PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2536, 10 August 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Some of to-day's cablegrams which arc not exactly Avar news deserve a certain amount of attention if only because they give compact expression to what many people are thinking, and state the extreme points between which opinions _ are oscillating. There is, _ for instance, a survey of the position by a Russian military expert, _ which takes a roseate view of Entente ' prospects, and a counterblast, taken from German newspapers, which would mean, if it represented a reliable estimate of the position now reached, that the Entente is faced by the spectre of defeat. It is natural enough, as matters now stand, that there should be some play of alternating hopes and fears, and on that account and until events have superseded speculation, time is not altogether wasted in considering attempts to state tho leading facts of the situation from two diametrically opposite points of viow. There be no doubt that the optimistic view of the Ilussian military expert, Colonel Peiietz, quoted in our cablegrams, is in much closer touch with the facts of the war they appear than tho German opinions quoted on the other .':ide. But so much being said, i'l, must be frankly admitted that the. hope of ;i good outcome of the war rests not so. much upon th«

operation of factors now visible as upon a belief that factors not now in visible operation will determine the issue. There is good reason to believe that the German armies will endeavour in vain to win a decisive victory in the wasted lands of 'Russia. In addition to other factors which have been often noted winter is approaching, and in winter it will bo easier than at present for the Russians to light _ a delaying campaign until a road is opened to the Black Sea and they can obtain the supplies essential lo their strength. The Italian campaign, the attack oil Turkey, possible de-' velopments in the Balkans, and economic pressure, are other actual and prospective factors with which Germany must reckon. But when all is said ifc is recognised as clearly in Entente countries as it seems to be in Germany the Western campaign is the main, campaign, and the one which must lie expected to decide the fate of the war.

From many doubts and uncertainties the fact stands out prominently that so far as the Entente Powers arc concerned the real turn-ing-point. in the war will nob be reached in aiiy other way than by some bold and successful initiative on the part of the Western Allies. Some experts have said, basing thoir contention on estimates of the wastage of the' war and the developing strength of the Entente, that the turning-point has already been reached and passed, and have taken the view that Germany is a weakening enemy faced by _ superior strength and organisation. . The contention may bo sound .enough, though only those have• a right to state it confidently who have a more intimate knowledge of the strength and organisation of Wie belligerent Powers than is accessible to tho layman, but only the test of battle can put the matter finally to the proof, and it is plain enough that the Western theatre is tho place in which the battle must bo fought. It is the greatest fact of the war today that the Western Allies have yet to manifest their strength, and the people in Germany who arc rejoicing over the fall of Warsaw as an earnest of final victory are in the most positive sense rejoicing before the event.

It would be lapsing into a similar folly to assume that action, early or otherwise, by the Western Allies is bound to transform the at present somewhat unsatisfactory aspect of tho war, but there are suggestive indications that they arc building up a greater power than the Germans have yet had to encounter. What is known about the recruiting and training of men in Britain, and the increased production of munitions in both Britain and Franco (quite apart from tho enormous contracts placed in America), very definitely supports such a conclusion. It gains support also from the fact that for some weeks past, wiiile Russia lias been lighting a long succcssion of desperate rearguard actions, the Western Allies have quite evidently been concentrating on preparations rather than on action.

For a long time the campaign of tha Western Allies represented a gradually rising tide of effort, resulting in cvcr-increasing pressure on tho enemy. Tho supreme tension of the early battles, in which the enemy invasion was eventually arrcstecl and turned back for a distance, must be considered as a phase apart. Tho deadlock of the winter campaign gave place to the Allied spring offensive, which took the form of a series of heavy blows delivered at various points on the enemy's line, and designed to wear down his strength and drive him back, at critical points, upon his lateral communications. This phase of the war culminated in the Anglo-French offensive in Northern France, which mado important inroads into the great field-fortress—it is nothing less—covering the network of German communications west and south of Lille. As to time, the opening of this powerful attack roughly coincided with General von Mackensen's attack at. tta end of April upon the Russians in Western Galicia, the first movement in the offensive which has now given the Germans possession of Warsaw, and is still some way from being arrested. It appeared for a time that the vigorous attack upon tho German line in Northern France was a-counter-stroke to the German offensive on the opposite front, or an clement in such a counter-stroke. It has since appeared that it was nothing of the kind. While the German Eastern offensive has steadily developed in scope, power, and cffcct, tho Western campaign has, to all appearance, subsided into a state of relative calm. Tho offensive in Northern France developed during some weeks as a successful local attack upon tho German communications. It followed a series of similar, though less important, attacks, but has not itself been followed by still more powerful efforts to locally shatter and weaken the German line. In the main the story of the Western •campaign teiuco tiho great conflict in Northern Franco subsided, has been one of , lessened effort by the Allies. The position has been varied at times by German attacks in tho Argonne and elsewhere, but the state of affairs described to-day, and for some time past, is that of desultory local actions, ficrce enough no doubt, but iiot comparable with earlier lighting in the West and the present grim struggle in Poland.

The break in the continuity of the policy of tho Western Allies is so marked as to suggest deliberate design even apart from what is known about their developing preparations and mounting strength. Without going- into details, which by this time arc familiar, it may be said that it is safe to dismiss as incredible the idea that tho Allies were prevented by weakness from developing that phase of the Avar of attrition which culminated in the offensive in Northern France. The only conceivable alternative seems to bo that they desisted in order to muster force for aggressive action on a greater scale. This does not imply any cold-blooded decision to leave the Russians to bear the brunt of the war while men and guns were being assembled in Franco and Flanders. It is very possible that no other course was open. Tho necessity of co-ordination between the Allies in the two main theatres of war has been often _ and rightly insisted upon, but ifc dees not follow that a German blow upon one front can always be countered by a corresponding blow against the Germans on the opposite front. The actual conditions of the war, owing in part to Germany's position, and the almost total isolation of Russia, are very much more complex. The .uosfc reasonable view to take is that tho Western Allies hnvo. not relieved .tho fircsgiu'o oo AUibsia Jjy, an imuic-

diate counter-stroke, because such a, policy would not have most effectively served the common interests for whioh the, Unientc Powers arc fighting. The question may arise why some great blow was not struck in France or Flanders which would have assisted the Russians to save Warsaw, but it is necessary to bear in mind that the loss of Warsaw and the Vistula line is not equivalent to a crowning disaster to the Russian armies.

The position existing to-day is that the Russians arc fighting a. great delaying campaign, with further losses of territory in prospect, but in no immediate danger of being decisively crushed. In Russia's interests as well as in their own, the Western Allies must strike for victory, not when their brave partner is harcl-prcssed, but at the moment when their power will make itself felt with most deadly effect upon tho enemy. Taking it for granted fcbat they are creating such an offensive power as the case demands, it is not straining the facts to say that the conditions that exist in Russia today, and are likely to exist for some time to come, aro not unfavourable to tli© Western offensive when it comes, making itself felt with maximum effect.

Events reported in the Eastern theatre appear in the main to be consistent with the opinion expressed by Colonel Repington (The Times military correspondent) that the Russians arc likely to reach their new line in safety. Along the Na-rew front desperate lighting continues, and the east bank of the Vistula, as far south as Warsaw, is still in Russian hands, but as regards the whole of this area, a number of railways running to the south and east afford a way of retreat. The retiring armies aro already many miles cast of the river at Ivaugorod, but the northward advance of the enemy in Southern Poland seems to be progressing very slowly. General von Buloav's forces in the Baltic Provinces have been defeated in an action south of Riga, and are reported to be held in check on the eastward advance whioh threatens the Petro-grad-Warsaw railway. Satisfactory as the news is in pointing to the successful continuation of the Russian retreat, it must be recognised that the movement is very far from being completed, and that mishaps are still possible. On the other hand the dogged valour with which the Russians are fighting their rearguard battles means that the enemy is paying the maximum price for caoh additional area invaded.

Little news from the Dardanelles is in hand at time of writing, but some very interesting references are niadc to the Balkan situation. It is to be expected that many thoughts in llussia will be turning to the campaign against the Turks. Dr. Dillon quotes one Russian correspondent as stating that the cooperation of Bulgaria would ensure the capture of Constantinople within a month. Just whore Bulgaria is to stand should soon be determined, for it is reported that an Entente reply to the Bulgarian Note of June has been delivered. Its contents are not revealed as yet, but an immediately' favourable outcome cannot be expected with absolute confklcnce, for some messages suggest that Greooe and Sei'via have made difficulties about conceding the Macedonian territory which Bulgaria cqvcts. In the ease of Greece, this difficulty should be smoothed away when M. Venizelos returns to power. .Difficulties raised by Servia might be less easy to overcome, but llussia should bo able to exert powerful influence upon the little country whose cause she is ohampioning in the war. In any case, the' possibilities of a direct attack upon Constantinople do not nc'cessarily hingo upon Bulgarian co-operation, though it would certainly simplify matters very greatly. * a * #

Reports of the Italian campaign point to the probability of the early fall of Gorizia, the fortress which has hitherto constituted the principal obstacle to an invasion of Istria-. The Italians are also shown to be briskly attacking lloveredo, in the Southern Trcntino.