PROGRESS OF THE WAR
The sinking of the Turkish battleship Hairredin Barbarosse, by a submarine, an important achievement in itself is still more satisfactory as indicating that the Allied submarines arc successfully, pursuing the campaign whioh-bas done so much to i-tcrrupfc the Turkish, communications with the Gallipoli Peninsula. It is likely, though definite news on tho point has_ yet to arrive, that tho latest submarine success was the result of another daring raid into the Golden Horn or further up the Bosphorus. There would be no object in exposing a battleship to submarine attack, and the chances aro that the Hairredin Barbarosse was attacked and destroyed while lying in what : was supposed to be a seoure haven. The Turkish Navy, never very strong even with the addition of the battle:cruiser Goeben and the light oruiser Breslau, has now been deprived of half the heavy ships which it possessed at 'the outbreak of war. At that date there were three old Turkish battleships, a smaller coast-defence battleship, and two protected oruisers. The Hairredin Barbarosse, and a sister ship still to be accounted for, the 1 Torgiul Rois, were at the head of the list. These ships were built by Germany in 1891, and sold to Turkey in 1910. Each was armed with six 11-iuch guns. An older battleship, tho Messoudieh, was sunk by the British submarino 81l on Deoember 13. One of tho protected cruisers, the Hamidich, was mined and badly damaged in the Bosphorus a day earlier, and the other, the Medjidieh, was mined and sunk in the Black' Sea on April 3. Assuming the Hamidich to be still fit for service, the Turks are left with, three of tho aljc hw,v aliiiss with which they, entered the wa-j, They, huvs
also the Goebcn, but she is reported to be so badly damaged as to be incapablc of manoeuvring. The only other ship of anv size and fighting power possessed by the Turks is the light cruiser Brcslau, also reported to be seriously damaged. Besides the bigger sliips they have lost a number of gunboats and torpedo craft.
As- has been said, the whittling away of Turkey's naval strength is less important in itself than as affording evidence of tho efficiency of the Allied submarine oampaign in the Turkish inner seas. Obviously the submarine is going to play a very important part in the struggle for the Dardanelles, and there is ground for very real satisfaction in the fact that while the Allied submarines are _ continually extending their operations and damaging the enemy, the German submarines sent to Turkey's assistance have- added nothing for weeks to their initial success in sinking two British battleships and one supply ship. The last news of the German craft was that one of them had been towed, damaged, into the Golden Horn. Whether or not the menace of submarine attacks upon tho Allied seacommunications is to_ bo renewed, there can be no question as to the importance of tihe work that the Allied submarines are doing. Seacommunications are absolutely essential to the Turks ■if they are to maintain a_ rigorous resistance on the Gallip'oli Peninsula, and if these communications were definitely cut it would be the beginning of tho end. There is lancl access to t'he Peninsula by way of the Isthmus of Bulair, but there are no railways, and the roads arc bad and more or less exposed to shell-'fire. The alternative routes aro by rail along the Asiatic coast, and across the Dardanelles at the Narrows or tho direct sea-passage from Constantinople through tho Sea of Marmora ■ and down the Dardanelles. The number of transports sunk in the Sea of Marmora suggests that the last-men-, tioned route at least can no longer bo regarded as open, and tho submarines have operated with some success also in the strait itself, one of their victims being a big_ German ship used in ferrying supplies .across the Narrows. The continued activities of the submarines thus open up a ■ prospect that the campaign on the Gallipoli Peninsula may be shortened oven if no direct attack is made upon Constantinople. .
Very meagre accounts are available as yet of an attack by a strong German naval squa'dron upon the entrance to the Gulf of Riga. Nine German battleships, twelve cruisers, and a large number of destroyers were engaged,, and their attack was beaten off, a cruiser and two destroyers being damaged by mines. No mention is made of the Russian naval force engaged, but it is to be assumed that the Allied submarines whioh have lately been active in the Baltic, would play an important part in such a battle. The. reports as they stand : indicate that whatever Russian ships were present took shelter behind the minefields. It is mentioned that seaplanes asSStccl in repelling tho German attacks. « * * *
As the news in hand runs no very remarkable development is reported in the Eastern campaign. The Russians are still offering a strenuous resistance on the Narew front, north and north-east of Warsaw, against which, the enemy now seems to lie throwing his main;.attack,; The German passage of tho Vistula at Ivungorod and between that place and Warsaw, however, sets a period to tho continued resistance. of the armies further north on their present lines and the retreat from theso lines win no doubt soon be hastened. A French communique convicts the Germans of falsehood in reporting some of the recent detail operations on the Western front. Possibly another example is supplied in the German report to-day that several Allied aeroplanes (units in a squadron which attacked Saarbruck) were brought down. At all events the French report the raid without mentioning that any aeroplanes were lost. Saarbruck is a German railway junction about 35 miles cast of Metz. The raid was made in strong force,, but cloudy weather appears to have impaired its effect. A report from Sir John French shows that some ground has been gained cast of Ypres, but most of the news tells of tho defeat of German attacks at various parts of the Allied lino. In the Italian campaign the Austrians havo, been defeated with heavy _ losses in a big battle before Gorizia, but that place has not yet fallen.
A suggestion which has been made before is repeated to-day, that Germany may combine with Austria to invade Servia and advance through tho Balkan Peninsula to the relief of Turkey. Tho idea, take:; itho co-opera-tion or passive acquicscenco of Bulgaria for granted. It is no doubt true that possibilities of this kind are more or less open, but Germany is rather less likely than the Entente Powers to send troops far afield into new theatres. However desirablo it may be from the German standpoint to relievo Turkey, or rather to keep ilia Dardanelles closed to Kussia, sucn an enterprise could bo attempted only by detailing forces which are badly needed in the main theatres, and ! might bo cut off without accomplishing; their object. * * . , * *
Although there has been sonic difference of opinion on the. subject, the view has upon tho whole prevailed that tho Germans have distinctly weakened their forces in tho Western theatre during the last few months in order to press the campaign against tho Russians with vigour. To-day the directly opposite view is stated by Colonel Eepington (the Times military correspondent). He estimates that up to the end of Juno two-thirds of the German Army was still in the Western theatre', and believes that only a million and a quarter Germans, supplemented'by 750,000 Austrians, are carrying on tho war against Russia. The figures of Austrian strength, if they have been transmits d correctly, are evidently intended to apply to only a part of the Eastern theatre, probably excluding Eastern Galicia and Bukowina. Otherwise they would be obviously too low. More serious interest, attaches, however, to what' Colonel Repington has to say about [the distribution of German strength. If it were probably truo that Germany is employing only a million and a quarter soldiers against Russia, it would be necessary to recast many ideas that have been entertained about the stage reached in the war. Colonel Repington further states that "wo must not flatter ourselves that the German reserves are being used up," and that the garrisons and depots in tho interior arc still full of recruits, though of infm'lin' quality. I'lW statement!:, bower* Bsiwsety bea-v examination,
Tho Gorman reserves arc undoubtedly being used tin, whatever the rate of wastage may he, and Germany is under the necessity of maintaining large numbers of troops in garrisons and along her frontiers, many of whom cannot he made availabe for the purposes of the main campaigns.
It is impossible to appeal to definite evidence against Colonel Repington's estimate thai Germany is employing only a million and a quarter men in the Eastern theatre, but there is much to indicate that it is below the mark. Tho great onslaught now being made on the Russians is plainly intended to gain time by creating conditions which.will reduce them to temporary inactivity, and permit the greatest possible German concentration on the opposite front. Tho opinion has not been seriously attacked that Germany's heaviest task in the war is that of trying conclusions with the Western Allies, and that the longer she delays the less likely is she to succeed, since the Allies are steadily building up their strength in men and material. If Colonel Repington is right, Germany is incurring this perilous delay' for the sake at most of drawing a few hundred thousand men from the Eastcm theatre to lend weight to her blow in the West. This is not easy to believe. The present operations are developing upon a vastly greater scalo than, anything hitherto attempted against the Russians, and it is only reasonable to suppose that the armies engaged have been correspondingly reinforced and increased.
At this stage of the war isnatural that anxious attention should be paid to tho sentiments and leanings of neutral nations which stand in the relation of neighbours to belligerents, and in this connection the comments of a Times correspondent upon the attitudo of Sweden are a little disquieting. In his opinion a predominant party in Sweden lean towards Germany for a variety of reasons, tho most important being a dread.'of Russia. Tho danger that Sweden may join the Central Empires against the Entente is probably very slight,, since by doing so she would invite' the evils She is anxious to avoid, but this apart it is of considerable importance to Russia and her Allies to cultivate the best possible' relations with_ Sweden and induce her to do as little as possible to assist Germany. The Allied blockade cannot be enforced in the same way in the Baltic as in the North Sea, sinc<j the domination of the first-namad area by naval power is at best a matter of dispute. Germany is apparently deterred from risking any ■overwhelming naval force in the Baltic by fear of the Allied submarines, but on the other hand German submarines are in a position to excrcise a similarly deterrent influence upon surface units of the Russian Fleet. On available, information, a sea-traffic is..at present being conducted between • Sweden and Germany calculated to be very useful to the latter country. Britain, unfortunately,' has not yet devised measures preventing ' supplies _ of cotton and other;useful commodities passing into Germany through neutral countries- ;
On this subject, some startling statistics were cited by Mb. Pennefather, a member of tho House of Commons, in a letter to tho Morning Post at the end of June. During tho nine months to.April .30, 1915, Holland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, between them imported 1,112,150 bales of cotton in excess of the total importations for the preceding twelve months. Swcden'6 share of the excess amounted' to 647,630 bales, her importations rising to 74V,630 bales _ for tho nine months ending April 30, 1915, as compared with 100,000 bales' for tho preceding twelve months. There can do no question that these excess imports of cotton, or-the greater part of them, found their way into Germany to be turned into explosives for use against the Allied armies. Now that the new American cotton crop is about to . become available, the question of blocking enemy supplies clamours for attention. The only effective method seems to be to limit supplies to neutrals to their pre-war requirements, or thereabouts. This step the BritisE Government up to tho present has been reluctant to take, but the only alter-' native is to acquiesce in a tremendous accession of fighting _ strength to the enemy. It will be difficult in any case to arrive at a satisfactory understanding with neutrals, and, even in the United States, whore an immense proportion of the people aro well-affected to the Entente, the cotton problem has given rise to acute feeling. Where the neutral country ooncerned, as is reported of Sweden, has German leanings, • the difficulty of reaching a satisfactory understanding will, of course, be magnified. ,
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Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2537, 11 August 1915, Page 4
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2,156PROGRESS OF THE WAR Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2537, 11 August 1915, Page 4
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