PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2517, 19 July 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

. Some interesting information concerning Turkish resources is supplied by Mr. H. O. Woods ,in an article on the Dardanelles. campaign in the Fortnightly Review. One thing the Turks have not been ablo to do, ho states, is to provide an unlimited supply of ammunition for the great guns and the fieldpieces now engaged at the Dardanelles. Tho workshops of ' Constantinople, some of which are equipped with up-to-date machinery, can turn out a very considerable amount of small-arm , ammunition, and they can manufacture a limited amount 6f shell. But unless it has been installed recently (Mr. Wo.ods states) there is no plant for making projectiles for anything larger than six-incji guns. All the modern guns now employed in Turkey have been imported • from abroad, whioh probably means that Germany and Austria arc the only sources from which supplies and new parts can be obtained. Tho restrictions imposed upon the passage of Turkish military supplies through Rumania (which are the subject of further reports to-day) must thus be a very serious matter for the Turks, and should materially hasten an Allied victory at the Dardanelles. * * * »

Good news, if true, is contained in a report coming by way of Athens that the Russians have sunk a German submarine in tho Black; Sea. tJSI, tho boat mentioned, would from its number be a unit of the latest German programme, and capable of making- the voyage from the North Sea to Constantinople, but the report, of course, needs confirmation.

One reading of the waa.- situation as it stands ia that the Germans will launch ttfedr next great offensive, not in Flanders or in France, but in the Eastern theatre. In Petrogra'd the prospect of another German thrust at Wa-rsaw seems to be regarded very seriously, though not necessarily with alarm, and Colonel Repington (The Times' 3 military correspondent) is numbered amongst those ■ who subscribe to the view that the. enemy's Eastern armies are being rested and reinforced in preparation for. another forward move. Adding to these expressions of opinion what has been reported recently of German activities in North Poland, and concentration of troops in adjacent Prus-' eian territory, a considerable body of tangible evidence is afforded in support of the opinion that another attempt to drive the Russians beyond the Vistula at Warsaw, and bo compel a general retreat, is con- ' At the same time it would bo premature to assume that an enterprise of this character is likely to !e the main expression of German wa: poliey in the immediate future- Ir is as necessary as it ever was from the German standpoint that the Russians should be penned up east of the Vistula, but other and equally pressing necessities now demand attention. Unless the striking power of the Western Allies, and that of Italy, has been greatly over-estimated Germany will effect'the concentration implied in the Eastern tmatre at gravo risk that affairs in other war areas may meantime get completely out of hand. It is at least true that Germany can no louder mass her forces laaaiust the Russians KgjjraJin' %

belief that she can at worst hold her own upon, the other main front. She is menaced on 'the Western front as she has never been before, and in addition must pay constant heed to the Italian campaign and the attack upon the Dardanelles, each of them in its own way constituting a serious menace. No doubt her Eastern campaign is designed amongst other things to have an effect on the Balka-n States, and especially on Rumania and Bulgaria. A great stroko by the Western Allies on their present front or in concert with Italy, or final Turk-, ish defeat at the Dardanelles, may or may not be in near* prospect, but Germany must bo limited in her future activities against Russia by the' obvious possibility, of soaie such development occurring at any time.

But for the guarded tone of some vecent comments from Petrograd and elsewhere upon the situation in the Eastern theatre the prospect of another German thrust at Warsaw would not be particularly impressive or disconcerting. That such a thing should be again attempted might indeed be taken to imply, not that Germany was unfolding any new strategy, but that she was perforce restricting herself to the strategy ,she has pursued sinco the war began without reaching any.' decisive advantage. The note' of caution and reserve in some of the lata messages from' Petrograd may mean that nearly three months of furious fighting in Galicia 'and Southern Poland have imposed a more serious drain upon Russian resources in. the way ox war materials and munitions than is commonly supposed/ and that a scarcity of supplies is being severely felt. Short of any handicap of this kind tho armies of tho Tsak should enter the phase of the conflict now opening with good' prospects, even apart from the strong likelihood that a diversion in their favour may be effected by, the Western Allies before the contest in Poland has reached a crucial point. An ordered German offensive is not to be regarded with indifference at' any time, but tho Russians have several ; times beaten back German attacks ou the lines liow threatened, and under circumstances to all appearanco muelv more fav'ourable_ to. tho enemy than those now existing. Broadly speaking, the development threatened is a German advance on Warsaw from Northern Poland (where tho Russians have lately lost some ground on.tho outer lines of the NiemenNarow front) in conjunction with a further advance in Southern Poland by General von Mackensen's armies, which have invaded that territory from Eastern Galicia..

The advance on Warsaw from the north was attempted by the Germans, and proved abortive, when the Russians were last expelled from Ea-st Prussia. Owing to the marshy and broken' nature of the country or ■ for other reasons the German offensive on that occasion was more easily, stemmed by the Russians than the earlier attempt to reach Warsaw by the direct approach -from the west. Assuming that supplies of men and material are adequate, the ability of the Russians to 'resist an advance ton Warsaw from the north or north-west should be little affected by tho changed position in Galicia and Southern Poland. It is true that the gjreat AustroGcrman drive in Galicia compelled the Russians to fall )3ack towards the Vistula in Southern Poland, and that the enemy now hold .some twenty miles of that river where it runs ; north from the . Galician frontier. But the enemy in this region are still something like a hundred miles away from Warsaw with no immediate prospect of adding to their local advantage. General von Mackensen is operating much further to the east, with the lately-defeated Austrian army holding the wide belt of territory between his own left flank and the Vistula. On his immediate front he is faced by the problem of crossing a fifty-mile tract of country (between tho northern frontier of Galicia and the southernmost Russian railways), in which' railways are non-existent and roads few and bad. Obviously General von Mackensen's line of advance has been selected, not from tho standpoint of most effectively striking at the Russians, but with an eye to' the retention of his late conquests in Galicia. Having won back the greater part of Galioia, the Germans are now under the necessity of holding it to the limits of their advance, and it is undoubtedly for this reason that General von Mackensen is preparing to again attack the Russians at th© end of long-lines of communication and through the difficult country of Southern Poland far to the east of tho Vistula, instead of selecting a- more convenient route along the Vistula itself and through tho territory, on its western bank.

While the south-eastern German army is thus at an undoubted disadvantage so far as a further offensive is concerned, the Eussians arc practically everywhere in a position which lends itself to a. sound defence. The German invasion of the Baltic Provinces has not yet been shown to 'have any vi'tal bearing on the main campaign—although today's news suggests a, further advance—and for tho rest the Eussians north, west, and south of Warsaw (the armies extended right across Southern Poland .included) are arrayed along, or in advance of, the great railway system in which Warsaw is the principal western junction. The_ Eussians are everywhere in touch with their, bases of supply, they appear to have a -distinct advantage in Southern' Poland, and they havo more than ,onco weathered as dangerous storms as that now said to bo gathering north of Warsaw. . * * . *j ( ■* >. A very interesting item of information as to the strength of the Western Allies was supplied the other day by Lokd Lansdoavne when' ho said that there were 22 or 23 British divisions in the European theatre at the present time. This means a strength of a little over '100,000 men. The total possibly does not include Canadian and Indian troops, but even so, it cannot bo regarded as coming an v where _ near the total strength of the available British armies. It must be assumed that in addition to the forces now in the field in the main European theatre and elsewhere Britain is holding very much larger forces in reserve and at disposal. If any of tho men recruited and trained since tho war began arc included in the total mentioned by Lokd Lansdowne it must be a very small proportion of their total number.

The. assumption that the Western Allies hold ;i considerable reserve of strength which they have not yet thrown into the field and the possibility thus opened up of some new und lmnortimt move being made supplies" the basis for the

which has lately surrounded the. Western campaign, but tho situation remains to an extent obscure. It is plain enough that the expectation of a big reinforcement of tne Allies or of some new enterprise on their part provides Germany with a strong incentive to forestall their purpose, but if any such move is ■intended by Germany it has not yet developed, and it seems hardly consistent with predicted developments on the opposite front. It is conceivable, of course, that the Allies may simply develop and expand their- past strategy, in the Western campaign; that they may continue the war of attrition by vising increased forces in constantly attacking the Germans at various points 01 the line looking, as they have done in ,the past, to a gradually improving relative position. But it has to be remembered that the past conditions of tho war of attrition were set, not by tSe deliberate ohoico of the Allies, but by hard necessity, at a tinie when they, were heavily outweighted, and had difficulty in holding their own. The position as regards the relative strength of the contending armies is now reversed,'and it may be expected (in spite, of current suggestions that the Germans are concentrating attention upon the Eastern theatre) that the result will shortly be seen in the adoption by the Western Allies of a policy of vigorous enterprise and aggression, or an attempt by the Germans to. anticipate such a policy.

An Amsterdam message 'depicts the German authorities in a state of alarm on account of the spread of an anti-war movement. ' It is suggested that tho Socialists are at the bottom of the trouble at present,, and one of t-heir methods is to cir : eulate literature of a class likely to undermine the efforts of the militarists to keep tho nation up to a proper spurt of warlike ardour. There has been a growing movement amongst the Socialists, who are very strong in Germany, to curb the ambitions of the War Party and encourage tho idea of an honourable peace; but even amongst tho Socialists themselves the majority up, to the present have considered the nation too. deeply, committed to now withdraw from the course embarked on. There is, however, a factor whioh will greatly assist the Socialists' peace uioveinont, and that is the class of man ,who is now being drafted in to till the huge gaps in the German armies. The enormous toll levied by the war has thinned the ranks of the trained soldiers so deeply, imbued with the militarist spirit and their places are being taken 'by the ordinary every-day citizen, who is being wrenched away from his home and his business, and forced to face all the horrors of war. Ho is not a fighting man in the sense that the original. German army men were. • Ho is not swept away with the glamour of war. He does not love fighting for fighting's sake. He is able to think for himself: he will see for himself. It may be that he will see the hopelessness of prolonging the struggle. How he.will_.act in such circumstances is quite another matter, but given _ a _ rallying ( point—a peace organisation for instance—and tho German authorities might bo faced with a very dangerous situation. The precautions now being taken, however, indicate that the authorities are aware of this risk, and are as. fas a3 possible taking steps to remove it.

Mr. Churchill has been explaining things to the people of Holland through a Dutch newspaper interviewer. Seemingly, he has laid himself • out. to show that had the Entente Powers been breakers of treaties and agreements they could have held Antwerp and a bigger slice of Belgium than has been held. To do this, however, would' have necessitated the use of the River Scheldt to Secure communication with Antwerp from: the North Sea, which probably would have' embroiled Holland in the struggle. Mr. Churchill apparently has seized an -opportunity to impress Holland with a proper sense of the friendliness of Britain and France towards her, and also to convey to the Dutch people the - danger they run should - Germany emerge successful from the struggle. No doubt the Dutch are fully alive to these facts an'd possibilities. Why, then, should Mr. Churchill be dwolling on them just now. Does it mean that the Germans, who now hold Antwerp, are seeking to use the Scheldt as part of their plan to strike at England? The Dutch should they grant such permission would declare themselves on the side of Germany, and they are hardly likely to do this. But what if Germany ignored Dutoh rights and, as in the case of Belgium, found justification in necessity and the law of Might? Then the Dutch no doubt would fight. The statements of Mr. Churchill' suggest both a hint and a promise. Tlicy hint at German pressure on Holland, and'they suggest a promise of friendship and support against German aggression.