PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2544, 19 August 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Though news of military operations at Gallipoli is still meagre, a number of items to-day emphasise tho fact that the campaign has entered a nciv phase,_ and that the Allies are bringing increased power to bear upon tin problem of forcing the Dardanelles. The addition of 15,000 Canadians to the a.rmy under Sir lan Hamilton's command in itself implies a considerable accession of. force, and though the same authority does not attach to a Turkish official message asserting that tho Allies ha..e lately landed fresh divisions at the Dardanelles, there is no particular reason to doubt its general accuracy. As to. Canada's contribution of force, the statement made by the Dominion PostmasterGeneral on the subject refers to the men ordered to Gallipoli as being "in England," but the announcement is rather' more, likely to have been made a f ter the Canadians had reached theiv destination than on tie eve of their departure, moro especially as enemy submarines have to be reckoned with on the transport routes.

The fact in any ease is established that the Allied invading army is being heavily reinforced, and the interesting question now is as to where _ the next great blow of the campaign may be expected to fall. On this point, as is not surprising, news in hand.throws comparatively little light. Though there has been 110 further mention of tho reported landing at KarachaJi it still seems probable that the landing of a strong force north of tho Isthmus of Bulair to cut the Turkish land communications with Gallipoli would bo a distinct step forward in the campaign. Meantime, however, this matter remains in abeyance, possibly because only an advance carried to the point of occupying Constantinople would definitely and finally prevent further supplies being carried into the Peninsula. If the .Turks are not making much use of tho landroute to Gallipoli and are relying nmnly on transport by way of the Asiatic railways and the Narrows, the immediate advantages of a limited enterprise on the mainland would not be great. We have as yet only the extension of the area of occupation on the western side of the Gal-' lipoli Peninsula to go upon, and this in itself would imply an intention to press the direct attack upon the Narrows. _ The great difficulty of the campaign since tho initial problems of the landing were surmounted has.been that the Allied forces both in the southern and in the western zone of the Gallipoli Peninsula have been .operating upon a very short front, and in face of enormously stromr positions—conditions whioh lend themselves in a superlative degree to a stubborn Turkish defence. .' * * * # Already these' conditions must have been very greatly modified by the notorious advance of the Australians and ' New Zealanders, though the exact, extent to which the position has been altered has yet to be irtado manifest. In the past attacks on the southern line have usually been accompanied by demonstrations by the Australians and New Zealanders against the Turkish communications east of thoir area of occupation. Now tliafc the Allied foot-hold on tho western side of the peninsula has been so considerably increased as to afford scopo for the employment of a much greater force attacks from thj west are likely to assume a much greater importance than they have done in the past relatively to tluse on the southern lino. Tho extension of tho western' zone, if it is continued, will threaten tho envelopment of the whole of the Turkish forces in Gallipoli south from tho Narrows for fehs sea-pas-sago' of tho Narrows cannot bo regarded as a line of retreat, though it may suffice meantime whore the transport of supplies is concerned.

Most of to-day's. news relating to the Dardanelles tells of great additional forces gathering against tho Turks, and points to a vigorous development of ka oampaign, but ono item stands in a different category. On present information a thousand British. soldiers and sailors have gone down with' the transport Ttoyal Edward, sunk by a German submarine in the Aegean Sea. Tho loss will bo all the more severely felt since this is the first British transport to encounter such a fate in the present war. Thanks to the protective measures devised by the Admiralty, British transports have been kept safe from harm during moro than a year of war, alike in the narnow seas between England and Franco and in more extended voyagings, and it certainly cannot be set down to the prejudice of the Admiralty that lo admirable a record has now been brpken into by 'tho lasis & single ship,. • It has been i'cwg<

nised for a long time past that the submarine constitutes one of the most effective instruments at command of the German-Turkish forces defending the Dardanelles. The loss of the Royal Edward affords proof, if it wore needed, that even the finest and speediest v'esKols available as transports arc not immune from submarine attack. She was a fine turbine steamer of 11.000 tons, built in 1903, and witn a speed of 19 knots. That such a ship should fall a prey to a submarine says all that need bo said about the capabilities of the under-water craft,.

Information in hand does not tell how the submarine got within striking range of the transport, but it is likely that the latter was taken unawares. She would almost -certainly be armed, and a fast liner of her type carrying a pun or two would be more than a match for any submarine operating on the surface, despite the fact that the later German submarines are able to excced a speed of 19 knots. On the other hand, the odds are heavily in favour of the submarine when she is «blc to get within striking distance by an imdor-water approach. A single submarine can command a wide range of sea, and cut off even an exceptionally fast steamer such as the Royal Edward was, if she is kept lying awash. Her captain is thus enabled to sight an approaching steamer long beforp his own craft is likely to bo observed, and it is then a simple matter to sink out of sight and steer a converging course under water so as to get within the shortest possible range of his intended victim. It was no doubt in some such fashion that the Pioyal Edward met her fate, and so long as the relative powers of submarines and surface craft compare as at present such untoward events are liable to be repeated. » # # »

The most hopeful fact bearing upon the Gorman submarine menacc in the Mediterranean 'is that the depredations of these craft have been kept witmn comparatively narrow limits. The initial exploit—the sinking of two British battleships—was followed after some weeks by the sinking of a supply ship (the City of Paris) near Cape Hellcs. Now, after another lengthy interval, the .Royal Edward has been added to the list. Considering that tho Allied forces at the Dardanelles arc absolutely dependent upon sea transport, and that ships aro continually passing to and fro between Egypt and the island bases and between these .bases _a.nd the Gallipoli Peninsula, the ' limitations of the enemy submarine campaign can only be attributed to tne_ counter-measures taken by the Allies. No subject is more closely wrapped in secrecy than that of anti-submarine tactics, but it is obvious that conditions in the Eastern Mediterranean do not permit of the same thorough-going protection of transport' routes as is possible in the English Channel.. Transports bound for the Dardanelles are necessarily more exposed to attack than those plying in the Channel, but on the other hand the Allies in the Mediterranean have a much better chance of harrying and destroying submarine depots than is open to the naval forces in Home waters. A scaroity of submarine supplies in Turkey, intensified by punitive raids by the Allied warships, no doubt goes far to account for the limited activities of the German submarines in the seas around the Dardanelles, but even if every submarine base in the Ottoman Empire were destroyed there would still be a certain risk from these craft, since they could operate, though at a considerable disadvantage, from bases in the Adriatic.

It is probable that the very interesting statement regarding tho Dardanelles campaign attributed to the British Ambassador at Petrograd has suffered to some extent in the _ process of condensation for cabling. In its main bearing, as showing how directly Britain and France are assisting Eussia by undertaking this arduous campaign, the statement is timely in view of the underhanded attempts Germany is making to sow dissension amongst the Allies. Like; some references to British sea power'which have lately lcccived full publicity in Petrograd it is a straightforward appeal' to facts in rebuttal of enemy lies. The full text of Sir Geo. Buchanan's statement, however, would probably put a somewhat different complexion upon some of the details covered. The Dardanelles campaign certainly cannot be regarded as a mere diversion, undertaken in order to draw off the Turkish forces in the Caucasus. On the contrary, it is an enterprise with a vitally important bearing upon the Eussian main campaign. The forcing of the Dardanelles, by opening a road for munitions and_ supplies, will enable Russia to rapidly increase her effective military strength, and in addition it will make possible a degree of coordination between Eussia and the Western Allies which is unattainable as matters stand. The suggestion that the diversion of troops and munitions to Gallipoli so weakened the Allies on the Western front as to delay their advance also seems to call for some qualification. It is rather more likely that Russia and tho Western Allies agreed to postpone decisive action until tho Dardanelles had been opened, not because of the diversion of strength which tho campaign occasioned, but because of the great accession of strength wliioh would follow upon its being carried to a successful termination. It is from this latter point of view that tho Dardanelles campaign is seen -in its true and full importance.

At the moment the crux of the Eastern campaign appears to be the German Assault on the fortress of Kovno at tho northern end of that section of i tho Russian lino which lies opposite the East Prussian frontier. In defending Ifovno the Russians have to contend with the enemy on unequal terms, for ho is in possession of fairly good' transport lines which enablo him to employ and supply his heaviest artillery. _ The dogged and, tenacious Russian defence has so far broken before an assault pressed with all the fury o£ which the Germans arc capablc that some of the outer forts have fallen. 'i-a retention of the fortress is thus extremely problematical and if Kovno goes it is likely that the Russians will also lose Vilna, the important junction on the Petrograd railway, fifty miles further east. In that event tho continued successful resistance offered to the German forces in the Baltic Provinces would be nullified, and a considcrablo extension of the northern area of invasion would be inevitable. It is in this direction that matters are pointing at present. The enemy also claim a considerable extension of the area occupied in Southern Poland, but chiefly in the region which Uif, Russians aro deliberately eyafiuat'ings

. Claim's advanced in an Austrian communique that the passage of the River Bug lias been forced in Central Poland, north of Brest Litowsk imply, if true, that that fortress is imminently menaced from the north, as well as from the south arid southwest. It is in Central Poland, however, that transport difficulties will tell most heavily upon tlie enemy, and here if anywhere the Russians may be cxpected to make a stand unless the crucial operations in the north compel a further general retirement of the whole line. It must bo admitted that the developments of the campaign, as tJhoy are presented in enrrent reports, discover little sign of that retardation of the Austro-German advance which, according to a German newspaper (the Lohal Anzicr/cr) ma.y perhaps be expected.

Satisfactory news is given both of the Western and tho Italian campaigns to-day.- The Italians report the capturc of Austrian positions in the Western Trentin'o and in the Tolmino region, at the northern oncl of the Isonzo front. In the main Western campaign the French have gained a local victory in Alsace, a rid,eo being stormed and fold against the enemy's counter-attacks.