PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2471, 26 May 1915, Page 6

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Some vivid accounts are given today of the fighting at the Dardanelles, but the only definite account of progress made is contained in a Beuter message from Tenedos, dated on Sunday, which states that tho Anglo-French forces advancing from the southern end of the Gallipoli Peninsula have reached the outskirts of Krithia, the village which was recently tho objective of a gallant charge by the New Zealanders, but have not yet occupied it. Unless tho message has been delayed, it must be supposed that even if the Allies have by now captured Krithia, some hard fighting will still have to be done for Achi Baba, the Turkish stronghold a couple of miles further on. Other accounts declare that although the Turks have lost 80,000 men, they have been heavily reinforced, and still have 200,000 soldiers defending the Gallipoli Peninsula. The mam Turkish reserves, it is added, have been taken across to the peninsula from the Asiatic shores. No doubt the fact that this road remained open, and must remain open until tho Narrows are conquered, accounts for the Allies having apparently not yet occupied the Isthmus of Bulair, where they would cut off land access to the peninsula from Turkey in Europe.

Some further references are made in the war cablegrams to-day to a possible German retreat in the Western theatre, but they,must probably bo ascribed rather to the fascination of tEe topic than to any definite military development. It is quite likely that the withdrawal of the German armies from France and Belgium, or at all events to the frontiers of these countries, will be the next big development of the war. This is the immediate object for which the Western Allies, very greatly assisted by the Russians on the opposite front, are fighting. Matters have already gone so far that an eventual German retreat to a shorter line may be regarded as certain, so far as certainty enters into human affairs. This is not all. The retreat, once decided upon, is likely to be made as suddenly as tne mighty initial onfall which carried the German armies through Belgium and into France to tho very gates of Paris. When they accent the inevitable, the Germans will not take the world into their confidence, but out of ordinary prudence, if from no other motive, will endeavour to hide all knowledge of their intended retreat from the Allied armies to whom it will represent a great opportunity. There is an ever-present possibility of a sudden German retreat, but a definite opinion as to when it is likely to be made can only be formed by those who possess definite information as to the state of the German resources, in men and military material, as compared with those of the Allies. In tho somewhat vague predictions ventured today by the Rotterdam correspondent of tho Daily Mail, there is no hint of access to this jealouslyguarded information. The suggestion, as far as it is clearly made, is that the Germans mav decide to fall back to their second line. The remark is appended that the enemy have been deepening and widening the defensive works in their second and third line, particularly at Lille. Apparently, therefore, the suggestion is that the Germans may voluntarily relinquish the outer defences of their present, fighting front—the external crust which the Allies have broken and penetrated at some points, in a series of hard-fought battles, since they took Die offensive in the Spring.

Axy such action by the Germans is inherently improbable. If they retire in the Western theatre they will do so, not because their present defensive front is weak (it has been proved on the contrary to oe exceedingly strong), but because Ihev lack the strength in men and artillery wbiri) alone''ill enable them to bold it, To voluntarily abiuidon aiy; oi.

their works on the present fighting front, which has been laid out with an eye to its strength as a whole, would be to dishearten their own troops, inspirit the Allies, and run the risk of serious defeat, without any corresponding gain. When the Germans find it necessary to retire they will almost certainly fall back, not merely from one set of field fortifications to another, but from their present lino to one so much shorter that it could be much more easily held with fclio forces at command. Such a lino extends south 'from Liege, through the Ardennes, past Luxemburg, to join the present line near the Lorraine border, south-west °f Metz. The present .Western line, with its indentations, is four hundred miles long. Tne lino south from Liege is more than 100 miles shorter, and it includes the rugged country of the Ardennes, where comparatively small force's should be able to hold the line.' It includes also the Vosges on the frontier of Alsace, of which the same might have been said while the mountain-line remained in German hands, but the position has been greatly altered by the enterprise of tne French in capturing dominating strongholds (inoluding Hartmannsweiler Kopf), on the eastern fringe of the mountains opposite Mulhausen. If they are able to extend these successes further north, the French will do a great deal to undermine the strength of the line upon which Germany may be expected ultimately to make her last desperate stand. It is equally true that if fcho German retreattakes place while the French are still trying_ to force the mountain passages into northern Alsace their task will at onoe become vastly more difficult.

Eetdrnino to the main question, it is _ evident that tho Germans are not likely to adopt a policy of local withdrawals because it would weaken their position without lightening their Burdens. Any withdrawals they have so far made have been made under the compulsion of concentrated assaults, and it is improbable that they will give ground under any other circumstances until their declining strength makes a general retreat to a materially shorter front imperative. It has been twice reported, unofficially, that Bruges has been evacuated, and in one case it is suggested that food and ammunition have been transferred to Ghent. If the report- is true it may imply nothing more than a readjustment of strength in tho present Western line. It is chiefly interesting as suggesting an inclination upon the part of the Germans to draw in towards their main line of communications. Bruges is twenty miles behind the fighting front, but tie interest of the report lies rather in the fact that this city is situated in the northern part of Belgium, nine miles from the coast, while Ghent is twenty-five miles to the south-east, and so much nearer the main railway along the valley of ohe Mouse.

Italy'b intervention must be regarded as a factor bringing definitely nearer the day when weakness will compel Germa/nv to retire in the Western theatre, but it is a factor as yet untested, and its weight and importance are very largely a matter of speculation. So far only small encounters on the Tyrol frontier are reported in the way of actual fighting (apart from aerial raids and encounters), but a Rome message states that 800,000 AustroGerman troops (chiefly Bavarians and Hungarians) have been massed upon the Italian frontier.' Weeks before Italy entered the war it was reported that the Germanic allies had posted nearly half a million men on the Italian frontiers, and the suggestion now made is that these forces have been largely reinforoed with German troops, with a view to the invasion of Italy. It seems impossible that Germany can take a leading part in such an enterprise except at the cost of dangerously weakening her forces in tho two main theatres. Her position as regards numerical strength and reserves of men (as these factors are assessed by the most reliable British and French authorities) v has • been stated before, but may be briefly repeated. It is computed that she is already outnumbered by at least a million in the Western theatre, and that her permanent losses of men in the two main theatres during the first five months of the war (260,000 per month), if continued at the same rate, will exhaust her total available reserves of men at the end of another ten months of war. Accepting the calculations and estimates as correct, the strength of the German armies from that date (near the end of this year) would necessarily decline. In spite of the enormous driving force of her latest offensive in Galicia (now perceptibly abated) it is pretty certain that Germany is heavily outnumbered in the Eastern theatre as well as on the opposite front. In these circumstances it may be doubted whether she will invite the additional drain upon her resources involved in an offensive campaign against Italy. She can do so only at the cost of drawing upon resorves which will be badly needed before long in the two main theatres.

A German invasion of Italy would be, to say the least, a remarkable indication of confidence in her own strength and resources. While the alternative exists of conducting a defensive campaign in the Trentino, a successful invasion of Italy is in no way so vital to Germany as is the necessity of maintaining her Western lino and holding the Russian armies in check. It is practically certain that she will subordinate neither of these two main objects, and it follows that she will employ large forces against Italy only if she is confident that she can strike a crushing blow at that country without weakening her position in the Eastern and Western theatres. On visible evidence, Germany has long passed this point, and the prediction of an Austro-German invasion from the Trentino must be received meantime with a good deal of doubt, although a late message states that it is expected that the first big engagements will be fought on the hanks of thoAdige, that is to say, on the Trentino frontier. If the Austro-Germans elect to play a. defensive part in the Trentino, the entry of Italy should still exert a materia! intluence upon the main campaigns, though it would not necessarily make itself immediately apparent. Germany is not likely to take the risk of leaving it to Austria to hold Italy in play, even in a defensive campaign. There is a suggestive story to-day that four thousand Austrian troops, complaining of starvation, deserted, and wore interned in North Italy. This may be quite an exceptional instance, but there can bo no doubt, that the Austrian armies have been badly shaken and disorganised, and that a stiffenUs oi German troops it cswmldal to.

their continued usefulness. Many reports have made it plain that German forces were the backbone of the armies defending the Carpathians at the most critical stage of the Russian assault, and it is essentially a Gorman offensive that has reconquered one-half of the Austrian province of Galicia from the Russians. On the wholo it is a reasonable supposition that Germany will find the Italian campaign a heavy additional burden, and that she will be little inclined to increase the burden (by taking the offensive) at great risk of depleting her resources, and with little hope of decisive benefit, even if she drove her new invasion home.

According to the Bucharest correspondent of tlio Daily Chronicle, the Rumanian Government is negotiating with the Entente, and the greatest enthusiasm prevails. This pointing to probable Rumanian intervention, may be accepted as a tribute to the brightening prospects of the Entente. The people of Rumania are a canny folk. For a long time past they have pursued with remarkable success, though they live in a stormy corner of the world, a policy of husbanding their resources and holding aloof from strife. It is safe to suppose that they will enter the war only when they are very sure of their ground, and there seems now no reason to doubt that they will do it. Rumania has an army of about half a million men, and though it is something like forty years since her troops saw active service (except for the bloodless campaign against Bulgaria in the second Balkan War) they are reputed to be good and reliable soldiers. Rumanian intervention would in the first instance expedite an invasion of Eastern Hungary, and here, also, German troops would be required unless Germany elected to let the invasion take its course.

All things considered, though it is not possible to confidently predict the date of the German retreat in the Western theatre which will mark the grand turning point of the war, developments, actual and prospective, alike tend to bring it steadily nearer. In the meantime, unless the attitude of Rumania has been completely misinterpreted, the imminent prospect of still further additions to the list of her enemies should in itself suffice to deter Germany from wasting her strength in an invasion of Italy.

News from the main Eastern theatre to-day is uniformly good. Reports of fighting on the River San, north of Przemysl, and further south, all indicate that the Russians have not only stemmed the progress of the German attacking columns, but have taken the offensive in their turn with some success. The enemy still retains his foothold on the east bank of the San northward of Jaroslav, but his further attacks have been repulsed. In the marshes of the Dniester, east and south of Przemysl, the Russians claim' that they attacked and defeated the enemy, capturing nearly a thousand prisoners. It is too soon to assume that the force of tha German attack is wholly spent, but to-day's news shows that the Russians, at any rate, are now more than holding their own. A plausible explanation of the slackening in the German assaults is supplied in a message which states that the enemy have depleted the great stores of shells they Had accumulated at Cracow, and so have lost the enormous superiority in artillery which enabled them to press forward so rapidly in the earlier phases of the battle.

No extraordinary developments are reported to-day in France and Flanders. Though some further progress has been made north and south of La Bassee, the Anglo-Frcnch offensive on this front has so far slowed down as to suggest that it is likely to be followed soon by an assault upon some other section of the German line. Some British trenches east of Ypres have been lost, but are in process of being regained. The Germans made their advance under cover of poisonous gas, an agent in the use of which they still appear to enjoy a monopoly, despite the recent declaration by the Allies that retaliatory measures would be adopted.