RUSSIA'S COMMANDERIN-CHIEF .

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2462, 15 May 1915, Page 9

RUSSIA'S COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF .

THE GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS.

Russia is earnestly grappling, writes "The Times" correspondent at Petrograd, with tho greatest crisis in hor entire history; and 'the consideration of publicity and the comprehension of what she is doing by the rest of the world is of so small importance m tho eyos of the Powers that it has been all but overlooked.. • r , ~ On© who lifts seen and studi&d uQ6 army at first hand comes to feel a growing confidencs in the future. This optimism, engendered by the observation 01 the machine, is solidified into conviction of ultimate success when one sees the Grand Dnke- Nicholas; for in this single personality, in the opinion of the writer, is contained a greater asset to Russia than in the rest of the army organisation combined. When the smoke of battle has' cleared away and the painstaking historian, in the seclusion of his study, reinforced by tie perspective of time, comes to write of this whole war, he will, I believe, put his finger upon the Grand Duke as perhaps the most remarkable single individual whom the year of 1914 has brought into the public eye... ; The Grand Duke has supplied to this campaign elements that have made final success possible for the Russians. _He is a big man with a far-reaching vision, political acumen, and a determination to wade steadily forward to viotory irrespective of all obstacles and all temporary setbacks. He has had sufficient intuition of men's characters to surround himself at his head quarters with men of capacity. What he himself lacks he has realised and remedied by placing men about him who' do possess it. His chief of _ staff is a masterly strategist, while in his other departments he has picked men each of whom is the best that Russia can produce. He himself, with an iron character and incomparable determination, binds the whole into a cohesive unit. In the army ho is an absolute autocrat. He has one fixed idea, and that is for t'he success of Russia regardless of cost. Eor cnoo Russia has a commander-in-chief and a general staff who have but one critorion and one standard—success and efficiency. The generalissimo is a big enough man to listen to others, and, if need be, to change his mind even at the. eleventh hour. I think he takes no great pride in dictating to others or in making the plans himself. . If tho programmes 'aro good he cares not who has the credit, provided only that victory result. He is himself a soldier, and; I believe, understands the , weakness and the strength of his own army and Mb own soldiers as does no other Russian general. He has sufficient moral strength to retreat if need be, regardless of what political effect a withdrawal may have. He realises that his troops on the defensive-are the peers of any soldiers in the world. Against the Austrians, who are outclassed by the Russians, his- campaigns have ever 'beep, of the offensive type and almost universally successful. Wherever possible ho has made the Germans como to him, and if one looks back over the last fow months one comes to realise that his policy, of drawing the Germans cn and on, always weakening them, aud making thorn pay heavily for every foot of advance, has cost the Germans moro in men and moral than any operations that have taken placo sinco tho attacks aimod on Calais.

The policy of Russia is undoubtedly to weaken the Germans, absorbing as many of the Teuton Army Corps as possible on the Eastern front, while she proceeds patiently with her task of digesting the residue of the Austro-Hun-garian Armies. If Russia does this, and does it successfully, she is doing all that hor Allies should expoct or demand of her. When Germany has been sapped to the dregs and her initiative broken, some one, be it in the East or in the West, may break through her lines and force the war home. Russia is setting systematically about this all-important task. Every corps absorbed on_this Eastern campaign of t'ho Germans is just so many thousand men kept away from the Western front, and overy costly victory or still moro costly repulse of the Teutons in Poland or in East Prussia is making the task juet so much the lighter for tho Western Allies.

Neither the Press nor the public of Western Europe should experience undue anxiety ovor Russian withdrawals or alleged German victories. Russia has tho men, the organisation, and a limitless capacity for absorbing defeat, which maVos each temporary set-back" littlo but a stopping-stono to an ultimate advanco.

Above all, she has a quiet, calm, determined man at the helm of lior genoral sUff, who intends to win this war if it takes tho last rouble and the last peasant soldier that Russia possesses. 1