INDUSTRIES AND THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2481, 7 June 1915, Page 4

INDUSTRIES AND THE WAR

$ Though it follows pat upon loud and critical complaints that the British output of munitions is hopelessly below the demands of the war, the latest speech delivered by Mr. Lloyd Georqe is only in a very limited sense a confession. It contains, indeed, a frank admission that the industrial resources of the nation havo not. yet been organised as they should be, and must be, in the production of munitions of war. Supplies of military equipment at the. moment lag .behind the mobilisation of volunteers, with the unfortunate result that a not inconsiderable number of men remain inactive who would otherwise be lighting their country's battles in Franco anil Flanders, and possibly in other thoatres of war as well. Probablv some of tlic_ improvements in industrial organisation and in methods of production now in proccFs of •jdoptioa could ha"f benn so.!, on font. wpfltbs s&o, lkfciveaa jyjjftt, baa heau

accomplished a.ncl what is possible there appears to be a tolerably wide margin, and to the extent, whatever it may be, that this margin could have been overtaken in the past conduct of the war, the late Imperial Government is open to reproach. This aspect of tlie matter is of little practical importance now that a National Government has been installed, which is plainly determined to tune up the industrial organisation of the nation to the highest possible pitch of efficiency. But in so far as the partial failure of the lato Government to secure the maximum possible output of munitions of war still commands attention, justice demands that account should be taken also of what it accomplished and of mitigating facts which go. to explain the shortage of munitions which has prevented the nation up to the present exerting its full strength in the war. In the unexampled emergency which appeared at the outbreak of war the Imperial Government had to act with little time for planning. Particularly in regard to the production of munitions of war—not for the Main Expeditionary Force only, but for the Navy and for forces entrusted with subsidiary campaignsit had to grapple with problems accentuated by the strongly individualised organisation ana control of industries in Great Britain, which is in such striking contrast to tho elaborately-devised co-ordination of German industries capablo of serving military ends. In these circumstances a measure of confusion rein the British production of munitions of which the effects are still apparent. Bub this does not mean, as some critics have asserted, that the Imperial Government simply "muddled along" and hopelessly failed in the unprecedented task which devolved upon it at tho outbreak of war. Whatever its failures have been, it has at least so far met the first urgency of tho war-demands that it is" possible now to take stock of the national resources with a view to bringing imVroved organisation and redoubled energy to bear upon' a new phase of the war. The story of the British conduct of the war to. the present date is neither one of triumphant success nor one of dismal failure, but the truth, lying between thw?, extremes, justifies the statement 'thai; it is a story of wonderful. achievement.

The best evidence at present available on the subject of British warpreparation and the production of munitions is to be found in a House i of Commons debate on April 21, which is fully reported in late English files. It took its rise from a motion proposed by a Unionist mem- ■ ber (Mil. Hewinb), affirming the . urgent necessity of co-ordinating the resources of all firms capable of producing, or co-operating in producing, munitions of war, under a unified administration in direct touch with such firms. The debate undoubtedly exposed serious defects and shortcomings in the Government plans for securing.munitions, but it was chiefly remarkable for a speech in which Mb. Lloyd George gave some indication of what had been accomplished up to that time. Some of the leading facts have been stated before in these columns, but they are worth recalling at a time when the appointment of the new Government gives promise of a radical improvement .in the national organisation for war. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, as ho then was, was able to state that whereas the Committee of Imperial Defeneo had always proceeded _ on the assumption that theExpeditionary Force would consist of six divisions, Britain, after eight months of war, bad six- times as many men in the field, fully equipped and supplied with adequate ammunition, and ©very man who had fallen had been replaced. This means that in April at least 600,000 or 700,000 British soldiers wero engaged in France and Flanders. Mr. Lloyd George mentioned 'also that in the fortnight's battle around Neuva Chapolla nearly as' much ammunition was spent by the British-artillery as during the two and three-quarter years of the Boer War._ Even after this enormous expenditure of shells a reserve remained in hand. As to the production of artillery ammunition the output of shells in March, 1915, was nineteenfold greater than in September, 1914. Taking 20 as representing the production in Soptember, Mb. Lloyd George gave the following figures as showing the relative production in the months named:— October go November go Decetmber lse January 186 February 256 March 388 The increase for April Mr. . Lloyd George stated would correspond to the increase which had taken place in the preceding month. Though the increase is shown as from September there had also been an increase in August, so that the actual increase since tho beginning of the war was considerably more than nineteenfold. This is not all. The manufacture of high explosives, the Chancellor stated, had been placed on such a footing in Britain as to not only satisfy British demands, but to enable trie country to largely sujiply its allies. And Britain is assisting its allies not only in the supply of explosives, but in respect of other munitions of war. All thiugs considered, though the actions of the Government in ccrtain directions may be open to criticism, this is not a bad performance. To the British Government, as to most other people, the war has been an education. Even Germany, with her unexampled preliminary preparation, did not foreseo the tremendous demands which _ the' war would create for munitions and supplies, and it is not surprising that Britain's great resources have not yet been developed in a completely satisfactory way. The conception of an industrial army, seconding the efforts of the army in the field, has been reached by a gradual progression, under the goad of imperative necessity, in the school of hard experience. It is possible that, it could have been reaohed in no other way. It is easy for critics running alongside to hurl counsels of perfection at those who labour in harness, but tho truth seems to bs that the great | expansion in the military strongUi , of the nation now in prospect could , not have been achieved by nuy .sudden effort.