PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2498, 26 June 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

As might be expected in the state of affairs created by the expulsion of the Russians from Lemberg, not very much news is available at the moment from Galicia. One of the few items in hand at time of writing is rather confusing than otherwise. A German communique states tha.t General von Lissingen has crossed the Dniester between Halicz and Zar&vno, that is to say, south and a little east of Lemberg, and is engaged in a violent battle. This in all likelihood is delayed news. There is no reason to suppose that tho Russians arc still located as far westward on tho _ Dniester as the I German message indicates. If they were, their forces in this region would bo not merely exposed to simultaneous attack from north and south, but would be in imminent danger of being surrounded. It is probable that tho Russians have withdrawn their forces towards their own frontier, both north and east of Lemberg, and that their recently reported victory over the Austrians on the Dniester was in itself a prelude to a retreat to the eastern end of tho province. * * * » The relation between operations in Galicia and /on tho Italian frontier is emphasised in a message from Rome. The defeat of the Russians iu Galicia has not lessened the burdens of the German Eastern armies. Thev must maintain the pressure which has driven the Russians out of Galicia or expect a counterstroke which would tend to undo what they have accomplished. But the burdens of the Ausfcriaus, as matters now stand, have been very greatly lightened. Not long ago they were fighting on a long front in Western Galicia, along a great part of the Carpathians Range, and iu Bukowina. Their front has now been very greatly shortened, and unless they are called upon by Germany to largely man the battle-line in Southern Poland and other parts of the Eastern theatre, they should be able to transfer considerable forces from Galicia to act against Italy. This no doubt was one object of the Galician offensive, though its main purpose was to roll back the tide of invasion menacing Hungary. On the past showing of the Austrians, Germany is not likelv to depend upon them to maintain any vital section of the Eastern line, though she may draw upon them largely as auxiliaries to supplement her own troops. Probably Austria will now be in a position to very largely augment her armies opposed to Italy. Tho Rome message mentioned makes the general statement that the Austrians, forced, assumed the offensive on the whole front and were everywhere repulsed with heavy losses. The reinforcements no doubt came from Galicia.

As it stands, this message points to a radically altered position along the Austro-Italian frontiers. Always hitherto, reports from Rome have indicated that the initiative was with the Italians. With matters in this state the Italians have made important headway, both in the Trcntino and on the approach to Istria. It is something • new to hear of the Austrians taking the offensive, and it is rather soon to attempt to measure the probable eifects of the new development. If the Italians have not exaggerated the extent of their success, they are much less exposed to the danger of an Austrian iuvasion from the Trentino than they were when hostilities opened, but the adoption of an aggressive policy by _ largely-increased Austrian forces might very materially alter the aspect of the war. With matters taking this turn double interest attaches to the attitude of Germany towards Italy. This is still more or less clouded in mystery. Apart from somewhat vague references in early Italian messages no evidence has been afforded that German troops are acting against Italy, but it is impossible to believe that Germany will withhold her aid' in this campaign unless for the reason that her energies are wholly absorbed in other theatres of war. Ifc was reported on apparently sound authority that Prince von Bulow, prior to the rupture with Italv, intimated that Germany would feel it incumbent to actively support her ally against the latter country in the event of war, and the report that Germany had declared war on Italy followed in natural sequence, In her last publicly-reported communication to Italy, Germany apparently asserted the status of a neutral, but this was probably a mere blind. The situation is rich in possibilities. It is not to be assumed that the effect of the increased strength which Austria is able to bring to bear has yet been put to any serious test, or even that this increased strength has been exerted. At the same time, the well-appointed Italian armies, if they have to deal with Austria alone, shculd be able to copo with all the troops that can be spared from the operations in the north. If Germany sends any considerable force into the Trentino the position will necessarily become more critical. The latest reports so far received indicate that the Italians are still improving their position both in north and east. * * * * The action of the Russians in burning the petroleum refineries at Len;berg_ rather suggests that they ha« no immediate expectation of renewing the offensive in Galicia. In any case, it will materially reduce the vahi' of the reconqucst which the Aust'i-Germans have effected for petroleum is one of the commodities oE which they stand in great need, and in which their supplies are reported to be short of requirements. 'Iliero are wolls at Lemberg (as in utlier purls Gaiicia and in Bukov/ina), but the destruction of the leiineiics will seriously hamper the utilisation (f their product. For a time at least, it" will have to be transported to refineries elsewhere instead of beniir available on the spot as an ai.i to transport and for the other ' pin |ms::. : which if is applied in as fuel for aircraft. * ' * * * Nnws from the Western theatre discloses no strikingly new developNorth of Arras a ''relative calm,"' still amounting (o a verv IV.vtv. RMnttii!). itn i-UwM., is eepm'M. , iu Alsace and aiwhwe fcks ranch

have made some headway, and enemy counter-attacks seem nowhere to have achieved their purpose. Late accounts of the recent heavy lighting on the southern line in the Gallipoli Peninsula shows that the Fronch, by their successful assault, have gained a position commanding the head of the ravine whicn oilers a formidable obstacle to progress on the right of the line. This should exert an important influence upon future operations. Predictions are again current of early Greek intervention. The Speaker of the Greek House is credited with a statement that when the time comes a million Greek bayonets will reinforce the Allies at the Dardanelles. This, to say the least, involves a somewhat ambitious estimate of Greek military resources. A satisfactory assurance is given in a Melbourne message. The Australian Defence Department has obtained from Headquarters in Gallipoli a statement that it is unaware of any authentic cases of Turkish atrocities. This may be taken as a denial of some unpleasant stones that have lately been cabled. * * * * Late references in tho cablegrams to the subject of cotton indicate that tho Imperial Government has receded from its intention of declaring this commodity contraband. Lord Robert Cecil stated the other day that the Government desired to stop cotton reaching Germany, but had to consider the rights of neutrals—it did not believe that the declaration of cotton as contraband would be of assistance. News published to-day shows that the Government has already paid nearly half a million sterling to American claimants alone in respcct of cotton. Considering that cotton reaching Germany is really so much gunpowder (to use a convenient expression), and that the right of a belligerent to block the passage of essential munitions of war to an enemy is fully recognised in international law, the British Ministerial attitude shows traces of weakness. The Imperial Government is bound in any case to as far as possible block the passage of cotton to Germany, paying compensation to the owners where necessary. Placing cotton on the contraband list would enable it to exorcise a more rigorous and effective eonti'ol over the traffic and it would undoubtedly be well within its recognised rights in doing so. During the present slack season, when little cotton is in transit, the burden of paying compensation is not heavy. It will become much heavier _ when tho new season's supply is exported from America, towards the end of the year. Declaring cotton contraband might not very greatly lighten the burden, but it would at least enable Britain .to get better value for its money by more effectively blocking German supplies. The attitude of the British Government is presumably based upon a desire to avoid controversy with America, but since the penal aspects of contraband regulation would only apply to fraudulent transactions, apprehensions of trouble with America seem in tho light of available information rather far-fetched. * * * *

Here Dernberg, who lately set sail from New l'ork with his cabinsuite converted by American admirers into a bower of roses, has been captured by the British on the high seas. It is stated that tho event has created a sensation in the United States. Why it should do so is not quite clear. Certainly Herr Dernberg did not purchase immunity by the misehief-piaking activities in America, in which he was associated with Count Beiinstorff and others. He had tho impudence, before setting sail, to apply for a safeconduct, but naturally it was not granted. The only regrettable fact about the matter is that he is likely to be infinitely better treated in durance than the unfortunate British soldiers and sailors held as prisoners of war in Germany. For the vile treatment of these prisoners men of standing in Germany like Herr Dernberg are directly responsible. Reprisals taking the form of equal treatment, upon Herr Dernberg and any others of his class who happen to be caught, might exert a salutary influence. * *• * ft The latest achievement of a German submarine is the sinking of seven fishing boats off the coast of Shetland.- A proportion of tho crews, happily, were saved. The continued vendetta against the smallest and humblest craft that ply in the coastal waters of the British Isles is a strange feature of the submarine campaign, which deserves more than passing attention. Although it is not to be denied that the slaughter of non-combatants for its own sake is one phase of the madness that has settled upon the German nation, mere love of wanton murder and destruction will not wholly account for the frequency of submarine attacks on fishing craft. These attacks speak not only of ferocity, but of timidity. At all times there is any amount of nobler game afoot. Apart from warships, practically as many merchant ships as ever are constantly passing through the seas around Great Britain, bound to and from British ports. In itself the employment of a submarine—a craft capable if well-handled of sending a battleship to the bottom—in the destruction of fishing boats, is an anomaly calling for explanation. Possibly the explanation is that Germany is anxious to train submarine officers and men and counts it more important meantime to do this than to make full use of her flotillas in attacking tho enemy. Aleo, no doubt, it is a.n attack on Britain's food supplies, and on a class of vessel very useful for mine-sweeping purposes.

All that has been accomplished in tho destruction of shipping uuring the last month or two is a poor return for the expenditure that Germany has made on submarines. Probably during this period she has ha'l forty oj; fifty submarines completed (perhaps not in commission). One boat sank the Lusitania, another voyaged to tho Dardanelles and sank two British battleships. Everything else that has been accomplished by the German submarines during thelast two months is relatively trifling from the standpoint of materia! damage. Evidently Germany possesses a number—a very limited number—of enterprising .submarine commanders, but a moro striking feature of the situation as it stands is that she is holding the greater (.art of her submarine force in reserve, and not risking it in attack. The only alternative is to suppose that the anti-submarine (actios af tin? Allies, not only as regards warship?, but also as regards the protection of merchant shipping, have been brought to such a point of efficiency tha.(, only half a dozen ior so out of a flotilla of about fifty b.«vc. i) sihle to acnom* I filiali anything at all .duritur a

period of nearly tw 0 months. Consoling as it would bo to adopt this opinion, it will be wise to set it aside until it has been definitely established. in the light of what some German submarines hava accomplished, .it is likely thai, the gieati majority have accomplished Uttlc because thov hare atUnpu'd little. It 1S not, to be imaged, ct course, that Gernuny is dcliljmlelv abstaining from destroying shii's which her submarines con 1:1 oasil v send to the bottom. But it is reasonable to suppose that she lias slackened meantime in her attacks on warships and surface'craft because she could continue them only at the cost of impairing the ultimate olliciency of her submarine flotillas It was observed in the opening months of the so-called blockade that a number of the German submarines carried unusually numerous crews. From this it was assumed mat oflicers and men additional to the ordinary complements were being carried for purposes of training. The results of this method of training must have been unsatisfactory. By this time twenty or more German submarines have been sunk, some of them by warships and others by merchant craft. Attempting to train uicn and officers in war serVice, Germany was thus likely to make little headway or none at all m building up her submarine personnel. *** . * It is a reasonable inference from the visible facts that leas risky training methods have now been adopted, and in this connection nothing is more suggestive than the repeated attacks on fishing boats. Mere cruising practice, together with a studied avoidance of all risks, is not calculated to bring out the qualities of skill and judgment required in capable submarine officers and men, but attacks on fishing boats and _ trawlers provide a sort of safe middle course. These craft have to be stalked with a certain amount of skill, but as a rule they are not likely to hit back and it is quite possible that German submarines are attacking them' largely for purposes of practice and training By deeds like the destruction of these fishing boats Germany adds to her overflowing infamy, but it is much more important that her present tactics suggest a determination to prepare for some greater submarine enterprise than she has yet attempted. With flotillas which probably aggregate now something like fifty boats, and with additions in prospcct, she no doubt hopes to presently strike a great blow at the British Fleet. If during the present period of comparative inactivshe is building up a forcc of trained officers and men, the hope is no doubt growing stronger. As times goes on it becomes - more and more evident that Germany's submarines must bo regarded as the most dangerous section of her fleet. Anti-submarine tactics have certainly made great headway since the war began, but the striking power of the submarine has not yet been put to any conclusive test. "