THE ALLIES' TASK

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2380, 9 February 1915, Page 6

THE ALLIES' TASK

GERMANY TRAINING FOUR MILLIONS OF MEN GREAT EFFORT COMING We reprint below the salient passages from a remarkable article by the London "Times" Military Correspondent which appeared in the "Times" of December 23: — Information recently to hand points to a fresh development j>f German military power. It is apparently the intention. since the trained armies have failed to provoke a decision, to call up the whole manhood of tho country, to set every available industry at work upon tho manufacture of arms, ammunition, and equipments, and to prepare in tho Spring to crush the Allied armies or to perish in the attempt. The ■ situation is brielly as follows. Tho German Kerntruppe—namely, the Active Army and its youngest reserves on whom the highest German hopes were set —failed in its mission. The remainder of the trained reservists came up into line in the form of drafts, and of Reserve, Landwehr, aud Laudsturm formations. Germany was saved from invasion, but thoro was still no decision, and the armies of the Allies were still unbroken aud defiant. There remained nothing but to fall back upon untrainod men, and this apparently is what Germany is doing, and what we should do in her place. Trained Men Used Up,

The moment has come whan we may well review the recruiting resources of Germany, so that wo may harbour no illusions concerning the formidable nature of the task before the Allies. Germany began the . war with 872,000 all ranks of the peace establishment, with 1,180,000 men of the Reserve, 970,000 Landwehr of the Ist Ban, 1,000,000 Landwehr of the 2nd Ban or men up to 39 years of age, and with 875,000 Landstrum of the 2nd Ban—namely, men between 39} and 45 years of age. 'These were all fully trained men, and the total in round numbers came up to 4,900,000 men. Germany has, approximately, 2,000,000 men in lino in the west and 1,000,000 m the east, excluding communication troops. Her losses cannot be estimated with precision, but, excluding slightly wounded who havo returned to the colours, they are certainly not less than 1,000,000 men. . . . There is good reason to suppose that the supply of fully trained men is practically used up, in the sense that there are but few more left for drafting. In order to find future drafts, and to increase the numbers and the larger units at the front, it is necessary for Germany to make a heavy call upon the people. It has been the practice in Germany for many years to allow young men liable' for • service to postpone their entry into the Army from the- age of 20 to 21 of 22, and in some cases even to a higher age The last year for which the writer has complete German recruiting statistics is 1911. In that year there were 563,000 youths of 20 examined for tho first time, 368,000 youths of 21 adjourned from the previous year, 289,000 adjourned from the year 1909, and 51,000 over the age of 22. This gave about 1,271,000 youths liable to service, r-nd the situation m 1914, when war begau must have been not very different. This is the first source upon which the German raditary administration will naturally draw.

The First Reserves. The measure of what Germany can do to increase her numbers by the incorporation of hitherto untrained men is mainly the measure of the numbers classed in the Ersatz Reserve and the Ist Ban of the Landsturm over a series of past years. For how many years must be reckon back ? At first the plan was to call , out only men aged from twonty to thirty-eight, but the ' Handelsblad" announced last Saturday that men born between 1889 and 18/3 had also been called up, and wo have consequently to reckon that all the untrained Ersatz and Ist Ban Landsturm men have joined or are joining the depots or centres of new formations. As we must. hark back to men born in 1889, the first year that concerns us i 3 1889, when the 1869 children reached the age of twenty. In that year there were 102,000 classed in the Ersatz and 110,000 in the Ist Ban of the Landsturm. All the figures are available tor subsequent years, and they average about 170,000 a year for the two categories in question' from 1889 to the present date. Twenty-five contingents of 170,000 men give 4,250,000 men, less waste, which may bo set down at oU per cent. . As, however, the recruits classed in these two categories are not the best of the yearly contingent but the worst, we shall probably be well justified in reckoning the available strength from this courco at under 3,000,000 men. This is the second and most important source, which is novr being used. n There is, lastly,. the yonth of Germany to be borne in mind. We nrust calculate that- at "least 1,000,000 youths under twenty will be employed in the war. Tliis is the third and last sourw on which Germany depends. There is Thus we must reckon that Germany harf at her disposal, first, the 1914 contmeent and recruiting reserve, approximately 1,000,000; secondly, the Ersatz men and Ist .Ban Landstnrm, 3 000,000; and, thirdly, the youths under twenty, say, 1,000,000: Considering, however, that some independent Ersate formations have been placed m the field; that many youths are already serving as volunteers; that quite a number from the Landsturm Ist Ba,n have marched with the older trained men ot the 2nd Ban; and, filially, that many men are abroad and have been unable to return, we must place the total number of untrained men, who are now; in nfocess of incorporation- and training, in the region of 4,000,000 or thereabouts. It is not safe to put the figure down at anything,less. . These 4.000,000 new men were entirely untrained until the fir6t of them were called up. They are inferior to the German serving troops in physique and constitution, and many of them are old as warfare goes nowadays. On the other hand, the military spirit of Germany will overcome many difficulties, and as the Germans have recently given Austria a million rifles for her Landsturm there must be no lack or small ann 6. Krupp and Ehrhardt no longer possess the monopoly of warlike material. Every metallurgic industry is hard at vtork. j Wo must anticipate that a great number of these new men will be used as drafts, but- it is aleo probable, if not certain, that an endeavour will soon bo made to create fresh army the stamp of the 22nd to 28th. Corps, which have already figured at the lront, and that Germany intends in the early , sDrin" to make her final and most- violent effort for victory. In these circumstances it would be well for representatives of the Entente Powers to meet and discuss the situation. Wo have no reason to fear a war of masses, because the population of the Allies is double that of the enemy, their resources much greater, mid their spirit ] at least equal. But victory w the held does not necessarily nnso on account ot the possession of masses of men or monev. It depends upon a proper political direction of the war, iijwii the timely arrangement of appropriate military measures, and upon the concerted action of all parts of. the Allied I'orces in a resolute and devastating, ollensivc. We have on the whole, especially in +!ie West checked the German oflensive, and"are subjecting Germany lo a great j drain. But to end the war on our terms much more is needed, and it, will not be until the Allies penetrate deeply into Gorman territory that Germans will think of pew- ►