THE DARDANELLES

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2489, 16 June 1915, Page 8

THE DARDANELLES

IMPOSSIBLE TASK FOR THE FLEET SERIOUS OBSTACLES CREAT LAND ARMY NECESSARY. The following article is from Mr. Ashmead Bartlett, t'lio Special Correspondent ill tho Dardenelles, who, with the consult of tlie British Government, 13 representing there certain London newspapers Eastern Mediterranean, April 12. in© days of the 'lurk in ISuropo are numbered, but 110 one will deny that he is dying hard and game. It cama as a disagreeable shock to manv to read 011 tho momma of March 19 that two British battleships and one French had beon 6link 111 the Dardanelles, whilst several others had been hit and damaged The blow was all the more sudden because tne publio had been led to believe from previous official and unofficial reports that all was going well. We wero told that the outer forts had been completely destroyed, and that tho work of mine-sweeping had made excellent progress. Tins news was irivßii in perfect good faith, and was also quite true, but we built up on it too great a structure ofhope, but few realising the immense difficulties the Fleet has had to face, obstacles which do not really commence until tho Narrows are ap- ? ,le combined advance of tile Allied Fleet up the Dardanelles on March 18 was not an attempt to pass cue ISarrows. It was merely intended as a great demonstration against tho torts, m order that the destroyers and sweepers might clear the minefield' under cover of the guns and of tho ships. JTie work was carried out in the most gallant manner, and was perfectly successful, hut, unfortunately, the further advance had to be abandoned, owing to tile sudden and unexpected disasters to lliree vessels inflictefi by drifting muiV-s. But the price paid cannot be considered too high when one remembers tho issues at stake and the vast bearing they mav have on the future of tho war.' Tho lurks have always believed tlie Dardanelles to be impregnable, and this belief has been accepted as the truth by most lay minds until the Navy started to put the issue to the test, then for some unknown reason there came a quite unjustifiable wave of optimism, which swept over the country until the eyes of the public were opened by the events of March 18. Past and Present. In the old days of sailing ships tho Dardanelles were a most formidable obstacle, which 310 admiral would havo faced with confidence. But then tho tains of both forts and ships only had a very short range, and the chief difficulty was to find a favourable wind which would carry the old three-deckers past tho Narrows up into the Sea of Marmora. They could have got through had they been able to keep in tho centre o! the channel and maKo their way against tho four-knot current which comes swirling down. But unless the wind was dead aft they had to tack from side to side, thus coming within close range of tho forts, whose fire it was almost impossible to keep down by Broadsides. If it nas almost impossible to ovorcomo those obstacles in the early days of the Nineteenth Century tho difficulties and dangers of the passage have been increased tenfold now by loiifrange weapons, torpedoes/ and mines. Nevertheless, the Navy is of opinion that the ISarrows can be forced in spite of theso obstacles, and this opinion lias beon strengthened and confirmed bv the great trial of March IS. It might mean tho loss of ships, but if the occasion justified the sacrifice tho Fleet would not hesitato to make tho attempt But unless there is a powerful army ready to occupy the Galhpoli Peninsula the moment tho Fleet passed into tho bea- of Marmora, or made its way to Constantinople, the Straits would immediately be closcd behind it, ami, supposing tho Turks, backed up by German officers and German intrigues, decided to continue the war, it would havo to fight its way out, and again c'„.<ir tho minefield. It has long boon, an accepted axiom of naval warfare that ships nre of 110 use against forts or that they fight at such a disadvantage that it i's not worth while employing them for such a purpose. Forts' Resisting Power, This axiom must now bo modified, after the experience which the Fleet has gamed in tho present operations against tho Dardanelles. Any fort built of stone or concrete, however strong, can bo put out of action by direct firo from guns if only a clear viow of it can be obtained or provided aeroplanes are available to spot for the gunners, to signal back results, and correct the firo. Yet nothing has amazed the gunners out here more than the resisting power of these old lorts round the Dardanelles. For instance, those at Seddul Bahr and Kunie Jvale, at the northern and entrance to the Dardanelles were subjected to a terrific bombardment by the combined fleets on February 19, both at long and short, range. Thev were so completely smothered" with firo that 110 one believed a stone or a gun wild be left standing. Their fire was, m fact, completely silenced. Yet, when the. landing parties were put ashore to examine them, tho material damage was found to be comparatively small although thoy were mere shambles. ' Many of the guns were still intact and one 9m. was actually found loaded' The work of destruction had to be completed by the landing parties, and the torts arc now heaps of unoccupied ruins, with their guns lying about at all angles. In like manner the forts at Chanak, on the Asiatio side of the Narrows, and at Kilid Bahr, 011 the European, together with the batteries known as Nos. 7 and 8, lower down the Straits, were silenced temporarily on March 18,_ because they were so completely smothered by a tremendous volume of fire that the gunners -nere driven from the guns to the cover of their bomb-proof shelters; hut ill view of experience -gained 011 Februarv 25 tho fleet does not claim to havo knocked out many guns in them, and after the disaster to the Irresistible and Ocean some of the guns were manned again, and concentrated a tremendous firo on these unfortunate ships during the work of removing the crews to destroyers. Tho Real Obstacles. It must also be borne, in mind that tho Turks were not relying on their heavy guns alone to defend the Straits. They know that their minefield was to a great extent intact, and that the fleet would have great difficulty in getting through without heavy loss, Nevertheless, all those works which actually overlook the Dardanelles and are situated right 011 the shores of the Straits can speedily.be placed out of action by the guns of ships, or else smothered with such a volume of fire that tho gunners will be forced io take shelter in the bomb-proofs. Hut such works as these only come within the category of obsolete defences. They are 110 longer the real obstacles which must be overcome h»fore the parage ctm he forccd. The Turkish soldier fights very well behind entrenchments, but lie is a yenbad gunner and possesses ahsolulely 110 knowledge of llic science of war. Hnd the defence of the Straits been |nf| in his liands alone the Allied l''l"et wnulr) most probably have been off C'onstimti. inopls by now. But the Turkish araiy,

) directed by highly-trained German officers, and having the advantage of their science and technical skill, is a vcrv different enemy. One must give the Gormans their due meed of praise for 1 'Manner m which they have adapted o defences to meet the immense power of ships guns, and for having built up J- Kmd of secondary defence out of any atenal available—which is now provf«L °"? e fo ™idabla than the old <rf punting the heaviest guns. • el' leet has three main obstacles to overcome, and to achieve decisive resuits tno assistance of a very large ex- ' M !+"n ry f l rCO i' su PP li€d l'owere Cl ' V 'p- 0t 1 flel , d aud howit ™'> » minnfiin' i'- s i foremost are the Minefields, which are constantly being H®" 0 '• a , n 4 tlle floating mines, which rln+ carn fi ' vu k.V the four-knot curl ;+ ' s " ow 6™crally accepted whiV W , a V m T of tllls description ' aiid the" Ocean 6 Irrcsistible . Concealed Batteries. ® Tho second obstacle which must bo • b-Uteri" 6 l-M 01 ™ 5 ? the concealed 'i fi™ mnf i'T 1 ; howit M" aud direct. - V s • whlcl \ have be®" Placed ill i onto "T f We 4 ho flrst attaok 0,1 tlle I field rnm ! r movable batteries of „ " Hi! ja, ''sht howitzers, which n n !f sl '" ted from Point to point under " perfect cover, and which open up on s ™°v s m t ' lo most unexpected positions, present the third obstacle. All theso defences have an important I bearma on each other. For instance, field guns and light howitzers can do a" I'lio jY 10 da ? as ° t0 a battleship cleared for action except to those in t r „ Coll ff 01 \° VS - „ Several ships ha£ I torv su ? ered \ But the >' ca » in fli<=t b vorj serious damage on trawlers and destroyers engaged in tho task ofsweepy rug the Straits. <" »»u.p - The work has often had to be checked I tLJT 1 0f th V ev erity of this fire 11 le destroyers and trawlers go up the 1 WH ai i°- l "i tlle Paction of a „ fci n ' eshl P n and co . m >»ence their opera- - toons. They are immediately subjected J? » tremendous fire from tho enemy's cMIM K H IS i fi' Uol ' are so carefully cont tlio l tfi ) • ■ sec ,°» dM ? armament of imno«K P '" t Cbarg ° fi " ds !t impossible _to pick up a target. Thev can only ami at the flashes of the guns when these are visible, or else by the -■fine. o 'i a "i \° t r °P liine reconnaissance, i ? located a battery. Some guns and batteries are temporarily silenced, but to , day t he ? are shifted io+f, +1 no f tlon . and the task of locating them has to' commence all over again. r Thus the _ task of clearing the fixed cuTt° T1 r rellder f d ' extremely difficult. The Germans have also mounted many heavy 2 uns inland, where it is extremely difficult to locate them, and i>fliet ?r ® P° lvwful enough to 1 shins A^tf'"° US j ama 2 e on battleships. Anything made of stone or concrete which is visible will be speediW smothered by the direct fire of navd guns, and by indirect fire, assisted by accurate spotting" from an aeroplane. Naval dinners' Difficulties. In this sense the old axiom that ships are of no use agamst forts is quite inaccurate, but the enemy has discovered that even the heaviest shells can do but sW?"i lUm f damage to a well-con-etructed emplacement of earth thrown from tho I ! \P I1 ' ' J ' he great shells imnLi p pS i rup an enormous amount of smoke and earth, but the actlv.?!? 1112 ? 13 Sm f"' U can > "i cCneially bo made good during tho night or when the weather is too thick to allow of shooting. A battleship has to score a direct hit on the gun itself before guns mounted in this simple manner can fairly be said to be out of action. The difficulty of scoring direct nits is enormous, especially when the hre is indirect and has to be corrected by aeroplanes, which are themselves constanty exposed to heavy shrapnel faro which lt-js impossible to keep under. If the ground on tho European and Asiatic sides of the Straits wero fiat tho task would bo comparatively easy because the enemy's guns could be kept out of range by tho long-range 6in. of the ships. Unfortunately, it is just tho lumhu' f vii 9 Ga A llpt>ll is a jumblo of hills, valleys, small rivers, lowlying ridges, and spurs, which assume no regular formation, and which seem to havo been especially designed by Nature to assist tho defence of the , a ,• Jn parts the country is thickly wooded, in others the trees are sparse, and there are patches of low-lying ground which havo been cultivated. 'The ascent from the shore is steep and fair- • ... i ' , an d ships must clear this initial obstacle beforo they can reach their mark. A Stupendous Task. _ Amongst this hilly country there are innumerable positions where giuis can be concealed, in valleys, behind hills, or amongst trees. When a gun or bat- ■ tery has been located by an aeroplane s it is often necessary to fire right over ; the top of several ridges of hills, and > the sinckc of the bursting projectiles b cannot bo seen, even from the control tops, lho Asiatic shore of the Straits I is loxvar, and is commanded along al--1 m, os k 4?, whole length by the European, c J lie lulls are not so flush with tho water, and it is therefore easier to lo s cate batteries on that side. s But oven with this small assistance it has been found impossible to silence tho r enemy's guns. Amongst the hills and i broken ground they conceal them with . ease and security, and they are also, t apparently, able to move guns with , much greater facility on the south side. ' 0 , .? the task of forcing the ' Straits is examined, the more stupendi ous proportions does it assume. We do , not know wuat number of troops tho 1 lurks have in the Peninsula and on the ' Asiatic side, but it must lot bo fori gotten that they have Had ample time • and ample warning.to bring up any reinforcements which are available from , the needs of the other theatres of war • They are entrenched up to their necks and have placed barbed wire round j every position. The Fleet has done, and is doing, everything possible to assure success, in tho face of obstacles such as 5 no Fleet has taken on before. Tho tale 3 of gallant deeds is a long and glorious ' one. But the facts must be faced. They ' are briefly these: 1 No fleet can advance even close to the ' Narrows, much less through them, [ yntil the mine-field has been cleared. > lho enemy's heavy concealed guns and ; light mobile artillery render this task [ impossible, even under tho covering fire 1 of the battleships, for the reasons I ' have already explained. In addition, there is every known reason to believo j that tho Turks have placed a large J number of torpedo-tubes along both 1 shores. Therefore, the only way the 5 Straits can be opened ib from tho land ' side. To accomplish this a very large Expeditionary Force is required, and also a very largo number'of field howitzers, with which to deal with tho coni cealed batteries. Lessons of Flanders. i The guns of the battleships can cover t a landing ,and their fire will bo ablo to r assist an advance inland up to a cer- . tain point, hut once the ormy is on . shore it must do the real work of tak- . ing tho enemy's positions in reverso by s its-own unaided efforts. We do not • know the enemy's numbers, but he is': 1 entrenched everywhere, and the lessons ) of I'landers havo brought it clearly • homo what the cost of assaulting cn- : trenched positions means. Everything r will depend on the number of guns r available lor shore work/ and tho lium- - bers of infantry. A great army is required to ensure | success. The occupation of the Gal- • lipoli Peninsula would prob.ibly enable i the Straits to bo cleared i'or the ships 1 to pass, because, as I have already i snid. Ihc northern shore commands the 1 southern, and tho enemy's artillery on the Astatic side could thus be kept at , [ a distance.