PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2491, 18 June 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

News from the Western theatre tells of no brilliant achievement, but affords reasonable ground for satisfaction. The Germans admit that tlicy have been clviveu back by the British near Ypres, but report also the "complete collapse" of a British attack north of La Biissee. British official reports show that what occurred in the latter action was that the German' front-line trendies on a front of a .mile'were captured, but subsequently evacuated during the night. Near Ypres a similar extent of ground was captured and retained. Meantime the French arc still battering their wr,v into the enemy front and have now up the; in l'MimtfefF, •iear Dlxmude i» Alwe.. Ihe

situation retains its normal features: a continual stir of attack on the part of the Allies to which the Germans in the main are able to make no effective reply. Their greatest, reported success, near La Bassee, amounted to_ nothing more than recovering their own ground from which they, had been temporarily displaced. No undue significance need be attacked to the fact that tho "British opposite La Bassec aro practically stationary for the time 'being, and are making no swell progress into tli2 enemy's line as are the French further' south. It has long been evident that the British positions in Northern France front one of the strongest sections of the enemy's line—a section hardly to be pierced by direct assault. The British in this region are none the less playing their part in wearing down the strength of the defending forces, as the nature of the latest assault north of La Bassee, one of many Isimilar enterprises, bears witness. _ The position and work of the British forces _in Northern France must be considered in the light- of the fact that progress in the Western campaign is to be measured, not merely by yards of forward movement, but by the progressive depletion of tho enemy's resources in men and material.

Despite General von Mackensex's reported boast, that he expects to reach Leniberg by July ], the fate of that city is "hot yet a foregone conclusion. E.rom the reports it is clear, however, that the Russians arc being pressed very hard along the line of _ the San, west of Leniberg, and their turning movement in Northern Galicia, striking at the German flank, seems to have faded out without achieving its purpose. On the south along the Dniester, the Russians appear to have rolled back the enemy at some points, but Russian and German reports equally show that tho Germane are bearing down opposition on the western approach to Leniberg and from their point of view it is the best and most convenient approach. To this extent the situation in Galicia is disquieting, but the general position in the Eastern theatre affords no particular ground for alarm. It is more easy to believe that General von Mackensen will capture Leniberg than that he will bo able to turn, his conquest to particularly useful account in reducing the scope and effect of future Russian operations. * * * *

The report that Ilussia and Rumania have concluded a tentative agreement which has overcome obstacles to the latter country entering the ivar might easily have come by a more direct route _ than thrpugh the Montenegrin Minister at Rome, and would have been more convincing if it had. At the same time it need not on that account be sot aside. One suggestive piece of evidence that .Rumania is likely to make war on Austria is to be found in her reported stoppage of military supplies intended for Turkey. Similar action by Italy (pripr to her declaration of war), in stopping supplies destined for Germany andAustria, was used as _ an argument by those who maintained that sho would throw in her lot with the Entente. As the event proved the argument and . the inference were just. * * * * A Rome message professes to throw some light upon the Austrian plan in the eastern campaign, in which the Italians are developing an invasion of Istriit. The plan, it is said, is to hold only the northern section of the Isonzo River, leaving a space of a dozen, miles or more north from the Adriatic open to tho passage of the Italians. The hope that the latter would fear to advance leaving their flank exposed to an attack from the north seems to have been disappointed by their niovemont round the shores of the Gulf of Trieste which has already carried them miles beyond the southern reach of the Isonzo River. . The Austrian plan in any ease is marked by weakness, not only in the eastern campaign, but in the operations against Italy as a whole. Assuming that they had the necessary strength at command it was obviously in their interests to strike south from tho Trentino, while the mountain strongholds of its frontier were still intact in their possession. Their 'failure to do so is plain evidence that they lacked the strength and confidence to invade Italy. It is still conceivable that the Italian armies may sustain a chcck at some point of their advance, but it cannot bo doubted that the whole situation has altered for the worse from the Austrian point of view. The foothold gained by the Italians in the passes of the Trentino and in the Alps further east is a military asset of the highest value. The capture of Monfalcone also is a positive Italian gain which has cost the Austrians amongst other things two cruisers and a merchant steamer under construction. It cannot be supposed that the Austrians have given ground in the mountains of the northern frontier and sustained these losses in the eastern campaign for any other reason than that they were too weak to hold the Italians in chock. * # * * An announcement that Great Britain is considering the question of declaring cotton contraband is in some respects extraordinary. In this war, cotton—an important ingredient in practically all the explosives used—is essential to German military efficiency as it is to that of all the other Powers engaged. So far as is known no satisfactory substituto exists for raw cotton, in the manufacture of explosives. Wood pulp and made-up cotton have been considered as substitutes, but it is stated that they are out of the question. The place that raw cotton occupies as a war material is sufficiently emphasised in the cabled statement that Germany and Austria are estimated to bo firing away five thousand bales I of cotton daily—something over one thousand tons. Considering that tho end of her cotton supplies will practically mean the end of Germany's fighting power (unless her chemists solvo the problem of finding a practicable and satisfactory substitute) Britain has been amazingly lax in stopping supplies. In some details tho position is obscure, but the one big fact that enormous supplies of cotton have- been allowed to pour into Germany since the war began is uncontested. Instead of using her sea- power to block German imports j of cotton from the beginning of tho war Britain for a long time allowed it to pass freely into neutral countries which were merely a step-ping-stone on the road to Germany. ! It will hi'- lemetnbcrcd that not. so . very long «go British agents were industriously searching .American ijliips for-coppcr concealed in cottonbale. Tile cotton itself—certainly not less important as <1 war material— wne■nllotferl to pifis unnhalletmoil, .lie £ull of block-;

ade promised in the proposal to declare cotton contraband has _ been reached by gradual steps. It is not even certain that supplies of Indian and Egyptian cotton were prevented from reaching Germany (by way of neutral countries) until a month or two ago, and according to the Vaily Mail, shipments of American cotton are still passing into Sweden, Holland, and Denmark, which are intended eventually to reach Germany. * * * * Prospects of a complete blockade of German cotton supplies were opened up by the British Order-in-Council of March 11, which declared practically that, subject to certain reservations, s all trade to and from Germany, directly or indirectly, would come within the scope of the British blockade. Evidently, however, the reservations are more sweeping than the general tenor of the Orcier-in-Counou indicated and the mere fact that the question of placing cotton on the list of contrar band is being considered is an implied confession that more drastic measures are required and that some cotton is still passing into Germany by way of neutral countries. The ordinary penalty for carriage of contraband, according to Sir F. E. Smith, is confiscation of the cargo, but on occasion pre-emption at a fair valuation takes the place of confiscation. The modern rule is tliat the ship generally is not liable to condemnation for carrying contraband, but the rule may be varied if tho ship carries false papers,, or is owned by the owner of the cargo. * * * * Some interesting observations on the subject of cotton were made by Mr. Hilairf, Belloc, in Land and Water, a.couple of months ago. He estimated that German cotton reserves for military purposes at that time (Austria was supposed to have none) amouned to 125,000 tons, and that the amount might be raised to 200,000 tons by seizing all supplies set aside for textile industries and so bringing these industries to a standstill. At a rate of military consumption then estimated by Mr. Belloc at from 750 to 1000 tons a day, Germany had supplies in hand capable of meeting her own demands and those of her allies'for about four months. Making a liberal allowance .for-possible miscalculations, Mr. Belloc names nine months a-s an outside estimate. This, however, is of'little importance. The main fact is that Germany is working upon a limited reserve stock of raw cotton, and that it is a vital matter that she should be prevented from replenishing it. Possibly she has increased her reserve stock during the last two months, but on the other hand the expenditure of ammunition, and therefore of cotton, by the Germanic allies is certainly increasing. The cablegram of yesterday, which has been quoted, suggests an increase in the daily expenditure to 1100 tons per. day, This is by no means improbable in face of the costly_ assaults upon the Russians in Galicia and the furious cannonading with which the Germans have endeavoured to bear back tho. Allied offensive in France and Flanders.

To declare _ cotton contraband might bring Britain into controversy with America, the exporting country chiefly concerned, but it should not be very difficult to arrive at a satisfactory arrangement. It is mentioned to-day that Manchester has offered to negotiate for the purchase of the whole American crop. On this aspcct of the question Mr. Belloc remarked: "Tho cotton we buy at the present moment in open market for British use we get to-day for just under sixpence the pound. Germany in her need is willing to pay, I believe, just about double this. Had_ we adopted the policy of preventing this reserve of ammunition from growing up in Germany (and if we had the war might well be over now) we could have paid for the total of her present reserve with a sum of somewhat, more than £10,000,000." Even at the rate Germany is prepared to pay, ho adds, twenty would have compensated the American exporter. Compensation on the latter basis would have cost Britain less than a week of war. It is an important factor that little cotton is at present, in transit. It is with the winter that the new supplies will come in. The immediate imposition of a rigorous cotton- blockade would therefore be comparatively easy, and time is available in which to make arrangements for the disposal of the new crop and tlie compensation of the growers. Conducting as she is an enormous trade in munitions with the Entente Powers, America should be prepared to meet them on reasonable terms where cotton is concerned, but in any case Germany's ability to obtain further supplies of cotton is so vital to her continued prosecution of the war that a blockade of these supplies ought obviously to be achieved at all costs. One o"f the questions that will call for a reply when the war is over is why Germany has been permitted to build up her stocks of cotton during many months of war. « * * * _ One of the most humorous productions of the war is the German communique which declares that the population- of Karlsruhe is embittered at "the senseless procedure" of the French air squadron which bombarded that place a day or two ago. On the same principle a murderer might submit a pious protest if he were shot or stabbed by one of his intended victims. There is no need to go very critically into the Question as to whether the French raid constituted a purely military attack. The airmen seem to have attacked a military objective—an arms factory and other places of more or less military importance—and to have incidentally tilled a number of civilians. Their expedition was thus very different in character from the Zeppelin attacks on French and British towns which can only bo described as acts of indiscriminate murder. But even if the Karlsruhe raid had been an exact parallel to the Zeppelin babykilling expeditions tie Germans would have had no reason to complain and oven the Germans might have been expected to grasp the fact.