TURKEY.S ROAD TO RUIN

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2360, 16 January 1915, Page 6

TURKEY.S ROAD TO RUIN

Since becoming an appendage to the German military machine the Uttoman Empire has developed a fatal facility for doing the wrong thing on every possible occasion, t , oxample is the invasion of Persia, an enterprise chiefly interesting as a wanton aggression upon a neighbouring Mohammedan nation. Apart from the fact that lurkey had no just cause of quarrel with Persia, her unprincipled invasion of a Mohammedan State will assuredly be the final destruction of her pretensions to be conducting a Hmy War" in the name of Islam. Whatever else it may afford a pretext for, the "Holy War" plea can scarcely be expected to justify a wanton attack upon unoffending brothers in the faith which the Turks profess. Tho London Times, commenting on the occupation of' Tabriz, remarks that it does not appear to have been a formal military operation, but was evidently the work of Turkish irregulars. It is quite possible that some such excuse may bo put forward by tho Porte in extenuation both of the occupation of Tabriz and of_ the fearful massacre of Christians in Armenia, of which its soldiers have_ been guilty. The Ottoman Power is not more confirmed in the habit of doing outrageous things than it is prolifio in impossible excuses for deeds and acts that cannot by any possibility be excused. The truth is that the Turkish invasion of Persia, though it may .fairly be described as "a curious and unexampled ' development," is not really out of keeping with the strangely tortuous courso which Turkoy seems fated to pursue. It was a foolish thing as well as an outrageous thing for a nation ostensibly conducting a "Holy War" to make an unprovoked attack upon a Mohammedan neighbour, but it was hardly more outrageous and foolish than the attack on Russia, which committed Turkey to the war. No • reasonably organised and governed nation standing in Turkey's position would have been guilty of either of these acts of insane folly, and it is precisely because Turkey is hopelessly disorganised that she has been guilty of national crimes for which the punishment will probably be her final expulsion from Europe. The Ottoman troops, organised on tho Gorman model, are admittedly fighting well and bravely in Trans-Uan-casia and elsewhere, but the valour of her soldiers cannot save Turkey from her fate; it is more than neutralised by tho divided counsels and incompetency of'her rulers and their utter failure to work in harmony for the consolidation of the Ottoman Empire. Authorities who have' set themselves to elucidate and explain tho mystifying adventures which have landed Turkey in the position of a belligerent with hopelessly bad prospects seem to be 'generally agreed that Enver Bey 'must bo regarded as the evil genius of his country, and the man above all others who responsible for bringing it under that German tutelage which is now proving its bane. There can' bo little doubt that in the critical days before Turkey entered the war, the Sultan (Mahmoud V) was strongly in favour of a pacific policy and a strict maintenance of neutrality. To that end he sought to terminate tho dictatorship of Enver Bey as Minister of War, and elevate the heir to tho throne to that office in his stead. The outcome was a series of palace revolutions, in which Enver Bey so far prevailed tHa" he ultimately succeeded in handing his country over, bound hand and foot, to the Germans, to whom he himself now plays the part of puppet. For a time there was a fluctuating contest between tho opposing palace cliques, which found outward expression in acts of military aggression, alternating with vague apologies. In the end tho Young Turk and pro-German party led by Enver Bey prevailed, but only as a successful band of conspirators who have contrived to override the legitimate but incompetent rulers of a hopelessly demoralised and disunited nation. Enver Bey and his associates, it must be conceded, have sought to impart a flavour of patriotism to their usurpation by setting up as an ostensible object the recovery of the territories which Turkey has lost in previous wars. Such, ambitions are so obviously impracticable, however, that they hardly merit serious consideration. It is perfectly clear that Turkey's last chance was to content herself with the territories still left to her in Europe, and approach with determination the task of consolidating her loose-strung and unstable Em- 1 pirc. Their failure to recognise 1 that this was the only activity opon to Turkish patriots stamps Enver Buy and his associates as a set of sehcniera looking (,nly to their own aggrandisement, and setting much 1 greater store by German patronage than by any patriotic inspiration. The depth to which Enver Bey has now sunk If strikingly illustrated in i the I'ejiort that he ordered the eseßu> ■

tion of a number of Turkish officers at Erzerum for expressing disrespect to Germany. His flatterers have often pictured the Young Turk leader as a man of Napoleonic power, but late events, the executions at Erzerum among the number, suggest that he is merely a pliant schemer with whom duty and allegiance to his own country are completely subordinated to a desire to please his German; taskmasters. Dominated, but not led, by men of this type, the unhappy Ottoman Empire must be expected to pursue a wild and devious course in its career to destruction, and the wanton invasion of Bersia is but one of a scries of follies' which make that destruction inevitable.