PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2519, 21 July 1915, Page 6

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

The mystery in which the principal campaign of the war is enshrouded has never been more in evidence than in connection with the prevailing uncertainty as to the policy likely to be pursued by the Western Allies. in the near future. _ At the present moment tho impossibility of forming any definite opinion as to whether the war is likely to end this year, or to extend through another winter campaign and some distance beyond it, does not by any means measure the secrecy observed by the French and British military authorities. It is not only not known whether the war is likely to end'this year, it is not even known whether General Joffre, upon whom rests tho supremo responsibility of directing the Western campaign, has any idea of attempting to end it this year. All that is really known with a bearing on the question is that tho Allies havo very greatly augmented the forces with which they entered tho war, and that Germany has certainly • not been able to increase her force in anything like the same ratio, and may even have alreidy passed the zenith of her military strength. This, however, does not necessarily mean that tho Allies have, attained such a supremacy of strength as would make a great effort to crush Germany and end the war imminent. All that can bo said is' that they may be nearing a position of advantage that would justify' an effort of this character, and that nothing has yet been disclosed which would put tho possibility.. out of court.

Much depends upon the state of the British New _ Army—undoubtedly the greatest single factor yet to be thrown into the scale by the Western Allies. Somewhat conflicting accounts have been given of this force, and there are critics who maintain that it has not yet by any means reached the strength and efficiency which the circumstances demand. On the other hand, British official reports—conclusive as far as they go—have stated that a portion of the new Army has been subjected to tho practical test of war in France, and has satisfactorily answered tho test. If this is to be taken as typical of the state of preparation reached by a large proportion of the British levies enrolled in the early months of tho war, it would no doubt point to an early extension of Allied activities in the Western theatre. Such an extension of effort, however, would not necessarily be identified with an effort to end the war this year. While matters remain to some extent in suspense, available information goes to suggest that tho Germans are likely soon to be attacked in the West more heavilv than ever, and it is to be noted thai the. position in the Eastern campaign" is by no means unfavourable to the inception and development of new enterprises by tho Allies on the Western front. On visible evidence the Germans have won the whole of the ground they now hold from the Baltic Provinces to South-Eastern Poland by hard fighting. At the same time, when the Western Allies come to attempt any decisive stroke it will probably suit them at least as well that tho Eastern German armies should bo thrown far forward into Poland as that they should be in nearer touch with the strategic railways which gridiron Germany in every part of its area.

Reports from the Eastern theatre available at time of writing certainly afford no new causo lor alarm as to the position of the Russian armies covering Warsaw. A London message, which would carry more weight if invested with official authority, declares that ,the Russians arc confident of being able to hold tho Germans, both in tho area north of the Lower Vistula, where they lately had. to fall back from Prasnysz, and in South-Eastern Poland, where they are fighting on. a lino south of, and covering, the LublinCholni railway. The statement of a- Times correspondent who has traversed tho Russian front, that the "crux of tho situation" is the section of the front south-east of Lublin, is probably intended' to apply to the Galic-ian operations rather than to the Eastern campaign as a whole. So much is implied in his further .Ktiilomeufc lh»l dseisiva blow itn tfe resign o{,

Cholm would demoralise the Austrian between the Vistula and tho Dniester. This presumably means that a Russian victory over the south-eastern German army would imperil tho Austro-German occupation of Eastern Galieia. Viewing the campaign as a whole, however, the most critical area for the Russians is the region north and west of Warsaw, where tlig enemy has massed great forces, and given every indication of his intention to make another big effort to reach Warsaw by the most direct available route.

Official confirmation is supplied to-day of the Athens message which lately reported a successful Allied attack upon the Turkish positions on the Gallipoli Peninsula. As it is desoribcel in a dispatch from Sir lan Hamilton, the attack, though temporarily checked at one point, was successfully driven home, and resulted in a considerable gain of ground at the eastern end, and towards the other extremity of the Turkish southern line. Another step has thus been taken in tho flanking movoment which threatens the Turkish possession of Krithia, but that village has not yet been wrested from the enemy. * * * * The report that, "a refugee, from Pola states that two Austrian sub-' marines which wore reconnoitring on the Italian coast have not returned, and are believed to have been lost," is vague,' and may seem to deserve little attention. Thore is every reason to suppose, however, that in addition to submarines definitely accounted for, a constant proportion leave port and are not afterwards heard of. One of the two Australian submarines, it will bo remembered, was lost in this way. In tho days before y the war, when there werei fewer submarines in commission, and their cruises were less frequent and less extended than at present, and they had fewer dangers from mines and such things to encounter, a number of _ under-water oraft were lost from time to time by misadventure. It must bo supposed that similar losses have occurred in increased numbers since the war bega,ii, quite apart from the destruction of a considerable number of submarines by ramming and gunfire. It is, therefore, not at all unlikely that the story about the Austrian submarines is true.

The continued inaction of Greece after the triumphant vindication of the war party in the late election has been explained by M. Venizelos in an address to his party. Tho Government, beaten at the polls, is ignoring the popular mandate and sheltering behind the Crown's prerogatives. It is an ostrich polioy, which probably would have run a very brief career but for the serious illness of King Constantine, which has 'induced all parties to stay their hands. M. Venizelos has told his, followers that when the King 1 recovers he will clear up the situation. As a constitutional monarch, he is bound to do so, and since the Venizelists have a substantial majors ity in Parliament, tho only way to clear up'the situation is to summon that assembly, and so pave the way for a change of Government. Meantime, the decisive result of the late elections pretty thoroughly disoredits the rumours mentioned by M. Venizelos of an intended .coup d'etat-s~ an attempt to defeat the popular will by military force, and set up some sort of dictatorship. The illness of King Constantine, has not only delayed and hindered the ' normal trend of political developments in Greece, but must be regarded as distinctly unfortunate from the point of v-iew of the Entente. Greece is only more sympathetically inclined than any;_ other Balkan country, except Servia and Montenegro towards' the Entente, but may be expected, under the leadership of M. Venizelos, to exercise a very important influence in the direction of bringing tho whole of the Balkan States into a league designed to forward their more or less common interests by cooperation with the Entente. ■ * .* • •»

■ In its broad features- thei Balkan situation so obviously makes action on these lines desirable that it is strange that the desirability ha-s not been more widely recognised. Generally speaking, the distinction between the policy of the Entente and that of the Germanic Alliance, where the Balkans are concerned, as in matters of wider scope, is that the first points to the free and unfettered development of nationalities and tho latter to the stifling of nationalities. To this general truth there is hardly any exception. Italian and Servian ambitions are,- it is true, partly in confliot. where the eastern seaboard of the Adriatic is concerned, but a satisfactory arrangement between these two countries is quite within the bounds of possibility. Russian designs on Constantinople may be unpalatable to Bulgaria, but except in a very short-sighted view they cannot be more unpalatable than Austria's consistently piratical policy. For many years it has been the _ undisguised aim of. Austrian foreign policy to force a way to the Aegean; or failing that,- limit and stunt in every _ possible way tho growth of neighbouring Balkan States. The fear that the people of these States may liberate tneir own kindred living under Austrian misrule, and with them the territories they inhabit, has made Austria in her past dealings with tho Balkans a bully and a robber. On experience, which is more potent than any theories, the Balkan States must realise that a Germanic victory in this war would bo followed sooner or later by determined and unscrupulous efforts to extend the frontiers of the Dual Monarchy, or possibly of an enlarged German Empire, to tho Aegean Sea. Any other expectation must be based upon an unconvincing theory that a victorious Austria would exchange the morals of. tho wolf for those of the lamb.

Plainly, as . Austria has manifested her real sentiments towards her Balkan neighbours in the past, M. Venizelos seems to be almost the only Balkan statesman, outside of Scrvia, who has. capably grasped the position and laid down a policy calculated to defeat Austrian ambitions and safeguard the present standing and future prospects of the countries the Dual Monarch}; is anxious to absorb. In no parochial spirit he has formulated a series-of proposals which make generally for the consolidation of Balkan nationalities by territorial adjustments, and in part by exchanges of population. The idea governing his proposals is that tho little Balkan States should harmoniously settle their minor differences, and so become strong to resist the cncroachmcnts of their common enemy in tho north. Co-op-eration with the Entente is the natural complement to the policy which M. Vf.nizelos has laid down since it opens up to the whole of the fltvlknu iimiuti'ioe iimpscU of oxpan-

Turkey, scarcely to be otherwise obtained. .When M. Venizelos is in a position to agaiii take fch© open and promiment part in Balkan affairs from which he is at present excluded, he will have a cause to advocate which should recommend itself not to his own countrymen alone, but to the people of the other Balkan-States as well. It is true that there is competition between the Entente and the Germanic Alliance for tho co-op-eration of Balkan countries at present neutral, but while tho Entente offers them enlarged nationality and strength and freedom in the years to come, the other competitor is merely seeking their present help and favour in the hope of being able to destfoy them at leisure later on. An item of iutsrest in today's messages is the news that Prince Grouse ok Greece is paying a visit to the King or Italy'. Such an interview at such a time will no doubt be interpreted in different ways, but it suggests at least-that Greece is alive to possibilities. The Prince, it may be assumed, has gone at the instance of his father, King Constantine, and tho objcct of his'visit may safely bo taken to be to pave the way to an understanding in the case of certain ovcntualties. _ 'Greece and Italy have interests which may conflict, and Greece no doubt would-like to be certain- where she stands in respect of such matters in tho event of hor joining with the Entente Powers— also what' will happen if sho continues to stand out.

Austria would appear to be in a state 'of nerves regarding the attitude of Rumania. The Austro-Hun-garian Conference, under the Presidency of the Emperor, which we are now told has been deliberating as to whether to send Rumania an ultimatum- or a declaration of war, could hardly be expected to regard Rumania's attitude from- the same point of view as the Kaiser. Rumania. looks for expansion at 1 the expense of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a substantial slice of which is peopled with Rumanians. The Kaiser, as in the case of Italy, is prepared, to shed his ally's territory to avert complications, and desires to' placate Rumania at Austria's expense. He failed in the case of Italy, and itMooks as though he was bound to fail in, the case of Rumania. It will be noted that again to-day wo have evidence that Bulgaria, is the stumbling block to Rumania, participating in the war on the side of the Entente. Bulgaria' it is suggested by the Premier of Rumania, 'should be given Macedonia, • which naturally belongs to her. Macedonia is now held by Greece, as the result of the, late war against Turkey. M. Venizelos has shown a readiness to go a certain length to meet Bulgaria, but his suggestions in this direction diH not meet with the approval of his King. Still, with the success of M. Venizelos at tho recent elections, the matter cannot be considered as closed. ' Meanwhile it remains to bo seen whether the Kaiser can prevent Austria driving Rumania into the arms of the Entente. ,