, aro constantly kept fighting and being killed and wounded freely, as the Turkish sniper is no match for tho Kangaroo shooter,- even at his own game. | The assistance of the Royal Navy/ hero as elsewhere has been invaluable. The whole of the arrangements have been in Admiral Thursby's hands, and I trust I may bo permitted to say what' a trusty and powerful friend he; has proved himself to bp to tho Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

Landing of the French. . Concurrently with the British land* ings a regiment of tlie French Corps was successfully disembarked at Kum Kale under the guns of the French fleet, end remained ashore till the morning of the 26th, when they were re-embarked. Five hundred prisoners were captured by the French on this day. This operation drew the fire of tlio Asiatio guns from Morto Bay and V beach on to Kum Kale, and contributed largely to the succoss of the British landings. , ~ • On, the evening of tlio 20fch the mam disembarkation of -the French Corps waa begun, V beach being allotted to our Allies for this purpose, and it was arranged that the French should hold tha portion of the front between the telegraph wire and the sea. The following day I ordered a general advance to a line stretching From Hill 230, near Eski Hissarlik Point, to tho mouth of the stream two miles north of Tekke Burnu. This advance, which was commenced at mid-day, "was completed without opposition, and the troops once consolidated their new line. Tho forward movement relieved the growing congestion on the beaches, and by. giving us possession of several new wells .afforded a temporary solution to the, water problem, which had hitherto been causing me much anxiety. By the evening of the 27th tlie Allied forces had established themselves on a line some three miles long, which' stretched from the mouth of the irullah, 3200, yards nortli-oast of Tekke Burnu, to Esk'i Hissarlik Point, the three brigades of the 29th Division less two battalions on tho left and in the centre, with four Firench battalions on the right and beyond them again tho South Wales Borderers on the extreme right. Owing to casualties this line was somewhat thinly held. Still it was so vital to make what headway we could before tho enemy recovered himself and received fresh reinforcements .that it was decided to push on as' quickly as possible. Orders were therefore issued for a general advance to commonco at 8 a.m. next day. Tho 29th Division were to march oil Krithia, with their left brigade leading, tho French were directed to extend their left in conformity with tho British movements and to retain their right on tho osast-lino south of the Kercves Dore.

The Ceneral Advance, it , „ llio advanco commenced at 8 a,ni. 011 the 28th, and was carried out with conimenda-blo vigour, despite tho fact tliafc from tho moment or landing tlio troops had boon unable to obtain, any; proper rest. _ _ . Tlio S7tli Brigade, with which' had boon incorporated the Drake Battalion, Royal Naval Division; in the place of tho King's- Own Scottish Borderers and South Wales Borderers, pushed on rapidly, and. by 10 a.m. had ndvanccd sonw two milos. Horo tho further progress of the Border Bogimciit was barred by a strong work on tlio left flank. Tliey halted to concentrate and mako dispositions to a thick it, ajtd at that moment hnd to withstand .a determined coimter-attaok by the Turks. Aided by heavy gun fire from 11.M.8, Quooa .Elizabeth, tliey in bcafcif; off the attack, but they nmdo (CoatitmaJi.v® P<ig«.l3^

110 further progress that day, and when ; night fell entrenched themselves 011 the ground they had gained in the . morning. _ _ .. . Tho. Jnniskilling Fusiliers, who advanced with their right on the Krithia ravine, reached a point about threequarters of a milo south-west of Krithia. 'This was, however, the farthest limit attained, and later on in tho day they.fell back into line with other corps. The 88th Brigade on the right of the 87th progressed steadily until about 11.30 a.m., when tho stubbornness of the opposition, coupled with a dearth of ammunition, brought their advance to a standstill. The 86Mi' Brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel , Casson, which had, been held in reserve, wore thereupon I ordered to. ; push forward through tho 88th Brigade in the direction of Krithia. Tho movement commenced at about 1 p.m., but though small reconnoitring parties got to within a. few hundred yards of Krithia, tho main body of the brigade did not get beyond the lure held by the BSth Brigade. Meanwhile ,the French had also pushed on in the face ;of strong opposition along tho spurs on tho western bank of the ICereves Dero, and had got to within a mile of Krithia with their right thrown back and. their left in..touch- with the 88th .Brigade. Here they were unable to make further progress; gradually the,'strength of the resistance made' itself felt, and our Allies were forced during the; afternoon to give ground. 1 By-2 p.m. the' whole of the troops with the exception/of the Drake Battalion "had been absorbed into, the firing line. The men wore exhausted, and the few guns'landed at the'time were unable to afford them adequate artillery support. The small amount of transport available did not! suffice to maintain'the supply of munitions, and cartridges were running short despite all efforts to tlhem up from tlie landing places.' ' . .

Tho Problem. Hopes of getting a footing on 'Achl Babi had now perforce to be adandoned' —at least for this occasion. Tlie best that could bo expected was that we ' should be able to maintain what we bad . won, and* when a 3 p.m. the Turks , mdo a 'determined counter-attack with the bayonet against the centre and right of our line even his seemed exceedingly . doubtful. Actually a partial retirement did , take place.: The French were also . forced back, and at; 6:p.m. orders were issued for our' trops to entrench them- . selves as best* ; they co'ulcf in' the positions tlioy then held, with their riglit flank thrown back .'so'as i-to maintain connection with, our Allies. In' this retirement the right.-flank of the 88th. Brigade was temporarily uncovered, and . the Worcester Regiment? suffered severely* - V ' , Had. it been possible to push ... in, reinforcements in : ' . men, ■ artillery, and munitions during _the day Krithia. should have fallen, and much' subsequent fighting'. for its cap-' ture would have been avoided. \

Two days later' this would 'have been feasible, but I had to'reckon with the . certainty that the enemy'would in that same time have received proportionately "greater support. I was faced by the usual choice of evils, and although the result was, not' I bad. hoped, I . have no Teason to believe: that hesitation and delay would better have an-, iswered my.purpose. For, , after all, we had. pushed forward quito appreciably oil the whole. •The line eventually, held by-our troops on theinight of the 28th ran from a point on She coast three miles northwest of Tekke Burnu- to' a point, one , mile north of Eski Hissarlik, whence it Was continued by the ; French south,east to tlio coast. Mucih inevitable mixing of units -of the 86th and 88th Brigades had occurred during the day!s fighting, and there was a dangerous res-entrant in the line at the junction of the 87th and 88th Brigades near the Krithia nullah.' Tho ..French had lost: heavily," especially in officers, and required time to Teorgah- ■■ iae. '' The _29th- April was consequently Spent .in!'straightening the line and inconsolidating and strengthening the positions There was a certain • amount of artillery and musketry , fire, but nothing serious": Similarly, on ilio 30th, no advance was made, nor was any attack delivered by the enemy. The landing 'of the bulk of the artillery was completed, and a •readjustment of tlie lino took tho portion held by the Frendh being somewhat increased. ' V

-Two more battalions of the' Royal aval Division had been disembarked, and-these,'together with three battalions'of the 88th Brigade withdrawn . from /the, line, were formed into a reserve- - ..." - This reserve was inoreased on "the Ist May by addition of the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, which released the three battalions of the 88th Brigade to return ;to the trenches.. -The Corps Espeditionnaire d'Orient had disembarked the whole:of their infantry and all but two of their batteries by'the same-even-ing.

v - Turkish Method of Attack. ■ i'A? 2" P' nl - 10 Turks opened a lot shell fire upon our position, and lialf ail hour later,- just before the rise ;of the moon they delivered a series of desperate attacks. Their formation was in three solid linesthe men in the front rank being deprived of ammunition to ■make them rely only upon the bayonet. omcers woro served out with, coloured Bengal lights to fire from their pistols, red indicating to the Turkish guns that .they woto to lengthen their range; white -that our front trendies had been stortned; green that our main position had bean carried. The Turkish attack was to crawl on hands and ■ knees until the time came for the final rush to be_ made. An eloqtient hortative was-signed Von Zowenstern and addressed to the Turkish rank and file who were called upon, by one mighty rr r J;, , us a " into the sea. Attack the enemy with tho bavonet end. utterly destroy him! ~ shall not retire one step; for, ir we do, our religion, our country, and our nation mil perish! Soldiers I The world is looking at foul iYour only hope of salvation is to bring; this battle to a successful issue or gloriously to give up your lifo in tho attempt I The first momentum of this ponderous onslaught fell upon the right of tho BGth Brigade, an unlucky spot, seeing all the officers thereabouts had already been killed or wounded. So when tho Turks came right on without firing, and charged into tho trenches with tho bayonet they made an 'ugly gap in tho ime. This gap was instantly filled by the sth Royal Scots (Territorials), who faced to their flank and oxcutcd a brilliant bayonet charge against tho enemy, end by the Essex Regiment detached for the. purpose by the Officer Commanding the'Bßth Brigade. The" rest of the British line held its own with comparative ease, and it was not found ncccsBary to employ any portion of the re»orve._ The storm next broke in fullest violence against the French left, which was held by the Senegalese. Behind them were two British Field Artil'er.y Brigades and a howitzer battery. 'After several charges and ' countercharges tho Senegaleso began to give ground, and a company of- tho Worcester Regiment and some gunners were Bont forward to hold tlio gap. Later, a Bccopd company of the Worcester Regijnent was also sent ap, and the position was then maintained for the remainder of-the night, although, about 2 a.m., it was found necessary to dispatch ono battalion Royal Naval Division to Btrengthen the extreme right of tho Jfronch.

Repulse of tho Turks. About 5 a.m. a counter-offensive was brdered, and the whole line began to '■ ndvanco. By 7.30 a.m. tho British left had Rained some 500 yards, and the centre had pushed tho oneniy back and inflicted heavy losses. The right also had gained' .some ground in conjunction

with the French loft, but the remainder of the French line was unable to progress. As'the British centre and left wore now subjected to heavy cross fire from concealed machine guns, ' it was found impossible to maintain tho ground Rained, and therefore, about 11 a.m., tho whole lino withdrew to its former trenches. The net result of the operations was the repulse of the Turks and the infliction upon them of very heavy losses. At first we had them fairly on the run, and had it .not .been for those inventions of tho dovil —machine guns and barbed wire—which suit the Turkish character and tactics to perfection, wo should not have stopped short of tho orost of Achi Baba. As it was, all .brigades reported great numbers of dead Turks in front oi their lines, and 350 prisoners wero left in our hands.

On the 2nd, during the day, tho enemy remained quiet, burying his dead under a red crescent flag, a work with which wo did not interfere. Shortly after 9 .p.m., however, they made another attack against the whole Allied line, their chief, effort . being made against the French front, where the ground favoured their approach. The attack was repulsed with loss. During tho night of the 3rd-4th the French front was again subjected to a heavy attack, which they were able ri> ■repulse without assistance from my general reserve.

The day of the 4th was spent in reorganisation, and a portion of the line held by the French, who had lost heavily during the previous night's fighting, was taken over by the 2nd Naval Brigade. _ The night passed quietly. During the 6th tho Lancashire Fusilier Brigade of the East Lancashire Division was disembarked and placed in reserve behind the British left. Orders were issued for an advance to be carried out nest day, and these and the three days' battle which ensued will be dealt with in my next dispatch. The losses, exclusive of the French, during the period covered by this dispatch were, I regret-to say, very severe, numbering: _ . 177 officers and 1990 other 'ranks killed. 412 officers and ' 7807 other ranks wounded. 13 officers and 3580 other ranks ' missing.

From a technical point of view it is interesting to, note that my Administrative Staff had not reached Mudros by the time irhen the landings were finally arranged. All the highly elaborate Work involved by these landings was. put through by my General Staff working in collaboration with Commodore Roger Kayes, C.8., M.V.0.-, and the Naval Transport Officers alloted for the purpose by Vice-Admiral de Robeek. Navy and Army carried, out these combined duties with that perfect harmony wliich was indeed absolutely essential to success. ••• Tribute to the Navy.

Throughout the events I have chronicled the Royal Navy has been father and mother to the Army. Not one of U3 but realises how much he owes to Vice-Admiral de Robeck; to the warships, French and British; to the de-. stroyers, mine sweepers, picket boats, and to all their dauntless crews, who took no thought of themselves, but risked everything to {*ive their soldier comrades a "fair run in at tho enemy. Throughout these preparations and operations Monsieur le General d'Amade has given me the benefit of his wide experiences of war, and has afforded me always the-'most loyal and energetic "supports--The landing of Kum Kale planned by me as a mere diversion to distract the attention of the enemy was transformed by the Commander of'the Corps Expeditionaire do I'Orient into a brilliant operation, which _ secured some substantial ,results. During the fight-, ing which followed the landing of the French 'Division at Sedd-el-Bahr no trooijs could have acquitted themselves more creditably under very trying circumstances, and under very heavy losses, than those working under the orders of Monsieur le General d'Amade.

Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood, K.C.5.1., C.8., C.1.E., D.5.0., was in command of the detached land : ing of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps above Kab;v Tepe, as well as during tbe subsequent fighting The fact of his having been responsible for the execution of those difficult and hazardous operations—operations which .'were crowned with a very, remarkable success —speaks, I think, for itself. • Major-General A. G. Hunter'Weston,. C.8., D.5.0., was tried very highly, not only during the landings, but more especially in the day and night attacks and counter-attacks which ensued. .Untiring, resourceful, and ever more cheerful as tho outlook (on occasion) grew darker, he possesses, in my opinion, very special qualifications as a commander of troops in the field. Major-General •W- P- Braithwaite. C.8., is the best Chief of the' General Staff.it has ever been my fortune to encounter in war. I will not pile epithets upon him. I can say no more than what I have said, and I can certainly say no less. ... ' I have many other names to bring to notice for the period under renew, and these will form the subject of a separate report at an early date.