PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2543, 18 August 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

~4 Some rather sensational developments in the Eastern campaign are reported to-clav, but they rest in part upon unofficial and, therefore, more or less doubtful, authority. Hitherto the belt uvo.ils.bl9 tiUßm&Uon has gone to show, that tbe Gmkww m

. developing their most'dangerous at-' 5 tacks against tlie northern flank of I; the Russian line, in the Baltic Provinces, and in Southern Poland. A very different view is advanced in ~ an unofficial mess-go from Petro- ' grad, wl.ioh declares that_ the bulk ~ of tho enemy's strength is concentrated on the front from Oss'owiec , to Brest Litowsk, In point of fact, the Germans are still something like 3 fifty miles away from Brest Litowsk on tho approach from the west, so " that the line suggested is one about 5 100 miles long extending from Cen--1 tral Poland, in the latitude of War- • saw, to Ossowiec a fortress still in " Russian hands, situated about 18 | miles from tho south-eastern corner ' of East Prussia. On this lino it is 1 stated that the enemy has arrayed 1 troops to to number of about a " million and a half, in the hope of 1 precipitating a decisive action bc--5 fore the Russians havo deployed on 1 the positions to which they are rej tiring. , 1 * * * . * 6 This is probably theorising. At - all events, all definite knowledge in i hand tends to discredit it, and put s it out of court. As to the immedis ate position, the suggestion that 3 there is still a favourable opportunity of overwhelming tho Russian cent tral armies before they have time to - adjust themselves to their altered i circumstances is misleading. They 3 are much less likely to be f overtak*en , in this way now than when they - were extricating themselves from the s salient thrown forward west of c Warsaw. At present the Russians, a according to the messages wo have . received, occupy an approximately t straight line, and aro free to mail noeuvre and to retreat if necessary. s The Germans, on tho other hand, j aro less favourably placed to strike » a shattering blow than when they were assaulting the War--5 saw salient. 1 Not only were the j Russians then at a disadvantage on ■j account of their cramped and.exposed situation, but the enemy in his frontal attack was workiug on (. and near railways which had been 1 long in his hands, and were presumably in full working order. Ahead of these railways ho now has to negotiate a great area of devas- '. tated country, in which railways J have been as far as possible destroyed. A notable item in tho dcstnietion effected wag tho blowing up 7 of the bridges over the Vistula at Warsaw and Jvangorod. ; A heavy 3 attack_ on Ossowioe and in the area j. immediately to the south where tho , Russian, line :s still comparatively ' close to the Prussian frontier, is ' well within the bounds pf possibility, but preparations by the Germans on tho scale mentioned for a ' new forward move in Central Poland t are improbable. If • the Russians aro coinpellc I td fall back upon j. Brest Litowsk it will be because a J' much smaller Gorman force than 3 the one mentioned is capable of ac--1 complishing so mucfi. * * * * The transport problems of the Ger-. 3 mans in Central Poland, will bo modified, ■ though by no means dis- ■ posed of, when they are in full com--1 mand of the Vistula., The use of 5 water-borne transport on this great J rivor will to an extent compensate for tho loss of the railway- bridges e by which it was spanned, but mcana time the passage, of ..the Vistula is s blocked by the continued defence of j. the fortress of Novo Georgviesk, s north-west of Warsaw, which is evi- .. dently offering a stout resistance. , * * « » i- The circumstances being what they are,' the prospect of the Germans J being able to force a decisive battle in Central Poland may safely be J dismissed as negligible. Indeed, =. thc : term "decisive battle" seems to o be' a meaningless figure of speech ® whore tho Eastern campaign is c'onn corned. The Russians have, at times d given ground readily in order to ob(1 tain relief from enemy pressure, and i- on other occasions (as in their pree sent defence of Kovno) have stoutly and doggedly resisted the enemy's advance, but in the ultimate resort ' r> it has been their invariable policy •- to make any sacrifice of ground and n position necessary to enable them to fo on fighting with unbroken armies. o long as they adhere to this policy " it is difficult to set any limit to tho g number of battles the Germans d would have to win in order to grasp If any decisive advantage' in tho Eastn em campaign. Prospects of achievj. ihg anything of tho kind by massing e force in Central Poland aire so uni. promising that tho thing is not y likely to be attempted. The Ger--0 mans are much more likely to reach j® o.ufc • for tho partial political and * military advantage that would be y gained by a successful advanco e against Petrograd. Even that more ■s limited enterprise, however, carries tl its own problems and difficulties. 15 . . » * » » [j To-day's reports tell of a number of changes- in the position of tho it contending armies in Poland, but it d is hardly necessary to follow them 16 out in detail. The facts are no doubt summed up accurately- enough 1 in the Petrograd messages whidli describe the Russian armies as occupyh ing for the time being a nearly e straight line from Northern to s Central Poland. A German comi- mimiqite asserts that the Russian ,s line was broken between the Narew o and tho Bug (north-east of Ware saw), and that the passage 'of the f Bug was forced at Drogitshin (about r 55 miles north-west ■ of Brest Litowsk), but if the Russian and Geri- man accounts a-re read with a map f at hand, it will appear that tho L- eriomy stories are simply an attempt c to make the most of tho easy gains v that are scoured in following up a [. retreat. While this applies to the I- operations in North and Central o Poland, it is not possible to speak ifc with the same confidence about the a position in Southern Poland. Here, it if their own reports aro true, the Germans are working in rapidly tojj waii'ds tho fortress of Brest Litowsk y from the south and south-west; but r. the last Russian _ reports dealing (S with events in this region indicated If that the enemy had been decisively o checked and his advance stemmed. , * * * it Except for a oablegram from Sin r lan Hamilton to tho Defence MinisTEit, which throws some light upon the nature of the battle in which the Australians and New Zcalanders so ~ largely increased their area of oecu--0 pation on the Gallipoli Peninsula, there is no news of the Dardanelles operations at time of writing. Tho , continued absonco of any further ro- " foronco to the landing at Karaohali, , on the mainland, is disappointing, and opens up a possibility that tho landing, if made, was merely a feint and suDsidia.ry to tho operations on tho peninsula. Tho point, however, has vet to be determined. J * it « * Whether or not a landing has been effected at it ro- •" mains true that a material impetus it has lately been given to the Allied i- attack on the Dardanelles, of which >r the full bcaring and importance has o not yet boon disclosed. There 'can .'s be lHtlo doubt t'licji. fcbn w..m|misti hn» a Wared a nwx paasc, waioli should

lead to results at no very distant date. Tho assumption is in no way invalidated by the obscurity in which the actual events and developments of tho campaign are veiled. The necessity of opening a road to Russia and that of obtaining a full command over affairs in the Balkans alike prescribe a vigorous prosecution of the campaign and the depletion of Turkisn resources accomplished chiefly by the Allied and colonial troops, who have fought a strenuous campaign for nearly four months past in Gallipoli; should make such a policy eminently practicable. The Times Paris correspondent no doubt accurately sums up tho situation when ho says that the arguments supplied by the Allies' troops at the Dardanelles will have more weight with Bulgaria than those of tho Chancelleries. ii * * * While Bulgaria and perhaps Rumania also are probably waiting to make quito sure of the winning side before taking action, matters appear to bo in a more forward state where Greece is concerned.' A test division at the opening session of the Chamber of Deputies resulted in the Venizelist victory by a two to one majority, which would indicate that M. Venizelos, in his impending return to power, is likely to havo a tolerably free hand in carrying out the policy of intervention for which ho stands. King C.onstantine, who is definitely opposed to that policy, has exhausted the means availablo to a constitutional monarch of obstructing its adoption, but his opposition has still to be reckoned with. Incidentally, events in Greece lend point to a statement attributed to the Bulgarian Ambassador at Rome, that nis country has never been in a situation of greater delicacy, and that its decision wilj not be long delayed. Anxious as she is not to make any false step, Bulgaria is certainly equally anxious not to miss her chance of aggrandizement, and a policy of continued neutrality with Grcece in the field besicle tho Entente, would considerably intensify this latter risk. * * * * Fuencii accounts of reccnt fighting in tho Argonno lay cmohasis upon tho terrible losses which the Gelmans have suffered in recent attacks without anywhere niatorially improving their position, and in some cases without improving it at all. This apart, there is little news of events in the Western campaign.