PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2535, 9 August 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

The principal event in the Eastern campaign recorded to-day is _ the withdrawal of the Russians from Ivangorocl—a further step, and ono nf no little importance in I,lie retirement from the Vistula line—but much greater interest attache to tho auxrjtcsUons made as to the possible

development of the Austro-Gcrman invasion. For more than a month the enemy have been engaged in an attempt to encircle the Russian armies on the Vistula line by outflanking them on north and south. It is now highly probable that tho attempt has failed, but the suggestion is made—and apparently it is seriously entertained in Pctrograd—that tho enemy is about to embark upon the even greater enterprise of attempting to outflank the Russians upon the line to which they are retiring. In spite of tho apparently serious spirit in-which it is put forward this idea might on some grounds almost be dismissed as incredible- and impossible, but experience has shown that it is wise to suspend judgment where developments in tho Eastern campaign arc in question. The broad features of the situation as it stands may be readily grasped. The Russians are retiring upon the Nicmcn-Bug line, which runs north and south through Poland 120 miles east of Warsaw. Up to tho present it has been tho objeefc of the enoray to cut tho communications of the Russian armies before tbey could reach this line, and so destroy them. There is now comparatively little danger of any such disaster. Generally speaking, the Russian retreat is well advanced, and the jaws of tho Gorman pincers (to use a simile employed in some of the cablegrams) are something like 150, miles apart. Tho jaws in question aro the German armies attempting to strike south from the Narcw front (north ancl north-east of Warsaw) and the A.ustro-Gcrraan forces slowly advancing north through Southern Poland.

The new German plan, according to tho messages mentioned, is to envelop the Russian armies, after they have reached tho Niemen-Bug line, by a continuation of the present attack in Southern Poland, in conjunction with an advance from the Baltic Provinces, outflanking the Russian line on tho north. One reason against dismissing the prediction of a German enterprise of this character as fanciful is that the enemy will be well posted to inaugurate it when tho present Russian retreat has reached the Niemen-Bug line. With the retreat still far from being completed, the Russians are already being attacked on the line of the River Bug, in Southern Poland. In the Baltic Provinces also the enemy arc at present established in an area due north of the Nicmen at Kovno, so that a successful advance in this region would outflank the line upon which .the Russians arc retiring. If the distances in question were smaller, the position of the Russian armies— in view of the artillery inferiority which makes a definite stand against the enemy so difficult—would be one of extreme peril,, but it is the saving grace- of the situation that a point is being approached at which the Russians are bound to benefit largely by the sacrifices they have made so freely in their present retreat by resigning territory, laying it waste, and destroying means of communication. The Gorman enveloping movement directed against the Vistula line, which now seems to have failed, and has certainly failed in a considerable measure, was ambitious, but tho movement now predicted is conceived upon an even vaster scale, and would involve correspondingly greater difficulties. As a Petrograd message points out, it would necessitate the employment of a very large number of troops, and would bo liable to many mishaps. To that may be .added that while a continuation of the Austro-Gcrman offensive might very probably result in the successful invasion of additional la-rgc areas of Russian territory, it would bo rather less likely than the attack on the Vistula to attain the principal object for which the enemy is striving—that of cutting off and destroying the Russian armies.

•It is no doubt true that so long as the enemy retains his present advantage arising from a superiority in artillery and more amplo supplies of munitions, he will continue to defeat the Russians wherever and whenever he can contrivo to effcct and maintain a- concentration of troops and guns. This, however, affords no index as to the probable limits of the Austro-Gcrman invasion of Russia. The enemy superiority in artillery is only one out of a number of factors which definitely limit the possibilities of further invasion, though it is not possible to state the limits in so many words. One factor—perhaps the greatest of all—is the necessity of holding a sufficient force in reserve to maintain the conflict in the West against the rising power of the Allies in that theatre. This apart, the tactics to which the Russians have resorted in conducting their retreat in themselves afford a guarantee that it will not be of indefinite duration. The destruction of tho Vistula bridges (no doubt accompanied by a similar destruction of railways), the removal of all useful supplies and machinery, and the withdrawal oi a large proportion of the population, are so many definite obstacles opposed to the further progress of the Gorman armies. Much light is thrown in rcccnfc news upon what the Russians have accomplished iu this way. The German armies are essentially dependent upon heavy transport. In Poland to-day they, are advancing _ through areas iu which all for transport have as far as possible been eliminj a'tcd, and more than that, through I a country which has been laid wasto. i It is recorded that hundreds of thouj sands of villagers from tho region about Warsaw have cleserkd their ruined homes, and travelled east ! ahead of the retiring armies. Tho Gormans aro invading a country which affords them no more comforting sight than that of burning villages and devastated fields. « * * « It is not possible on the facts in hand to form any very definite opinion as to the importance of tho German attack which is developing in the Baltic provinces, but it constitutes an essential element in the tremendous enveloping movement which tho enemy is now said to bo meditating. Riga, tho anticipated startiug-point of the new attack, is about 140 miles north of ICovno, at the northern end of the Nicmen lino, and the German forces in tho intermediate area arc said t/ number 350,000. A couple of days ago it was reported that German forces, after penetrating to within ten miles of Riga, had been compelled to retreat abandoning large quantities' of munitions. It is now suggested that tho enemy may occupy Riga (which is being deserted by large numbers of its inhabitants), and from that point 'strike south-east along a branch line towards the Pctrograd-AVarsaw railway, 110 miles away, and so work in behind the Russian armies holding f.lio Nicmcn line. The weakness of tho Russian position is that the northern scct.ion of tho Niomon lino js liable to bo a,ttackd from both

north and south along railway routes ns well as from the East Prussian frontier, from which it is only forty miles distant. As yet, however, tho northern attack is not at a very advanced stage, and the Russians can do much to impede the use of tho southern section of the railway before they abandon it. * * » * The principal disability under which tho Germans in tho Baltic Provinces labour is that they are largely dependent upon sea communications which the submarines of the Allies have done much, to make insecure. An attempt to use Riga as a main base might in these circumstances yield anything but satisfactory results, and capturing that place the Germans woiiJd be hardly better off than at present., when the possession of Libau giws them a port which, like Riga, is connected by a branch lino with the main railway from Pctrograd. Up to the present tho slow progress of the Germans in the Baltic Provinces has lent colour to the iuea that tho insecurity of sea communications and the absence of a railway running north from East Prussia, is seriously hindering their operations. They aro apparently nowhere in tho an.a between Kovno and Riga-, than about 60 miles to the main Petrograd railway, and to-day's reports suggest that only their cavalry havo approached it so closely. Here, as in other parts oE tho fighting area, the Russians arc able to' delay tho advance of tho enemy by laying the country waste and blowing up the railways, and tho cavalry activities reported suggest that something of this kind has been done.

Assuming that tko Germans overcome local difficulties in the Baltic Provinces and begin an advance from Higa, they will be about 400 miles distant in that area from the point now reached in Southern Poland. Prospects of an enveloping movement being successfully carried out from these extremities arc not very serious, but it cannot be ignored that both Riga and the fortress of Kovno may be somewhat difficult to retain. The redeeming feature of the situation is that the security of the Russian armies, until such timo as improved equipment enables them to resume the offensive, will no longor depend upon fortress lines or upon a defensive barrier such as the Vistula afforded, but upon the existence of a tract of country in which the enemy will of necessity operate at an enormous disadvantage, magnified as his invasion extends. Even in face of the full fury of the enemy assault, the Russians have shown that they can bit back with deadly effect. Although it was an incident in a Russian retreat, the great night-attack which smashed General von Mackensen s phalanx in Southern Poland was a splendid feat of arms, and it may be accepted as proof that the Russians are well able to profit by the opportunities which arc being created by their own enterprise and sacrifices. Whetner or not it is found possible to retain-Kovno and Grodno, ' another' fortress further south, lying at about the same distance from the Prussian frontier, the in their retreat are creating conditions which must progressively minimise the disabilities under which they labour and enable their mobile troops to attack the slow-moving columns 'of tho enemy with greater and greater effect. # M # No very notable events are recorded at timo of writing in the Western'theatre, and the ruling impression remains that actual events afford no true indication of tho great developments that must be maturing. A graphic description of tho struggle for Hill 60 (near Yprcs) three months ago can no longer_ be classed as news, but is of absorbing interest. It tells vigorously, and in some detail, tho story of a battle in which British soldiers did not ultimately prevail, but which will nevertheless take a proud place in British military annals., All that men could do was done by tho soldiers who stormed and defended Hill 60, but at that timo no efficient method had been devised of neutralising the effect of poisonous gas, and it was to this foul weapon tr.a-t the, Germans owed their success. * * * * There is little news in hand of the Italian campaign, but a unit in tho airship squadron which has dono good service in raiding tho Austrian depots has been lost in tho Adriatic. The Italian airships arc much smaller and less powerful than the big German Zeppelins, but have shown themselves decidedly more enterprising in work of military value. No new development is reported at timo of writing at the Dardanelles, but the situation in the Balkans, which has a very dlose bearing upon the main campaign against the Turks, is satisfactory as far as it goes. It is hinted that the diplomatic representatives of tho Entente aro making some headway in their efforts to promote an understanding with .tho Balkan States, and the same idea is supported by the tone of German newspaper comments, directed principally against Rumania. Count von Heventlow is credited with an assertion that Rumania's embargo upon the passage of munitions to Turkey is less important now, as the latter country is able to make what is nccessary, but he is evidently intent only on making ElTo best of a bad job.