PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2534, 7 August 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Although events have visibly, been leading up to it for a week and more, the fal' of Warsaw may bo expected to occasion very real concern for our brave Allies. It is not pleasant that a year of war should end in e\. i a modified German triumph and tho loss of a great city of nearly a million inhabitants cannot from any point of view bo regarded as a matter of slight importance. But whatever the moral effect of the capture of Warsaw may be in belligerent and neutral countries its immediate military effect, though great, is of definitely limited value to the Germans. As a military event tho fall of Warsaw is a normal development in the retreat which tho Russian military authorities have invited the world to take as a matter of course for a week or two past. To take a retreat as a mattor of course does not convert it into a triumph or a victory, but it is only by taking the surrounding circumstances j.nto account that reliable conclusions can be formed as to the importance of tho fall of Warsaw. To the Germans it means tho mastery of the Vistula line, for the evacuation by the Russians of Novo Georgievsk on the north, and Ivangorod on the south, may bo expected to follow quickly upon the retirement from Warsaw. This in its turn means that the German eastern and south-eastern provinces are safe from attack until the Vistula lino has been won back again. But tho kernel of the situation is that the Germans have not wrested this advantage from beaten and demoralised _ enemies, but from unbroken armies which havo deliberately drawn back and contracted their operations in order that thoy may build up strength for a- new military effort. Tho loss of Warsaw is the greatest individual sacrifice that tho Russian nation has yet been called upon to make, but it has been made in strength and decision of purpose, and with unshaken fortitude. As Mr, Lloyd George has said, the Russian nation is bursting its fetters. Its enemies, even in their present victories, are hammering the sword that mil destroy them.

So far as the military developments of tho campaign in Eastern Europe aro concerned, the evacuation of Warsaw relieves instead of intensifying the tension of the situation. The loss of the city is an inevitable incident in tho process of contraction to which the Russians are compelled to resort until they havo obtained supplies of artillery and munitions adequate to a new aggression in their niain campaign. But even leaving aside the question of tho cost at which the Germans have won a modified triumph, it must be remembered always that their strategic purpose will not be achieved unless, instead of merely thrusting back tho Russian armies, for a distance, they pierce the retiring lines and convert tho retreat into a rout. The aim of the German offensive in the Eastern theatre, liko that of any other similar enterprise, is not merely to drive _ back the enemy but to destroy him, or at the least to render him incapable of further resistance. The fall of Warsaw has not brought the Germans perceptibly nearer-to attaining this object. On the contrary, so far as the immediate operations are concerned, it has made it less likely that it will be attained. A glanco at the map will show this to bo true.

Ignoring the operations in the Baltic Province for the time being, the Russians arc retiring from a line about thi'ee hundred miles long, curving forward into Poland to an approximately straight lino in rear. Tho lines lately occupied west. of Warsaw constituted the forward extremity of the bulging curve. The principal danger of the situation has not been that the Gormans might succeed in dealing a shattering blow at the Russian armies west of Warsaw.. These armies were insured against any such catastropho by. an open line of retreat. Tho danger has been, and still is' to ain extent, that tho Germans might succeed in working in behind tho retreating armies by striking at the flanks of the great salient from which they aro retiring and cutting across the main railways upon which tho Russians aro dependent for a safe retreat. This possibility still exists, but it is diminished now that Warsaw has been evacuated, and in its bearing upon tho retreat the abandonment of the city nfay be counted good instead of bad news. Clearly the likelihood of a successful German attack on either flank is diminished by every movement which carries the Russian centre back towards a straighter line. Considering the progress lately made by German attacks along the Narew, on the northern side of tho Russian salient, and in Southern Poland, along its southern side, the occupation of Warsaw, at the forward extremity of the salient, has been remarkably prolonged. The delay has no doubt been occasioned by the removal of warlike stores and other things useful to the enemy, and by arrangements to hinder and hamper his further advance.

The fall of Warsaw apart, messages in hand disclose no very marked change in the Eastern campaign. As yet only that section of tho Ivangorod fortifications standing on tho western Hide of (.ho Vistula bus bron

ing Ivangorod are threatened on both flanks, it is likely that ttio whole place.will soon be resigned to the enemy. Both at Warsaw and Ivangorocl the Russians have or had the option of destroying the bridges over the Vistula, and doubtless will have done so if it was necessary to safeguard their retreat. The sacrifice entailed would be great, but if the bridges are not blown up now by tho Russians, it is not unlikely that it may be done by the Germans when their time comes to retreat from the Vistula. It is still on the ilanks of the Russian retreat that critical developments must be looked for. At various points on the Na-rcw line, north of Warsaw, the Germans arc making some headway, and gradually gaining possession of the roads and railways (hero fairly numerous) which run in towards the PetrogradWarsaw main line. Now that they havo abandoned Warsaw, however, tho eastward retreat of the Russians may be expected to proceed apace, and once they are clear of the Warsaw neighbourhood and the area immediately to the north, the 'Na-rew lino in its turn • will, in ordinary courso, be resigned to the enemy. The Russians have lately found it necessary t<? evacuate a considerable area in 'Southern Poland, but as tho retreat dcvelopes, tho enemy advanco in a great part of this region will tend more and mor.e to assume tho character of a frontal instead of a flank attack. At some points east of tho Vistula the head of the enemy advance is sixty miles or more north of the Galician frontier, but the eastern section of the attack, which chiefly threatens tho Russian main communications, has made less progress. On this line of advanco tho enemy- have reached the town of Vladimir Volynski, about 18 miles north of tho Galician border, and thirty miles away from the nearest railway on tho north.

A late Pctrogracl messago states that the Russians retreated to the cast bank of the Vistula in good order, blowing up tho Warsaw bridges behind them. It was an act of splendid sacrifice, but no doubt necessary in order to check the enemy's advance. Ono message states that tho Germans are within ton miles of Riga, but an official report indicates that they subsequently retreated southward. They have made some further progress towards iho Petrograd-Warsaw railway, but their attack seems to be developing slowly, and unless it is materially expedited will not seriously threaten the Russian retreat. It is plain enough, however, that Riga is still menaced. # * *' * A Petroqrad denial that the War Office has issued an official Note of any kind regarding the desirability of an Allied offensive in tho AVest might, in other circumstances, have been open to a different reading, but as matters stand is no doubt intended as an honest and straightforward assurance of Russia's confidence in her Allies. The remarkable' contrast presented by recent events in the two main theatres has naturally occasioned some surprise in the public mind, but the Russian Government and military authorities are doubtless familial' with tho considerations governing tho policy of tho Western Allies, and may be expected to approve it. As nas been pointed out in these notes on a number of occasions, the Allkss are probably rendering much more useful service to Russia at the Dardanelles than could havo been rendered by any diversion on tho Western front. It is. not even certain yet that the Western Allies will seek to bring on a struggle for supremacy until the opening of tho Dardanelles has enabled Russia to obtain the equipment and supplies she so greatly needs. However that may be, the Allies in Franco and Flanders arc faced by tho prospect, or at all events the strong probability, of a renewed German offensive in the near future. The most obvious explanation of their own delay in attacking the enemy is that it pays them to delay, because they are continually developing ancl making available reserve resources of men and material, which are far from exhaustion, while Germany is working on vanishing reserves, and is approaching, if she has not passed, the zenith of her military strength. The same considerations furnish Germany with cogent reasons for forcing the contest in the West. She must fight for victory now or expect to fight stronger and better-prepared enemies later on. » * # # As an alternative policy Germany' might continue on the defensive in the Western theatre, press the invasion of Russia as far as possible, and perhaps attack Italy. The adoption of such a policy, however, would imply that sne had abandoned all hopo of a decisive victory in tho war, and was fighting merely for delay and an inconclusive peace. Costly as the Russian campaign has been, ib is likely that Germany has not yet roaoned this point, and that she will be still inclined to a policy of enterprise. Assuming so much, the expectation of an early German offensive in the West is strictly reasonable. She may bo expected to shortly extricate a. proportion of her Eastern armies, because the campaign against Russia need only bo continued on its present lines to make a serious attempt to master the Western Allies impossible. Making_ due allowance for her rccent losses in Poland, Germany is .probably incapable of massing as many as 3,000,000 men in any one theatre. To assume that she can oven approach this number is indeed to adopt an outside estimate of her remaining strength. The Western. Allies, on the other hand, should.be capablo of very greatly exceeding that number as soon as the new British Army is available. Unless the production of equipment and munitions has lagged behind, the training of men there should be a very' decided margin of superiority on the side of the Allies, but Germany is perhaps not likely to be deterred by that,fact from making another desperate bid for victory.

Events reported at the moment in the Western theafcro aro not of the first importance, but the prevailing conditions aro very far ; from approximating to stalemate! The position seems to be that tho Allies are generally standing on the defensive, and that the Germans are conducting a series of vigorous local attacks in which they have suffered heavy loss and nowhere gained advantage, except at one point, where they_ have dislodged tho French from portion of the trenches on a ridge in tne Vosges. Attacks in the valley of the Feoht (on the approach to Colmar, in Northern Alsacc), in Northern France, and in Flanders,, have been decisively repelled. The determination with which they were pressed may be gathered, however, from the statement that of 600 Bavarians who mado an attack on Ncuvitlo (ia Northern Franco)

The Germans, it is said, intend to turn their present success in the Eastern campaign to account by creating an autonomous kingdom of Poland (under joint HohcnzollcrnHapsburg suzerainty), including llussian Poland, Posen, and the greater part of Galieia, and with the Archduke Paul Stephen, a nephew of the Austrian Emperor, who has lived in Galieia, and is popular there, as its ruler. The scheme is less clumsy than many others of German manufacture, for an autonomous kingdom, restoring their ancient national boundaries, is a dream and aspiration for which tho Poles have striven and suffered. It is true also that the Poles of Galieia, under Austrian rule, have been better treated than their kinsfolk in llussian and in Prussian Poland. The German scheme nevertheless is likely to fall flat with tho oppressed nationality it is designed to placate. The Poles arc already promised autonomy by Russia, and they are wise enough to see that the Austrian Prince it is proposed to confer upon them as a ruler would be likely to be a mere catspaw and tool of German policy. Tho fate of tho war will decide the matter in any case, but even if perfect freedom of choice rested with the Poles they might choose Russian rather than German domination. Under Russian rule they have suffered bitterly in tho past, but Russia in recent years has shown herself a country capable of liberal reforms. Germany, on tho other hand, has mado her Poles the victims of a coldblooded policy (inaugurated by Bismarck), aiming at stamping out their nationality by proscribing thenlanguage and compulsorily expropriating their lands. Tho policy has signally failed, but the Pole? may be expected to regard very dubiously a promise of autonomy and freedom which rests upon a German guarantee;