MR. CHURCHILL'S GREAT SPEECH
THE BRITISH NAVY
WHAT IT HAS DONE & IS DOING
POSSIBILITIES AHEAD
INTERESTING REVIEW OF THE NAVAL SITUATION
Files to hand by last night's mail contain the report of Mr. Cliurchill s speech in the House of' Commons on February 15, in which he discussed the Naval situation and made known many matters of great interest and concern to the whole nation. Following is a report of the speech slightly condensed in parts, taken from the columns of the "Morning Post":— ■' Mr. Churchill (First Lord of the Admiralty) said: After the outbreak of ivar my noble' friend Lord Kitchener, Secretary of State for War, had to create an Army eight or ten times as large as any previously maintained, or even contemplated, in this country. The War Office has been, arid is, engaged in a vast process of expansion, improvisation, and development entirely without parallel in military' experience. Thinks, however, to the generous provision made so regularly for the last five years by the House of Commons for the Royal Navy, no such difficulties or labours have confronted the Admiralty. On the declaration of war we were able to count upon a fleet of sufficient superiority for all our needs, with a good margin': for safety in vital matters; fully mobilised, placed on its war stations; supplied and equipped with every requirement down to" the smallest detail that could be foreseen, with TeBerves of ammunition and torpedoes up to and above the regular standards, with ample supplies of fuel and oil, with adequate reserves of stores of all kinds, with complete systems of transport and supply, with full; numbers of trained officers and men of all ratings, with a large surplus reserve of trained men, with adequate establishments for training new men, with an immensce programme of new construction rapidly maturing to reinforce the Fleet, and to replace casualties, and with a pre-ar-ranged system for accelerating that now construction which has been found to yield satisfactory and even surprising results. (Cheers.) Three Important Points. In illustration of this I would draw the attention of the House to three particular points. First of all, the store of ammunition. If hon. members* will examine the long 'series of figures for Vote 9 in the last five Or six years, in 'latter years, they will see an enormous increase in that Vote. In time of peace one gets little credit for such expenditure, but'in time of war we thank God that it'has been made; (Cheers.) Then take the store of oil. Most pessimistic prophecies Were made as to the supply of oil, but tio difficulty has been found in practice in that regard. The Estimates which svo had formed of 'the quantity of oil which would be consumed by'the Fleet in war proved to.be much larger than our actual consumption". ' On the other hand there whatever in .Not a single oil ship has been interfered with on its vo.yage to this country, and ths price of oil is substantially below what it was when I last addressed the House on this subject. Indeed, ws have found it possible to do what we had_ long wished to do, but hesitated to decide upon on account of the gloomy prophecies and the views which were entertained. "We found it possible to oonvert the Eoyal Sovereign to a completely oil-fuel basis, so that this ship, equally with the Queen Elizabeth,, will enjoy the great advantages of liquid fuel for wa,r purposes. The Question of Men. As regards men, no more widespread delusion existed abroad than that though we might build ships' we could never find the men to man them, and even in some quarters in this country the idea was fostered that when mobilisation took place the ships could not be sent to sea fully manned. •' When mobilisation took place we were able to man every ship in the Navy fit to send to sea; we were able to man a number of old ships which we had not at first intended to tend to sea; but which, after being repaired and refitted we found to have possibilities of usefulness in them, we were able to man in addition the powerful new vessels building for foreign countries for which no provision had been made, and we were able .to man several score of armed merchantmen which had been taken up and which play an important part in our arrangements for the control of traffic and trade. We were also able to provide all the men that wore necessary for the Royal Navy Air Service, which did not exist three years ago, and which is already making a name for itself—-(cheers) —and is becoming a considerable and formidable body. (Cheers.) We were able to keep our training schools full to the very brim' so as to prepare a continuous supply of drafts for the new vessels which are coming on in such great .numbers, and over and above we were able without injury to any of these important interests to supply,, the nucleus of instructors of trained men to form tho cadres of the Royal Naval Division, which has now reached a respeotable total and have developed an efficiency which enables them to be counted on immediately as a factor in the defence of this country, and very soon as an element in tho forcos which we' con use overseas. Britain's Reliance on Sea Power. _ We. have never been a military nation. but now we are .going to take a hand in that. We have always relied for our safety on naval power, and in that respect it is not true to say that we entered this war unprepared. (Cheers.) On the contrary, £he German Anny was not more ready for offensive war on a gigantic sale than was the British Fleet for national defence. (Cheers.) Now after six months of war, when new dangers and new difficulties | are coming into view, we have every right to feel content with the results of our labours. (Cheers.) Since November, when I last addressed the House 011 naval matters, two considerable events bave happened—the 'victory off the Falkland Islands and the successful oruiser action near tho Dogger Bank. Both these events are satisfactory in themselves, and still more are they satisfactory in their consequences and significance. But I shall venture to enlarge upon them and to hang tho thread of my argument upon them. The victory off the Falklands terminated the first phase of the naval war by effecting decisively tho clearancc of the German flag from the oceans of the world. (Cheers.) The blocking in of the enemy armed merchantmen at the very outsot and tho consequent frustration of his whole plan for tbO i destruction of commerce. tho reduction of his base at Tsing-tau, and- tho expulsion of his ships from the China seas by Japan— (cheers) —the hunting down of tho Konigsberg and the Emden—the latter by an Australian cruiser—(chcers) —were steps along the path, and the goal was finally reached when Admiral von Spee's . eowerfui apuadroni having been unsuc-
cessfully though gallantly engaged off C'oronel, was brought to action and destroyed on December 8 by Admiral Sir F. Sturdee. (Cheers.) Only two small Gorman cruisers and two armed merchantmen remain at largo of all. their* formidable preparation for attack upon tho trade routes, and these vessels are at present in hiding. During tho last three months—that is to say, since Parliament rose—on an average about 8000 British vessels have been continuously on tho seas passing to and fro on their lawful occupations. There have been 4485 arrivals and 3600 sail-, ings from the ports of the, United Kingdom. Only 19 vessels have been sunk by the enemy, and only four of those vessels have been sunk by above-water craft. That is a very remarkable result to have achieved after only a few months of war. (Cheers.) I am sure if we had been told before the war that such a result would be so soon achieved and that our losses would be so small we should not have believed it for a moment. (Cheers.) lam sure that the noble Lord whom I see in his place who always felt, and quit© legitimately "felt, anxiety about the trade routes and the great difficulty of maintaining them, if he had been offered any such prospect six months ago he would have said that it was too good to be true. (Hear, hear.) Certainly the great sailors of the past, men of the Revolutionary and the Napoleonic Wars, would have . been, astounded.
Six Months' Losses. During those two great wars, which began in 1733 and ended after a brief interval in 1814, 10,871 British merchant ships wore' captured or sunk by the enemy, liven after the decisivo Battle of Trafalgar, when we had tho undisputed comniand of the sea, so far as it can be tactically and strategically attained, tho loss of British ships went on at the rate of 600 ships a year. In I£o6, 519 ships were' sunk or captured —that is, the year after Trafalgar—in 1807, 559 j in. 1808, 469; in 1809, 571; and in 1810, 619. Our total, losses on the high seas in the iirsfc sis months of the war, including all ships other than trawlers engaged in mine-sweep-ing, including all -ships, including losses by mines and vossefs scuttled by submarines, ar.e ouly 63. (Cheers.) Of course, we must always be on the look out for another attempt by the enemy to harass the trade routes. Although the oceans oiler rather a blefik prospect to the Gorman cruisers, and the experience of their consorts is not encouraging, the Admiralty' must be fully prepared for that possibility, and wo snail be able to meet any new efforts witli advantages and resources incomparably superior' to those which wore at our disposal at the beginning of the war. The truth is that steam and telegraphs have enormously increased, as compared with sailing daye, the thoroughness and efficiency- of superior sea-power. _ Coaling;' Mihihiwications, and supplies are vital and constant needs, ana once the upper hand, hae been lost they become operations of almost' insuperable difficulty to the weaker Navy. Credit is due to our outlying squadrons—(cheers) —and to the Admiralty organisation by which'they have been directed. It must never be forgotten that the situation 011 every sea, even the most remote, is dominated and decided by the influence of Sir John .Jellicoe's Fleet—(cheers)—' lost to view amid the Northern nlists, preserved by patience and seamanship in all its strength and efficiency, silent, unsleeping, and as yet unchallenged. (Cheers.) A Million Troops Moved. 'l'he command of the sea which we have thus enjoyed has not only enabled our trade to be carried on practically without interruption or serious disturbance, but we have been able to move freely about the world very large numbers of troops. The Leader of the Opposition in a speech which he made the other night—l do not at all quarrel with the moderate and temperate tone of his criticism —quoted a letter of a shipowner as applied to the Admiralty Transport Department, in which the word "incapacity" occurred. Of all the words which could be applied to the Admiralty Transport Department no word could be more unsuitable than the word "inoapaoity." 1 am going to give the House a-, ligure which lias no military significance, because so many uncertain factors are comprised within the total, but which is an absolutely definite figure so far as the work of the Admiralty Transport Department is concerned. We fiave now moved by sea at homo and abroad, including wounded brought back [ from the front, including Belgian wounded, including Belgian and French troops moved here and there as circumstances required, often at the shortest possible notice, with constant changes of plan, acrobs oceans threatened by the enemy's cruisers and across 'channels haunted b.v submarines, to and fro from India and Egypt, from Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, China. South Africa, from every fortress and possession under the Crown, .approximately 1,000,000 men, without up to the present any accident or loss of life. (Cheers.) If'that is "incapacity" I hope there will be an inexhaustible supply of that quality. Credit for these arrangements lies very largely with the head of tho Admiralty Transport Department, Mr. Graham Thompson, one of the discoveries of the war, a man who stepped .into the place when the emergency came, who lias organised and presided over performances and transactions the like of which were never contemplated by any State in history. Supply Ships' Work. The statement that the Admiralty have on charter approximately about one-fifth of the British mercantile marine tonnage is correct. With that we discharge two duties—first, the supply, fuelling, and replenishing with ammunition of the fleets, and, secoudly, the transport of reinforcements and the supply of tho Army in tho field, including the return of wounded. Everything required to keep the Fleet in being, supplies, stores, and, above all, fuel, lias to bo not only carried hut kept afloat in ships. What aro called tho afloat reserves —tho great mobile reserves of fuel and stores maintained at the various bases used by the Fleet —are those which are fixed by the War Staff and approved by the Board of Admiralty after consultation with the Commander-in-Chief. When those amounts have been fixed tho Transport Department have no choice but to supply them. It is necessary that there should he sufficient colliers to enable all the Fleet units at a particular base to coal simultaneously with tho maximum rapidity twice over within a short interval, and extonsive naval movements at high speed may at any moment necessitate this hcing put to the test. We cannot possibly run arij; risk of Laving the Fleet rendered immobile. We must, make assurance doubly sure. The life of the State depends upon it, and it Jolloivfu having alms to Jjs raafe for.
a great emergency—all the Fleets steaming at onco continuously for days together—that during periods of normal fleet movements tho reserves of coal are often and necessarily turned over slowly, and colliers may in conscquence remain at the bases for considerable periods. That is our system. The fact therefore that particular vessels aro noticed by shipowners wailing about for long periods is no sign of mismanagement or incapacity on tho part of the Admiralty, but is an indispensable precaution and method without which the Fleet could not act in times of emergency. A Warning. With regard to the Army it should be remembered that we are supplying across the sea in the teeth of the enemy's opposition an Army almost as large as the Grand Army of Napoleon, only vastlv more complex in organisation and equipment. We are also preparing other armies still larger in number. I do not know on what day or at what hour the Secretary for War will ask the Admiralty to move 20,000, or it may be 40,000 men. It may be at very short notice; and he does not know until we tell him how we shall move them, by what route, or to what ports. I lans aro frequently changed on purpose at the very last moment; it is imperative for the safety of our soldiers and the reinforcement of our armies and the conduct of the war. We •^ e P reson '' momenta, powerful and flexible machinery which can- move whole armies with celerity,, wherever desired, in a manner never before contemplated or dreamt of, and I warn the House most solemnly against allowing grounds of commercial advantage or financial economy to place any hampering restriction or impediment upon these most difficult and momentous operations. I am afraid that I cannot hold out any hope of any immediate reduction m the tonnage required by the Admiralty. More than a month ago, before these matters were at all ventilated in public, notjeing the rise in freights, I directed*the Fourth Sea Lord to hold an inquiry into the whole useof merchant ships taken by the Admiralty, including particularly transports, colliers, and supply ships; but after the most stringent scrutiny and consultation with the Admirals afloat, it was not found possible to make any appreciable reduction. Indeed, since January 1 the requirements of the Admiralty have actually increased. That is only to be expected, as the size of the Fleet and the general scale of the military operations both grow continually. To sum up, then, the retention of a large number of full colliers and ammunition ships in attendance on the Fleet is a- naval necessity. The retention of a large number of troops transports is a military necessity. In either case ships may be, and have frequently been, required at an hour's notice, for urgent service which may be vital to the success of our operations. Coal must be ready afloat for the Fleet and troopships must be for the men, and no amount of business management, however excellent it may be, will get over that fact.' Enemy's Flag Cleared From the Seas. ■ I have said that the' strain in the c-arly "months - of the war has been greatly diminished now by the abatement of distant' convoy- work and by the "clearance of the'enemy's flag from the seas and oceans. There were times when, for instance, the great Australian cenvoy of six-ty ships was crossing the Pacific, or- the great Canadian convoy of forty ships, with its protecting squadrons, was crossing tho Atlantic, or when, the regular flow of large Indian convoys of forty and fifty ships sailing in company was at its height both ways, when there were half-a-dozen minor expeditions being carried on by the Navy, guarded and landed at different points and supplied after landing, when there was a powerful German cruiser squadron still at large in the Pacific or the Atlantic, which nad to be watched for and waited for in superior force in six or seven differept parts of the world at once, and when all the time within a few hours' steam of our shores there were concentrated a hostile fleet, which many have argued in former timeswas little inferior to our own, and when there was hardly a Regular soldier left at home and before the Territorial Force and the New Armies had attained their present high efficiency and power —there were times when our naval resources, considerable as they are, were drawn <nit to their utmost limit and when we had to uso old battleships to give strength to cruiser squadrons, even at the cost of their speed, and. when we had to face and to accept risks with which we did not trouble the public and which no one would willingly 6eek an opportunity to share. But the victory at tho Falkland Islands swept all these difficulties out of existence. It set free a large force of,cruisers and battleships for all purposes. It opened the way to other operations of §reat interest. It enabled a much stricter control and more constant outlook to be maintained in home waters, and it almost entirely freed the outer seas of danger. That was a memorable event, the relief and advantage of which will, only be fully appreciated by those who have full knowledge of all that has taken place, and will only be fully appreciated by those who not only knew but felt what was going forward. Significance of the North Sea Fight. Now I come to, the battle-cruiser action on the Dogger Bank. That action was not fought out, because the enemy, after abandoning their wounded consort, _ the Blucher, made good their escape into waters infested by their submarines and mines. But this combat between the finest 6hips in both naviesis of immense significance aud value in the light which it throws upon rival systems of design and'armament and upon relative gunnery efficiency. It is the first test we have ever hud, and without depending too much upon it I think it is at onco important and encouraging. First of all it vindicates, so far as it goes, the theories of design, and particularly of big gun armament, always identified with Lord Fisher. (Oheers.) Tho range of the British guns was found to exceed that of the German. Although the Gorman shell is a most formidable instrument of destruction, tho bursting, smashing power of the heavier British projectile is decidedly greater, and—this is the great thing—our shooting is at least as good as theirs. (Laughter.) The Navy, while always working very hard—no one except themselves knows how hard they have worked in. these years — (cheers) —have credited the Germans with' a sort of super-efficiency in gunnery, and we have always been prepared for some surprises in their system of control end accuracy of fire. But there is a feeling, after the combat of January 24, that perhaps our naval officers were too diffident in regard to their oiva professional skill in gunnery. Than the guns. While the Germans v.'jie huilding 11-in'M guns we built 12-inch and 13j-inch guns. Before tlioy advanced to the 12-inch gun we had large numbers of ships armed with the 13.5. It was said by the opposite school of naval thought that a smaller gun fires faster and has a fcigher velocity, and therefore greater destructive power and Krupp is the master gun-maker in the world, and it was very right and proper to take such possibilities into consideration. Everything that wo have learnt, however, so that shows that we need liot at all doubt the wisdom of our policy or the excellence of our material. Tho 13.5inch gun is unequalled by any weapon yet brought on the sea. Now wo liavo tho 15-inch gun, witli which the five Queen Elizabeths and the five Royal Sovereigns aro all armed, coming into line, and this gun in quality equals the | 13.5-inch gun aud is vastly more powerful and destructive. The Navy "Sound as a Bell." . There is another remarkable feature ipi flfitjflA ts.wfccfe I (should like to,
draw attention—che steaming of our ships. All the vessels engaged in this action exceeded all their previous records without exception. I wonder if the Houso and tho public appreciate what that means. Hero is a squadron of the Fleet, which does not live in harbour, but is far away from its dockyards, and which, during six months of war, has been constantly at sea. All of a sudden tho greatest trial is demanded of their engines, and they all excel all previous peace time records. (Cheers.) Can you conceive a more remarkable proof of the excellence of British machinery, of tho glorious industry of the engine-room branch — (cheers) —or of tho admirable system of repairs and refits by which the Grand Fleet is maintained from month to month, and can, if need be, be maintained from .ear to year in a state of ceaseless vigilance without exhaustion. Take the case of the Kent ut the I-'alk-lands. The Kent is an old vessel. She was launched thirteen years ago, and has been running evar iiuce. The Kent was designed to go 23} knots, and she had to catch a ship which weo; considerably over knots. They out a pressure and a strain on tho 'engines I much greater than is allowed in time of peace, and they drove tho Kent 25 knots and caught the Nurnburg and sank her. It is my duty in this House to speak for the Navy, and the truth is that it is sound as a bell all through. (Cheers.) I do not care where or how it may be tested; it will be found good, and fit, and Keen, and honest. It will be found to I e the product of . tKod management and organisation, of sound principle in design and strategy, of sterling workmen and faithful work-' manship, careful clerks and accountants and skilful engineers, and painstaking officers and hardy tars. (Cheers.) The great merit of • Admifal Sir David Beatty's action is that it shows to us' and to the world that there is at present no reason to assume that, ship for ship, and gun for gun, and man for man, we cannot give a very good account of. ourselves. (Cheers ) It shows that at five to four representative ships (becalm the quality of the ships on either Bide is a very fair representation of the relative qualities of tho lines of battle), tho Germans did not think it prudent to engage, that t&ey accepted without doubt or hesitation their inferiority, that they thought only of flight, as our men thought only of pursuit, and that they, were wise in the view they took, for if they had taken any other view they would unquestionably have been destroyed. (Cheers.) That is the cruel fact, which no falsehood—and many have been issued—no endeavour to sink by official communiques vessels they could not stay to sink in war could have obscured. When, if ever, our great Fleet sets out for a general battle, we shall hope to bring into the line a preponderance, not only in quality, but iu numbers, which will not be five to four, but will be something considerably greater than that. Therefore, we may consider this extra margin as an additional insurance against unexpected losses by mine and submarine, such as may at any moment occur in the preliminaries of a great sea battle. It is for these importmt reasons of test and trial that we must regard this action of tho Dogger Bank as an important, and, I think I may say,' satisfactory ovent. Losses of the: Navy. The losses of the Navy, though' small compared to the sacrifices of the Army, have been heavy. • We have lost, mainly by submarines, the lives of 5500 officers and men,"and we have killed, mainly by gunfire, an equal number, which is, of course, a. much larger proportion of the German forces engaged. We have also taken in sea fighting 82 officers and 934 men prisoners of war. No British naval prisoners of war have been taken in fighting at sea by the Germans. (Cheers.) When they hod the inclination they had not the opportunity, and when they had the opportunity they had not the inclination. (Cheers and laughter.) For the loss of these British lives we have lived through six months of this war safelyand even prosperously. We have established for the time being a command of the sea such as we. had never expected, such as we had never known and our ancestors had never known at any other period of our history. These are those—they are not a very numerous class—who, shutting their eyes to all that had been gained, look only at that which has been lost and. seek to dwell unduly upon it. .We are urged to hold a court-martial in every case where a ship is lost in action, and to hear the talk in some quarters one would suppose that the loss of a ship by mines or submarines necessarily involved a criminal offence.
Mr. Austen Chamberlain: No,- no. Mr. Churchill: Not in the quarters which tho right honourable gentleman frequents, perhaps. One would suppose that it involves a criminal offence for which somebody should be brought to book. The Admiralty have lately given careful consideration to this question. No doubt the precedents, both in peace and war, favour though they do not enjoin the holding of a court-martial when ships are lost or captured. Tho circumstances and conditions of modern naval ■warfare differ entirely from all previous experiences. When a clear case of misconduct or failure in duty can be presumed, a court-martial may be necessary. When technical or special matters are raised which it is desirable to elucidate with a view to precautions being taken to prevent a similar accident in the future Courts of Inquiry have been and will be assembled, but in all these matters I must respectfully claim, on behalf of the Board of Admiralty, an absolute discretionary power with regard to holding courts-martial or Courts of Inquiry .or the removal without trial of officers who have forfeited the confidence of the board, or the publication of particular information on particular incidents. No Playing for Safety. I ask the House on behalf of the board for their confidence and support during the war in this respect. I would especially deprecate anything being done which tends to make officers, whether afloat or at tho Admiralty, play for safety and avoid responsibility for positive action. (Cheers.) Losses have to be incurred in war, and mistakes will certainly be made from time to time. Our Navy keeps tlie sea, our ships are in consant movement, valuable ships run risks every day. The enemy is continually endeavouring to strike, and from time to time accidents are inevitable. How do you suppose the battle cruiser squadron of Sir David Beatty was where it was when the action of January 24 took place? How many times is it supposed that the squadrons of the Grand Fleet, the cruiser and battle squadrons, have been patrolling and steaming through the North Sea, alwayß exposed to risk by mine and torpedo, before at last they reaped their reward ? If any mood or tendency of public opinion arises or is fostered by the newspapers or given countenance to in this House which makes too much of losses, even if they, aro cruel losses, aud even if it may be said that they are in some respects avoidable losses, then I say you will have started on the path which, pressed to its logical conclusion, would leavo our' Navy cowering in its harbours instead of ruling the seas. When I think <)? the great scale of our operations, tho enormous target we expose, tho numbers of ships whose movements have to bo arranged for, of tho novel conditions to which I have referred, it is marvellous how few have been our lossos; and tho great care and vigilance exercised by tho Admirals afloat and by tho Admiralty Staff will certainly be regarded by those who study this war in history as praiseworthy in the highest degree. (Cheers.) Piracy and Murder an the High Seas. The tasks which lie before us aro anxiou.s and grave, We'are, it how >Djasai'J»A tq be t&g pjikst. of a kia&ii.
warfare which has never before been practised by a civilised State. The scuttling and sinking at sight, -without search or parley, of merchant ships by submarine agency is a wholly novel and unprecedented departure. It is a state of things which no one had ever contemplated before this war, and it would have been universally reprobated and repudiated before tho war. (Hear, hear.) But it must not be supposed because the attack is extraordinary that a good defence and a good reply cannot be made. (Cheers.) _ The statutes of ancient Rome contained no provision for the punishment of parricides, but when the first offender appeared it was found that satisfactory arrangements could be made to deal with him. (Qheers and laughter.) Losses no doubt will be incurred—of that I*givo full warning— but we believe that no vital injury can be done.' If our traders put to sea regularly and act in tho spirit of the gallant captain of the merchant ship Laertes, whose well-merited honour has been made public this morning, and if they take the precautions which are proper and legitimate, we expect that the losses will be confined within manageable limits, even at the outset, when the enemy must be expected to make his greatest effort to produce an impression. All losses can, of course, be covered by the resort on the part of shipowners to the Government insurance scheme, tho rates of which are now one-fifth of what they, were at tho outbreak of war.
Tha British Reply, On the other hand, the reply which we shall make will not, perhaps, be wholly ineffective. (Cheers.) Germany cannot be allowed to adopt a system of open piracy and murder, or what has always hitherto been called open piracy and murder, on the high seas, while remaining herself protected by the bulwark of international instruments which she has utterly repudiated and defied, but which we, much to our detriment, have respected. There are good reasons for believing that the economic which the Navy exerts is beginning to be felt in Germany. .We have to some extent restricted their imports of useful commodities like, copper, petrol, rubber, nickel, manganese, antimony, and the like, which are needed for the efficient production of war materials and for carrying on modern war on a great scale. The tone of the German Chancellor's recent remarks, and the evidences of hatred and anger against this country which are so apparent in the German Press encpurage us to believe that this restriction is proving inconvenient. We shall, of course,, icdouble our efforts to make it so. So far, however, we have not attempted to stop imports of food into Germany. We have not prevented neutral ships from trading direct with German ports. We have allowed German exports in neutral ships to pass unchallenged. The time has oome when the enjoyment of these immunities by a State which as a matter of deliberate policy places herself outside all international obligations, must be reconsidered. (Loud oheers.) Further declarations on the part of the Allied Governments will promptly be made which' will have the effect for the first time of applying the full force of naval pressure, to the enemy. (Cheers.) I thank _ the House'for the attention with which 'they liaye listened to me. The stress' and strain of this war aro not imperceptible to those who are called upon to bear a part in the responsibility for <Jie direction of the tremendous and terrible events which are now taking place. They have a right to the generous and indulgent judgment and support of their fellow countrymen and to the goodwill of the House of Commons. (Cheers.) We cannot tell what lies before us, or how 6con or in what way the next great developments of tie struggle will declare themselves, or what the state'of Europe or the world will be at its close. But this, I think, we can already say. so far as the British Navy is concerned: that although, rid doubt, new dangers and perplexities will oome upon us cbntimially and anxiety will make its abode in our dwellings, yet the dangers and anxieties which now are advancing upon ub will not be more serious or more embarrassing than those through which we have successfully made our way—(cheers)— for in the months to come the British Navy and the sea power which it exerts will increasingly dominate the general situation, will be tho main and unfailing reserve of the Allied nations, will progressively paralyse the fighting energies of our antagonists, and "could, if need be, even in default of all other favourable causes, ultimately by itself decide the issue of this war.' (Cheers.)
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Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2428, 6 April 1915, Page 9
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5,819MR. CHURCHILL'S GREAT SPEECH Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2428, 6 April 1915, Page 9
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